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Men in the Picture 
 
This study explores the diverse representations of Egyptian men and 
masculinities in commercial Egyptian cinema. Through a critical 
analysis of images of men, the research uncovers general assumptions 
about men and what is deemed masculine. It analyzes different 
masculine performances as they are brought by different actors. A star 
analysis forms an integral part of this study as stars constitute an 
essential element in the construction of meaning and of gender 
identities. Through an analysis of female masculinities, the study 
furthermore disentangles masculinity from biological men. This 
research is interdisciplinary, engaging with postcolonial, film and 
gender theories, while exploring a new angle to a starting field of 
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The transliteration of titles and names in the text is based on the 
transliteration used in the International Journal of Middle East Studies. 
I have opted not to transliterate the initial hamza (or the initial qāf 
when it is pronounced as hamza), nor do I use diacritics in the text 
when referring to names, place names, titles of books or films (with 
the exception of ‘ayn and hamza in the middle of a word). In the 
bibliography I did use diacritics. Whenever an English translation 
exists or when an Arabic word is common (e.g. mufti), I will use this 
term instead of a proper transliteration. Titles of films are only 
transliterated the first time they are mentioned (or if the title 
reappears in another chapter) followed by their English translation. 
Afterwards I only use the English translation of the title. When 
referencing to film titles for the first time, I include the name of the 
director together with the year in which the film was first screened. 
For certain names or words I have opted to use an Egyptian 
pronunciation when transliterating, for example Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, 
to indicate the Egyptian pronunciation of the Arabic letter jīm as the 
English ‘g’ as in ‘garden’. Other examples are the transliteration of 
vowels in titles, since Egyptian does not use diphthongs like aw or ay, 
but rather pronounces them as a long ‘o’ or ‘e’ (as in the English ‘more’ 
and the French ‘café’). Notable exceptions to the transliteration system 
are the names of the famous directors Youssef Chahine and Henry 
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Before I started with this research back in 2010 I was pondering one 
question over and over again in my mind: why is it that whenever 
Western media talk about ‘immigrants’ and more specifically about 
‘Muslims’, they have a tendency to write about young Muslim men in 
terms of a ‘problem’? Back in 2009, Belgium (and its neighboring 
countries) was battered with talk about integration, Islam in Europe, 
the problem that Muslims (read: young, unemployed immigrant men) 
posed. I wondered in how far these discourses were influenced by class 
differences and a white middle class angst of losing their hegemony 
defining what a ‘real’ Flemish identity is. One such example of a white 
middle class woman in fear presented itself to me during an Italian 
language course I took back in 2006. It was about foreigners in Belgium 
and what we thought about integration and whether foreigners 
‘should learn our language’? It should be noted that Belgium has three 
official languages; which one is ‘ours’ anyway? It was clear from the 
group (all white and Flemish) which language we were talking about. 
The woman – a middle-aged lawyer working in Brussels – stated that 
she was appalled and, frankly, a bit scared when walking down one of 
Brussels’ main commercial thoroughfares ‘to hear all those different 
languages’. I personally could not withhold myself from commenting 
and said this remark was outright racist. 
I was still young back then, and now I realize that this woman’s 
remark – although I still believe it is racist – is actually not so out-of-
place as I thought it was. Looking at Belgian news from a distance, with 
their frequent reports of the violence inflicted on Belgian citizens, the 
woman’s attitude towards foreigners was not at all that strange and 
seemed to be informed by a prejudiced mediated image of the 
‘problematic immigrant male’. This idea was reconfirmed to me when 
in 2012 a graduate student from the art academy in Brussels made a 
short film from her daily walk between her home and her school, 
through a neighborhood where mostly immigrants live. Her point in 
the film was not to draw attention to problematic foreign men; her 
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interest was to show that – as a young independent woman in Brussels 
– life was not easy as she was constantly harassed by passers-by. The 
media, however, were quick to note the ‘obvious fact’ that most of the 
men catcalling or outright insulting her were foreign. Later, the 
Flemish television (paid for by tax money!) made a documentary with 
two gay men and a hidden camera, walking hand in hand and looking 
for parks and places where they would be sure to find some troubled 
young (Muslim) men. When asked about their experience on a 
talkshow, they stated they felt threatened and frightened at a certain 
point. Without condoning the young men’s insults and attitude 
towards a gay couple (or the young woman in the earlier film), I do not 
believe these men’s film made any other point but to stigmatize the 
immigrant community and specifically young Muslim men. 
The point was clear and the stereotype of the young Arab male 
reaffirmed as misogynist and homophobic men, not at all integrated 
into our democratic Western culture. For me, however, these media 
reactions to the first film point at one thing only: their ability to 
construct an image of marginalized men as problematic in order to 
reaffirm the hegemony of the middle class white heterosexual male, 
cultured and understanding towards both women and gays. But it also 
shows something else, a deeper, underlying problem in our Western 
culture. Why do these young men feel marginalized in the first place? 
Why do they ‘hate’ women or gays? I started wondering what could be 
the reason behind their performance of their ‘immigrant’ identity. 
When considering their general absence in popular television serials – 
apart from the occasional ‘good’ Moroccan or Turk who barely shows 
any cultural markers – I slowly started to understand these young 
men’s perceived need to identify themselves with a constructed 
‘immigrant’ identity that makes them special in their own way and 
creates respect among their own community. Is it so strange for young 
adolescent men to look for their own identity, to construct their 
personal selves in a society that anyway seems to favor individualism 
and encourages a man to take care of himself and others around him? 
But then another question popped up: why women and gay men? 
Why do these marginalized (and often young) men supposedly target 
women and gay men? On the one hand, the media suggested that in 
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‘our’ culture, we respect women and gay men. On the other hand, this 
suggestion means that ‘our’ culture considers both women and gay 
men to be ‘different’, as an ‘Other’ to the white, middle class, 
heterosexual male as norm. If that is the norm, and these marginalized 
men are unable to attain that due to their race and class, it seems that 
their way to assert a stronger identity and create respect among their 
peers, is to hit on those groups they perceive as either subordinated or 
more marginalized than they themselves are. Although these are 
strong assumptions, and perhaps I should not make them without 
studying the effects of mediated messages, of a racially biased legal 
system, or a deeply racist society, I felt encouraged and noticed the 
dire need to study representations of Arab men and masculinities. 
More specifically, I chose to focus on representations of Egyptian men 
and masculine performances on the white screen, on how Egyptians 
portrayed themselves. At first, I intended to focus on marginalized 
men only – considering my initial interest in these power structures as 
I noticed them in Belgian media and society. However, I noticed the 
general absence of research on Arab men and masculinities and 
decided to include a wider range of films and masculinities. 
The main question I started with was rather negative: Why are Arab 
men (and from now on, I will solely focus on Egyptians) portrayed and 
described in terms of a ‘problem’? My supervisor correctly warned me 
to watch out for too much negativity, so I changed direction towards 
‘how’ men are depicted. During a film class I was teaching, one of my 
students pointed out to me, after watching for the first time popular 
Egyptian films, that there was never a ‘real man’ in the films. They 
were always somehow restricted, either idiotic brutes, or powerless, 
yet well-behaved and educated men. Perhaps this was due to my 
particular interest in masculinity and the choice of films I offered to 
them. Yet, apart from a few films with heroic men (based on Arab 
history and folklore), this perception indeed appeared to be correct. So 
what is it about Egyptian men and a masculine performance on screen? 
Is Egyptian masculinity in crisis? Are Egyptian men lacking 
representations of positive ideals? Is the cinema industry portraying a 
perceived ideal through ridiculing its adversaries? Is the industry 
occupied with a bourgeois ideal, ‘educating’ the nation’s citizens (Abu-
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Lughod 2005: 81)? All these questions, and many more, will be handled 
throughout this research. 
Throughout its long history (the first Egyptian feature film was 
produced in 1923), Egyptian cinema has produced many different male 
types, idealized men such as national heroes and independence-
fighters, warriors and soldiers. Actors like Ahmad Mazhar, ‘Umar al-
Sharif, Salah Dhu al-Fiqar, and Farid Shawqi all played at some point in 
their careers a heroic Arab and/or Egyptian male. Also romantic 
singers and poets, idealized through their ‘good’ nature and wit were 
at the forefront of early Egyptian films. The most famous ones are the 
singers Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab and, later, Farid al-Atrash, who 
both (‘Abd al-Wahhab significantly less) made musicals in which they 
starred and performed their romantic male type. The comedians and 
fools, led by Bishara Wakim and Nagib al-Rihani in the earliest films, 
later joined by Isma‘il Yasin and ‘Abd al-Mon‘im Ibrahim, were mostly 
playing antiheroes, yet lovable good guys. The latter two were also not 
afraid to cross-dress in some of their films; their comedic star personas 
allowed to transgress gender norms and to play with 
heteronormativity as their virile antagonists fall in love with them. 
The attentive reader will notice that this research on masculine 
performances does not include the ‘most masculine’ actor in Egyptian 
cinema’s history, Rushdi Abaza. Nor does it include the ‘don Juan’ 
Ahmad Ramzi, or many other famous actors. I am aware of their 
absence, and in the following chapters I will explain why and how the 
choices were made. Although Rushdi Abaza is by many viewers (many 
of them middle-aged women) in the Arab world considered one of the 
most virile men, he is not the only one who is not discussed. There are 
many reasons to include him, but so are there many reasons to include 
others. This research is not a list of masculine versus non-masculine 
actors and performances, but focuses on the politics of the image and 
the creation of hegemonic ideals of masculinity – no matter who 
impersonates them. Nevertheless, I cannot completely ignore the star 
behind the masculine performance, since (s)he has a large following 
among the audience and creates certain expectations and affects 
audience responses. For example, casting the self-confident and 
imposing Ahmad Mazhar as Saladin, the liberator of Palestine and 
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Jerusalem in the 12th century, in Youssef Chahine’s epic historical 
drama al-Nasir Salah al-Din/Saladin the Victorious (1963) is convincing 
and reassuring. Casting Rushdi Abaza’s muscular and virile star 
persona in a role in which he is ridiculed by his twelve previous wives 
in Fatin ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s comedy al-Zoga Talattashar/The Thirteenth 
Wife (1962) assists in the film’s comical effects and reminds the viewer 
of the transience of such an easily shattered macho façade. But this 
film was also about educating the Egyptian male into a proper citizen, 
and thus raises questions on class and gender and the portrayed ‘ideal’ 
of an Egyptian identity. 
The 1950s and 60s were riddled with ideal images of men and 
women, all in favor of constructing a national Egyptian identity, each 
assisting in his or her own way in building the modern nation. The war 
of ’67 shattered this idealized imagery and the male and female ideals 
were no longer at the center of the films. The 70s saw the emergence 
of films that were critical of the Nasirist vision for a modern Egypt. 
The 80s and 90s, then, allowed for greater diversity in depictions of 
men and women and their respective roles. With actors and actresses 
like Nur al-Sharif, ‘Izzat al-‘Alayli, ‘Adil Imam, Ahmad Zaki, Su‘ad 
Husni and Mirvat Amin the images of ideal men and women were not 
only questioned, they were also unattainable or undesirable. The era of 
the underdog male (and female) had begun. By the end of the 90s and 
the early 2000s, young, new actors contributed to more diversity in the 
portrayal of masculine identities. Not only misery and underdogs, but 
also young, educated professionals were depicted; they were men in 
touch with their feminine side and respectful towards women. Khalid 
Abu al-Naga is the poster-boy of this ‘new’ masculinity. But the 2000s 
signal also a return to patriarchal masculinity, a domineering and old-
fashioned masculinity, sometimes veiled by a ‘modern’ lifestyle and 
fashionable clothes. Some of these paternalist actors and new 
patriarchs will be discussed throughout this research. 
The attentive reader will also notice something else throughout the 
analysis. I focus on the power relations that exist and are implemented 
between the different masculine types and how male hegemony is 
always at some point recreated and reinstated. These power relations 
point at a leitmotif in this research. Although I am not analyzing 
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specific actors’ careers, there seems to be a recognizable narrative 
pattern in the execution of power by older men/women over others, 
mainly younger and lower classes. There is always something 
rebellious about younger actors and actresses, a rebelliousness that 
seems to lose its fervor as they grow older. When actors and actresses 
grow older, their roles and performances on the screen change 
accordingly. That is why we can see the lower class criminal and tough 
guy Farid Shawqi in the 50s and early 60s perform a father-figure in 
the 70s through 90s. Even Nur al-Sharif, the underdog male of the late 
70s through early 90s, turned into a patriarch in his later career. These 
are but broad generalizations, yet the pattern of an older, patriarchal 
father- or matriarchal mother-figure is a recurring motif in many 
Egyptian films. Sometimes oppressive, sometimes imbibed with 
knowledge, these patriarchs and matriarchs are representative of the 
young women’s and men’s burden. 
 
This research is divided into two main parts. In the first part I start 
with a short historical overview of the recent history of Egypt, with a 
special focus on the developments in the creation of a national film 
industry in the country. Then I will give an overview of the different 
studies about masculinity, men and film in the Arab world. This 
literature overview is extensive but not inclusive, highlighting only 
the major studies that I have found of interest as a general framework 
for the analysis of masculine performances in Egyptian cinema. The 
next two chapters outline first the theoretical framework for 
analyzing masculinities and performances in film, and second the 
methodology for choosing the films and analyzing representations of 
men and masculinities. In the second part, I have included four 
chapters on the representations of male masculinities in four major 
eras in Egyptian film history as outlined above. The last chapter 
includes an analysis of the female masculinities that have been present 
in Egyptian cinema since the early beginnings, as well as an analysis of 
films by two of the most famous and popular female directors in the 
country, Inas al-Daghaydi and Nadia Hamza. 
Although this research relies strongly on theories from sociology, 
gender and cultural studies, the main framework is historical. This 
7 
 
research is set up as a historical research that aims to shed light on the 
construction of masculine identities in particular historical times and 
places. The films in no way depict ‘the real’, yet they are grounded in a 
cultural and social context that is very real and tangible. The research 
thus aims to offer insights into the politics behind the representations 
of men and women on the screen and how this influenced the 
construction of gendered identities. Simultaneously, the discursive 
practices that shaped the historical periods in which these films were 
made have also influenced and continue to influence the 








1. An overview of Egypt’s recent history - 1896-2011 
 
In this chapter I will give a short overview of Egypt’s modern history 
and the development of the country’s cinema industry. I will only 
mention those events that are relevant to understanding how things 
have changed in film production and the industry over the course of 
more than a century of cinema in Egypt. As Walter Armbrust (1995: 83) 
has argued, in order to understand commercial (as well as art-house) 
Egyptian cinema both now and from earlier periods, it is necessary to 
have a vast understanding of the history, narratives, and contexts 
within which Egyptian films were and are made. This chapter will only 
serve as a backdrop to the research question, but it is nevertheless 
essential for an understanding of the changing gender 
representations. Gender is not ahistorical, detached from the culture 
and society in which it is represented and in which it has meaning. 
Therefore, I embark here on a hurried trip through Egypt’s film 
history starting with the earliest screenings of films all the way 
through to the onset of the 2011 revolutions and uprisings we are 
witnessing in various Arabic speaking countries at the moment. 
The start of Egypt’s film industry coincided with a period of intense 
cultural, political and social changes in the late 19th century. Egypt 
became a British colony since the defeat of the Egyptian army at Tell 
el-Kebir in 1882. Tarek Osman (2010) argues that because of the British 
occupation, Egypt became a “regional commercial and trading 
destination” (id. 33), resulting in a huge influx of foreign nationals into 
Egypt looking to make some money. The result was that by 1930 there 
were already over 1.5 million immigrants, about 10 percent of the total 
population, mostly in the major urban centers of Cairo and Alexandria. 
Egypt, or at least its urban centers, in the first half of the twentieth 
century had become a cosmopolitan country. At the same time, the 
liberal Wafd-party garnered more and more support for a growing 
Egyptian nationalism. They created awareness of the need to limit the 
powers of the ruling family (the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty had been 
ruling since 1805) and turn Egypt into a parliamentary monarchy. This 
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period is often referred to as the “liberal experiment” (al-Sayyid-
Marsot 1977) which started in 1924 with the election of Sa‘d Zaghlul as 
first prime minister under the new constitution of 1923, the same year 
the first Egyptian feature-length film, Fi Bilad Tut ‘Ankh Amun/In the 
Country of Tutankhamun was made by an Italian national, Victor Rosito. 
 
1.1 The Nahḍa in nineteenth century Egypt and the “liberal 
experiment” 
 
The modernization of Egypt gained momentum in the early nineteenth 
century under Muhammad ‘Ali’s rule. He modernized the nation using 
scientific and military advances made in Europe. Muhammad ‘Ali was a 
fierce leader (infamous for slaughtering the medieval Mamluk rulers). 
During and after his rule, Egypt’s population would expand in no time 
thanks in part to better medical care. One of the goals of his health 
care policy was to drastically lower child deaths. He moreover initiated 
the industrialization of Egypt, which is an important factor for the 
successful establishment of a national film industry in the first part of 
the 20th century. 
The nineteenth century was also known as the period of the Nahḍa 
(Tomiche 1993: 900-3) or cultural, social, intellectual and political 
renewal. Great intellectuals and writers of the late nineteenth, early 
twentieth century are – among others – ‘A’isha al-Taymuriyya, Huda 
Sha‘rawi and Doria Shafiq, Qasim Amin, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 
Taha Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim and many more. I have chosen these 
examples for various reasons, but particularly relating to this research 
on gender and film. ‘A’isha al-Taymuriyya, Huda Sha‘rawi and Doria 
Shafiq are some of the most famous pioneers for women’s rights in 
Egypt. ‘A’isha al-Taymuriyya (1840-1902) was not only a feminist; she 
was also a poet and a writer. As a feminist, she called for “equality 
between men and women […] and inspired the early growth of 
Egyptian feminism” (Goldschmidt 2000: 211). Huda al-Sha‘rawi (1879-
1947) was a central figure in the feminist movement in Egypt. In 1923 
she founded the Egyptian Feminist Union and in 1945 became the 
president of the Arab Feminist Union, thus regionalizing the feminist 
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cause (Badran 1996: 110). She was the first Egyptian woman to publicly 
take off her veil in defiance of patriarchal traditions and male 
domination over women’s freedom of movement. Doria Shafiq (1908-
1975) was predominantly active after World War II. She was also a 
writer, like al-Taymuriyya, and “attempted to unite her aesthetic voice 
with her activist voice in her struggle for liberation” (Nelson 1996: 
xvi). She was the editor of women’s journals and established, like 
Sha‘rawi, her own feminist union: Bint al-Nil Union (‘Daughter of the 
Nile’) in 1948. 
In terms of a redefinition of gender relations, the thinker Qasim 
Amin (1863-1908) – among others – has written important essays 
arguing for the liberation and education of women in Egypt, among 
others Tahrir al-Mar’a (The Liberation of Women) and al-Mar’a al-Jadida 
(The New Woman). His advocacy to abolish the veil provoked heated 
reactions (Ahmed 1992: 145). But Leila Ahmed argues that Amin’s 
assertions about Egyptian women were likely to be based on 
generalizations rather than observation, given the country’s 
segregation at that time (id. 157). Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888-
1956) was a lawyer, writer and politician whose contribution to the 
intellectual discussion was important for the development of modern 
Egyptian literature upon publishing his novel Zaynab in 1913. He 
initially published the novel anonymously, but it was later reprinted 
under his name. Furthermore, this novel was turned into a film in 1930 
and 1952, both directed by Muhammad Karim, one of the pioneers of 
Egyptian cinema. According to Timoche (1993: 901), Zaynab signaled a 
“return to authenticity” in the Nahḍa movement with greater 
emphasis on Egyptian and Arab culture and history. 
No discussion on the modernization of Egyptian society and culture 
can remain without remembering Taha Husayn’s contributions to the 
modern art scene in Egypt. Taha Husayn is famous for his novels and 
stories, but he was also an academic. He was a controversial thinker, 
and lost his post as university professor from the Cairo University for 
political reasons.1 His novels have also contributed greatly to Egyptian 
                                                   
1 His dismissal was related to the publishing of a work questioning the 
authenticity of some of the pre-Islamic poetry traditionally found in the Ka‘ba 
in Mecca, the so-called mu‘allaqāt. 
12 
cinema. Several of them were filmed, particularly after the 1952 coup. 
One of the most famous books that was later turned into a film, is Du‘a’ 
al-Karawan/Call of the Curlew (Henry Barakat 1959) about, among other 
things, the backwardness and need for education to break free from 
the chains of tradition in Egypt’s rural south. The gender relations in 
the film (and novel) are also of interest and reminiscent of modernist 
discourses prevalent in Egypt, particularly the (female) protagonist’s 
transformation from an uneducated peasant girl into an educated 
citizen of a modern Egypt. But also the male in the film, an educated 
upper-class professional, is portrayed as in need of a proper education 
into becoming what is deemed an ideal and modern Egyptian citizen. 
Another important writer – particularly for theater and film – is 
Tawfiq al-Hakim. His plays were controversial and scandalized his 
colleagues in the public prosecutor’s office, forcing him to resign 
(Goldschmidt 2000: 67). His book Yawmiyyat Na’ib fi al-Aryaf/Diary of a 
Prosecutor in the County (1937) was turned into a film in 1969, by 
directors Tawfiq Salih and Khayri Bishara. 
I have given a lot of attention to these modernist writers and their 
advocacy for new roles for women. In her essay Imagining the “New 
Man”, Hoda El Sadda (2007) distinguishes also a new concept of 
masculinity that was advanced in these modernist, nationalist 
writings. These new gender roles and relations will be quintessential 
for the gender roles as presented in a modernist Egyptian cinema – as 
well as other cultural texts of the early 20th century. However, Jacob 
(2007, 2010 and 2011) has shown that the discussions on new types of 
masculinity extended beyond cultural texts, too. The discourse that 
developed in magazines in the early 20th century revolved around the 
colonial subject and a new concept of Egyptian masculinity in the wake 
of nationalist feelings, Jacob claims (2010: 659). But similar questions 
were raised about representations of women and men in films, as Ifdal 
Elsaket (n.d.) has shown in her study about early Egyptian films and 
the depiction of the modern nation. Critics’ reactions to these earliest 
films betrayed a similar concern about a national image for the 
country, as well as a concern about images of men and – particularly – 
women. 
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Although the industrialization of the country in the early 19th 
century took up a higher pace under the rule of Muhammad ‘Ali, it is 
debatable whether the Nahḍa has its direct roots in the French 
expedition at the end of the 18th century, as some historians argue.2 
Muhammad ‘Ali started an active policy of sending Egyptian scholars 
and officers to Europe to receive a modern education and bring this 
knowledge back to Egypt. Combined with a growing sense of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century, particularly after the defeat by 
the British, the Nahḍa was a renaissance movement with a particular 
Arab nationalist touch. Film scholar Malek Khouri (2005) also turns to 
the nineteenth century Nahḍa to explain Arab cinematic modernity. As 
mentioned, this period saw great academic and cultural efforts to first 
and foremost renew classical Arabic language as well as the arts and 
their importance within society. The reappraisal and preservation of 
Arab and Islamic heritage was equally important, which was 
increasingly used in an anticolonial discourse against the Ottoman 
Turkish rulers in the first place. The literary and artistic renewal 
concerned an inherently anticolonial and thus political discourse, as 
Khouri said: “the openness toward and the recognition of the polity of 
the text constituted the essence of Arab modernity” (id. 8, emphasis 
mine). Artistic production was part and parcel of the construction of a 
national identity within the larger project of Egyptian self-rule that 
emerged in the 19th century and continued in the early 20th century. 
Cinema and the moving image were introduced to Arab audiences 
in Egypt at the Toussoun Stock Exchange in Alexandria in January 
1896, during the British occupation. Cinema as a “new textual mode of 
communication” (id. 9) was immediately associated with the concerns 
of modern Arab thinkers and “was largely fashioned via a modernist 
symbiosis that informed and was informed by a budding national 
identity struggling to affirm its heterogeneity and find a new role for 
itself in the continuing fight for national liberation” (id. 9). Modernist 
Arab thinkers emphasized the openness of language and thought and 
were therefore able to incorporate different philosophical, social, 
                                                   
2 Sheehi notes that the French occupation is not the reason, but rather a 
catalyst for a movement that was already well underway in Arab capitals to 
modernize the Arab nation (Sheehi 2004: 4). 
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cultural and political ideas and ideologies in an Egyptian context. After 
British occupation of Egypt started in 1882, and more directly after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the struggle for independence 
was directed towards European nations. As such, the film played an 
important role in Egypt’s struggle for national independence in the 
1920s and became more prominently nationalist after 1952. 
 
1.2 Building a national cinema industry: 1923-1952 
 
The early days of Egyptian cinema production were characterized by 
changing social and political conditions and discourses that predated 
it. The first films shot in Egypt were short documentaries from the 
1910s. By 1923 a foreign resident (Victor Rosito) shot Egypt’s first 
feature film, Fi Bilad Tut ‘Ankh Amun/In the Country of Tutankhamun. The 
German-trained Egyptian Muhammad Bayyumi was the film’s 
cameraman, earning the film a place in Egypt’s national film 
historiography. Four years later, in 1927, the ‘first’ Egyptian film was 
produced, Layla, by the Egyptian actress, director and producer ‘Aziza 
Amir, directed by the Italian-Egyptian Stéphane Rosti. The following 
year3 the Lama-brothers (Lebanese-Argentinians) produced and 
directed Qubla fi al-Sahra’/Kiss in the Desert, with Egyptian actress 
Badriyya Ra’fat and actor Anwar Wagdi. The film turned out to be a 
box office flop because of its stereotypical representations of Egypt, 
undermining the country’s self-image as a modern nation (Elsaket 
n.d.). 
I would like to point out the transnational nature of early Egyptian 
cinema, though, and the high number of women participating in and 
financing film productions. Many ‘foreigners’ (Ibrahim and Badr Lama, 
Asya Daghir, Mary Queeny, Victor Rosito, Fritz Kramp, etc.) but also 
Egyptians (‘Aziza Amir, Fatima Rushdi, Muhammad Bayyumi, Anwar 
                                                   
3 The website www.elcinema.com mentions however that Kiss in the Desert was 
produced and distributed half a year earlier than Layla. Viola Shafik (2007: 18-
9) mentions that Kiss in the Desert was at first not recognized as an Egyptian 
production because of an emerging nationalism in post-1952 film 
historiography and the film’s Palestinian-Argentinian directors and 
producers were not considered ‘Egyptian’. 
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Wagdi, Yusif Wahbi, etc.) were active as producers, directors or 
cameramen in early cinema thanks to the cosmopolitan environment 
in Egypt’s urban centers and the as yet uninstitutionalized nature of 
the earliest productions. The films were made with private investment 
by pioneers who invested their own money in this new venture. Many 
women who would invest their personal savings in their own films 
would not yield a sufficient turnover to produce another film (Shafik 
2007: 191), taking great risks as pioneers of this new art form. 
The 1920s were characterized by silent film productions and a 
growing number of cinemas that were built across the country. The 
first cinema was built in 1906 by the French company Pathé, but major 
investments started to flow in from the 20s onwards. A big change in 
the haphazard investments and the start of an institutionalized 
cinema industry came when Tala‘at Harb – the director of Misr Bank 
and a major industrial investor – built Studio Misr. The studios were 
inaugurated in 1935 and their first production, Widad (Fritz Kramp), 
was released in 1936, with Umm Kulthum playing the lead. The 
importance of Studio Misr was its modern sound recording studio, 
enabling sound to be recorded and edited in Egypt whereas before 
that, sound was recorded in Europe (Shafik 2001: 25). The studio 
moreover sent Egyptian directors and cameramen to Europe to learn 
technical skills related to filmmaking and invited foreign directors to 
come and work in Egypt. Fritz Kramp was one of the studio’s foreign 
employees, while the young and (later to become) famous directors 
Salah Abu Sayf and Ahmad Badrakhan were sent to Italy and France 
respectively to study cinema there. 
Women, who had played major roles in the earliest productions, 
lost significance after the film industry was institutionalized with the 
establishment of Studio Misr and other studios.4 Particularly their 
presence as directors diminished; as such, the industry became mainly 
dominated by men. There are several notable exceptions, like Lebanese 
producers Asya Daghir and her niece Mary Queeny, or ‘Aziza Amir who 
                                                   
4 Not only Studio Misr signaled the start of the consolidation of the film 
industry. Many other studios were already active and continued to produce 
the majority of Egyptian films in the 40s. Studio Misr was one among many, 
and the importance attributed to it is sometimes exaggerated (Armbrust 2002: 
82-3). 
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continued to act and write her own scripts. Asya Daghir remained one 
of the biggest producers in Egypt up until the 1960s through her 
production company, Lotus Films. She produced her first film, Ghadat 
al-Sahra’/Desert Beauty (Widad ‘Urfi 1929), at the age of 28 and 
introduced color film to Egyptian cinema in 1957 with the film Rudd 
Qalbi/Back Alive (‘Izz al-Din Dhu al-Fiqar).5 Asya Daghir produced the 
mega-production al-Nasir Salah al-Din/Saladin the Victorious (Youssef 
Chahine 1963) and her niece, Mary Queeny, was also to become one of 
the major producers in Egypt through her (multiple) production 
companies together with her husband, Ahmad Galal. 
In this period and up to the 1952 coup, Egypt’s studios produced 
over 300 films and, with the introduction of sound, genres and genre 
conventions started to develop. Whereas the first films were historical 
Bedouin-films – in line with a folkloric revival in Egyptian art of the 
time – as of the 1930s, the genres were more diverse, including 
comedies (Salama fi Khayr/Salama is Fine, Niyazi Mustafa 1937) and 
musicals (Unshudat al-Fu’ad/Song of the Heart, Mario Volpi 1932). 
Particularly the comedy became part and parcel of Egypt’s film 
industry, with prominent comedians like Nagib al-Rihani (1889-1949). 
Al-Rihani was a famous theater actor who later started acting in films 
as well. He became particularly famous through his comedic character, 
Kishkish Bey, the headman (‘umda) of a small village. Other famous 
comedy actors of the time are ‘Ali al-Kassar (1887-1957) – who acted 
mainly Nubian characters – and Bishara Wakim (1890-1949). Bishara 
Wakim was the main actor in the first ‘Egyptian’ silent film, Barsum 
Yibhath ‘an Wazifa/Barsoum Is Looking For a Job (Muhammad Karim 1923) 
and as of the late 30s acted in many comedies. 
Early musicals became vehicles for the famous singers Muhammad 
‘Abd al-Wahhab (1897-1991) and Umm Kulthum (1898-1975). ‘Abd al-
Wahhab was an innovator in Egyptian music and expanded the 
traditional Arab orchestra or takht to include Western instruments like 
                                                   
5 Rudd Qalbi/Back Alive was not the actual first Egyptian color film, the first 
was Baba ‘Aris/Daddy Wants a Wife (Husayn Fawzi 1950). This film used a 
different, not very common and complex, French technique called Rouxcolor. 
Back Alive used the cheaper and more practical Eastman Kodak technique. It 
lasted nevertheless until the 1970s before Egyptian cinema would break 
definitely with black and white film and produce only color films. 
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the violin, the bass and the quarter-tone piano. For his first film, al-
Warda al-Bayda’/The White Rose (Muhammad Karim 1932), ‘Abd al-
Wahhab composed the music of the film, which was to become the first 
Egyptian musical. The film was a great hit with audiences, too. Umm 
Kulthum was regularly cast to play young adolescent girls, although 
she was already well in her thirties when she first started acting. Both 
Umm Kulthum and ‘Abd al-Wahhab ended their acting careers in the 
early 40s, making way for comedy actors and -films. The time of the 
romantic musical was over and the commercial fīlm isti‘rāḍī became the 
new popular format, interspersed with belly dancing and songs (Shafik 
1998: 24). ‘Abd al-Wahhab continued to compose songs for popular 
films, while Umm Kulthum became the most famous singer of the 
‘Golden Age’, practically unrivaled until well into the 1960s. 
In 1939 Studio Misr produced one of the first examples of cinematic 
realism, al-‘Azima/Determination (Kamal Salim), whose topics of social 
progress and class conflict were to become central themes in Egyptian 
films.6 Determination is a realist drama about Muhammad (Husayn 
Sidqi) and Fatma (Fatima Rushdi), both from a poor neighborhood 
planning to get married. Muhammad’s only hope is to start a business 
together with his colleague ‘Adli (Anwar Wagdi) from university, the 
son of a rich pasha. The film is critical of the luxurious lifestyle of 
‘Adli, the pasha’s son, in comparison to the poor lives of Muhammad 
and Fatma. Nevertheless, the film’s solution and the couple’s relief 
eventually lies with the rich landowner whose money helps 
Muhammad on his way. In light of the political situation in Egypt at 
the time, it was inconceivable to release a film too critical about class 
                                                   
6 Film critic ‘Ali Abu Shadi (1998) mentions Fritz Kramp’s 1938 film Lashin as 
the country’s first experiments with realism, although it is a historical film 
taking place in the 12th century. Its interest in social inequality and a 
proletarian uprising makes it a film close to the realist aesthetics with its 
political agenda. Ifdal Elsaket, on the other hand, mentions some ‘realist’ 
elements in Muhammad Karim’s Zaynab (1930). Although he used Soviet- and 
German-inspired film techniques, the film’s locations and use of peasants are 
inspired by realist aesthetics. Nevertheless, the film was rife with a class-
conscious depiction of peasants. His use of the aristocratic Bahiga Hafez in the 
role of Zaynab constituted several issues with the ‘uneducated’ peasants 
during the filming (Elsaket n.d.). 
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relations; it would not pass the censorship committee.7 Similar to 
Zaynab (Muhammad Karim 1930; see earlier on Nahḍa and Haykal’s 
novel), and indeed most early Egyptian films, Determination betrayed a 
modernist middle class ideology, arguing for new gender relations and 
depicting an image of Egypt with a progressive future. Lila Abu-Lughod 
called this ‘development realism’ (Abu-Lughod: 2005: 57-61, and 81), 
referring to a large number of popular serials being produced by 
Egyptian state television, purporting to bring an educational message 
to the masses neatly packaged into what she calls ‘state culture’. Abu-
Lughod’s assertions relate to 1980s and 90s television serials, but are 
no less applicable to early Egyptian cinema. 
By the end of the 40s, some directors were taking shy steps into 
nationalist film making, for example the film about nationalist leader 
Mustafa Kamil, Mustafa Kamil (Ahmad Badrakhan 1952). Ahmad 
Badrakhan directed this film prior to the 1952 coup and the censor 
refused to give it a screening license. After the coup in July of that 
year, the film did receive a screening license and was presented to the 
public in December of that year (Gordon 1999: 65). Another pan-Arab 
nationalist film was of ‘Aziza Amir’s hand (as producer), Fatat Min 
Filistin/A Girl From Palestine (Mahmud Dhu al-Fiqar 1948). Set during the 
Palestinian war – which was ongoing – this film tells the love story 
between two heroes, an Egyptian pilot who was shot down and 
stranded in a Palestinian village, and a Palestinian girl whose house 
was a storage room for the Arab resistance’s weapons. The ensuing 
love between the two protagonists symbolizes the pan-Arab ideals the 
film espouses, but also points at Egypt’s cultural and political 
hegemony – or at least how Egypt perceived its cultural and political 
role in the region, a role the country continued to play after the 
abolition of the monarchy. 
 
                                                   
7 This is what happened to Lashin, which was forbidden to screen for over 
eight months because of its premise of a population rising up against a tyrant 
and imposing their own, chosen, leader. Only when the director changed the 
end to a more lenient one, where the tyrant suddenly gains insight and is 
allowed to remain on the throne, the film was allowed to screen. Determination 
avoided a similar fate by allowing the pasha a positive role in the resolution to 
the conflict. 
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1.3 The Free Officers’ revolution and Public Sector 
filmmaking 
 
On the 23rd of July 1952, several young high-ranking officers in the 
Egyptian army took hold of the country in a bloodless coup. During the 
night of 22 and 23 July, the officers seized key positions in Cairo and a 
few days later also in Alexandria. They then forced the king into exile 
and appointed his infant son Ahmad Fu’ad to be the new king of Egypt. 
The rule of the new king did not last long. In 1953 Muhammad Nagib 
became the country’s first president, a year later deposed and followed 
by Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir. The coup followed a period of increased 
instability in Egypt, with many strikes and protests ever since the end 
of the Second World War. This left the Wafd-party in shambles 
(Vatikiotis 1985: 368) enabling the officers to take hold of the country. 
They nevertheless encountered much difficulty in consolidating their 
power. Soon, workers’ protests erupted across the country, specifically 
in textile factories in the Delta.8 The army responded the way it was 
used to responding, with quick military trials and executions of key 
figures. Soon, the coup-leaders started to quell political and social 
dissent against their ‘revolution’. By 1954, the new regime had 
dissolved all opposition parties, including their initial supporters, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and jailed their leaders. 
The new regime initially did not attempt to use cinema extensively 
as a vehicle of propaganda for their politics, perhaps because of their 
lack of a coherent revolutionary ideology (Ginat 1997: 13). More 
generally, political films were simply not that common in the period 
following independence (Armbrust 2011: 230). One of the earlier 
productions is Allah Ma‘ana/God With Us (Ahmad Badrakhan 1955), a 
film that tells the story of the Free Officers’ revolution. The film 
showed Egypt’s first president Muhammad Nagib (1953-54; played by 
Zaki Tulimat) as the leader of the revolution. But when Gamal ‘Abd al-
Nasir took power, the scenario was changed completely and the 
character of Muhammad Nagib was written out of the plot and Zaki 
                                                   
8 Almost sixty years later, the textile workers in the Delta city al-Mahalla al-
Kubra were at the forefront of the different protests against Egypt’s deposed 
president, Husni Mubarak, and the regime in 2006, 2008 and 2011. 
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Tulimat’s name deleted from the credits (Qasim 2012). In the period 
following the revolution, and with the new constitution and 
censorship laws, old taboos (most importantly class relations) were 
now practically free game, although new taboos were quickly put in 
place, specifically about the army and their revolution (Gordon 2002: 
9). 
In the 1960s, ‘Abd al-Nasir turned towards socialism, with more and 
stronger relations with Eastern Europe, particularly after the Soviet 
funding of the High Dam in Aswan and a lucrative arms deal, 
implementing the first five-year plan (Ginat 1997: 13). He started to 
nationalize banks and industries, including the cinema. In 1956 ‘Abd 
al-Nasir nationalized the Suez Canal, leading to the tripartite 
aggression, and he continued to nationalize industries and the media 
in the following years. The era of public sector film production, 
however, did not culminate in a distinct non-commercial cinema 
industry in Egypt, which it had done in other post-colonial regions 
(Shafik 1998: 25). Nevertheless, many films discussing social issues 
were produced (both in public and private productions), within the 
previously mentioned air of ‘development realism’ (Abu-Lughod 2005: 
81). The public sector never produced much more than a quarter of the 
total film production in Egypt and remained relatively small compared 
to the private sector (Shafik 1998: 32). However, the public sector film 
industry did offer opportunities for young and established directors to 
distinguish themselves (Khouri 2010: 55), such as Salah Abu Sayf and 
Tawfiq Salih. 
Apart from stronger public institutions and government, ‘Abd al-
Nasir’s nationalist socialist governing style was characterized by a 
strong anticolonialism and antifeudalism in order to bring about 
‘social justice’ (Abdel-Fadil 1980: 1-2). For ‘Abd al-Nasir, socialism did 
not mean building a classless society, but rather the “dissolution of 
‘class distinctions’, within the Egyptian society” (id.: 2). Abdel-Fadil’s 
pro-Nasirist biases are obvious though, especially when he considers 
‘Abd al-Nasir’s establishment of an economically strong ruling military 
class and of institutions and politics centered on his own persona, 
which essentially undermined the Nasirist project. Nevertheless, 
Egypt’s economic and political relations with “Western” countries 
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improved in the 1960s, with for example half of the wheat supplies to 
Egypt coming from the United States (Abdel-Malek 1968: xviii). Abdel-
Malek concludes that, although there was a strong state presence in 
the economy, the ideology itself cannot simply be defined as socialist 
(id. 365-9). ‘Abd al-Nasir went back and forth between a left and right 
solution, which was reflected in the alternation between a leftist and 
rightist prime minister (Baker 1978: 90). These changes in directions 
furthermore prove Ginat’s earlier point about the military 
revolutionaries’ lack of a clear ideology. It is also proof of the cult 
developing around ‘Abd al-Nasir’s persona, with strong pan-Arab 
nationalism but little social vision for Egypt. In cinema, ‘Abd al-Nasir’s 
personality cult culminated in Youssef Chahine’s heroic portrayal of 
Saladin in his 1963 film, which contained obvious references to Egypt’s 
leader. In 1996, director Muhammad Fadil made the film Nasir 56 with 
Ahmad Zaki in the role of ‘Abd al-Nasir. The former president’s 
personality cult was revived. 
 
1.4 The 1967 defeat and 1973 ‘victory’: What after socialism? 
 
The defeat of 1967 was a major turning point in the history of the 
region, foretelling the decline in popular support for Arab socialism. 
The defeat in the war caused ‘Abd al-Nasir to formally resign from 
office, although he soon returned. After the defeat, student protests 
erupted, calling for a more severe punishment of the culprits of the 
defeat (Vatikiotis 1985: 407). These protests were violently suppressed, 
but ‘Abd al-Nasir would not live long to continue his vision of the 
future. He died in 1970 – his funeral brought about huge gatherings in 
Cairo and all over Egypt – and was succeeded by Anwar al-Sadat. Al-
Sadat inherited a country in debt, especially after the expensive and 
destructive 1967 war, which also resulted in an Israeli occupation of 
the Sinai Desert, thus effectively cutting off Egypt from its oil revenues 
(the main oil fields are in the Sinai Desert) and putting the Suez Canal 
out of order. As such, al-Sadat did not have much other choice but to 
look for other means of investment. 
Al-Sadat quickly tried to change ‘Abd al-Nasir’s economic policy 
and opened up the country more and more towards foreign investors. 
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Within a few years, al-Sadat had started his new economic politics, or 
infitāḥ (translated as open-door-policy), which meant – among other 
things – the re-privatization of businesses, including the cinema 
industry. Privatization in the cinema industry was mostly nominal, 
selling a few theaters across Egypt while the studios and laboratories 
remained public property well into the 90s (Shafik 2001: 30). Opening 
up the country to foreign investment was no easy feat, and eventually 
al-Sadat would fail, because ‘Abd al-Nasir’s Arab socialism had left “a 
constitutional/legal/regulatory structure as inimical to private sector 
activity as any in the communist world” (Henry and Springborg 2001: 
139). There were large investments from Gulf countries – al-Sadat had 
decided to economically approach the more conservative countries in 
the Gulf from where many Egyptians sent back remittances.  
Another difficulty that al-Sadat faced, was overturning the military 
class that had emerged under ‘Abd al-Nasir and had been in charge of 
major political and economic decision-making (Henry and Springborg 
2001: 152). Instead, al-Sadat tried to limit their power and set up a 
more civilian involvement in politics and the economy. Being from the 
army and part of ‘Abd al-Nasir’s inner circle himself, one can question 
his sincere attempts to downscale the military’s occupation of politics 
and economy. Al-Sadat also had to deal with a plethora of social 
problems, such as a growing population, increasing poverty and an 
ever-growing gap between rich and poor. The bread riots of January 
1977 are a good example of the failure of al-Sadat’s liberal economic 
policies and a growing resistance in the country. The direct reason for 
the riots was al-Sadat’s decision to cut subsidies on basic staple goods, 
such as rice and sugar, a decision he took under pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund. During the 1970s there was also an 
increasing Islamist presence in all layers of society – including the 
army. The rising Islamism in society was perceived as a threat, 
particularly after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. In order to 
appease Islamists, al-Sadat would amend the 1971 constitution in 1980 
and include that Islamic shari‘a would be the principal source of 
legislation – a principal also kept in the new 2012 and 2013 
constitutions. However, al-Sadat’s crackdown on Islamists and 
opposition voices across the country and the peace treaty signed with 
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Israel in 1979 further angered the Islamist opposition against his 
policy, accumulating in his assassination in 1981. 
The film industry also began to undergo changes in the 70s. 
Petrodollar-rich Gulf countries invested in the country’s cinema 
industry, resulting in Gulf-market oriented commercial productions, 
or sīnimā al-muqāwalāt (entrepreneur cinema). These films were 
produced for video distribution, mainly in the Gulf, reflecting 
“mediocre production standards, hasty direction […], and the use of 
non-star actors” (Tartoussieh 2011: 221-2). The period of the late 60s 
and early 70s also saw many film makers move to other Arab countries, 
with notable productions like Dhi’ab La Ta’kul al-Lahm/Wolves Don’t Eat 
Meat (Samir Khuri 1973), a joint Egyptian-Lebanese production which 
was entirely shot in Kuwait. One last important factor I need to 
mention for this period, is the establishment of the Jamā‘at al-Sīnimā al-
Jadīda (New Cinema Group) in 1968. This was a group of young 
filmmakers and critics whose goal was to induce a new attitude 
towards film art, fighting the sheer commercialism in Egyptian cinema 
(Khouri 2005: 57). They did this through a joint manifesto calling for a 
new approach to cinema as art, but also through the establishment of a 
film club in Cairo and a specialized film magazine, al-Sinima. The 
group did not remain revolutionary for long and Nouri Bouzid (1997) 
notes that soon their techniques “succumbed to the old patterns” (id. 
245). He called for a cinema that would be more self-conscious, 
examining the reasons behind the defeat. But Bouzid suggests that the 
group’s revolutionary approach to cinema and dismissal of melodrama 
in favor of a more realistic film style and content was quickly 
overshadowed by a return to commercial filmmaking. 
 
1.5 Mubarak and the decline of cinema productions 
 
In October 1981, Husni Mubarak took power, after the violent 
assassination of al-Sadat during a military parade remembering the Six 
October war of 1973. By 2011, the year Mubarak was deposed, he had 
become the longest serving president in Egypt, staying in office for 
almost 30 years. During his reign, Egypt underwent enormous 
sociopolitical and economic changes in an ever changing global 
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economy. During the first years of his service, he continued to deal 
with the “Islamist problem” and created a strong police-state. 
Mubarak was already in office during Sadat’s regime, establishing a 
“behind-the-scenes control of the military and security forces” (Henry 
and Springborg 2001: 153), which he maintained in the police state he 
was creating. Mubarak’s media propaganda also continued to vilify the 
Islamists in the name of fighting terrorism but essentially to justify 
repression of all opposition voices. Mubarak’s police state was, 
however, criticized in several contemporary popular Egyptian films, 
the most famous one being ‘Imarat Ya‘qubiyan/The Yaqoubian Building 
(Marwan Wahid Hamid, 2005), an adaptation from ‘Ala’ al-Aswani’s 
acclaimed novel with the same title. One of the most controversial 
scenes in the film was the rape of a political prisoner, sanctioned by 
the investigating officer.9 
One of the biggest challenges to Mubarak’s neoliberalist economic 
policies10 was the exponentially growing gap between rich and poor, 
also in part because of the rapidly expanding population. During his 
30-year reign, the population doubled from approximately 40 million 
in 1980 to over 75 million in 2006.11 Approximately a third of Egyptians 
living in urban areas, live in unregulated housing or ‘ashwā’iyyāt12 that 
have sprouted around the city, occupying previously fertile land. 
Those areas had started to grow around the urban centers, particularly 
Cairo, in the 1970s and have continued to do so throughout the 80s and 
early 90s when the government did not yet pay too much attention to 
                                                   
9 Rape is still a common form of torture in Egyptian prisons and police 
stations. Human rights organizations continue to denounce the practice and 
the lack of punishment for the perpetrators among the police or secret 
service forces. 
10 Mubarak’s neoliberalism not only meant privatization of businesses and 
reallocation of public expenditure, but it also entailed impeding political 
liberties for opposition members (Mitchell 1999: 32). 
11 The country’s leading newspaper, al-Ahram, wrote that between 2006 and 
2012, the population had increased 18%, reaching 91 million Egyptians across 
the globe (including Egyptian expats). From: Ahram Online, 30 August 2012. 
12 It remains elusive to define what are ‘ashwā’iyyāt. What are the criteria to 
define an urban area as such (i.e. ‘haphazard’)? Do we use class as a criterion, 
or rather only look at the urban features of the area (unplanned, unlicensed, 
no services, etc.)? 
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these areas (Isma‘il 2006: xviii). Initially these new neighborhoods 
were only considered an “urban management challenge” (id.: xix), but 
when they also turned out to be hotbeds for Islamist resistance and 
opposition to the government, they were increasingly perceived as 
possible threats to security. The growing number of these ‘ashwā’iyyāt 
has also had an influence on film production, particularly since 2000, 
when a so-called sīnimā al-‘ashwā’iyyāt (‘informal areas’-cinema) came 
to the fore (Karawya 2011). This type of films included comedies by 
actor Muhammad Sa‘d13 and the more ‘serious’ social dramas by 
director Khalid Yusif14 for the first time explicitly representing this 
particularly ‘new’ urban-rural phenomenon. 
In terms of output, Egyptian cinema went through the biggest crisis 
ever since its inception. In the nineties the Arab world witnessed a 
satellite TV boom, every house being dotted with multiple dishes, each 
connected to a television set placed centrally in the home. The boom 
not only in satellite dishes but also in satellite stations across the 
region has resulted in a sharp drop in cinema productions. Ever since 
the increase in television productions (because of the diversification in 
television channels and increased production of TV series, the 
musalsalāt) and a declining artistic standard in popular (film) 
productions (partly as a result of the ‘entrepreneur cinema’ and 
dwindling investment in the industry, but also the public sector’s 
bankruptcy after 1967), the number of moviegoers has gone down and, 
with them, the number of productions. In 1994 Egypt only produced 18 
feature films, the lowest since the Golden Age of the 40s through 60s 
and down by over 40 compared to the decade before (Shafik 1998: 43). 
Only by the end of the decade did the number of productions climb 
again to more acceptable and viable numbers. As a result of a lack of 
investment, by the end of the 90s European co-productions gained 
importance. Youssef Chahine and Yusri Nasrallah started making films 
with European funding (e.g. Chahine’s al-Masir/Destiny from 1997 and 
                                                   
13 A good example is Muhammad Sa‘d’s al-Limbi character and the movie with 
the same title from 2002, although that film is not actually set in one of the 
‘ashwā’iyyāt (see chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion on the meaning of 
‘ashwā’iyyāt, or ‘informal settlements’. 
14 Particularly Yusif’s 2006 film Hina Maysara/Till Things Get Better is 
exemplary of these neighborhoods as décor. 
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Nasrallah’s Bab al-Shams/Gate of the Sun), while Nasrallah’s film al-
Madina/The City (1999) could be considered as one of the first steps 
taken to create ‘independent’ films in Egypt. 
 
1.6 A decade of protests 
 
In the introduction to their anthology, Singerman and Amar (2006) 
talk about protests and social unrest that have erupted across Egypt in 
the 2000s. Of particular importance is the Kifaya-movement, initially 
set up to oppose Mubarak’s grooming of his son Gamal Mubarak for 
the presidency. Kifaya was a mix of opposition groups, including 
liberals, secularists and Islamists opposing the Mubarak regime’s 
cruelty and lack of respect for human rights.15 Singerman and Amar 
have labeled the protests that have erupted across the country and 
particularly in main urban centers like Cairo, “cosmopolitan claims-
making” (Singerman and Amar 2006: 5). A growing educated, upper 
middle class population with access to English-language media, 
congregating in Cairo’s Western-style café’s (as opposed to the more 
traditional ahwa), was one of the instigators of these new social 
movements, they claim. I would argue that the Downtown16 ahawi 
(plural of ahwa) were and still are the main places of assembly for 
those young middle class men and women, who are highly educated, 
politically aware, and have access to English-language media. 
                                                   
15 The popular support for the movement declined rapidly after the 2005 
elections and their split up in 2006. In the 2010 comedy film with popular 
actress Yasmin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, al-Thalatha Yashtaghilunaha/All Three Made Fun of 
Her (‘Ali Idris) these liberal and secular opposition movements were ridiculed, 
alongside the ‘hip, Americanized youth’ and the new religious class 
characterized by tele-preachers. Walter Armbrust (2012) in his analysis of 
Rami al-I‘tisami/Rami the Protestor (Nadir Galal 2008) argues that other films, 
too, have ridiculed popular protests. 
16 Downtown, or in Egyptian Arabic Wusṭ il-balad, is the 19th century modern 
city, built between the Nile river and the old city of Cairo, the Fatimid city 
(sometimes referred to as Islamic Cairo). Particularly the area around the 
Egyptian stock exchange is littered with local coffee shops which continue to 
witness scenes of mass arrests. 
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Those young men and women were later on accompanied by the 
textile workers from al-Mahalla, who started strikes and protests in 
that city in 2006. These protests were not new to Egypt. When we look 
back to the last century, we can see that more or less each generation 
was characterized by major student or worker protests, social 
movements that have continued to challenge the governments and 
regimes. In the late 19th century, the first workers protests were 
organized by the tobacco and cigarette industry workers, demanding 
better pay and working conditions. In 1919 there were again large 
protests organized by the Wafd-party and its leader, Sa‘d Zaghlul, 
culminating in Britain’s formal recognition of Egypt’s independence in 
1922 and a new constitution in 1923. In 1946 there were again violent 
protests against the British occupation and many students lost their 
lives when the police opened fire upon the demonstration when it 
crossed ‘Abbas-bridge toward downtown (remembered for example in 
the nationalist anti-colonial film Fi Baytina Rajul/A Man in Our House, by 
Henri Barakat 1961). Another thirty years on, there were the violent 
bread riots in 1977, and one generation later we see these protests 
erupting again. Obviously there are big differences in the reasons 
behind and the contexts surrounding these historical protests, but 
nevertheless it shows the people’s continuing struggle for bread, 
freedom and social justice.17 The film industry in Egypt has always 
been informed by political events in the country and is rooted in the 
general developments in the country’s cultural scene as well. The way 




                                                   
17 This was the slogan of the 2011 revolution in Egypt: “‘īsh, ḥurriyya, ‘adāla 




2. Literature overview 
 
In this chapter I will give a short overview of several landmark studies 
about film and gender in Egypt and the region. I will mostly focus on 
those studies that have proven to be pivotal in the development of the 
field of gender studies and which are also of use for this research. As 
will become clear from this chapter, these studies cover diverse topics 
and are inherently interdisciplinary. Gender studies is a young 
discipline in the West, and particularly so in Arab countries. Since it is 
still a new field, this means that, with regard to men’s studies, there is 
little to no theorizing, and – as we will see – it is sometimes based on 
populist assumptions of Middle Eastern men. In a second part of this 
chapter I will focus on available film and media studies in Egypt and 
the region. Although Egypt has the oldest and most developed film 
industry of all Arabic speaking countries, and although relatively 
numerous Arabic historiographies are available, research on gender 
representations in Egyptian and Arab films as well as studies that 
venture beyond a mere structural analysis of Arab cinemas, continues 
to be elusive. 
In the first part of this chapter I will outline some of the most 
essential studies on gender in the Arab world, and areas where I see 
room for improvement. This will be followed by a specific focus on 
studies about men and masculinities in the Arab world, offering an 
overview of the available studies and the methods applied, pointing at 
the need for diversification and a more material approach towards the 
study of men and masculinities in the Arab world. In the third part I 
will highlight the present state of film studies in Egypt and the Arab 
world, followed by a short overview of the available studies about the 
politics of representation in cultural products. 
 
2.1 Gender studies 
 
In general, gender studies in the area is a new discipline with limited 
studies available and – as a result – suffers from a lack of theorizing 
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compared to other countries or regions – specifically the Anglo-Saxon 
traditions. Furthermore, until recently when thinking of gender in the 
Arab world, this mostly incurred women’s rights, with a particular 
interest in oppression, hijab and female genital mutilation (Ouzgane 
2011: 68). This ‘limited’ interest is part of a wider discourse instigated 
by early anthropological research. Abu Lughod (1989) claims that early 
anthropology focused on three main issues, namely Islam, segregation 
and segmentation. Most importantly she finds that it is time for 
anthropologists to include other disciplines and methods in their 
research. She encourages, in other words, the use of a more 
materialistic approach in theorizing about anthropology and 
embedding the studied society and ‘culture’1 in a historical and socio-
cultural framework, considering “such things as state violence and 
repression, class inequalities, consumerism, military occupation, 
changing politics of gender and sexuality, migration, exile, and work” 
(id. 300). The same goes for studies on Arab men, that have until 
recently focused on men in terms of their religion and religious 
practices, in terms of their normativity as opposed to women’s 
‘otherness’, or as parts of a larger entity (e.g. the tribe) that essentially 
defines their identities as men, ignoring individual experiences of 
being a man and ultimately reinforcing common perceptions of Arab 
men (and women). 
Men and masculinities in the region have for a long time been 
overlooked and perhaps have been taken for granted. Deniz Kandiyoti 
(1994: 197) describes her own misconceptions about Middle Eastern 
masculinities clearly: “I had made the elementary mistake of assuming 
that [men] had come into being as full-blown men, as patriarchs 
themselves, on the flimsy grounds that this role was culturally 
available to them”. She points at the limitations of certain approaches 
to the study of men in specific, non-Western contexts. A focus limited 
to the external influences on masculine identities risks neglecting the 
internal inconsistencies of patriarchal types, whether subordinated, 
marginalized or hegemonic (id. 198-9). The assumptions made about 
                                                   
1 ‘Culture’ is a complex term which is defined here according to Stuart Hall’s 
use of the word, namely as “patterns of organization” that “reveal themselves 
[…] within or underlying all social practices” (Hall 1980: 60). 
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Arab men and their gendered identities were (and often still are) 
restricting, confining men to one dominant mode of male identity. 
This is due to a leading discourse about patriarchy and male 
domination in Arab societies, informed in part by Bourdieu in his 
seminal Masculine Domination (2002), but also informed by colonialism 
(Hassan 2003), which have informed anthropology and gender studies 
on the region. Both have turned out to be intricately connected 
disciplines in the Middle East and North Africa. As a result of the 
limited scope of research about Arab men as colonial subjects, the 
discipline of men and masculinity studies is still very young and 
underdeveloped. Over the last decade, though, academic research has 
started to include men and masculinities, although once more studies 
on representations of men (e.g. Hassan 2003, Aghacy 2009) or 
questioning the construction of male identities remain extremely 
limited.2  
A quick search alone in any popular internet search engine on the 
topics of ‘gender’ and ‘Islam’,3 for example, results in an enormous 
amount of literature on women in Islam, but close to nothing shows up 
about masculinity and men. Some literature talks about the history of 
feminism in Islamic societies (Mernissi 1991; Badran 1996; Haddad and 
Esposito 2001; Mahmood 2005; Ali 2006; Wadud 1999, 2006; Bier 2011), 
other studies focus on the role of women and women’s rights in a 
modern society and particularly relating these roles to policy making 
(Ahmed 1992; Kandiyoti 1991a, 1991b, 1996; Saliba, Allen and Howard 
2002; Keddie 2007; Kassam 2010). Most of these researchers are 
women, too, although there is the occasional exception (McMurray 
1997; Hopkins and Sa‘d Eddin 1997; Haddad and Esposito 2001). This is 
only a very quick first look, but it is obvious from the start that men 
and masculinities have been grossly neglected and – contrary to our 
claims of fluid gender identities – have been taken for granted. 
                                                   
2 With the exception of e.g. Isma‘il (2009), Aghacy (2009), Jacob (2010), and 
Ouzgane (2011). 
3 Obviously this search is extremely limited and ill-defined, but it gives a 
general overview. Furthermore, the search term ‘Islam’ does not say anything 
about the Arab world, which is much more diverse religiously, ethnically, 
socially and linguistically. 
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To avoid accusations of being orientalist, particularly since the 
renewed ‘Western’ interest in ‘the Arab world’ with discourses of Arab 
(and Muslim) men in crisis (Amar 2011), this study on the topic of 
gender and masculinity avoids discussions on common themes like 
‘honor and shame’ from an Islamic perspective.4 As Amar correctly 
argues, Arab men are depicted as being in crisis for reasons related to 
their inability to cope with changing realities, like a growing (female) 
workforce and emancipation in Arab countries.5 The way with which 
popular Western venues write about men is as if the only acceptable 
Arab or Muslim man – he argues – would be the Westernized gay man. 
He relates this coverage to earlier and perhaps standardized ways of 
talking about Arab men in terms of their presumed omnipresent 
misogyny and repression of their weaker ‘other’. 
This resulted in making Arab masculinity ‘hypervisible’ (id. 40). 
Amar understands ‘hypervisible’ as a stereotypical representation of 
Arab and Muslim men in order to define them as the cause of the issue, 
a problem that has to be dealt with, and essentially as a way of 
rendering them – as individuals – obsolete. ‘They’ are talked about as a 
unified group, in the same way as is talked about Islam as a unified 
block with no option or possibility for neither internal dynamics nor 
interaction. The resulting talk about a ‘crisis’ entails a confined 
discourse that has no eye for the material and historical contexts that 
                                                   
4 Martin Stollery notes how studies on Arab men ignore agency or the 
“spectrum of activity” (Stollery 2001: 50), referring to Nancy Lindisfarne 
(1994). In her essay, Lindisfarne argues that studies on the Mediterranean 
have often been restricted to the concepts of honor and shame, “ignoring the 
shifting reality of people’s experience as gendered beings” (Lindisfarne 1994: 
82). The fact that my main interest is not how honor and shame are defined 
and their representations possibly work in the films, this does not mean that 
they will be entirely ignored in the analysis of the films – the point is that I do 
not consider them as the only or main defining factors in male identity 
construction. 
5 In trying to explain the Arab revolts, Amar argues, Western news outlets 
regularly resorted to simplistic explanations of these uprisings as the result of 
angry young (Arab) men. This conclusion, however, failed to notice the 
gender dynamics ‘on the square’ and the wide participation (and sometimes 
also leadership) of women in the protests. In Western logic – imbued with 
notions of hypermasculine Arab men and oppressed Arab women – it was and 
sometimes still is inconceivable of thinking otherwise. 
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construct and are constructed by popular imaginations of masculinity. 
These politics of gender live alongside a continuous challenge of 
normatization of class and generational conflicts as well, as the 2010-
‘11 uprisings have shown us. Yet, research on men and masculinities 
has continued to suffer from an uncritical approach to masculinity. My 
research project tries to change this neglect, which is why the main 
question here is focused on how Egyptian cinema establishes norms or 
rather critically opposes and deconstructs them. 
In his article Gender (and) Imperialism, Waïl Hassan (2003) argues 
along the same line as Amar, stating that African (and Arab) men are 
depicted as hypermasculine subjects. Simultaneously, and 
contradictory to that hypermasculine subject, twentieth century 
colonialism and orientalism as well as contemporary imperialism 
emasculates those same men and eventually takes away any possibility 
for agency. Hassan deconstructs the popular (Western) discourse from 
a postcolonial and racial perspective, and thus adopts several 
approaches. The double and contradictory position which African men 
are placed in is critiqued and questioned applying Judith Butler’s 
critique of gender performance (as inherently constructed) but also 
redefining postcolonial studies. He argues that in order to deconstruct 
hegemonic masculinity and question its constructed nature, we also 
need to pay attention to the neocolonialist dynamics that reinforce 
and justify a patriarchal subjugation of both men and women (id. 321). 
Fighting one form of hegemony by establishing and enforcing a new 
form of hegemony does not result in liberation and gender-equality. 
Such battles against racial, gender, class and generational hegemony 
continue to be visualized also in Egyptian films, but particularly in the 
last decade class has become the major distinctive feature defining 
representations of hegemonic and subversive masculinities in Egyptian 
cinema. 
It is my intention in this research to include not only the external 
instigators that contribute to a construction of masculine identities – 
whether in crisis or not – but also at internal inconsistencies of 
masculine identities, specifically of hegemonic masculinity. We will see 
that these inconsistencies have always been visualized in Egyptian 
cinema, arguing for the need to study popular film. In the following 
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part I discuss men’s studies in the Middle East and North Africa, which 
cover a diverse set of topics such as health and body (reproduction, 
circumcision, bodily acts, muscularity), men’s relation with state and 
oppression, their relation with other men, dress and public behavior, 
their relation with women, and historical roles of men. 
 
2.2 Masculinity and Men studies 
 
Masculinity and men’s studies in the Arab world are still in their early 
phase. Most research about masculinity is anthropological. Within this 
discipline, some studies focus on the historicity of masculinity as well 
as historical (idealized) appearances of maleness. Most of these works 
are descriptive and essentialist (El-Messiri 1978; Gilmore 1990). Homa 
Hoodfar (1999) and Salwa Isma‘il (2009) do not only focus on men and 
masculinity but analyze how gender politics create specific male and 
female urban spaces while keeping in mind the relationship between 
men and women on one side, institutions and institutionalized 
practices and the state on the other side. Julie Peteet (1994) studies 
new forms of ‘rites of passage’ in occupied Palestine which suffers 
from military arbitrariness singling out many (young) men who are 
then tortured and beaten in Israeli prisons. She argues that, as such, 
these beatings and detentions are part of men constructing their 
masculine identity (id.: 31). A new publication by Farha Ghannam 
(2013) fills up a continuing gap in anthropological research about 
contemporary Egyptian society, focusing on masculine identities in a 
post-2011 and post-Mubarak Egypt. Ghannam’s study questions the 
construction of male identities, in relation to women, other men and 
the state, gendering Egyptian men and acknowledging individual 
agency. 
Institutionalized forms of masculinity and rites of passage also 
return in Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Webb’s anthology Imagined 
Masculinities (2000). Essays in this anthology discuss circumcision 
(Bouhdiba and Khal, Bilu) and military service (Sinclair-Webb, Kaplan) 
or resistance (Peteet) as rites of passage. The second part of the 
anthology examines historical writings about male homosexuality 
(Lagrange) or theorizes the reception of ‘women stories’ (Najmabadi). 
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Ghoussoub writes about the creation of a national image of 
masculinity, as does Saghieh when he analyzes images of Saddam 
Hussein in newspapers or on billboards throughout Iraq. Walter 
Armbrust studies one of Egypt’s most famous and masculine actors, 
Farid Shawqi. Armbrust uses a historical and star studiesapproach for 
the analysis, distinguishing between the actor’s stage character and his 
real life persona analyzing both his films and his appearances in fan 
magazines of the era. Armbrust’s analysis of this actor’s star persona – 
and the mechanics that are involved in the production and 
consumption of meaning – is the first to offer a productive idea of 
masculinity in film. His work will prove pivotal to this research on 
masculine performances in Egyptian cinema. 
Sherifa Zuhur (2003) likewise adopts a historical method to depict 
the particular romantic masculinity of Farid al-Atrash, a famous actor 
and singer from the early days of Egyptian cinema (1940s-60s). She 
notes how he resorted to a romantic Arab and Islamic image of 
masculinity put in a modern context through his performances on 
stage and the silver screen. Farid al-Atrash’s masculine performance 
on screen was recognizable as the romantic hero from Arab folk tales 
and poems, such as the story Majnun Layla, or the love story about 
‘Antara and ‘Abla.6 Another study on a specific masculine type is 
Wilson Chacko Jacob’s article (2007) on the futuwwa (see also chapter 
7).7 In it, he discusses the eventual decline of the tough guy 
masculinity that the futuwwa represented in a changing historical 
                                                   
6 The origins of the story of Majnun Layla are not entirely certain, although 
they could date back to the 7th century. As a medieval story in an oral 
tradition, the contents have continued to change. But one essential element 
remains central to the story: the untenable love of Qays for Layla. Similarly, 
‘Antara was an Arab poet, and the son of a slave woman and a nobleman. But 
apart from that, popular culture remembers him for his superhuman strength 
and chivalry. 
7 The concept of futuwwa has a long history, dating back to the 8th century. In 
its most basic meaning, it was initially complementary to muruwwa, which 
stood for values and qualities of adult men whereas futuwwa was reserved for 
the qualities of the young man (fatā). In this research – and I return to the 
specific male type in chapter 7 – the meaning is closely related to the 




context, rendering its very existence unnecessary in early 20th century 
Egyptian society (Jacob 2007: 690). In the same vein, he writes about a 
new hegemonic form of masculinity in colonial Egypt (Jacob 2010, 
2011) – the effendi masculinity – from the perspective of gender 
performance.8 This effendi masculinity was constructed around its 
concern about its health and looks, a similar argument Kholoussy 
(2010a) makes. 
Kholoussy examined the Egyptian (colonized) state’s interest in 
single men’s health and sexuality in order to create a strong, healthy 
and disciplined population “that would serve as the foundation for a 
postcolonial nation free of socio-medical ills” (Kholoussy 2010a: 677). 
Research on masculinity from a health and medical perspective was 
also advanced by Inhorn (2003). Her essay maps the reaction of men 
towards infertility in a deeply patriarchal society that encourages 
them not only to get married but also to produce offspring. But Inhorn 
proves that male infertility results in paradoxes within a presumed 
rigid patriarchy. She argues that it is often women who take the blame 
publicly and who suffer the most from their husband’s ‘crisis of 
masculinity’ (id. 253) resulting from their inability to reproduce. In 
Egypt, where men are at the forefront of the family and are supposed 
to accept responsibility for their actions, the result is women fighting 
their husbands’ battle against social derision. 
Not only anthropological, historical or social and health research 
but also postcolonial and regional studies have tended to masculinities 
in the Middle East and North Africa. I already mentioned Armbrust 
(2000) and Jacob (2007, 2010, and 2011) who addressed particular types 
of masculinity (futuwwa, effendi) which were heterosexual hegemonic 
masculinities. Murray and Roscoe’s anthology (1997) centers on 
                                                   
8 For a different take on effendiyya in the first half of the 20th century, see 
also Lucie Ryzova’s Egyptianizing Modernity through the ‘New Effendiyya’ (in Re-
Envisioning Egypt, 2005). In it she argues that oftentimes the effendiyya are 
either considered as a cultural group or a social class. She describes them in 
ways they defined themselves as a group, through a reading of popular media 
like films and magazines. The educated effendiyya were active consumers and 
producers of these media and as such they can be used as a source of 
information on how they viewed themselves. For Ryzova, the effendiyya are 
the new educated middle classes, but also those classes that were associated 
with impoverished males in the late 20s and 30s of the 20th century. 
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homosexuality in Islamic history and culture, including an analysis of 
descriptions of homosexuality in classical Arabic, Persian and Turkish 
literature. El-Rouayheb (2009) takes it a step further, arguing that the 
modern-day concept of a homosexual identity (different from 
homosexual practices) did not exist universally or indefinitely. He re-
reads and deconstructs Ottoman-period Arabic texts (roughly 1500-
1800) that talk about same-sex relations and intercourse from a post-
colonial and gender perspective. He argues that Arabic literature in 
that period lacked this contemporary (and Western) concept of a 
homosexual identity (id. 6) but did accept its utterance in literary 
form, as proven in classical Arabic poetry and literature (id. 4).9 His 
study questions the generalizability of a homosexual identity as a 
relatively new, Western, concept that is sometimes also taken as ‘the 
norm’ for homosexual identities across cultures and histories.  
Joseph Massad (2002) perhaps initialized the critical questioning of 
a ‘globalized homosexuality’ in the Middle East, arguing that “it is the 
discourse of the Gay International that both produces homosexuals, as 
well as gays and lesbians, where they do not exist, and represses same-
sex desires and practices that refuse to be assimilated into its sexual 
epistemology” (Massad 2002: 363). It might sound like too strong a 
claim, arguing that homosexuality did not exist before in the Arab 
world, but perhaps we should look at it from a non-Western 
perspective in terms of that homosexual identity and the discourse 
that constructs and surrounds it. Similar to El-Rouayheb, Massad 
questions a universalized homosexual identity. This way, his claim is 
still valid, since a Western concept of homosexuality and a homosexual 
                                                   
9 There are many more studies on homosexualities in an Islamic or Arab (or 
both) context. I have only listed a few here, but other noteworthy studies on 
homosexualities include Stephen Murray’s 2000 study Homosexualities, which 
includes a few chapters on different homosexualities in Islamic societies from 
the past. Scott Kugle studies Islamic texts and how they treat homosexuality 
from a religious perspective. J. W. Wright and Everett Rowson’s anthology 
contains articles on representations of homoeroticism in classical Arabic 
literature. For an extensive postcolonial critique of some of the studies 
written about deviant sexualities in Islamic and Arab cultures, I strongly 
recommend Joseph Massad’s Desiring Arabs (2007). El-Rouayheb’s Before 
Homosexuality in the Arab-Islamic world (2005) is of particular interest in a 
postcolonial and post-orientalist context as well. 
38 
 
identity cannot and should not be taken as a universal and historical 
fact. This notion is important to remember when watching Egyptian 
films and analyzing their gender representations and representational 
practices as well. Just like ‘contemporary’ homosexuality is considered 
a modern construct, so are present-day discourses about masculinity 
in general. 
Massad has further developed this line of thinking and traces it 
back to orientalist depictions of the ‘East’, with which he generally 
means the Arabic speaking Middle East.10 In Desiring Arabs (Massad 
2007) he looks back at Arabic literature which depicted same-sex 
desire and discussed sexuality, thus historically contextualizing the 
current discourses on sexuality and sexual identity in the region. In 
the next parts of his book, he argues that modernist and contemporary 
Arabic literature and academic studies about sexual identities were 
influenced by orientalist depictions of a ‘licentious East’, whose past 
was then considered backward by enlightened Arab intellectuals. 
Again, this constitutes a warning for the current study about 
representations of masculinity; one cannot approach representations 
of 1960s men without placing these films in their historical and social 
contexts. When analyzing images of masculinities and men, one also 
needs to be aware of the fact that these representations were made in 
a particular context to a certain effect. 
We have seen that gender studies in the Arab world, as a 
development within women’s studies, has suffered from its own 
orientalist assumptions of men in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Many studies have continued to approach Arab men from the same 
angles as other disciplines were used to, like anthropology and 
women’s studies. Theoretical approaches and methods have started to 
open up, with studies that question a presumed masculine norm and 
male identities. These studies no longer approach ‘Arab men’ as a 
monolith detached from a social and historical context, but rather 
                                                   
10 This is a serious point of critique on both Joseph Massad’s and his mentor, 
Edward Said’s, work. In Orientalism Edward Said deconstructs Orientalist 
depictions of the ‘East’, which he usually identifies with the Middle East only, 
falling essentially – according to his critics – in the same trap as the 
orientalists he criticizes. Nevertheless, I do not think it lessens his argument; 
on the contrary, it rather strengthens it. 
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acknowledge the complex dynamics at work in any society, which I 
will tend to in more detail soon. Furthermore, it is essential to stop 
defining Arab men in terms of their presumed identification with 
larger group structures or with the stereotypical role of men as 
patriarchs, effectively disarming their agency as men. 
As becomes clear from this overview of studies on masculinity in 
Arab societies, they have mostly tended to describing different forms of 
masculinity in different eras, without questioning identity politics or 
politics of representations of different masculinities. As some of these 
studies show, the concern with a ‘healthy’ image of men grew in 
colonial times but is still present to this day. Looking at Inhorn’s study, 
it is clear that men’s health is considered an essential requirement to 
protect the nation from foreign invasion or mingling in its internal 
issues. The 2005 film Laylat Suqut Baghdad/The Night Baghdad Fell 
(Muhammad Amin) returns to this issue as well, with a youth failing 
sexually (and thus emasculated) because of his fear of foreign invasion 
in Arab lands by the (masculinized) American army, represented by 
American male (and female!) soldiers. But as Kandiyoti (1994) argues, 
foreign involvement in Arab countries and Western neocolonialism is 
not a sufficient explanation for a presumed crisis in masculinity. This 
film, too, hints at self-critique when it becomes clear that the sexually 
impaired youth has suffered all his life from social norms repressing 
not only his sexuality and his need to explore his body, but also his 
personal development as a student, a man, and an Egyptian. 
I wish to steer clear of any form of universalizing and essentialist 
understanding of masculinity that too often approaches (Arab) 
masculinities from a culturalist or behaviorist angle and ultimately 
results in mere descriptions of different forms of masculinity, either 
demonizing Arab men or apologetically redeeming ‘them’ as 
victimized others. Instead, I propose an inclusive approach towards 
Arab masculinity and men’s studies. Similar to a few of the arguments 
made earlier in this chapter, I believe it is necessary to have a look at 
the contexts that contribute to the construction of masculine 
identities. 
First, on a local level, these contexts would include but are not 
limited to studies of relationships between men and other men as well 
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as women, encounters with the state and their relation to political, 
legal, social and religious authorities. Second is on a global level, 
including studies on the effects of imperialism and neocolonialism, as 
well as men’s place in an increasingly competitive global economy. 
Third are the institutions and social structures that shape and give 
form to masculine identities, such as circumcision and marriage, the 
army and the police (which also relate to encounters with the state). 
Fourth are studies that focus on men’s health and their bodies and the 
way they construct their masculine identities as men, how they 
perform them physically. This research project falls within the fifth 
sphere: an analysis of cultural products and other meaning-producing 
institutions, such as magazines, film, television, music and music 
videos. This research analyzes the way Arab men are represented in 
popular media and how this shapes and is shaped by general 
perceptions about men and what is deemed masculine in Egypt. In 
general, articles and comments on blogs and websites are also used to 
complement the textual reading of the films. In the following part, I 
will highlight a number of studies available on Egyptian and Arab 
cinemas. 
 
2.3 Film studies 
 
Egyptian film studies – and more generally also Arab film studies – are 
perhaps undergoing a similar development as gender studies in the 
wider region, in the sense that only recently studies are emerging that 
go beyond the purely structuralist approaches describing historical 
developments in cinema production contexts. Viola Shafik (1998, 2007) 
has been one of the first to offer a comprehensive study of Egyptian 
and Arab cinemas and she too comments on the limited approaches in 
research on Arab cinema. Many studies about Egyptian cinema – 
specially in Arabic – are available, but she states that this research 
tends to be historical in nature and overemphasizes topics like films’ 
images of women – focusing on stereotypes – without taking into 
account many of the elements responsible for creating meaning in 
media texts (Shafik 2007: 7). In other words, she argues for a cultural 
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studies approach to Egyptian and Arab film studies considering the 
multiplicity of factors partaking in the creation of meaning. 
Viola Shafik’s Arab cinema: History and cultural identity (1998) offers a 
concise history of cinema in the Arab world. Although she realizes that 
there is no one, united, ‘Arab cinema’ (Shafik 1998: 1), she still 
continues to use the singular both in her title and the rest of her book. 
The reason for this is that she is looking at the production of feature 
films, or in general the cinema industry in the Arab world. The ‘label’ 
implies other questions, however, about what to include or exclude 
from ‘Arab cinema’? Does this entail Arab diaspora films, or only films 
made in a majority Arabic speaking country? What about Berber-
language films, for example? And what kind of ‘Arab cinema’ are we 
talking about: the limited number of art-house films that Roy Armes11 
discusses or the popular and commercial Egyptian products? What is 
‘Arab’ about ‘Arab cinema’, then? Certainly not Egyptian cinema’s own 
stereotypical representations of Egyptian Bedouins as irrational 
backward brutes or emotionally charged women in, for example, the 
comedy Li-ʼl-Rigal Faqat/For Men Only (Mahmud Dhu al-Fiqar 1964). 
Shafik leaves these questions unanswered. 
Yet, I would argue that, in the sense of constructing an Egyptian 
cultural identity, commercial films have played and continue to play 
an important role. Ever since the ‘start’ of an Egyptian cinema industry 
when Tala‘at Harb Pasha erected the Studio Misr, the cinema industry 
has become a structural element of the Egyptian struggle to assert 
itself as a national Egyptian identity on a cultural and political scene. 
Ifdal Elsaket’s study (n.d.) focuses entirely on the pre-revolutionary 
cinema in Egypt and how it contributed to the construction and 
dissemination of a national identity with images of progress and 
modernity that filmmakers and critics propagated to the outside world 
as much as to the nation itself (id. n.d.). As a modern form of art, 
cinema was part and parcel of the construction of a modern national 
                                                   
11 Roy Armes systematically ignores commercial Egyptian films, instead only 
looking at the more ‘artistically and critically acclaimed’ films, which in Egypt 




Egyptian identity trying to answer the question of what the modern 
nation should look like. 
Most Arabic language studies of Egyptian (or Arab) cinema tend to 
remain descriptive about historical developments of genres and styles 
in Egyptian cinema (e.g. Abu Shadi 1998) without reference to wider 
discourses prevalent at the time. Only recently more varied 
approaches have emerged, most notably Fayruz Karawya’s research 
(2011) on the different ways in depicting sha‘bi (local, popular) 
neighborhoods. She distinguishes between the comedic sha‘bi 
neighborhoods, often studio-built like al-Limbi (Sharif ‘Arafa 2002), and 
the more ‘serious’ depictions of films like Hina Maysara/Until Things Get 
Better (Khalid Yusif 2007). She claims that the cinema’s increased 
interest (and particularly so after the making of al-Limbi) in lower class 
and ‘haphazard’ (‘ashwā’ī) neighborhoods is a starting attempt to 
counter middle- and upper-class domination of cultural products, and 
among those, the cinema industry (Karawya 2011: 16), with producers 
like al-Subki and films such as al-Limbi or more recently the trilogy 
made with popular young actor Muhammad Ramadan. Simultaneously, 
filmmakers behind certain other films are part of an educated middle 
(and upper-) class (such as Khalid Yusif), representing lower class 
areas as they see it, reiterating and contributing to prevalent 
discourses about those same lower class neighborhoods as dangerous 
and unstable hotbeds for extremists and social violence. In chapter 8 I 
will return specifically to a number of films promulgating this 
discourse.12 
                                                   
12 Egyptian cinema has always shown interest in portraying lower class areas: 
from the ‘contemporaneous’ representations of lower class historical areas in 
the 30s and 40s, to the plights of the poor citizen (and peasants) in the 50s and 
60s’ socialist-inspired films portraying a pre-1952 feudal society, to the 
representations of traditional, historical areas in a “time before the rule of 
law” in the 80s, to finally the representations of the danger and extremism so 
‘rampant’ in present-day ‘ashwā’iyyāt (‘haphazard areas’, see also chapter 8). 
Class differences have always played a central part in Egyptian cinema, the 
way they’re represented depends on the specific era we are studying. Viola 
Shafik (2007: 274) argues that 80s and 90s’ portrayals of people walking on the 
margin of society and becoming the country’s nouveau riche are reminiscent 
of bourgeois fears of not being able to recognize lower classes and having to 
share their privileged social status. 
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Nahid Salah’s study (2012) focuses on representations (and the 
increase and diversity in the number of representations) of futuwwa in 
Egyptian films and how this relates to a discourse in Egyptian society 
on the meaning of futuwwa. She argues that the most common film 
that is usually referred to as a framework for futuwwa-films is al-
Futuwwa/The Tough Guy (Salah Abu Sayf 1956). But she claims it has no 
relation to the ‘real’ meaning of futuwwa, which is that of a more 
chivalrous variety of masculinity (Salah 2012: 61). Her analysis shows, 
however, that she does not question the fixed, ahistorical concept of 
futuwwa, neither does she explain the possible reasons behind the 
proliferation of this specific type, either in the 50s film or in the 80s. At 
the end of her study, Salah includes three frameworks for representing 
futuwwa in more recent Egyptian films as opposed to the ‘formative’ 
period of the 1950s for futuwwa-films. Nevertheless her argument is 
unconvincing, and exposes her structuralist, essentialist and positivist 
approach to this ambiguous masculine ideal. In chapter 7 I will go into 
more detail with regard to this specific male type that became 
prominent in historical films from the 1980s. 
A number of English language works have also started theorizing 
about Arab and Egyptian cinema, notably Viola Shafik’s work, but also 
Malek Khouri’s study (2010) on the life and work of Egypt’s enfant 
terrible, Youssef Chahine. In it, Khouri approaches Youssef Chahine’s 
films as a body of films, an oeuvre spanning the lifetime of the 
director. Furthermore, Khouri has theorized a very important period 
in Arab cinema, the artistic rebirth of the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
so-called New Arab Cinema (Khouri 2005). Malek Khouri (2005) 
considers the Nahḍa period in the 19th century a formative period. Al-
Nahḍa is often translated as Renaissance in English, although that does 
not cover its meaning.13 
Khouri considers al-Nahḍa as formative for the modern Arab state, 
through renewing Arab and Muslim heritage (literature, history, 
language), the reappraisal of classical Arabic and adjusting it to 
                                                   
13  The Arab Nahḍa has an inherently political, anti-colonial agenda out of 
which the need arose for a cultural and intellectual renewal turning back to 
an Arab and Islamic heritage. Although initially making use of scientific 




modern needs,14 reconnecting the arts with social history and stressing 
their importance in the fight against colonial occupation (first directed 
against the Ottoman Turks, later against the major colonizers of the 
region, the British and the French). According to Khouri’s framework, 
modernity in the Arab world thus entails a strong political awareness, 
nationalism and self-consciousness. Khouri’s claims are similar to 
Armbrust’s (1995), although Armbrust does not necessarily distinguish 
between the ‘vulgar’ commercial films made earlier and the artistic 
revival of the 80s and 90s with a handful of critically acclaimed films, 
that Khouri considers representative of the new cinema.  
Walter Armbrust’s 1995 article on the ‘codes of modernity’ in 
Egyptian film is an essential starting point for the theorizing of 
representational politics in the Arab world’s most popular cinema 
industry. In the article, Armbrust argues that “in fact there is a 
language of Egyptian cinema common to both commercial and art 
films” (Armbrust 1995: 83). This language situates itself on “the same 
ideological map [and] as a whole constitutes a fund of images shared 
by audience and directors” (id. 83). These images of modernity, ‘codes 
of modernity’ as he calls them, constitute meaning producing elements 
within a discourse of nationalism and a modern vision for the nation, 
an ideological construct he labels the “myth of modernity” (id. 93). 
These codes are positive and negative depictions of the local and the 
foreign, the traditional and the modern. Certain local traditions and 
values are depicted positively and uphold a certain essence of Egyptian 
identity. Simultaneously they are juxtaposed to images of 
backwardness and oppression stemming from a lack of modern 
education. The imagery of modern education is coded positively as 
Western and the scientific advances made in the West can be adapted 
to help create a modern nation. But, the West is also associated with 
imperialism and injustice, coded as negative. Throughout the analysis, 
these codes will form the background to understanding the elements 
that contribute to the production of meaning. 
                                                   
14 Concerning the modernization of classical Arabic language, new research 
has shown that in Egypt (and likely in other countries as well, though 
research is lacking) the development of colloquial Egyptian dialect and its use 
in popular culture and means of communication (pamphlets, magazines) also 
contributed to the construction of a national identity (Fahmy 2011). 
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Taking into consideration here Wilson Jacob’s study on a new form 
of effendi masculinity that came about in the early 20th century, we 
realize that this modernity was accompanied by new discourses on the 
body, the self, sexuality and the nation. The late 19th and early 20th 
century proved pivotal for the construction of a national image in 
which a re-assessment of gender relations was central. With the 
emergence of new classes (the effendiyya, see Ryzova 2005 and Jacob 
2010, 2011), new discourses on gender relations emerged as well 
(Badran 1996; Elsadda 2006, 2007). But another period in Egyptian film 
production rather than the 19th century modernist discourses, also 
proved pivotal to understanding the developments in filmmaking 
techniques and styles of the 80s and 90s. 
Nouri Bouzid (1995, translated by Shereen el Ezabi) has theorized 
the emergence of new realism in Arab cinemas, from North Africa to 
the Levant, which he linked to the 1967 defeat. He chooses the 1967 
naksa (setback; in the Six Day War) – although he calls the event hazima 
or defeat – as a decisive point in history which thoroughly changed 
Arab societies and – as a consequence – also Arab cinemas following 
that war. Bouzid argues that since the defeat in ‘67 Arab audiences 
started to question the military regimes and, particularly for Egypt, 
the socialist ideology that ‘Abd al-Nasir proposed. Therefore, for a 
couple of years during al-Sadat’s early reign (from 1971-‘73), all films 
addressing the defeat were prohibited, including for example Youssef 
Chahine’s al-‘Asfur/The Sparrow (1971) (Shafik 1998: 35). Bouzid argues 
that because of this defeat, a new generation of film makers stood up 
with new ideas and styles, often labeled ‘New Realism’, in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.15 
Perhaps in anticipation of Nagib’s argument about the ethics of 
realism in world cinema (see chapter 3), Bouzid states about realism in 
Arab cinemas that “New Realism, then, is not a form but a specific 
content that has a form; it is concerned with reality. […] In this 
interaction, reality is the dominant force, stubbornly refusing 
                                                   
15 Not to be confused with the ‘New Cinema Group’ from the early 1970s 
(Jamā‘at al-Sīnima al-Jadīda) to which several directors in the Arab world 
subscribed, arguing for a radical change in filmmaking. Through radically 
new styles and ways of storytelling, film was to be used as a vehicle for social 
change as well. 
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anything but a meticulously truthful representation” (Bouzid 1995: 
249). With this definition, New Realism comprises different genres and 
styles, as long as it stays true to reality – whatever the director’s 
impression about that reality may be. Bouzid betrays here his 
conviction that the camera’s purpose is an unaltered representation of 
the world. In this way, the culturally ‘Western’ phenomenon of cinema 
can be appropriated by filmmakers worldwide, offering opportunities 
to represent their own cultural identities. 
Although most of the films analyzed in this study would probably 
not entirely subscribe to Bouzid’s definition of realism – indeed, 
popular Egyptian cinema’s melodramatic features sometimes 
paradoxically undermine the films’ possible social critiques – realism 
nevertheless remains a powerful element in most films. Abu-Lughod 
named Egyptian television serials’ aesthetic “development realism 
[which] idealizes education, progress, and modernity within the 
nation” (Abu-Lughod 2005: 81). This form of realism, as part of a state 
effort to ‘educate’ the nation, is also visible in films, more strongly 
prior to ‘67, more subversively after. The subversion of the middle 
class ideals of modernism and education is what defines later cinema 
productions in a way that could be described as anti-modernist 
(Armbrust 1995: 105). 
To conclude, I see an interesting progress in historical studies about 
film. The available studies remain limited, but they have developed 
from a structural discussion on film styles and genres over the course 
of history (Malkmus and Armes 1991; Farid 1992, 2005; Abu Shady 
1998) into a more contextualized reading, putting film production in a 
broad historical framework (Bouzid 1995; al-Tilmisani 1995; Armbrust 
1995, 2000; Khouri 2005; Shafik 2007; Karawya 2011). These studies link 
the developments and changes in styles and elements to changing 
sociopolitical situations in a specifically Arab context. As such, films 
prove to be interesting and informative historical documents, 
testimonies of their times, relics of the past, but also producers of 





2.4 Gendered representations 
 
As becomes clear from the research mentioned above, the study of 
men and masculinities in the Middle East – and indeed, gender in 
general as well – consists of a wide array of disciplines and adopts 
multiple approaches. But it is important to note that the analysis of 
masculinities in media texts is linked to “their relationship to wider 
patterns of cultural dissemination of issues concerning masculinity” 
(Edwards 2006: 139). Thus, let us turn to those studies that have 
focused on representational practices in art of the region – whether 
representations of class, gender, or the nation, either in books, 
historical documents, television or films – placing these 
representational practices in their respective contexts. Depictions of 
masculinities and representational practices in general have been 
studied in a variety of images and texts, from billboards and mass 
media (Sa‘d 1998; Rohde 2006), through literature (Hassan 2003; 
Rahman 2003; Najmabadi 2005, Ouzgane 2011), to cinema (Schochat 
1983; Armbrust 1998a; Menicucci 1998; Stollery 2001; Shafik 2007; 
Mostafa 2009; Khouri 2010; Karawya 2011; Salah 2012) and television 
(Salamandra 1998; Abu-Lughod 1993, 2005; Sakr 2004). 
An historical approach is used by Garay Menicucci in his Unlocking 
the Arab celluloid closet: Homosexuality in Egyptian film (1998). Menicucci 
lists several noteworthy representations of homosexuality in Egyptian 
cinema from its beginning, although focusing only on explicit 
depictions of non-normative sexualities and cross-dressing. Menicucci 
concludes, however, that Arab societies are becoming more and more 
conservative, which means fewer representations of ‘deviations’. While 
his article is handy to have a list of films tackling sexual taboos, he 
does not offer a very detailed reading of the relation between the 
enormous changes Egyptian society was undergoing in the 1990s 
(stronger implementation of neoliberal economic policies, a violent 
crackdown on an increasingly violent opposition to a corrupt 
government, a general ‘dogmatization’ of religion)16 and the 
                                                   
16 The nineties were characterized by violence towards what was perceived as 
an increasingly corrupt government and society, resulting in terrorist attacks 
in Luxor in 1997 and a stronger crackdown on ‘extremists’ (who were often 
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developments in Egyptian filmmaking. Instead he only describes the 
different forms of representations of non-normative sexualities and 
how it has changed over time. His conclusion that a more conservative 
society offers fewer possibilities for representations of non-normative 
sexualities I do not share. On the contrary it seems to become more 
polarized instead with certain films breaking taboos in a stronger no-
nonsense way. Further, a study on the more covert depictions of non-
normative sexualities, or indeed, a queer reading of Egyptian films, is 
not yet available. 
Although Menicucci claims that representations of non-normative 
sexualities are declining in an increasingly more conservative society, 
there are several films that represent non-normative sexualities quite 
starkly (and differently). The 1993 film Mercedes (Yusri Nasrallah) is an 
example of a film that depicts a homosexual type in a rather different 
way. A young man from a bourgeois family decides to leave behind his 
family’s obstructing way of life and goes to live together with his lover 
in an underground gay community. Contrary to recurring images of 
effeminate gay men – like in the newest addition to a gay film-‘genre’, 
Asrar ‘A’iliyya/Family Secrets (Hani Fawzi 2014) – Nasrallah’s film 
portrays them as ‘normal’, though marginalized, young men who like 
football and are tough and masculine. The film ‘Imarat Ya‘qubian/The 
Yaqoubian Building (Marwan Hamid 2006) also has a gay character in it 
who is a respected member of the community, in spite of also being 
obviously effeminate and leaving no doubt about his sexual identity. 
Both Family Secrets and The Yaqoubian Building perpetuate common 
perceptions in Egypt that homosexuality is an ‘affliction’ caused by 
childhood traumas like incest or rape, or the absence of a male role-
model. Khalid Yusif’s film Hina Maysara/Till Things Get Better also 
                                                                                                                   
political opponents) from the side of the government. Other attacks on 
Egyptian intellectuals include the attack on Nagib Mahfuz (1994) and the case 
against Nasr Abu Zayd in 1993 which resulted in him being labeled an infidel. 
In general, the political, economic, and – as a result – the cultural and 
intellectual situation in Egypt was in a disastrous state, which would only 
minimally improve on the surface throughout the 2000s with the country’s 
new economic course encouraging foreign investment. The GDP grew, but 
class disparity also grew exponentially. At this moment, an estimated 25% 
lives in poverty, not counting the numerous people who fall short of being 
considered poor (the poverty threshold is 1.25$/day). 
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portrayed a gay character, albeit a woman, which continues to be a 
greater taboo than male homosexuality. The character, a female pimp 
played by actress Ghada ‘Abd al-Raziq, only plays a small, yet not 
insignificant part in the film. The short lesbian scene, which lasts no 
longer than a few seconds, sparked harsh comments about the film’s 
‘morals’.17 
Walter Armbrust (1998) points out a valid reason for this 
continuous tackling of taboos in Egyptian cinema. He analyzed the 
representations of sex and marriage in Egyptian cinema and shows 
that ‘Golden Age’ films (1940s-1960s) often challenge patriarchal 
norms, advancing notions of romantic love in a society that largely 
adhered to a concept of marriage as a union between families in the 
first place, and a union between two individuals secondly. Armbrust 
thus links the representations of marriage and sex in films to a wider 
discourse in a society which has changed because of the huge increase 
in population in Egypt in the last 60 years, and because of the more 
frequent participation of women in public life (and therefore a greater 
emphasis on the more ‘modern’ concept of romantic love, binding 
individuals instead of families). As such, some films continue in their 
efforts to challenge patriarchal notions of marriage and love. 
A different approach to a similar argument is Martin Stollery’s 
article (2001) on representations of masculinities and particularly 
father-son relationships in Tunisian cinema. Stollery approaches the 
study of masculinity from a set of theoretical assumptions about North 
African society, including the argument that the state is essentially 
structured according to the family, with a strong patriarch heading the 
nation (id. 50), which is effectively feminized. He admits though that 
these are mere generalizations, overlooking the individual experience 
as well as possible sites of resistance – like cinema can be (id. 50). 
Stollery furthermore invokes Kandiyoti’s argument that focuses on the 
power relations between hegemonic and subordinated masculinities as 
well as between genders (id. 51, referring to Kandiyoti 1994). By 
looking at the possible subversion in films vis-à-vis actions (i.e. 
                                                   




metanarratives versus individual plot developments), he aims to 
deconstruct the narratives and lay bare the potential for change. 
I would like to turn my attention here to one important and 
informative recent study on representations of masculinity and men in 
the Arab East. Samira Aghacy’s study Masculine identity in the fiction of 
the Arab East since 1967 (2009) questions gender and sexuality through a 
historical and cultural studies approach to the representation of 
masculinity. She scrutinizes representations of masculinities in Arabic 
novels within the context of social, political and economic changes. In 
the introduction she writes that she takes into account the different 
wars and their effects on – among other things – masculinity, gender 
roles, and sexuality (id.: 2) whose discursive practices have been 
strongly influenced by those events. She thus reads the texts within a 
local, historical context including a reference to major international 
events influencing social and political structures in Arab societies, 
while questioning prevalent discourses about gender and sexuality at 
the time. 
Aghacy approaches masculinity as a process, constantly changing 
and changed: “[t]he argument that runs through the book questions 
the assumption that male identity is characterized by strong 
boundaries and reveals these boundaries to be porous and permeable” 
(Aghacy 2009: 3). She understands gender performance in the semiotic 
sense, as an interaction, an identity one assumes in relation to others 
around him/her. These others also contribute to an understanding of 
the ‘self’, as the gendered subject positions itself within the larger 
structures of gender relations. But institutions (such as circumcision, 
marriage, the army, etc.), historical events, society and cultural 
products all contribute to an understanding of masculinity in a 
particular time and place, favoring certain configurations of 
masculinity over others. Aghacy invokes Judith Butler’s (1990) 
arguments in her approach to the study of masculinities, showing that 
“gender performances are in accordance with socially constituted 
norms and patterns of masculinity and femininity” (Aghacy 2009: 4). 
The outcome is that masculine performances – similar to femininity – 
are exposed as a masquerade, or in Butler’s words: “an appearing that 
makes itself convincing as a ‘being’” (Butler 1990: 47). 
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Gender thus shows itself as an inherently unstable element of one’s 
identity in these novels. Aghacy deconstructs a presumed gender 
stability – often explained through an ahistoric version of the 
patriarch (for example how Stollery explained the Arab state which 
continues to represent itself and is represented as a ‘benign father’) – 
which is threatened in the current political environment in which men 
move around. Deconstructing the novelists’ descriptions of a 
hegemonic masculinity, she contests that the assumed “plurality of 
masculinities, in the sociopolitical sense of the word, is already in 
existence in the fiction of the Arab East” (id. 18, emphasis mine). But, 
although novels question a presumed stable hegemonic masculinity, 
through subversion, resistance, or opposition, these non-hegemonic 
masculinities are nevertheless othered and show that hegemonic 
masculinity is in crisis in its current (since 1967) social and political 
environment. Aghacy links the reasons for this ‘crisis’ to a quickly 
changing society in the light of – first and foremost – the 1967 naksa, as 
well as subsequent attacks and occupations of the Arab homeland by 
foreign invaders, an increasing presence of women in the public 
sphere, and a very competitive economic environment. Aghacy’s 
interest in these different aspects forming new social relations – both 
locally and globally – are what Kandiyoti (1994) also asked for when 
analyzing performances of masculinity (or femininity). In the next 
chapters, I will outline the theoretical concepts and methodology that 
have shaped and enabled this study on masculine performances and 




The study of gender in Arab societies as well as its representations in 
culture is shown to be an inherently interdisciplinary endeavor. The 
recent publication of Tarik Sabry’s Arab Cultural Studies (2012) is a good 
example of this interdisciplinarity that showcases different 
approaches to studying culture – “as a system of meaning” (Matar 
2012: 123) – in the Arab world. Theories and approaches from a variety 
of fields, like anthropology, history, political and media studies are all 
relevant and offer different and complimentary readings for the 
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analysis of cultural products and constructs of gender. An 
interdisciplinary approach is necessary when questioning, discussing 
and addressing any cultural product or society, particularly if we 
assume a general discourse that is prevalent in a certain time and 
space. 
Yet, masculinity and men studies in general suffer from limited 
methodologies and a lack of theorizing (Hearn 2013: 26, 35-6). When 
we are to apply feminist and queer theories to the study of men and 
masculinities, we need to do so critically and take into account the 
privileged position of the research subject (men) as well as the 
particularities of Arab men and masculinities. Western feminist 
theory, constructed in a specific social and material context, cannot be 
assigned to Arab men without adapting it and taking into account 
material differences. These differences do not only relate to defining 
gender, class and race; they also have implications on a global level, as 
different hegemonic masculinities now compete locally and globally 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Furthermore, the privileged 
position of the researcher needs equally critical reflection. I am aware 
of this advantage, not only as a researcher, but also as a white male, 
coming from an academic and social context privileging white men. 
The present research aims to contribute to this lack of theorizing 
about masculinities in the region and in Egypt (see also chapter 3.2), as 
well as about meaning producing elements in the country’s cinema 
industry (see chapter 3.1). With the exception of a few studies, most 
tend to approach Egyptian cinema in structuralist terms without 
considering its wider implications and elements participating in the 
construction of meaning. The point here is to question and 
deconstruct prevalent discourses and ideologies and lay bare the 
industry’s potential for change. In the next chapters I will outline in 
more details the theoretical framework that envelops this research –
which I have only hinted at in this chapter – and clarify several key 
concepts of gender and film studies and how they are used in the 
analysis of the chosen films. 
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3. Theoretical concepts 
 
In order to answer the questions posited in this research I need to 
situate the films within a discussion on world cinema as well as clarify 
how concepts like masculinity, gender and gender performance, 
patriarchy, and representational practices are understood and used in 
the analysis. This research, which is inherently interdisciplinary, 
cannot be limited to one theoretical framework. As such, it draws on 
theories and key concepts from different disciplines, mainly those of 
gender and masculinity studies, queer studies, postcolonial and 
cultural studies. In this chapter I will explain these theoretical 
concepts as I will be using them in the analysis of the films and their 
representational practices to be able to deconstruct notions of 
masculine normativity. 
Masculinity studies in the Arab region and in Egypt in particular, 
are only slowly starting to get attention, as is clear from the literature 
review. But what has also become clear from this review is the 
interdisciplinary nature of the available studies. In terms of 
representations of masculinities in Egyptian films, this automatically 
involves taking into account many different theoretical approaches. To 
be able to historically place these different types of representations, I 
will have to look at material and structural elements contributing to a 
construction of certain dominant images of masculinity. But this 
research will also take into account the different power relations that 
are constructed, contested, maintained, adjusted or – perhaps – 
abolished in favor of a novel “system of representations” (Hall 1997: 
17-9). The analyzed films and other media are all part of this system 
that at once produces meaning but also constitutes possibilities for the 
consumption of these products. 
 
3.1 Egyptian cinema in the world 
 
First and foremost, there is a necessity to situate Egyptian cinema in 
the world. Egyptian and Arab filmmaking suffer from a lack of 
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theorizing, far behind many other so-called “world cinemas”, like 
Latin-American, or Iranian cinema. An attempt at introducing 
Egyptian cinema in the world cinema sphere was tentatively made by 
Malkmus and Armes in their study Arab and African Filmmaking (1991). 
It offers a historical overview of the birth, development and 
consolidation of the different national film traditions in this vast and 
diverse geographical area. The vastness of the area covered in their 
study is also their weakness, since it is impossible to present a deep 
reading and understanding of any national cinema industry when 
including so many countries. Nevertheless their work includes an 
overview of the development of Egyptian cinema and its link with a 
local emerging nationalism against the colonial rulers. In the literature 
review, I have already hinted at the importance of Egyptian cinema in 
the creation of a national, Egyptian identity, referring to the many 
studies that have taken nationalism and modernism as defining 
features covering the lifespan of Egyptian cinema. 
An emerging national film culture was evidenced through 
adaptations from novels, like the 1930 film Zaynab by director 
Muhammad Karim, which, according to Egyptian film historian and 
critic, Samir Farid, was considered to be the most important Egyptian 
film of the era, as opposed to the first1 feature-length films from 1927, 
Layla (Widad ‘Urfi, Stéphane Rosti), and Qubla Fi al-Sahra’/Kiss in the 
Desert (Ibrahim Lama). From a nationalist perspective reconstructing 
the history of Egyptian cinema, Zaynab could be considered the 
country’s most important silent film, directed by a native Egyptian and 
adapted from a modern Egyptian novel, Malkmus and Armes argue 
(1991: 28-9). Apart from the historical developments in the different 
cinema traditions, they do not venture beyond a merely structural 
analysis of the different genres and styles in Arab and African cinema, 
without linking these styles to specific historical, social, economic, 
cultural and political developments as meaning producing elements in 
the respective countries. 
Within the disciplines of film and media studies, Malek Khouri’s 
research on representations of the nation and pan-Arabism in Youssef 
Chahine’s films, The Arab National Project in Youssef Chahine’s Cinema 
                                                   
1 See chapter 1, footnote 3. 
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(2010), is important in the sense that he puts Chahine’s work on the 
world cinema map from the perspective of Arab nationalism in his 
films. Khouri approaches Chahine’s films and the topics therein from a 
postcolonial angle, including the production context within which the 
director worked as an artist, as well as the political and social changes 
the country was undergoing throughout his career. These 
sociopolitical transformations are all relevant and were treated by 
Chahine in his films, making an inclusive historical, materialist 
approach extremely relevant. Yet, with the exception of Chahine’s 
films, Egyptian cinema remains practically invisible on the world 
cinema map. 
The amalgam of approaches, which will also be applied in this 
study, strives to offer a different view on Egyptian films by critiquing 
social and political forces and changes in one society from the region 
(Egypt) and the different institutions that are at work shaping the 
country’s self-image and society through popular culture.2 Likewise, 
the articles in Joseph Gugler’s anthology Film In The Middle East and 
North Africa: Creative Dissidence (2011) cover a variety of topics, films 
and film genres with one common thread: the subversive message they 
carry. The articles include historical (Eric Egan; Lisa Wedeen; Lina 
Khatib), postcolonial (Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi), structural (Roy 
Armes; Kevin Dwyer), and historical-anthropological (Walter 
Armbrust; Florence Martin) approaches as well as in-depth readings of 
exemplary films for each topic (political film, war film, auteur cinema). 
Interestingly though, the articles can be categorized along the 
different topics that Malek Khouri (2005) had extracted concerning 
New Arab Cinema, being religious dogmatism, independence and 
nationalism, renewed discussions on gender and sexuality and a 
modernist self-reflexive cinema. These topics betray the ongoing 
discussions on nation-building in a postcolonial Egypt, portrayed in a 
culture-specific cinema industry that is making sense of the world in 
its own way. 
                                                   
2 Stuart Hall (1981: 228) points out the “double movement of containment and 
resistance” in popular culture, allowing for an entirely different reading, 
other than the dominant and most obvious one. This gives popular culture an 
intrinsically political meaning and agency.  
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Yet, it remains conspicuously invisible on the world cinema map. 
Walter Armbrust (2000) states that “for over most of its history the 
Egyptian film industry has been systematically ignored in our 
literature on the Middle East” (Armbrust 2000: 300). Omar Kholeif 
(2011), too, notes the continued absence of Egyptian cinema in studies 
on (and international festivals about) world cinema, attributing the 
lack of presence of Egyptian cinema in (mainly) Western film theory to 
the fact that film theory is Eurocentric, and so is world cinema theory. 
In order to enter the Eurocentric academic discourse on world cinema, 
a film in a certain way has to adapt to foreign tastes and audiences, or 
as Kholeif writes: “it must diverge from its own tradition in order to 
find audiences abroad” (id. 4). Kholeif also mentions another reason, 
namely the cinema’s commercial nature (as opposed to ‘high art’; 
Kholeif 2011: 1-2) as one of the reasons for its limited presence. 
Academic discussions on world cinema seem to favor alternative 
art-house films instead of ‘sheer entertainment’. Yet, Egyptian cinema 
is not simply entertainment. It rather functions within a meaning-
producing system for which a good understanding of the history of the 
cinema industry and its local production contexts are indispensable to 
fully comprehend the different levels of the films. Viola Shafik claims 
that, compared to other countries with public film production in a 
postcolonial era, Egyptian films produced by the public sector 
“followed the same commercial guidelines as the private sector” 
(Shafik 1998: 26). Thus both privately produced films, their main goal 
being to make money, and public sector films shared common 
elements (use of stars, tested storylines, familiar topics), elements that 
were not deemed fit for academic discussions on the ‘meaning’ of 
world cinema, but which were and are essential to create a shared 
language (Armbrust 1995: 83) between director, film and audience. 
The discussions on how to theorize and define world cinema is still 
ongoing, although the more recent turn in world cinema theory and 
film theory in general is more practical and not an all-encompassing 
“Grand Theory” (Bordwell and Carroll 1996) which would ironically 
exclude certain films and film industries from the world cinema arena. 
Anthony Guneratne (2003) lists several reasons why third cinema3 
                                                   
3 When talking about ‘third cinema’, I am not referring to Third Cinema, the 
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theory was problematic and failed to enter theoretical discourse. Of 
importance here is his claim that film theory is Eurocentric – and more 
specifically used to be “Anglo-Francophone” (id. 10) – which led to the 
initial theoretical disinterest for world (read: non-European) cinemas. 
When film theory expanded its views beyond the major countries of 
production, it started out with ideas of ‘difference’. World cinema 
theory, as it was defined, had to be different from the commercial 
Hollywood-style productions (‘first cinema’), and different from 
European art-house cinema (‘second cinema’). High expectations were 
in place for world/third cinema films, such as the expectation that 
socialist-inspired and state-supported productions are politically 
critical films. This in part also explains why some have compared 
commercial Egyptian cinema to Hollywood and have continued to 
ignore Egyptian cinema in discussions on world- and postcolonial 
cinema: rather than oppose dominant filmmaking practices, Egyptian 
cinema seemed to joyfully incorporate them. 
The systematic exclusion of Egyptian cinema from the world 
cinema sphere goes far, to the point that Roy Armes (2005) does not 
even consider Egyptian films in his study on postcolonial North 
African cinema. Although Armes quotes Edward Said’s Orientalism 
(1994) and how Said critiqued upon the links between cultural 
products and imperialist politics in 19th century Europe, and 
specifically how European cultural production actively contributed to 
justifications of imperialism, Armes himself – perhaps unwillingly – 
falls into the same trap of orientalist thinking. Armes’s 2005 
Postcolonial Images: Studies in North African Film does not include any 
chapter on the only truly successful national cinema industry present 
in North Africa, Egyptian cinema. This way, his inclusion of certain 
cinema cultures (and only specific ‘festival-films’, that is) – excluding 
certain others – is already informed by his own expectations about 
what constitutes North African cinema. 
Perhaps with North African film he meant Maghreb films (which 
does become clear later in the book), but then his title should state so. 
                                                                                                                   
Latin-American movement from the 1960s and 70s. I mean with this term the 
‘third’ element of world cinema, past the so-called first and second cinemas of 
Hollywood and art-house European films respectively. 
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True, Egypt falls in the middle between orientalist descriptions of both 
North Africa and ‘the Middle East’, so perhaps that is why he did not 
include it. But the reason is probably more formal and content-related. 
Not to discard ‘North African’ (or rather Moroccan, Algerian and 
Tunisian) cinema(s) as unauthentic, Western scholars do have a 
fetishized obsession toward a few pioneer films from that region. They 
are undoubtedly interesting films worthy of studying, but let us have a 
look past the usual suspects of ‘Arab cinema’ and actually start to 
include films that are made in the first place for an ‘indigenous’ public4 
instead of European festivals.5 
World cinema theory need not be so limiting and narrow. Lucía 
Nagib (2011) defines world cinema more inclusively, not simply as 
films ‘different’ or other from commercial Western cinema production 
or European ‘art-house’ films (thus the term ‘third cinema’). For Nagib, 
the films’ truthfulness to realism is the defining factor in theorizing 
about world cinema. In the introduction to World Cinema and the Ethics 
of Realism, she writes: 
I propose to break away from discourses of ‘difference’, 
which reduce world cinema to a victimized ‘other’ and 
risk replicating and perpetuating the very colonial 
partition of the world they claim to deconstruct. […] I 
suggest the adoption of a positive, democratic and 
inclusive approach to film studies […]. Once notions of a 
single center and primacies are discarded, everything can 
be put on the world cinema map on an equal footing, even 
Hollywood, which instead of a threat becomes a cinema 
among others. (Nagib, 2011: 1) 
                                                   
4 I am aware of the distinctions made here between ‘Arab cinemas’ versus 
‘other’ world cinemas, and of the ethnocentric ‘indigenous’ label applied to 
Egyptian audiences. Therefore the labels are highlighted, to avoid being 
ethnocentric myself. 
5 This, however, does not mean that those ‘festival-films’ cannot have a 
popular and positive reception in their country of origin, like the popular film 
Omar Gatlato (Allouache 1977). The same can be argued about some of Youssef 
Chahine’s films that were incredibly popular both in Egypt as well as across its 
border, including festivals. He could be considered one of the exceptions who 
were able to attract both a foreign and local audience for (some of) his films. 
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Thus she discards the nationalist, transnationalist and diasporic 
traditions in theorizing about world cinema, suggesting they can lead 
to new divisions and othering non-Hollywood film production, which is 
continuously considered as ‘different’. 
Instead of defining world cinema in what it is not, she proposes to 
define it positively in terms of what it is, placing the world’s diverse 
film traditions on equal footing. For this she uses the concept of 
“ethics of realism”, or the films’ truthful intentions in portraying 
‘reality’ (Nagib 2011: 12). Cinematic ‘reality’ has since long been a point 
of discussion: with questions such as whether the camera’s main 
purpose is a truthful and meticulous re-presentation of reality, or 
rather a means to distort said reality. For Nagib, this is not necessarily 
an opposition, as she understands reality in multiple ways. The 
examples of films she gives in her study come from a variety of 
countries in their different ways of portraying the ‘real’ (the physical 
reality through the body and sex; the reality of the medium as an eye 
on the world; and the real story in the form of biographies and 
documentaries). In this way, film as a medium to convey meaning and 
one’s own vision on the world, can be appropriated and adapted by 
local filmmakers. Rather than define theories of World Cinema 
negatively, this positive definition allows for the inclusion of all forms, 
genres and modes of filmmaking into a discourse on world cinema 
theory. 
Robert Stam (2003) in a similar line of thinking does not consider 
third/world cinema as something belonging to a different world or 
different cultures (different from what, one might ask, which would 
mean there is a presumed original or norm it differs from, i.e. Western 
cinemas). Instead, he argues for a definition of third cinema in terms 
of its incorporation and adaptation to local sensitivities and culture of 
common themes and techniques found in a – for a Western researcher 
at least – more familiar film culture. He understands ‘hybridity’ as one 
of the elements defining third cinema, as well as cinema in general (id. 
37-8). For Stam, cinema is an example of a field where hybridity is 
most visible: it shares different times and spaces, and is able to switch 
between them as it likes, its hybridity is evidence of the relations 
between these spaces and times. But the cinema can also portray 
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“temporalized cultural contradictions” (id. 38), such as the interplay of 
local and global, the Western versus the non-Western, the traditional 
and the modern. In the literature overview, I have discussed Walter 
Armbrust’s (1995) analysis of the hybrid configuration of Egyptian 
cinema and its ‘codes of modernity’, mixing both Western scientific 
advances and the appraisal of an Arabic and Islamic past. As such, 
Egyptian cinema – both art-house and commercial cinema – is a 
beautiful example of such a hybrid claims-making. 
Homi Bhabha is known for coining the term hybridization as a 
temporary in-between-period of colonial occupation and the agency of 
local resistance through adaptation and mixing (Bhabha 1992: 148). 
Stam does not simply adapt the term to film studies in order to 
describe how aesthetic aspects are taken over from other cultures and 
adapted to local tastes. In his understanding, hybridization in film is 
active, and it means that local cultural elements are mixed with styles, 
narratives and techniques from other cultures and production 
contexts creating a new tradition but with an inherently political 
meaning. Bhabha’s understanding of the term is in the first place 
political. He emphasizes that the oppressed could use this mixing of 
styles (as well as race and sexuality in his original definition) and 
adaptation of the colonizer’s culture in order to fight back against 
oppression. Bhabha states that “[T]his is the historical movement of 
hybridity as camouflage, as a contesting, antagonistic agency 
functioning in the time-lag of sign/symbol, which is a space in-
between the rules of engagement” (Bhabha 1994: 277). In this sense, 
hybridity in cinema also has a political agenda, against colonization 
and imperialism, as a means to oppose the hegemony of the oppressor 
and create a strong identity for the nation (see also chapter 2 on 
effendi masculinity, Ryzova 2005 and Jacob 2011; and Kholoussy 2010a 
about the health of the nation). Both the concepts of ethics of realism 
and hybridity are appealing, and offer the opportunity to watch 
Egyptian cinema from a different, less judging and more positive 
angle. The common criticism of commercialism becomes secondary to 
the Egyptian film industry’s possibility for agency and political 




Walter Armbrust (2009) has undertaken an analysis of such a hybrid 
period in cultural production during enormous social and political 
changes in Egypt’s recent history, namely the interwar period, 
referred to as the ‘liberal period’ after Egypt’s formal independence 
from 1923 until the 40s. In line with other research,6 he argues that 
this period was “formative to the Nasser era” (id. 156), thanks to three 
processes. These processes are “social change, the new nation-state 
political (and ideological) framework, and new forms of cultural 
production” (id. 157). Armbrust uses these processes in order to 
explain the complex developments going on in Egypt during a period 
that has often been labeled as ‘the liberal experiment’. Particularly the 
emergence of a new, hybrid, class – the effendi – was informative of 
the different processes shaping Egyptian national identity in that 
period. Hybridity’s agency is recognized in the effendi, which 
Armbrust describes as a performance (id. 168). Their performance was 
also situational, tapping into their Western-style education or their 
traditional, Egyptian backgrounds whenever necessary. 
In addition, the developments of new media (press, cinema, 
photography, etc.), new political structures and ideologies (like 
Marxism, socialism, liberalism, raditionalism, etc.), new social classes 
(‘effendiyya’, plural of ‘effendi’; but also bourgeois and mixed 
marriages between Europeans, Turks, Egyptians, Armenians, etc.) in a 
very diverse and multi-ethnic and multicultural society of early 
twentieth century Egypt were all involved in creating awareness for an 
emerging and independent Egyptian national identity. In an earlier 
essay, Armbrust has touched upon this line of thinking with regard to 
cinema in ‘the golden age before the Golden Age’, namely films from 
the vibrant 1940s and 50s (Armbrust 2000). He shows that films from 
the 1940s and 50s were not simply formative for the coming years, but 
were also distinctly popular because of their commercial nature and 
their cultural embedding in Egypt at the time. Egyptian cinema thus 
played an important symbolic role in the context of nation-building 
(Shafik 2007: 20) both running up to and after independence in 1952. 
In sum, it is no longer necessary nor desirable to define Egypt’s own 
film traditions in qualitative and essentialist terms, whether they 
                                                   
6 See Goldschmidt, Johnson and Salmoni (eds.), Re-envisioning Egypt: 1919-1952. 
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belong to an arbitrary aesthetics of world cinema, but rather to merit 
them for what they are worth: a popular cinema tradition anchored in 
Arab and Egyptian culture creating a sense of unity among different 
Arab countries through films, stars, and songs that millions of Arab 
viewers know and can identify with. As such, Egyptian melodrama as 
the most popular mode of filmmaking can be part of a discussion on 
cinematic ‘realism’, with its references to the lives of ordinary people 
and their emotional reactions to events unfolding in the film. 
Christine Gledhill notes that realism and melodrama, although 
applying different aesthetics of the ‘real’, share the same cultural and 
ideological conditions (Gledhill 2005: 217). Egyptian melodrama, too, is 
not so different from realism. One example of its relation to literary 
realism is the many adaptations of the novels by Nagib Mahfuz, not to 
mention the scenarios he wrote or assisted in writing for many films 
from the 50s onward. But other elements abound, including 
melodrama’s heightened interest in what lies beyond ‘the real’, or, in 
the words of Peter Brooks, its refusal “to content itself with the 
repressions, the tonings-down, the half-articulations, the 
accommodations, and the disappointments of the real” (Brooks 1995: 
ix). Melodrama thus instills additional meaning to the everyday, the 
principal theme of these films. 
But I understand melodrama in this research as more than ‘excess’. 
I adopt Linda Williams’ argument that melodrama is a mode and not a 
genre. In her essay Melancholy Melodrama (2004), Williams clearly 
considers it as a modern mode of filmmaking: “[It] describes a 
perpetually modernizing form that is neither opposed to the norms of 
the “classical” nor to the norms of “realism” but which adapts both” 
(id. 273). In the case of Egyptian cinema, particularly after the 
implementation of the public sector filmmaking (1963-1971), both 
elements of classicism and the real are adopted and appropriated. 
Armbrust (1995) and Khouri (2005) have both shown the influence of 
modernity and the reappraisal of classical Arab culture (in literature, 
language and religion) on the codes of production of Egyptian cinema. 
The film industry’s interest in the ‘real’, in terms of discourses on 
gender, class and the nation, furthermore elevates the Egyptian 
‘everyday’ to complex notions of what constitutes an Egyptian 
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identity. In the methodology chapter (see chapter 4) I will discuss the 
importance of stardom in the construction of this notion of identity, 
based on Richard Dyer’s (1998) informative study of stars. 
 
3.2 Women’s studies and queer theory as conceptual 
frameworks for the study of masculinities 
 
It is common knowledge that gender is constructed and thus prone to 
changes in a given time and space. Culture – understood as a system to 
make meaning of the world around us (Hall 1997) – plays a role in 
constructing and maintaining, but also subverting gender norms. 
Thanks to women’s studies, queer theory and men’s studies, we know 
now that images of men and women (but also images of race and class) 
contribute to the naturalization of culturally contingent 
understandings of gender and identity, and thus also as constructed 
and changeable images. Richard Dyer notes that “masculinity, 
whiteness, heterosexuality and able-bodiedness are just images of 
identity alongside all others”; but he warns that considering and 
deconstructing these normative images as such does not mean that we 
have already reached the point of actually ‘dethroning’ hegemonic 
elements of identity (Dyer 2002b: 4). These images and identity 
constructing elements can still be constructed as ideals and 
understood as such by the audiences. 
In this part of the chapter we will have a look at how feminist and 
queer theories have been of use as well for masculinity studies and this 
research. Masculinity is not a single entity, but as a term it stands in 
contrast to that which is not deemed masculine. Gender identity, the 
overarching term for masculinities and femininities, in this study is 
understood the way Judith Butler described it: not only is it a 
performance (Goffman 1956; West and Zimmerman 1987), it is also a 
performance of a non-existent and presumed ‘original’, exemplified in 
her analysis of drag as gender parody (Butler 1990: 338). Butler’s 
theory is rather complex, in part a development from Erving 
Goffman’s earlier theorizing on the presentation of the self (1956), 
although Butler is inspired by psychoanalytic and feminist theories in 
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Gender Trouble. Goffman’s study posited a very important premise 
inspired by semiotics, namely that an individual’s identity is a 
continuous ‘performance’, depending on the surroundings. This 
premise offers possibilities to question also the ‘performance’ of 
gender identities. Simone de Beauvoir’s assertion that “one is not born 
a woman, one becomes one” (from The Second Sex) means that gender is 
a social construct and that it is part of one’s identity, yet disarticulated 
from the biological sex. Butler does not refer to Goffman in Gender 
Trouble (1990), but there are similarities between her premise of 
gender performativity and Goffman’s principle of performance as they 
understand gender identity as a ‘doing’, rather than a ‘being’. 
The difference between her and Goffman’s work is situated in 
Butler’s focus on relations of power in gender performance. 
Performativity does not so much refer to an actual performance of 
gender (West and Zimmerman 1987), but rather to the discursive 
practices, the utterances (or when saying something becomes doing 
something), that inform it and the power relations that arise from it. 
One of the criticisms of her theory is that ‘performativity’ seems to 
neglect interaction with others, something which was essential in 
Goffman’s theory of performance. Another important premise that 
Butler refuses, is the idea of an original which was present in 
Goffman’s performance theory. Gender performance means a doing, 
but on a conceptual map of available identities and elements of 
identity, as if it is an imitation of some kind of ‘original’ gender 
performance. For Butler, gender performativity refutes the very 
premise of an original; it is a “performance without an original” 
(Butler 1990: 136). According to Brickell (2003), applying both theoretic 
strands together offers more possibilities to study larger structures of 
masculine performances, as presented in media. But it also answers 
questions related to the establishment of norms and the successful (or 
not) performance of gender, continuously recreating a gender binary 
and its precondition of an illusion of heteronormativity. 
Butler’s emphasis on the performativity of gender, namely the 
‘utterances’ of gender, reminds also of Connell’s concept of hegemonic 
masculinity (Connell 1987, 2005). Hegemonic masculinity is not so 
much a set of characteristics embodied by a certain individual, as it 
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constitutes the whole of power relations that fluctuate through society 
and whose discourse imposes itself as hegemonic, while subordinating 
others. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity has been a huge 
influence on the studies of masculinities, since it offers a workable tool 
to recognize the co-existence of multiple masculinities and to analyze 
how power relations among men are constructed complementary to 
the more obvious male-female binary. Connell uses the term 
‘hegemonic’ to explicitly point attention to the fluctuating power 
relations and hegemony’s reliance on consent, rather than absolute 
power, which offers the possibility to study hegemonic masculinity’s 
internal inconsistencies as well as the possibility for change. 
The concept of hegemonic masculinity has since been criticized and 
undergone more workable changes, as Connell and Messerschmidt 
(2005) recognize that the original conceptualization of hegemonic 
masculinity was too universalizing and simplistic. Demetriou (2001) 
has remarked that Connell’s initial theory of hegemonic masculinity, 
although arguing for scrutinizing the relations of power in a gender 
hierarchy, does not go far enough in analyzing how hegemonic 
masculinity (and its heteronormative patriarchal order) came to 
power and continues to remain so. He summarizes it clearly, saying 
that 
[w]e are used to seeing masculine power as a closed, 
coherent, and unified totality that embraces no otherness, 
no contradiction. That is an illusion that must be done 
away with because it is precisely through its hybrid and 
apparently contradictory content that hegemonic 
masculinity reproduces itself (id. 355). 
Demetriou raises valid arguments to emphasize the power relations 
between and within genders, instead of focusing on the domination of 
one group over another. He posits that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
as a ‘historic bloc’ should be more thoroughly explored: 
whereas for Connell the existence of non-white or non-
heterosexual elements in hegemonic masculinity is a sign 
of contradiction and weakness, for me it is precisely its 
internally diversified and hybrid nature that makes the 
hegemonic bloc dynamic and flexible (id. 348). 
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It is through hegemonic masculinity’s ability to adapt and incorporate 
supposedly subversive elements of masculinity that its hegemony is 
reestablished. In a later article, in order to clarify the theoretical 
concept of hegemonic masculinity, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) 
acknowledge this criticism and opt to keep several of its features, 
while rejecting and reformulating others. 
As such, the concept of hegemonic masculinity still retains its 
features of historicity and plurality of masculinities. The 
understanding of gender hierarchy as a “pattern of hegemony” 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 846) is also reconfirmed, meaning 
that the dominant group is not in power through absolute force but 
rather through a negotiated agreement with other players in society. 
This dominant group is also not necessarily the most common type of 
masculinity in a given society. What they reject now, however, is the 
notion of hegemonic masculinity as an “assemblage of traits” (id. 847) 
as well as the concept’s limited attention to the strategies of power. 
More important is how they reformulate certain elements of 
hegemonic masculinity into more usable tools for analysis. They 
concentrate on the concept’s feature of power relations (id. 849), 
emphasizing the agency of women but, also of subordinated 
masculinities and emphasizing the importance of the links between 
local, regional and global masculinities. 
It is one thing to recognize the multiplicity of masculinities and the 
different power relations among men and between genders, but how 
are these power relations constructed and maintained – or subverted – 
in everyday life? The power relations are partly constructed and 
informed by institutions which cannot be ignored in an analysis of 
masculinities and masculine identities. Kandiyoti argues that “an 
adequate explanation of the reproduction of patriarchal relations 
requires much closer attention to those institutions which are crucially 
responsible for the production of masculine identities” (Kandiyoti 
1994: 198, emphasis mine), effecting also the bodies on which these 
institutions inscribe meaning. These institutions can be personal and 
social, such as kinship and family relations, including marriage and 
circumcision, as well as the local ‘informal’ organization within the 
confines of the neighborhood; they can be legal, such as the personal 
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status laws informed by an Islamic (or Christian) frame of reference; 
and they can be organizational structures such as the army, police and 
the state. In the field of mass media, the cinema industry is also an 
important institution creating gendered identities. 
Mervat Hatem (1987) contends that in Middle Eastern gender 
studies since the end of the 70s the focus had shifted towards a Marxist 
approach questioning the political economy of patriarchal societies 
where institutions were held responsible for the continuing 
oppression of women (id. 811). This approach was designed to 
acknowledge more agency for women in the region who were 
previously often described as passive and not playing any significant 
role in the changing conditions of Middle Eastern societies (id. 812), 
but ironically ended up considering women as passive “objects of 
capital accumulation” (id. 813). Furthermore, a Marxist approach does 
not theorize the specific sexual and gender roles assigned to women 
(and men), but instead focuses solely on the market (id. 813). Hatem 
argues that “patriarchal systems have their own dynamics which, 
while affected by changing material conditions, are not totally 
determined by them” (id. 814). Thus she proposes a mixed approach, 
one that recognizes the material differences between men and women, 
but simultaneously focuses “on the autonomous dynamic of gender 
and its centrality to the development of patriarchal systems” (id. 814). 
The addition of the recognition of the dynamic that gender can 
produce is an essential part of the production of meaning. Not only the 
institutions as listed above produce gendered identities for men and 
women top-down, but these institutions are also the result of 
negotiations and power relations that influence in turn the social 
organization of gender relations bottom-up. 
The most important argument in her article is the definition she 
gives for patriarchy, as opposed to other (Arab) feminists’ definitions. 
Hatem criticizes Nawal el-Saadawi’s definition of patriarchy for its 
ambiguity, without a historical cadre to be able to define its specifics 
in a certain space and time (id. 815). Likewise, she says that Fatima 
Mernissi’s definition of the concept of patriarchy is a generalization 
across different Muslim countries and cultures, as if all Muslim 
countries would have the same sort of patriarchal system (id. 816). 
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Fatnah Sabbah analyzes the different discourses about women in two 
very different bodies of texts: erotic literature and Islamic legal texts. 
But Hatem argues that an analysis of different discourses – which she 
defines in Foucaultian terms – should consider a historical and social 
background of the texts studied (id. 817). In other words, she defines 
patriarchy in more practical, material and social terms, but looks at it 
“through a sexual lens” (id. 818). In the study of masculinities, a 
similar look at patriarchy can be useful to analyze how different 
masculinities are constructed and change in a given society and a 
given time. 
David Gilmore (1990) has studied the manifestation of a hegemonic 
masculinity within a patriarchal system that presented itself in the 
Mediterranean, more specifically his analysis of a patriarchal 
understanding of hegemonic masculinity in a Spanish town. As he 
notes, the essence lies in the public performance of masculinity. A man 
needs to present himself in public, thus putting himself at risk and 
make sure his achievements are tangible and visible. Apart from the 
public performance, men were and are required to create offspring, 
provide for their families and protect them when facing danger. 
Generally, these elements of a ‘good’ (not in a moral, but in a 
quantitative sense) performance of masculinity are also discernable in 
Trujillo’s (1991) analysis of American popular culture’s display of 
hegemonic masculinity. Similar to Gilmore, the performance is 
measured according to the men’s achievements, physical strength and 
courage. Further, the man’s performances are measured in the first 
place by other men, as also Marcia Inhorn has contended (Inhorn 2003: 
249). As an anthropologist, Gilmore describes the different 
manifestations as he saw them in front of him, while Trujillo uses 
cultural products to describe attitudes towards and common 
perceptions of masculinities in American pop culture. Similarly, we 
will see these features return in the analysis as elements of hegemonic 
masculinity, although with significant differences and approaches 





3.3 Systems of representation 
 
Now that we have a better understanding of the signs and symbols in 
Egyptian cinema, as well as a clearer understanding of how gender 
works, it is time to have a look at how this translates itself on the 
screen. How does representation work, how does it produce meaning, 
and how are we to understand its politics of representation? Films, like 
any other medium, convey meaning within a system of representation. 
Meaning, then, has to “enter the domain of these practices [of 
representation], if it is to circulate effectively within a culture” (Hall 
1997: 10). Stuart Hall distinguishes two systems of representation. The 
first system is the requirement for a shared conceptual map, a 
common cultural background (Hall 1997: 18). But this is not enough; 
the conceptual map needs to be conveyed by a common language, a 
system of signs. Hall’s semiotic understanding of representation is 
more complex, however, focusing first and foremost on the 
relationship between producers and consumers of language 
(understood broadly as any system conveying meaning through signs) 
and the way meaning is conveyed through representation. Hall further 
broadens the understanding of representation, to include Foucault’s 
historically grounded concept of discourse. Discourse and discursive 
practices provide a useful tool for understanding cultural products not 
as separate entities but as part of a larger discourse on a specific 
subject. Furthermore, Foucault’s interest in the relation between 
power/knowledge in the production of meaning appealed to Hall 
because of its possibility for political action. A historical 
understanding of discourse is useful in deconstructing representations 
of masculinity, particularly the relations of power between hegemonic 
and other masculinities. Stuart Hall described Foucault’s 
understanding of representation in his seminal study The Work of 
Representation (1997). 
Foucault’s system of representation consists of a set of rules and 
discursive practices in a given time and culture, producing knowledge 
and relations of power (Hall 1997: 42-43). The discourse on men and 
masculinities, and gender in general, constructs historically and 
culturally specific understandings of men and masculinities, as well as 
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women and femininities. Simultaneously, this discourse is produced 
through a language with which meaningful things can be said about 
men and masculinities, while being historically grounded in time and 
space. In order to study the language used in films, we need to 
consider several important elements in the analysis. First we need to 
consider statements about masculinity (id. 45). With regard to cinema, 
where can such statements be found? First and foremost within the 
film itself and the ‘images of men’ we see in the finished product. 
These images of men relate to the images we find all around us, in 
magazines, on television, billboards, newspapers, etc., which produce 
those statements. Within the film, images attain further meaning 
through the techniques and effects imposed on them. Statements are 
also quite literally made through the narrative and dialogues, for 
example the hero ‘saving’ his ‘lady’ (or not) and behavior expected 
from men (or not). But also masculine behavior performed by women 
can inform us about what masculinity means and who is allowed to 
impersonate it. In chapter 9 on female masculinities and women 
directors I give an overview of some iconic masculine performances by 
women in film. 
What then is the subject that those statements talk about within a 
set of accepted rules and norms (Hall 1997: 45)? The topic under 
investigation in this research is masculinity, but who (or what) 
‘impersonates’, or in Goffman’s terms, performs masculinity within 
these discourses? When there are multiple masculinities related to 
each other through power structures and relationships of domination, 
subjugation and marginalization, the question remains who is 
impersonating and performing masculinity, how is this performance 
represented (a hero or an anti-hero, men or women, etc.) and how is 
tension created with whoever is not represented as masculine? 
Between these various bearers of masculinity, these different 
‘performative utterances’,7 one informs and is informed by their 
                                                   
7 The term ‘performative utterances’ was first coined by Austin to distinguish 
between words that convey actions (performative utterance) and words that 
simply describe (constative utterance). For Eve K. Sedgwick, the importance 
was not so much the difference between the two types of utterances, but 
rather the way ‘performative utterances’ were read and possibly distorted 
and subverted (Edwards 2008: 80-81). In the research at hand, the 
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specifics. In other words, one is not entirely free to choose whatever 
type of masculinity, characteristic or form one would want, “for ... the 
substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled 
by the regulatory practices of gender coherence” (Butler 1990: 33). 
This choice is limited and happens within a socially constructed 
discourse of acceptable norms and behavior. Already these questions 
can inform us on representational politics leading to an informed 
discussion on gender politics in society. 
However, if this discourse is socially constructed, then how does 
behavior become ‘normal’ and socially acceptable? In other words, 
how do these statements gain authority and a sense of truth, a sense of 
real (Hall 1997: 45)? For this, the Marxist concepts of ideology and 
Gramscian hegemony are useful, but in Foucault’s reformulation. In 
the discussion on hegemonic masculinity before I outlined how 
hegemony works. Representations of these power struggles between 
and within genders are informed by and inform the specific cultural 
and historical contexts, the society in which these representations and 
the language used to convey them, come to mean something (id.: 28-
29). Ideology – and specifically ideology of representations – is defined 
here as a perceived-as-truthful system of representation, similar to 
Cynthia Freeland’s definition, “supposing that an ideology is a 
distorted representation of existing relations of power and 
domination” (Freeland 1996: 205). An ‘ideology’ of representations is 
thus a system that has the power and ability to give itself a sense of 
‘truth’ and is accepted as such. 
For Foucault, the Marxist definition of ideology (in economic terms) 
was not sufficient (Foucault 1980a, 1980b). According to him, it focused 
too much on material class differences and neglected complicated 
relations of power. Furthermore, its definition as an erroneous 
assumption of reality, assumes that ideology opposes an actual ‘truth’, 
thus paradoxically recreating the binary Marxist critique tries to 
uncover. Instead he proposed to not try to merely ‘discover’ and 
critique ideology and advance a valid alternative for it (another 
‘truth’), but instead to try to uncover “the application and 
                                                                                                                   
performative utterances are understood as acts (Butler 1990) through which 
one ‘performs’ gender. 
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effectiveness of power/knowledge” (Hall 1997: 49). It is the relation 
between power and knowledge and their prevalent discursive 
practices in society that “not only assumes the authority of ‘the truth’ 
but has the power to make itself true” (id. 49), what Foucault called the 
“régime of truth” (Foucault 1980a: 131). Power, for Foucault, was not 
just ‘present’, but it is active: power fluctuates and comes into 
existence whenever it is used. 
Since power is relational and can emanate in all structures of social 
life, this means that it is also at work within institutions and 
institutionalized practices such as cinema. Foucault gave examples 
from our knowledge of sex(uality), medicine or crime as the result of 
power relations, and how this knowledge in turn resulted in the 
affirmation of certain practices and relations of ‘power’. Concerning 
masculinities within a patriarchal order, we should be asking 
questions on how certain practices within particular institutions 
contribute to a construction of masculine identities (see Kandiyoti 
1994). These include, but are not confined to, marriage, the family, the 
state, the army (and the emphasized militarization of Egypt since 
Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and the Free Officers’ coup), colonialism and neo-
imperialism and their effects on local identities (see also Said 1994, 
Ryzova 2005, Massad 2009, Jacob 2011), as well as an increasingly 
globalized world and its consequences on the local, national and 
regional levels. Representational practices in cultural products are 
informed by and inform the institutions that produce these images 
(mass media such as television, cinema, magazines, newspapers, and 
internet). If we assume that these institutions, based on historically 
defined structures of knowledge and power, are the result of a 
historical formation, then so are the practices that are prevalent 
within that historical context. 
When these representational practices, now understood as both 
emanating within and forming a historical discourse, are shown to be a 
social and cultural construct, we can start looking for norms within 
that discourse and possible subversions of this normativity. We can 
deconstruct the films’ language, which does not simply mean uncover 
and abolish said normativity, but to expose it as inherently 
constructed through its internal contradictions (i.e. the possibility of a 
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queer reading of those utterances). This foregrounds a possibility to 
adapt to new historical and social contexts, what Foucault called the 
‘discursive formation’ (Foucault 1972: 74). It also means there is 
essentially a link between the text and real life, when the text can be 
read politically and its contradictions exposed. Not only gender, but 
also the film’s language is thus considered as a social and historical 
construct. The politics of representations of gender within films will be 
deconstructed and questioned. Those representations are no longer 
considered stable or true, but rather are destabilized and open to 
change and adaptations. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argued 
that questioning gender relations – understood as “arenas of tension” 
(id. 853) – and studying hegemonic masculinities must always 
“acknowledge the possibility of democratizing gender relations” (id. 
853). Representations of gender and gendered relations are political 
and contribute to an understanding of the social world, while the 
discursive practices historically available to us in turn offer 
meaningful ways of representing gender.  
Thus the concept of representation, as defined by Hall and based on 
Foucault, is political in the sense that it is the link between culture (as 
a system within which we make sense of ourselves) and society. Both 
are historical and changing as part of wider local, regional and global 
developments. Both need each other as they only ‘mean’ something 
together, a meaning which is conveyed through the processes of 
representation in a particular society’s cultural products. 
Representation is a means of expressing thoughts and ideas and 
communicating them with others, which are encoded and decoded 
(Hall 1980) and become meaningful. Representation for Hall is thus an 
interactive process. This is not to be confused with ‘presentation’, 
which is more tangible. It ‘presents’ something, like an exhibition 
showcasing artifacts. But what these artifacts mean, then, can only be 
understood when we understand the politics of representation behind 
those artifacts. The question is not necessarily what men and women 
represent, but how men and women, masculinities and femininities are 
represented and how this has come to be regarded as ‘normal’ 
masculine or feminine behavior. 
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But an extra element needs to be highlighted in this regard. It is 
one thing to deconstruct images of masculinity and femininity, but the 
production of meaning is not only reserved for those behind the actual 
production of films. The production of meaning is a continual process, 
as Stuart Hall has pointed out in his seminal article Encoding/Decoding 
(2001). Hall notes that the linear conception of the transfer of 
messages has proven to be unsatisfactory, instead arguing for a more 
complex procedure, what he called the ‘circuit of culture’ (Hall 1997:1). 
Different elements contribute to the production of meaning, not in the 
least by the producers of the artifact, but also the consumers of it. The 
consumption is also not a straightforward process, a criticism aimed at 
early feminist criticism of cultural products. Laura Mulvey’s article 
Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1975), although pinpointing an 
important issue in the representation of women on the white screen, 
was criticized for not taking into account the diversity of the audience. 
Elements of identity differ for each person, who constructs her 
identity as different from those surrounding her. 
Simultaneously, the understanding of the texts depends on what 
‘rules’ are allowed in a certain time and space. The interpretation of 
the meanings of the texts depends on this regulation. All elements 
together (production, consumption, representation, identity and 
regulation) are part of the encoding and decoding processes that take 
place whenever a ‘text’ (understood in its broadest sense) is produced 
and consumed. In this research, I will not focus my analysis on 
audience responses to the films, but rather start from the films and 
their social and historical contexts to analyze the representations of 
images of Egyptian masculinities and men on the white screen. In the 
following chapter I will explain in more detail the methodology of this 
research, explaining the meaning of stars and paradigms of 
masculinities, how ‘text’ is understood and how these images were 







This research covers multiple decades, with films from the 50s until 
the first decade of the new millennium. The main research question is 
centered on the representational practices in Egyptian films, more 
precisely gendered representations of men and masculinities. As 
discussed in the theoretical part (see chapter 3), cultural studies and 
feminist theories offer the necessary tools for analyzing the chosen 
films, adapted to the specific research questions of masculinity and 
postcolonial identities in Egypt after 1952, the starting date of this 
research project. In this chapter I will outline the methodology and 
different approaches that are adopted when analyzing the popular 
representations of gender and masculinities as well as the reasons 
behind the choice of films and the different performances of masculine 
types. ‘Reading’ a film text through textual analysis can inform us 
about the individual meanings conveyed in each film, but these 
analyses have to be opened up to social critique and placed in a 
historical context. 
Media are not merely conveying meaning top-down, yet, that is 
often how media studies are set up regarding the Arab world, 
something Armbrust referred to as the ‘Al Jazeera effect’ (Armbrust 
2012: 48).8 Nevertheless, many researchers have pointed out the effects 
of media on society, also with respect to Arab societies (Armbrust 1996, 
2000; Abu-Lughod 2005; Kraidy 2010), and the need to study how media 
and representations work (Kimmel, in Craig (ed.) 1992; Hall 1997; 
MacKinnon 2003).9 Stuart Hall (2001) also contends that not every text 
                                                   
8 The term was first coined in 2000 by Simon Henderson and later reused to 
explain the effects of private satellite TV-stations in the Arab world. But, as 
Armbrust correctly notes, the approaches to analyzing the effects of such TV-
stations on Arab audiences are always top-down, assuming a stable one-way 
relationship of producer and consumer of the media. The changes that these 
stations and ‘new media’ can bring about are in his opinion not always so 
sudden and novel, but rather they are also and already the effect of 
developments and changes underway in Arab countries. 
9 With regard to gender representations in mass media, Annette Kuhn’s study 
The Power of the Image (1985) questions images of women in mass media and 
how they construct ideals. Steve Neal looks at images of men, in his seminal 
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can be read in the same way. Rather, meanings are ‘encoded and 
decoded’ by individuals, and meanings can change substantially during 
this process. As MacKinnon (2003: 24) notes, this might answer 
questions such as why “mass culture […] can be so appealing to […] 
members of [politically and socially marginalized groups]”, which are 
otherwise oppressed or marginalized by those same forces dominating 
mass culture. It signals at the possibility of individual members of the 
audience to ‘read’ different meanings in the film and enjoy it 
depending on their own understanding. 
In the following parts of the chapter the method applied to analyze 
and ‘read’ film texts will be explained. I will start with Richard Dyer’s 
analysis of the phenomenon of ‘stars’ (Dyer 1998) to elucidate the 
reasons for the choice of actors (and actresses; e.g. in the chapter on 
female masculinities). In addition to Dyer, Andrew Spicer’s concept of 
‘paradigmatic films’ has proven to be useful for defining the choice of 
films from the otherwise vast database of Egyptian cinema (Spicer 
2001). Furthermore, the films cannot be analyzed without more 
attention being paid to the genre and genre conventions that might 
delineate readings of the films and their gender representations 
(Gledhill 2012). Then I will go on to define the four major periods in 
Egyptian cinema production that I have singled out for the analysis of 
the different masculine types together with an explanation of why 
certain specific types were chosen. And finally I will explain how the 
individual films were analyzed through textual analysis, for which 
David Bordwell’s formalist approach (1985) as well as Gérard Genette’s 




                                                                                                                   
articles Chariots of Fire (1982) and Masculinity as Spectacle (1983), informed in 
part by Laura Mulvey’s critique on the images of women in her article Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1975). Although these articles have encountered 
a lot of criticism for its one-sided view, the main point is that they have 




4.1 Star studies 
 
Richard Dyer’s analysis of stars has been a major contribution to 
cultural studies. Stars were initially studied as commercial products of 
the culture industry, and Dyer has clarified the notion that stars are 
constructs of and produce meaning in society and, therefore, can fulfill 
roles much larger than ‘simply’ entertain. Dyer states in Heavenly 
Bodies that “stars matter because they act out aspects of life that 
matter to us; and performers get to be stars when what they act out 
matters to enough people” (Dyer 1986: 17). He distinguishes between 
the actual person ‘playing’ the star and the star image, which can be 
reproduced in a number of media, like films, magazines, photographs, 
articles. The star has become a text which produces meaning over a 
number of media (Gledhill 2005: xii). As such, the subject (both the 
represented subject, the actor, and the spectator ‘reading’ the text) 
needed its own place alongside the more ‘traditional’ approaches to 
analyzing film texts, meaning, the narrative and mise-en-scène and 
the star’s relation to both. 
For Dyer, the star is more than just a performer in a film; a star is a 
complex construct with actual grounding in society and with images 
represented in cultural products. Because of the star’s capacity for 
authenticity and sincerity, the image becomes her or his actual 
identity. Similar to gender performance, the star’s performance has 
the ability – which is simultaneously a requirement for stardom – to 
make it look ‘real’. A star is able to convince the audience of the make-
believe, thanks to what Dyer calls ‘charisma’ (Dyer 1998: 30-2). Dyer 
adopts the term from Weber, who defined charisma within a 
discussion on political order as a leadership quality that differentiates 
the leader form ordinary people (id. 30). It makes the charismatic 
leader’s appeal extraordinary. Additionally, the leader’s charisma is 
most effective during uncertain and ambiguous times. Stars, different 
from political leaders in that they are not supposed to have 
institutionalized political power, should be understood as charismatic 
figures that can create some kind of logic and order in the 
“instabilities, ambiguities and contradictions in the culture” (id. 31). 
Dyer further notes that a star’s charisma is intricately connected to 
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“the specificities of the ideological configurations to which it belongs” 
(id. 31), as well as to the audience’s fragmented nature. Thus a star 
image can be read in multiple ways, and specific audiences can 
appropriate particular stars, most notably marginalized and 
subordinated groups in the audience, which Dyer describes as young, 
female or not heterosexual. In Egypt, this is probably somewhat 
different and most likely related to class differences in the first place. 
Lila Abu-Lughod’s fieldwork in a village in the rural south shows how 
audiences are reluctant to accept the messages that stars convey 
through the television serials because of the social differences between 
audience and stars (Abu-Lughod 2005: 228). The stars’ ability to 
represent the ordinary lives of the audience fails, resulting in poignant 
questions about the whole process of representation and the 
production and consumption of meaning. 
Dyer calls for us to study how stars (as texts) function in society and 
how they relate to ideology through their diverse representations. 
There are essentially three main questions to address when studying 
stars: why, what and how do they signify (Dyer 1998: 2). He relates 
these questions to ideology as “the set of ideas and representations in 
which people make sense of the world and the society in which they 
live” (id. 2). He understands ideology in the same terms as Gramsci and 
acknowledges its internal contradictions, as well as external 
subversions and opposition to it; there is never one ideology but 
multiple ideologies, one of which is dominant. Star images are then the 
result as well as tools of the fluctuating relations of power, and they 
should not be defined in a number of characteristics, but rather as 
essential contributors to the reproduction of dominant ideology. 
But stars can also positively and negatively reaffirm the hegemony 
of a dominant ideology (id. 3). Chris Holmlund (2002: 224-5) shows that 
a queer reading of certain hyper-masculine performances might add 
meaning to dominant readings of these performances and expose them 
as a masquerade. But, she argues, most viewers will not see these 
masculine performances as a masquerade, but rather as something 
‘real’. Gaylyn Studlar (2001: 175) adds to this that “[t]he male body in a 
performative mode draws attention to the construction of masculinity 
as a masquerade that attempts to create a set of readable signs 
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signifying “manliness” and to display these signs as a coherent 
subjectivity”. The masquerade is thus recognized, but it can be used to 
create the illusion of a stable identity and the masquerade of 
masculine performances is thus not necessarily exposed as inherently 
constructed with its own contradictions and incongruities. 
Yet, studying star performances for the analysis of masculinities is 
useful “to think about the performative aspects of masculinity in the 
cinema” (Tasker 2002: 233). Whether or not the performance is 
exposed as a masquerade that is either understood as a construction or 
as a stable identity, the star in and of itself is “composed of so many 
layers [and] so many slippages” (id. 233) that it raises questions about 
the supposed stability of gender identities. Richard Dyer continues, 
stating that the star’s image might effectively conceal “prevalent 
contradictions or problems” within an ideology, or offer compensation 
for the values which the audience lacks or which are perceived as 
under threat (Dyer 1998: 27-8). The star is thus an essential element in 
the production and consumption of meaning, in order to promote a 
certain dominant ideology and make it look not only plausible but also 
as the best option around. 
 
4.2 Cultural types and paradigm films 
 
The corpus of films is vast in a film history and -culture like Egypt’s 
and rigorous decisions need to be made, based on justifiable criteria, 
for which Dyer’s typology of stars is helpful. The films were chosen 
based on what Andrew Spicer (2001) called paradigmatic films in his 
enticing study Typical Men: Representations of Masculinity in Popular 
British Culture. Spicer defined paradigm films as “the ones that 
establish, reinforce, or significantly modify, an important male type” 
(id. 3). Not only for the choice of films and different types, but also the 
division in four major time frames in the period following the 1952 
coup, needs justification. I have opted to distinguish these four main 
periods based on both technical and political developments in the film 
industry and the country respectively, but also based on film critics’ 
and scholars’ historical overviews of changing discourses and styles 
within film productions. In the following paragraphs, I will first 
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outline how the term ‘type’ is understood and how paradigms of male 
types have proven to be a useful starting point to distinguish the 
different types and films. 
In order to understand paradigmatic masculinities, Spicer first 
argues that it is indispensable to differentiate between types and 
stereotypes and to do so he uses himself the term cultural types (id. 1). 
A type refers to an immediately recognizable character within a story, 
while a stereotype serves to stigmatize a group (Dyer 1993: 13). A type 
is recognizable in the media, but differs from stereotypes in that it 
does not create a binary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. But as Dyer (1999: 
247) states, the use of stereotypes is “part of the way societies make 
sense of themselves”, and thus they also fulfil a necessary task in 
media representations. It creates a certain group feeling, a unity for 
those not associated with the stereotype, whether a racial, religious, 
class or gender stereotype. 
Dyer furthermore distinguishes between a social type and the more 
generic and ‘universal’ archetype. Yet, the distinction between both is 
not always clear, since Dyer himself realizes that what is passed off as a 
‘universal’ archetype, is in itself a construction of a value system that 
imposes itself as universal and ahistorical. In order to avoid an 
undefinable ‘blurb’ of characteristics and elements, Spicer prefers to 
use the term ‘cultural type’ which is recognizable and functions as an 
umbrella term for Dyer’s more confusing distinction between social 
types and archetypes. Furthermore, the cultural type is open for 
change and can adapt to a particular context (similar to Dyer’s social 
type), as opposed to the more rigid stereotype which is posited as 
fixed, and against the generic archetype. The ‘cultural type’ allows for 
more diversity within the type, across time and across space, while 
still pertaining to and aiming for an (ideal) type. 
In one point I disagree with Spicer, at least when it comes to the 
historically specific context of Egyptian cinema as opposed to British 
cinema. He argues that stars as types had little or no influence on an 
institutional level while the production companies decided on how to 
represent, for example, men in films from the post-war era (1945-60; 
Spicer 2001: 2). In Egypt, I contend, films were and are often written 
with a specific star in mind, who has great influence on how the story 
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will develop or what the final film will look like. Perhaps this is more 
in line with the commercial production of stars similar to Hollywood 
that Dyer has studied and as such gives validity to his claim that films 
can be considered ‘vehicles’ – especially in an Egyptian context – for 
the star’s image to be shown and (possibly) idealized (Dyer 1998: 62). 
Without claiming that a star’s vehicles could be considered a genre – a 
critique aimed at Dyer’s theory by Andrew Britton (2005) – the films 
nevertheless create certain expectations regarding narrative simply 
because of a certain star’s presence in particular films. 
Such a development is visible in films from the 1940s, for example, 
with singer-songwriter Farid al-Atrash who often played the role of 
the poor talented artist in love with a girl whom he in the end is likely 
to marry. These musical comedies were written in the first place to let 
him sing and showcase his new romantic songs to his loved one and 
the audience in the setting of a comedic love story based on 
misunderstandings and double-entendres. Also, more recently, the 
famous star Muhammad Sa‘d continues to represent the same male 
types – the poor unemployed working class man without education 
and with speaking disorders because of drug and alcohol abuse. He has 
the final word on the film’s plotline which often results in the joining 
together of sketches without a real plot structure, to showcase his 
character’s ambiguity and make the audience laugh with recognizable 
and typically Egyptian particularities. The haphazard narrative of his 
films results, however, in uncertainty because simply anything is 
possible. But, he has created certain ‘conventions’ in his films, such as 
video-clip scenes, coming out of nowhere, in which he sings and 
dances. His films consist of a chaotic narrative integrated by his star 
performance, refuting any sort of genre conventions yet 
simultaneously tapping into the rich history and imagery of Egypt’s 
cinema industry and popular culture. 
 
4.3 Four major periods in Egypt’s history and film industry 
 
In order to be able to define the different cultural types present in the 
films, I return back to Spicer’s concept of paradigmatic films. I have 
chosen to chronologically organize the different chapters according to 
82 
 
recognizable masculine types for each period. As these types are all 
historically, culturally and socially contingent, it is possible to discern 
specific ‘paradigm’ masculinities in certain films of each period. A 
downside to this is that not every film is necessarily ‘popular’ in terms 
of its commercial success. Yet, all the films do boast several popular 
actors and actresses of their time, recognizable stars who conveyed 
meaning to their respective audiences. Likewise, although the time 
frames are not always as clear-cut as outlined below, we can 
distinguish broad strokes in the developments and changing forms of 
representation thanks to these somewhat iconic, paradigmatic films. I 
would also like to point out that, although certain paradigms of 
masculinity appear to be more prominent in specific periods, this does 
not mean that they are limited to only that period in time. These 
cultural types, thanks to the acknowledgement of a fluid depiction, can 
return in other periods in different, yet recognizable, forms. 
 
4.3.1 ‘Revolutionary melodrama’ 
The first period I distinguish in this research is relatively easy to 
justify, namely the period following the 1952 coup d’état and the 
subsequent period of public sector film making in Egypt. Still, the 
simple fact that there was a regime change does not necessarily result 
in a change in film production. The commercial productions of 
Egyptian cinema, like musicals and comedies, remained its 
predominant mode of filmmaking while only a handful of realist or 
somewhat anti-authoritarian productions were made alongside the 
commercial ones. 
Nevertheless, the 1950s and 60s offered opportunities for new and 
young directors, but also for new actors, styles and genres. The new 
styles that became ‘popular’ – also thanks to a relaxing censorship law 
– are melodramatic-realist films, with influences from Italian neo-
realism, Soviet montage and German expressionism. The Egyptian 
director Salah Abu Sayf, who studied cinema in Italy clearly affecting 
his film style, is often considered a proponent of a realist style in 
Egyptian cinema – though with melodramatic elements as well. Joel 
Gordon (2002) calls the new style of films from this period revolutionary 
melodrama. These films were made in a period when the state 
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“embarked upon the construction of a new civic identity for an 
independent Egypt” (id. 8). Emboldened by the regime change, 
directors started to explore issues of social inequality, gender 
relations, tradition and modernity, and all this with the image of a new 
Egypt in mind.10 
Although many of the films Gordon treats in his analysis are not 
revolutionary in terms of form and style, they do showcase a “youthful 
spirit that may be called revolutionary” (id. 11). As I will show in my 
analysis as well, the chosen films showcase an ambivalence towards 
and subversion of tradition and patriarchy. As such, it is possible to 
discern major changes in terms of gender representations and 
discourses on gender in the country. Laura Bier argues that there was 
an active politics of gender (Bier 2011: 4) in ‘Abd al-Nasir’s general 
political ideology that was to build the new nation-state. I would like 
to claim – and I will return to this in the next chapter – that this 
politics of gender was also visible in films made in this period. Many 
mainstream directors – particularly Henry Barakat and Salah Abu Sayf 
– directed several films that contributed to this new discourse on 
gender in the post-colonial state.11 A famous example of a nationalist 
feminist film emphasizing the role of women in a new Egypt is the film 
al-Bab al-Maftuh/The Open Door (Henry Barakat 1963), based on the 
novel with the same title by Latifa al-Zayat. But not only new 
representations of women were visible; regarding men we can also 
clearly define new roles and forms of representation. We can discern 
in this period certain new types of men – as opposed to the poor 
romantic singers and bourgeois masculinity of the 1940s. 
                                                   
10 In the sense of constructing an image of the modern nation, the post-
revolutionary films do not differ much from the pre-revolutionary ones. Ifdal 
Elsaket (n.d.) has shown how films from the 30s and 40s already proclaimed 
an image of modernity and progress. Walter Armbrust has made similar 
claims in his essay on the ‘Golden Age before the Golden Age’, the commercial 
film productions – mostly musicals and comedies – from the 1940s. In it, 
Armbrust shows how these films expressed images of a tolerant cosmopolitan 
and multi-religious Egypt. 
11 I am not only talking about films that only passingly mention women 
issues as part of wider social issues, but also explicitly feminist films 
emphasizing the role of women in a new Egypt and in building the nation. 
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Two paradigms of male types will be discussed in this era. On the 
one hand there are the national heroes, symbolizing the strong, 
independent Arab male. These men are the pride of the nation, 
defending it against foreign invaders or local traitors. At the other end 
of the spectrum are the corrupt, backward and traditionalist 
ma‘allimīn. The name literally means ‘masters’ or ‘knowledge-bearers’ 
but refers to their higher economic status within the confines of the 
popular local neighborhood as self-employed shop owners. The 
ma‘allim is often portrayed as an uneducated brute, knowing nothing 
else but a recourse to physical violence and oppression. Both types 
betray the films’ adherence to a hegemonic male ideal, inscribed with 
middle class bourgeois values of progress, education, moderation and a 
presumed equality for women. The national heroes positively portray 
these ideals, heroicized through their masculine performances on the 
screen. The ma‘allim contravenes that presumed ideal, his masculine 
performance depicted as detrimental to not only himself but also his 
surroundings. Additionally, the films do not merely portray rigid 
binaries, but, as we will see, some masculine performances will occupy 
a middle ground. 
 
4.3.2 Defeated men 
The second period under discussion relates strongly to the failing 
political ideologies of the newly established post-colonial Arab nations. 
This was particularly visualized after the devastating war of 1967, 
commonly referred to as the naksa (setback) or hazīma (defeat), which 
left the country almost bankrupt. In the second half of the 1960s more 
and more criticism was noticeable in cultural products – first and 
foremost in the books by Nagib Mahfuz as well as their adapted 
screenplays or the films he wrote the original scenarios for. The period 
of the great national Arab hero had finished and critical questions 
arose on the results of the revolution and the promises made by its 
leaders. Criticism was regulated by state censorship, for example it was 
impossible to directly criticize the president or question the 
revolution’s merit, but it was possible to condemn state officials’ 
corruption and the diminishing revolutionary spirit in society. The 
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war of ‘67 was then seen as the result of bad management and 
corruption in state offices and industries as well as politics. 
In terms of gender representations there is a shift towards more 
superficial characters that can no longer be defined as idealistic or 
heroic – whether they are men or women. They embody the moral 
corruption in a society gone out of control, interested in temporary 
and earthly pleasure. Nouri Bouzid (1995) considers the early 1970s a 
formative period for the new realism of the 1980s and early 90s in Arab 
cinema, in a period when questions arose to make a self-conscious and 
an activist cinema. In the present research, I have opted to keep it as a 
separate era because of its intermediary status – in between the great 
nationalist films and heroes of the 50s and 60s and the antiheroes of 
the 1980s and 90s. In terms of context and censorship too this period is 
intermediary.12 Apart from the period’s formative and intermediary 
status, the films produced in this era were also particularly relatable to 
the social, political and economic changes that the country was 
undergoing during Anwar al-Sadat’s reign. Walter Armbrust (1995) 
gives the period more allure and importance, too. Armbrust argues 
that “[I]t would not be an exaggeration to describe the new popular-
culture style as basically antimodernist” (Armbrust 1995: 103). The 
codes of modernity that were presented in a synthesizing manner in 
films prior to the 1970s were now being used to emphasize the failure 
and humiliation of “the middle class modernist hero” (id. 103). The 
result was a socially aware cinema with depictions of defeated men 
opposing new hegemonic ideals of materialism and nouveau-riche 
bourgeoisie for men and women to aspire to. 
On the one hand, the defeated men were depicted as being at a loss: 
they were unable to live up to the ideals that were upheld for years. 
Simultaneously, these ideals were exposed as lies, a veil barely 
covering deep-running social rifts. At least that was how many 
experienced the ensuing economic and social crises engulfing the 
country. Anwar al-Sadat’s new policies and the eventual opening up to 
foreign investment resulted in depictions of a materialist society gone 
                                                   
12 A case in point is Chahine’s film al-‘Asfur/The Sparrow (1972) which was at 
first forbidden because of its critical stance toward the Nasir-era. The film 
was only allowed to be screened after the ‘victory’ of 1973 in the October war. 
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astray in films from the 70s. Although not immediately comparable to 
the neo-realism of the 80s, the contexts were already set for the 
upcoming new styles: impoverished working and middle classes, 
cracks in the social mobility ideal, the ‘new city’ as décor for the films 
and the new ideal of money and Western consumer goods. The 
nouveau riche bourgeois ideal for men (and women) was portrayed as 
contributing to the further hollowing out of the revolution’s socialist 
idealism in favor of a new, selfish ruling class. These new men proved 
to be old-fashioned patriarchs in disguise, hiding behind a thin veil of 
modern clothing and a Western lifestyle. As is clear from this short 
description, the masculine types in this era are much less clearly 
defined than the more recognizable types of the 50s and 60s, 
shattering for the first time the idealized image of an ‘Arab hero’. 
 
4.3.3 Lower classes monopolize the screen 
In the 1980s, then, we can distinguish a new period and development 
in Egypt’s film production. These films belong to a neo-realist ‘wave’, 
made by a group of directors that studied together at the Cinema 
Institute and often worked collaboratively on their films. They were 
each other’s screenwriters, directors of photography, directors, and 
acted in each other’s films. They also had a similar style, growing up 
together watching the same films on television and in the cinemas, and 
being educated at the same institute, which is why they are sometimes 
referred to as “the children of Abu Seif, the street and Coca-Cola” 
(Shafik 2001: 62). Until today, some of them are iconic directors of 
Egyptian cinema, such as Muhammad Khan, Dawud ‘Abd al-Sayyid, 
Ra’fat al-Mihi, and Khayri Bishara, while others have passed away, 
such as ‘Atif al-Tayyib. 
This mixed background of realism, melodrama and aspects of 
consumer society was clearly visible in their films, coined as ‘the 
middle class going to the supermarket’ by Walter Armbrust (1995: 102). 
They all went out into the streets to film the lives and woes of the 
local, often impoverished, urban Egyptians – with the occasional 
exception in the countryside (al-Tawq wa-l-Iswirra/The Necklace and the 
Bracelet, Bishara 1986). The 1980s also saw the return of female 
directors to the industry who had been virtually non-existent ever 
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since the 1940s’ consolidation of the industry and its subsequent 
masculinization.13 Inas al-Daghaydi was the first female director with 
controversial feature films about women’s issues. Together with Nadia 
Hamza, al-Daghaydi was the most prolific female director of the 80s. 
The case of women directors is, however, discussed in a separate 
chapter. 
As a result of the conservative liberalism of president Anwar al-
Sadat in the 1970s, directors now tended to focus on the negative 
results of a devastating economic policy. This is why they focused their 
attention on the diminishing middle classes in Egypt, the difficult 
economic situations of the working classes, like taxi drivers or young, 
unemployed men. An interesting development too in the 1980s is the 
return to the female masculinity of the so-called ma‘allima. The 
ma‘allima, the female version of the ma‘allim, is a famous local, baladi 
female type that was already depicted in the 1950s. Tahiyya Carioca is 
perhaps one of the most famous incarnations of this type of masculine 
woman in films from the 50s – in the sense of imitating characteristics 
associated with masculinity, not in looks or outer appearances – who 
continued to infatuate men both on- and off-screen, such as Edward 
Said (2000), with her strong decisive attitude and power over men and 
other women in her films. 
Apart from this female type, this chapter on the 1980s and 90s 
discusses on the one hand the futuwwa and on the other hand the 
underdog stemming from the impoverished working and middle 
classes. The futuwwa is a very old and idealized notion of masculinity, 
which gained prominence in the 1980s after Nagib Mahfuz’s 
publication of The Harafish (1977).14 The novel’s different stories of the 
Nagi-family were adapted to the screen, and the 80s produced several 
                                                   
13 Although disappearing behind the camera as directors within the popular 
and commercial cinema industry, women had turned to the less popular field 
of documentary filmmaking or continued to work as screenwriters or editors. 
Famous examples are Atiyyat al-Abnudi as documentary filmmaker, scenarists 
Nabiha Lutfi and Wafiyya Khairi, and the praised film editor from Yugoslavian 
descent, Mila George. 
14 It was not Mahfuz’s first novel to include such a character. In The Children 
of Gebelawi (1959) he already described his view on the traditional quarter, the 
ḥāra, with a similar character like the futuwwa. 
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films with this idealized masculinity. Although the films discussed will 
portray the historical futuwwa, other films have taken up a similar 
premise: of a young man revolting against oppression and injustice, 
usually embodied by wealthy old men. The portrayal of the futuwwa is, 
however, always consistent: guided by morally superior motives 
opposing his antagonist, the young man violently takes what is 
‘rightfully’ his. Next to the futuwwa are the impoverished middle 
classes, embodied by the underdog male. Viola Shafik questions these 
films’ subplots of social mobility and corrupt nouveau-riche, exposing, 
she says, filmmakers’ bourgeois middle class angst (Shafik 2007: 280). 
The male underdog is then the representative of a middle class angst 
of being dethroned and having to substitute morality, culture, and 
manners (which they claim to have a monopoly on) for the new values 
of money, materialism, and consumerism (the perceived threat as 
embodied by the socially mobile lower classes). 
 
4.3.4 New discourses of gender and sexuality 
The last period I will deal with is situated in the new millennium and 
follows a period of artistic renewal in Arab cinema. Malek Khouri 
(2005) labeled films from the period starting halfway through the 90s 
New Arab Cinema, insisting on the films’ new approaches to cinema as 
well as new taboo subjects that were tackled. Khouri distinguishes four 
major themes in this period, relating to the particular historical, social 
and political contexts the directors were making these films in. These 
different topics include a renewed discourse on gender and sexuality, 
religious dogmatism, national identity and self-determination, and a 
self-reflexive mode of filmmaking. Although not entirely ‘new’ themes, 
the way of addressing them differed greatly from previous eras, in part 
because of the films’ anti-modernist look upon the real world. Framing 
these themes within the century-old discussions on the cultural 
rebirth of Arab society, the Nahḍa, Khouri aims to uncover the films’ 
increased interest in old themes portrayed through a new lens. The 
popular films discussed here all signal a sort of backlash against this 
cultural renewal, with depictions of men and masculinities in ‘crisis’, 
or a reinforcement of patriarchy to safeguard masculine domination. 
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We can discern again a few new forms of old types of masculinity, 
like ma‘allim and futuwwa on the one hand, and the educated 
professional – whether intellectual or ‘Westernized’ nouveau riches – 
on the other. At the same time, it seems that a return to these ‘old’ 
types of masculinities we discerned in the 1950s and 60s did not come 
with a similarly renewed gender politics. On the contrary, these ‘new 
men’ – a result of years of bad political and economic management, 
increasing unemployment and poverty – have on the one hand the 
traditional paternalist values that push them to find work and ‘to 
become a man’ as the natural providers of the family. On the other 
hand, they continue to be unable to do so and end up in a kind of 
intermediary zone with no clear way out. The only straw they hang on 
to is their masculinity, interpreted as a father-figure that has the right 
to resort to violence in order to keep his position of power, or 
portrayed as a useless youth in need of the aforementioned 
father-figure. Their physical masculine performance is the only bearer 
of their manhood they have left according to the films. These often 
young men are also – and literally since 2011 – described as criminals, 
baltagiyya,15 a term which gained prominence in popular mass media 
and news outlets after the revolution of 2011. 
The modern patriarch represents the other end of the spectrum of 
male types. Contrary to the baltagi, this type hides his new-found 
masculine domination behind his fancy clothing and modern lifestyles, 
similar to the patriarchs of the 70s. The difference is that these 
contemporary men pretend to express respect for women, instead of 
the regular abuse that was so prevalent in the 70s’ films. In the late 
2000s, the new patriarch asserts him domination under the pretense of 
protection and care, which quickly descends into control. Different 
also are the women’s reactions: they consent to the man’s paternalism 
and condescension. Gone are the gender relations that propose 
equality, or at least offer women the possibility of take up strong and 
decisive roles. Instead, male-female inequality is naturalized through 
the physical differences between men and women. Interestingly, these 
modern patriarchs – like their ‘criminal’ colleagues – also seem to 
                                                   




hang on to a dated concept of masculinity in order to safeguard their 
manhood and their domination over women. Their strong interest in a 
physical masculine performance (muscularity) furthermore 
predisposes them to violence as a ‘natural’ element of masculine 
identity. 
 
4.4 The film text and textual analysis 
 
The analysis of the films in this project consists of a textual analysis, 
focusing on questions of narrative and mise-en-scène. What does it 
mean when we look at a film as a text or talk about film texts? A film 
text (in the semiotic sense) is constructed in a certain way, conveying 
meaning using a specific language, to a specific audience and in a 
specific time and culture. But who produces the text? Is it the director, 
the producer, the actor(s), the scriptwriter, or all of those? How does a 
text ‘mean’? Who is the narrator? And when does a text ‘mean’ 
something? Is the meaning produced by the audience, the ones 
consuming the text and giving additional meaning to it? Stuart Hall, 
while recognizing the merit of content analysis, warns however 
against a rigid textual analysis alone, claiming that the encoding and 
decoding of the message are essential complementary processes (Hall 
2001: 508). Textual analysis of the film thus also requires taking into 
account its context, “the discursive form of the message” (id. 508). 
Referencing Gerbner, Hall notes that representation is never just an 
image, but it consists of discursive messages about what the images 
depict. Images about men and masculinity are not actual men or 
masculinity, but are messages about them made in a particular 
discursive context. 
Considering a film as a text in context, means that the film is also 
an artifact that needs to be analyzed in order to draw valuable 
conclusions from it with regard to prevalent discursive practices in a 
society. To this end, it is necessary to approach a text from a wide 
angle of perspectives using different methods. Close textual readings 
are done through analyzing signs in texts and what they mean, with 
questions such as: What are the particular masculine signs that texts 
offer and show?, How are certain signs used in relation to others and 
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can we distinguish certain relations of power? Not only signs are 
analyzed; also the way formal elements are used in the film to 
construct meaning. David Bordwell (2007) offers an interesting way of 
looking at the text through historical poetics. With attention paid to 
the aesthetics of the film text, this approach uncovers formal elements 
in the text that have arisen in a particular historical period to a 
specific effect in creating meaning. Poetic approaches focusing on the 
‘aesthetic’ have often been criticized for their interest in ‘high culture’ 
or an aesthetics of cinema, yet the usefulness of the approach cannot 
entirely be denied because of the way it has been used by some of its 
practitioners. 
Bordwell has warned however against ‘interpreting’ a film text 
(1989) and instead argues for inferring meaning from the text instead 
of ‘simply’ reading it. But interpreting a text is something we will 
always have to do to a certain extent. As long as the scholar is able to 
keep it to a minimum when writing about a film, and is able to build 
upon cues in the text – and other similar texts – we can draw more 
meaningful conclusions that can also be verified. Therefore Bordwell 
asserts that historical poetics are concerned with questions like “to 
what problems does its composition represent an attempted solution?” 
(Bordwell 1989: 265). Instead of ‘reading’ certain theories into the 
films, I use formalist elements to answer certain questions about the 
construction of masculine identities in a specific historical context. 
However, purely formalist approaches might ignore the films’ specific 
contexts as well as other texts and consider only certain films for their 
aesthetic value. Ideological approaches to film texts are subjective, 
assuming a unified audience. Keeping in mind the limitations and 
strengths of each approach is a way to formally justify possible 
discursive practices in the text. 
How to define the film text itself then? The language of films 
includes the production context of those films. Films are not created 
(nor consumed) in a social, historical, or cultural vacuum. They relate 
to and are constituted through the society and specific cultural 
context in which they are produced. But films are also constructed as 
texts, with a ‘language’, which consists of several layers of text. The first 
layer of the text is what formalists call story (Rimmon-Kenan 1983), 
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fabula (Bordwell 1985), or histoire (Genette 1988). This is the actual 
story, linear from its chronological beginning until its end. The story 
consists of both the events and the characters moving around in them, 
the story stripped of its filmic or narrative elements, the bare 
storyline. This chronological story is often not the way the work of art 
tells the story; it would be uninteresting without using any narrative 
techniques to enliven the story. 
The story is thus contrasted with the plot or the way it is presented 
in its final version to the audience (what Rimmon-Kenan labeled text, 
or Bordwell called syuzhet and Genette called récit). The plot is not 
necessarily a chronological account of the events (it could be though) 
and is constructed through all kinds of narrative strategies (flashback, 
flashforward, points of view, voice-over, etc.) as well as cinematic 
techniques (jump cut, continuity editing, sound, lighting, film angles, 
etc.). The point of these strategies and techniques is to create a certain 
effect and give (additional) meaning to a text. They can consist of 
lighting and sound (diegetic or extradiegetic), the language people use, 
what they say and how they say it, editing and editing techniques 
(continuity editing), or meaningful camera movements (pan, tilt, 
zoom, etc.). The analysis looks at to what effect they are used. For 
example in film, close-ups can be very personal, emphasizing certain 
emotions in the character, a technique often used in melodrama 
because of the genre’s emphasis on emotion and empathy with the 
main character. Additionally, when a director consciously, and with a 
specific effect in mind, in a shot-reverse-shot between a man and 
woman, uses close-ups for the woman, and a medium shot for the man 
this might indicate a greater empathy from the part of the woman, 
emphasizing her facial features, expressions and reactions, as opposed 
to the more ‘rational’ and emotionally stable man, emphasizing his 
physical sturdiness and him being less emotionally involved. 
The third layer is the narrative (narration, Genette) which relates to 
the actual person(s) telling the story. Mieke Bal (2009) defines the 
narrative as the textual layer. The question here is who is telling the 
story? Her interest is not so much in terms of the actual actor 
impersonating the narrator, but as “a function and not a person, which 
expresses itself in the language that constitutes the text” (Bal 2009: 
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15). The narrative can be constructed in a complex manner with 
narratives inside narratives, each with different points of view and 
different characters, using diegetic (e.g. sound of footsteps) and 
extradiegetic (voice over, music that only the audience could hear, 
etc.) elements. For example concerning gender, an analysis of the 
different narratives in the film text informs us which different points 
of view and narratives are presented in the film, and what their 
relationship is to one another. What is the leading narrative? What 
does this tell us about a possible gender order in the film text? A very 
interesting example is the 1957 film al-Futuwwa/The Tough Guy (Salah 
Abu Sayf) in which the story, at first glance, focuses on Farid Shawqi’s 
character Haridi. But when looking more closely at the plot, we notice 
that the decisive changes are made by another guiding character, 
Tahiyya Carioca16 in her role as Hosniya. In chapter 5 I will go into 
more detail concerning this film and a discussion on the male type of 
ma‘allim and the popular (sha‘bi) hero. 
When we analyze the film text, then, it is necessary to describe how 
these different layers relate to each other and what meaning their 
relationship could possibly give to the text. As such, the film is an 
incredibly rich text with many different angles to approach it from or 
to focus on. First in line is the film’s production context, with attention 
given to certain visible and invisible elements in the film text. These 
would include mise-en-scène (such as décor, space, light), the editing 
style, genre conventions, sound techniques, the composition of shots 
and camera angles and techniques. Second are analyses of the specific 
content of the film: the actual narrative, the way the story is told and 
by whom, the presence and use of stars and types. And last is the 
reception of the film, which includes the way audiences and film 
critics interpret the films, its popular appeal and reactions to it. For 
this research I have not included an audience response analysis, but 
reactions to the films – whenever available online on popular fora or in 
                                                   
16 Tahiyya Carioca is famous for her lower class impersonations as well as her 
belly dance performances. Edward Said described her as “a highly visible 
femme fatale in Egyptian films” (2000: 347). He also recalls her initial roles as 
almeh (‘ālima, learned woman), witty, educated, and a kind of courtesan. Later 
in her career, directors cast her in a rougher version of the almeh, as the 
ma‘allima who is discussed in chapter 9. 
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printed articles – are taken into account to understand how the film 
was received and to get extra insights into what these reactions might 
convey about gender and gender relations. All these elements need to 
be taken into consideration when analyzing films in order to draw 
informed, verifiable and probable – yet not necessarily definitive – 








5. Criminals and heroes 
 
In 1952 the Free Officers took hold of the country in a bloodless coup 
and popular cinema was to become part and parcel of the construction 
of a new national image for both Egypt and Egyptians (Gordon 2002: 8-
10). Before the coup, a strict censorship law prevented filmmakers 
from making films that depict and criticize class relations in a deeply 
divided feudal monarchy.1 As a result, many films from the 1930s and 
40s followed strict popular patterns and storylines, avoiding strong 
criticism of ‘old money’ aristocracy and class relations. Even the first 
attempts at ‘realism’ (the films al-‘Azima/Determination, Kamal Salim 
1939, and al-Suq al-Sawda’/The Black Market, Kamal al-Tilmisani 1945, 
are often quoted) did not venture past the strict class-divide, and 
generally depicted popular neighborhoods as folkloric and naive. In 
both films, too, the plot foresaw a dominant and positive role for the 
effendiyya-classes2 as the new educated urban middle class opposed to 
the local and uneducated ‘traditionalists’. 
Roles of men and women and their depictions were limited to the 
romantic singer (e.g. Farid al-Atrash’s stage character),3 the lower 
                                                   
1 Walter Armbrust (2000b) notes directors’ dismay at these censorship laws 
and the hope for radical changes after the coup, quoting director Salah Abu 
Sayf’s ten-point program for better and clearer regulation of the cinema 
industry and the establishment of institutes and schools (id. 317). As Abu Sayf 
saw it, censorship laws established under the British protectorship were 
outdated and did not allow artistic liberty. 
2 See also Jacob (2011) Working Out Egypt, in which he clearly describes the 
role of the new middle class effendiyya in early 20th century Egypt. He writes 
that the bourgeois effendi’s masculinity was either denounced or valorized, 
but proved to be a quintessential identity for the imagination of the modern 
nation (id. 101). The effendi’s identity was constructed around physical 
culture, education, and instilling nationalist feelings, thus creating an ideal 
modern Egyptian citizen alongside the other element of an Egyptian 
imaginary, the peasant (fallāḥ). 
3 Sherifa Zuhur (2003) surveyed his star persona and notes how he 
“established the model of the male romantic star through a self-scripted and 
popularly accepted fusion of his personal history with his screen persona” 
(Zuhur 2003: 276). Of importance is his ability to “fit in” with lower classes 
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working class (e.g. in the film Law Kunt Ghani/If I Were Rich, Henry 
Barakat 1942) or the effendiyya (e.g. al-‘Azima/Determination, Kamal 
Salim 1939; but also in Ghazal al-Banat/Flirtation of Girls, Anwar Wagdi 
1949). Earlier in the 1920s and 30s Bedouin and historic films and, 
later, musicals were very popular, with characters like triumphant 
Arab heroes (Lashin, Fritz Kramp 1938)4 or romantic lovers (e.g. singer 
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab in al-Warda al-Bayda’/The White Rose), or 
both together in Umm Kulthum’s film debut Widad (Fritz Kramp 1936). 
Walter Armbrust (2000a: 199) notes that “[b]efore the 1950s male 
characters in Egyptian films and fan magazines were usually 
associated with a bourgeois Western-looking lifestyle.” Later films 
(from the 70s onward) do not question a similar bourgeois ideal, 
though changes in style and topics are discernable, most prominently 
the choice of how to depict men and women as new and ideal national 
images. 
Gender representations were indirectly followed up by the 
censorship law, which primarily focused on class relations, eventually 
also limiting gender roles. There were strict gender divisions in most 
films – apart from the musicals and comedies that include famous 
Egyptian dancers or singers – with an almost burlesque depiction of 
gender relations, e.g. men subjected to their domineering wives at 
home. These stories are not necessarily emancipative, but rather 
confirm gender roles based on inequality and binary differences 
related to space and who occupies it. Although most of these comedic 
                                                                                                                   
coming from a relatively outcast social class (a Syrian-Druze immigrant to 
Egypt), but also to establish his star image and adorn it with ‘truth’ and 
sincerity, essential elements in order to be and become a star (Dyer 1998). 
4 Kramp’s film Lashin is similar to the story of Spartacus but with far less 
glorification of the male physique as Stanley Kubrick’s 1960 epic Spartacus. In 
Lashin a poor village rises up against the unjust rich – represented by the king 
and his advisors. Lashin is the name of an army officer and the only 
trustworthy man at Court, but the king is surrounded by liars and ultimately 
removes Lashin from his position. The censorship committee forced the 
director to change the end of the film – when the king was supposed to die at 
the hand of a revolting population – and turn it into a triumphant victory for 
the king, reinstating Lashin as his advisor. Lashin’s alternative ending was a 
necessity in monarchical Egypt, for such messages of a proletarian revolt 
against a country’s unjust rulers were deemed too instigating for Egypt’s 
politically inspired censors. 
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and stereotypical roles for men and women did not change 
immediately upon independence, after 1952 new roles for men and 
women were provided by the cinema industry, partly because of the 
industry’s heavy reliance on a melodramatic mode. According to 
Gordon (2002: 11), the genre-driven studio-based cinema of ‘Abd al-
Nasir’s Egypt “provides an alternate reading of genre”, one that allows 
to read those films as historical texts reminiscent of the social and 
political conditions of their time. For my analysis here, Walter 
Armbrust’s assertion about genre conventions will prove pivotal. 
Armbrust (1995: 118) notes that genre conventions function in a 
semantic field where audience and filmmaker collide, while 
simultaneously commercial films might subvert the very conventions 
they subscribe to, allowing for an alternative reading. In this chapter I 
will demonstrate how gender representations have changed during the 
50s, focusing on men and masculinities while not disregarding women, 
and discuss the new hegemonic types these modernist films construct. 
 
5.1 The Ma‘allim: Violence and power 
 
One of the prominent masculine types in films from the 1950s is the 
violent and muscle-yielding ma‘allim, which could be translated 
literally as ‘master’ or – in more film-related vocabulary – as ‘Boss’. I 
prefer the term ‘Boss’, as the ma‘allim is often the leader of a gang of 
criminals in local popular neighborhoods. Of course, a ma‘allim is not 
necessarily a criminal character, but a criminal gang leader is often 
referred to as ma‘allim. It can furthermore be a respectful title for local 
shop owners and entrepreneurs in lower class areas. The ma‘allim’s 
role in the film is furthermore defined by the film’s genre and its 
overall theme. He is sometimes ridiculed, sometimes portrayed as the 
‘evil’ mastermind. The character is also not ‘new’ for a post-’52 cinema 
– in 1951 Hasan Ramzi directed the cross-dressing farce al-Ma‘allim 
Bulbul/Master Bulbul (see also chapter 9) – though its context and 
setting had changed remarkably. I want to emphasize that the ma‘allim 
gained prominence after 1952, but is not limited to this period alone. 
The 1980s saw a vivid return to the character, albeit mixed up with the 
idealized futuwwa-type. Not to be underestimated is the actor who had 
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created his ‘tough guy’ star persona on screen, whose heydays were 
known in the 50s as ‘malik al-tirsu’ (king of the third-class seats) and 
who also returned in the 1980s films as futuwwa/ma‘allim: Farid Shawqi 
(1920-1998).5 
The type is contingent to specific historical and social contexts, as 
well as the production context of the films. The year 1952 brought 
about a change in the cinema industry and new modes of filmmaking 
became more prominent, particularly melodrama and melodramatic 
realism. Ginette Vincendeau’s (1989) analysis of poetic realist women’s 
films from 1930s France describes this filmic mode as one representing 
a world “dominated by fate, coincidence, circularity, and nostalgia” 
(id. 52). These are also hallmarks of 1950s Egyptian melodrama 
(Malkmus and Armes 1991: 101-2), although we need to bare the 
specificities of an Egyptian context in mind. The poetic realism present 
in some Egyptian films of the 50s and 60s is particularly visible in the 
work of Salah Abu Sayf (1915-1996). I will discuss later in this chapter 
his film al-Futuwwa/The Tough Guy (1957), but also other films by Abu 
Sayf are prominent exponents of poetic realism, for example Bidaya 
wa-Nihaya/Dead Among the Living (1960). Not coincidentally, both films’ 
scenarios were written with the help of, or based upon novels by, 
Nagib Mahfuz. 
When genres and filmmaking modes change due to changing socio-
political conditions, representational practices change accordingly. 
Where the ma‘allim in Master Bulbul is not necessarily a criminal, 
chances are that they will be in the ‘newer’, post-’52 films thanks to 
the less strict censorship on portrayals of social malaise. More 
important are perhaps their similarities. One of the films discussed in 
this chapter (The Tough Guy, Salah Abu Sayf 1957) portrays 
recognizable patterns of this male type. In both The Tough Guy and 
Master Bulbul the bosses are represented as very traditionalist and 
conservative – often southern-Egyptian – characters. One of their main 
and indispensable features is a mustache, that ever-present symbol of 
                                                   
5 Armbrust’s (2000a) analysis of Farid Shawqi’s star persona looks at a lesser 
known aspect of the actor’s public persona: the image of the family-man, 
being married to the singer, dancer and actress Huda Sultan. In some of his 
films too, Armbrust argues, he has portrayed this family image. My concern 
here is with his more famous persona of the brute and the villain. 
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masculinity. Men with mustaches in Egyptian films are not always 
doing well, though, and often the mustache is reduced to an object of 
ridicule.6 The tough-guy masculinity of the bosses requires an 
exhibition of these ubiquitous signs of masculinity; paradoxically, this 
does not always include heroic parts in the narrative for these types of 
men. 
Often shown wearing traditional southern Egyptian dress – with 
galabiyya and turban, and a walking stick showing their rank and 
status – the similarities between the ‘old’ (pre-’52) and ‘new’ (post-’52) 
ma‘allimīn are not limited to their looks. They are also localized and 
usually appear in urban settings, as is the case in The Tough Guy and 
Master Bulbul.7 Even in more recent films from the 1980s and later, the 
ma‘allim is often portrayed as a southern-Egyptian man that moved to 
the city at some point. They usually inhabit public spaces, like shops 
(fruit-, vegetable-, or spice shops) or traditional café’s (the qahwa 
baladī) and perform other ‘manly jobs’ as well, such as butcher (e.g. in 
al-Sifira ‘Aziza/Super ‘Aziza, Tolba Radwan 1961). Considering their 
space, their looks and their work we could say they are represented as 
traditionalist, ‘masculine’ men (or the occasional woman). How does 
this description result in representations of this ma‘allim in specific 
films and what can such analysis tell us about their perceived role in 
both films and society? 
                                                   
6 Actor Husayn Isma‘il – always with mustache – is reproached for his 
unsatisfying work in the film Tamr Hinna (Husayn Fawzi 1957), after which his 
boss decides to shave his mustache, since he is always swearing on it as a way 
to safeguard his honor. A big drama ensues and the man is shamed when he 
forcefully loses his mustache. Also in Youssef Chahine’s al-Ard/The Land (1970) 
the main character’s mustache is shaved as punishment for his actions. A 
more recent example is actor Muhammad Sa‘d in the film Katkut (Ahmad 
‘Awad 2006) who also needs to shave his mustache. Again the character goes 
completely insane over the prospect of losing his “apex of masculinity”, 
undressing and suggesting to shave his entire body. In both films, we can read 
a certain rape narrative in the shaving of the mustache, the men’s ultimate 
and untouchable marker of masculinity. 
7 Other examples abound, for example the 1956 police film Rasif Nimra 
Khamsa/Platform 5 (Niyazi Mustafa), the thriller Raya wa-Sikina/Raya and Sikina 
(Salah Abu Sayf 1952), both with Farid Shawqi in two distinct roles, and the 
1954 cross-dressing comedy with Isma‘il Yasin and Riyad al-Qasabgi, al-Anisa 




5.1.1 The Tough Guy 
An example of a ma‘allim’s performance is visible in the 1957 film The 
Tough Guy, directed by Salah Abu Sayf. The film’s title would indicate it 
is actually about the futuwwa-type, but the main characters are never 
really referred to as futuwwa. There is furthermore discussion on 
whether the film actually portrays that particular type (Salah 2012). 
Nahid Salah notes that The Tough Guy (al-Futuwwa), although the title 
would suggest otherwise, in the first place discusses shifting economic 
policies and a corrupt society in which the rich have no pity for the 
poor instead of fatwana,8 similar to Malkmus’ and Armes’ claim about 
the film, with its interest in the ‘mechanics of capitalism’ (Malkmus 
and Armes 1991: 102). But Salah’s concept of the futuwwa is ahistoric 
and confined to a fixed set of characteristics, which are not my main 
concern here.9 Neither am I concerned with a structural description of 
certain futuwwa-films, as do Malkmus and Armes. Rather, the main 
question addressed in the analysis of the film, is how its specific 
gender dynamics reveal a certain doubt in male behavior, while 
certain aspects of the different characters are positively portrayed as 
masculine. 
The film The Tough Guy is lauded for several reasons, not in the least 
because of the raw realism that Salah Abu Sayf depicts and of course 
the participation of Nagib Mahfuz in writing the script. The director 
                                                   
8 Interesting to note is that a similar perception of society was prevalent in 
the early 80s, after the gap between lower and upper classes had increased 
because of Sadat’s infitāḥ. 
9 Another example of an early futuwwa-film is Niyazi Mustafa’s 1954 film 
Futuwwat al-Husayniyya/Futuwwas of the Husayn-district, also with Farid Shawqi. 
The difference with Abu Sayf’s film is that the former has a rather positive 
message, somehow similar to what happened in the country at the time. The 
dictator-futuwwa was replaced by a just futuwwa, caring for the poor and 
disenfranchised. The director Niyazi Mustafa visualizes this in the final battle 
with his trademark comedy, when the owner of the café – depending on how 
the fight is going – continuously changes the pictures of the ma‘allimīn – a 
reference, also, to the official pictures of the ruler (whether the king or the 
president) hanging behind the desks of police investigators or government 
employees. An interesting artist’s rendition of this motif in Egyptian films is 
visible in the short film by Raed Yassin (from: 
http://www.raedyassin.com/works.25; acc. 23 October 2014).  
101 
 
has spent four months going to a large local vegetables market to 
study its economics and social relations (Abu Sayf 1996: 94), but the 
traders there did not appreciate his presence. The entire movie was 
later shot in a rebuilt market in the studios, reminiscent of the stylized 
realism of French poetic realism. The plot is supposed to be inspired by 
a true story in the vegetables market of Rod al-Farag (a few kilometers 
north of Cairo), according to Hasan Haddad (1993). According to the 
actual event, King Faruq was involved in the price hikes by a few rich 
traders who would give the king a slice of the profit. Whether or not 
this is a true story, in itself it does serve as an indication of the extent 
to which the royal family and the local rulers were perceived as 
corrupt by critics and the general population. It also indicates the new 
regime’s propaganda, slandering the monarchy. Accordingly, many 
post-independence films reused and contributed to this perception 
when depicting the old regime as corrupt womanizers, drunks and 
gamblers. 
Salah Abu Sayf was one of the most lauded Egyptian directors, with 
many of his films on the top list of Egyptian classics.10 According to 
critic Hasan Haddad, the realist style of Abu Sayf meant more than 
simply depicting what was happening, it meant looking for reasons 
behind the present state. This element is certainly prevalent in The 
Tough Guy, which spends a lot of its reel time on explaining the way the 
market place – its main setting – operates. Abu Sayf has also often 
worked together with not only Nagib Mahfuz for his films’ scripts, but 
also with actor Farid Shawqi as the embodiment of lost morals in The 
Tough Guy and al-Asta Hasan/Foreman Hasan (1952). In the latter film he 
played the role of an honorable working-class man lured into the 
clutches of a rich woman, but redeemed for his actions at the end, 
returning to his wife and son. Shawqi was also the bad guy in Raya wa-
Sikina/Raya and Sikina (Salah Abu Sayf 1952), abducting ignorant girls 
to steal from and murder them, by order of ma‘allima Raya. In Dead 
                                                   
10 Some of his most famous and lauded films are Shabab Imraʼa/Youth of a 
Woman (1956), La Anam/Sleepless (1957) – with Fatin Hamama in a rare ‘evil’ 
role, Ana Hurra/I Am Free (1959), Hamam al-Malatili/Malatili Bath (1973), and al-
Saqqa Mat/The Waterbearer Is Dead (1977). 
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Among the Living, Shawqi plays a supporting role as pimp, although his 
character is not as ‘evil’ as in Raya and Sikina. 
Throughout his career, Abu Sayf has incorporated comedic and 
melodramatic features in his predominantly realist films. Although it 
is not within the scope of this research to extrapolate the specific 
features, qualities, effects and techniques of a melodramatic mode in 
Egyptian cinema in general – we would first need an assessment of to 
what extent it can be defined a filmic mode, rather than a genre11 – I 
will have to explain a few of its dominant techniques and elements 
throughout the analyses. Linda Williams (1998: 42) argues in her 
account of Hollywood melodrama that “supposedly realist cinematic 
effects – whether of setting, action, acting, or narrative motivation – 
most often operate in the service of melodramatic affects.” Abu Sayf, 
with his realist style, cannot be described as solely employing realism, 
for he applied too many different modes and techniques in his films. In 
al-Zoga al-Tanya/The Second Wife (1967), he used certain elements of 
cinematic neo-realism, such as filming on location, the (partial) use of 
non-professional actors and a local dialect. But, with its emphasis on 
the plights of the poor and its pathos affecting the audience to 
sympathize with the victim-heroine and her husband, both famous 
star actors, the basic mode of this film’s narrative is melodramatic. 
The present film under discussion employs a lot less pathos and 
emotionality. Instead, the film is not void of some comedy, because of 
its stereotypical depictions of southern Egyptians (usually as not too 
bright) and deriding the muscularity of certain men. The facial 
features and bodies of these ma‘allimīn are an important marker of 
their identities, and the director’s choice of Farid Shawqi and Zaki 
Rustum as the two main opponents works well to convey their 
upcoming conflict. The muscular body of Farid Shawqi, and the old but 
still strong looking body of Zaki Rustum (he was an Egyptian 
weightlifting champion in the 20s, and the quintessential example of 
an ideal Egyptian subject under colonial rule) are two examples of a 
                                                   
11 Peter Brooks (1976, 1995: viii-ix) in his analysis of elements of melodrama 
in French novels has argued that “melodrama is a coherent aesthetic system”, 
but one that belongs to “a post-sacred era” in which the common everyday 
becomes meaningful. Film scholars (e.g. Gledhill 1987, Williams 1998) have 
taken up this premise and extended it to Hollywood cinema. 
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presumed ideal masculine body. Yvonne Tasker (1993: 232), referring 
to Dyer, reminds us of the paradox of muscular male bodies, 
functioning to reiterate the notion of male domination, while also 
pointing at the labor that went into achieving such a body, thus 
questioning its ‘naturalness’. The muscularity of Farid Shawqi’s star 
persona is emphasized in his embodiment of the mythical Arab poet 
and strongman ‘Antar, in the film ‘Antar bin Shaddad (Niyazi Mustafa 
1961). 
The Tough Guy starts with a short text stating that in a not so distant 
past, the people’s prospects to eat and chances to survive were in the 
hands of a wealthy few, indicating that the plot situates itself in feudal 
pre-1952 Egypt. Then we are introduced to the main character Haridi, 
a poor southern day-worker played by Farid Shawqi, who arrives in 
Cairo looking for work. After visiting his family – with a lengthy 
exchange of greetings – he arrives at a big market where he is 
introduced to the “seal of the market”, a slap on his scruff.12 The 
viewer is also immediately confronted with the violent power struggle 
that rules this market place, where newcomers are subjugated and 
have to work their way up the strict hierarchy of that market. Dancer 
and actress Tahiyya Carioca, in her role as Hosna, is a pivotal character 
in the film joining him at that very moment. She has been selling 
baskets at the market for some time and knows the local habits and 
market rules. 
Haridi’s first job is to replace a sick donkey, pulling a cart in order 
to earn some money. The image of Haridi’s powerful torso and 
muscular body, together with the scene’s montage are informative. 
Haridi – barefoot and sweating, clenching his galabiyya between his 
teeth – is pulling the cart, after which the camera cuts to his feet and 
back to his scruff, referring to the slap he received earlier and in order 
to establish his subordinated position. Then he is shown wrapping his 
feet with fabric, followed by another close-up of him pulling the cart 
                                                   
12 In Egypt this indicates a sign of disrespect towards the slapped person who 
is then considered as weak and eventually emasculated by the perpetrator. 
Slapping and other forms of physical violence are often used comedically, 
ridiculing the subjugated person. This too raises questions about masculine 
performances and particularly what is deemed unmasculine, which therefore 
requires opposition to it. 
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juxtaposed with a close-up of a donkey (including blinders) pulling a 
cart, establishing a bond between man and beast who are both not 
expected to think, but act. 
These introductory scenes displaying Haridi’s muscular body 
confirm the extreme strength and willpower of our future ma‘allim, 
while they also portray the bad working conditions for the 
subordinated lower class workers to which Haridi initially belongs. It 
furthermore confirms Farid Shawqi’s nickname as “the beast of the 
white screen”.13 This was not his own preferred nickname (Armbrust 
2000a: 203), although this is how he is most vividly remembered by 
audiences. His many evil roles destined him to die or otherwise be 
punished for his actions. He tried to counter this image of him as a 
brute in some of the films whose production process he could 
influence.14 
As soon as the donkey gets better, Haridi has to look for a new job. 
He arrives on the doorstep of the leading fruit and vegetables trader 
on the market, ma‘allim Abu Zayd. Abu Zayd – played by Zaki Rustum 
(1903-1972) – is a ruthless man controlling the prices on the market. 
He holds all authority in the area, but abuses it through his 
authoritarian and criminal behavior, condoned by the country’s rich 
thanks to his lucrative deals and good personal relations with the 
ruling classes. Considering the negative depiction of a pre-1952 Egypt 
in which the ma‘allim of The Tough Guy flourishes, entertaining very 
close relations with the rich and corrupt regime, the character suffers 
automatically from a bad reputation with the audience. Abu Zayd is 
depicted as the ultimate bad guy, beating up homeless people and 
beggars – more precisely command others to do it for him – 
unscrupulous in business, selling at extremely high prices and with no 
compassion for anyone or anything. His famous words summarize the 
character: “id-dinya zaḥma, khallīha tkhiff” [it’s a crowded world, let’s 
relieve it a bit]. His relationship with the country’s upper class also 
shows another element that often returns in Egyptian cinema in 
                                                   
13 His infamous title in Arabic is waḥsh al-shāsha, beast of the screen, referring 
to his many unsympathetic portrayals of ‘bad guys’. 
14 This includes The Tough Guy but also Foreman Hasan. In both films, his 
character repents at the end of the film. 
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general: how the wealthy were (and are) depicted as living their 
‘Western and bourgeois’ lifestyles, while vigorously holding on to strict 
authoritarian rule to suppress lower classes and deny others a similar, 
liberal, lifestyle. 
Farid Shawqi and Zaki Rustum have been portrayed as enemies in 
other films, for example in the film of the same era, Rasif Nimra 
Khamsa/Platform Five (Niyazi Mustafa, 1956), or have entered in an 
unlikely agreement as in the film Sira‘ fi al-Wadi/Struggle in the Valley 
(Youssef Chahine, 1954). Similar to Foreman Hasan, Farid Shawqi 
participated in writing the scenario of Platform Five, resulting in a 
similar storyline with the actor in a leading role and not merely as ‘evil 
beast’. In both these films he heralds a family life, as father and 
protector, although in Foreman Hasan he needs to learn this the hard 
way. This storyline stands in stark contrast to the plot of Struggle in the 
Valley, where Shawqi plays the unequivocal bad guy, eventually 
causing a rift between his and Rustum’s character, revealing their 
opportunist relationship. Struggle in the Valley also proclaims a message 
of modernity, when Shawqi’s character Riyad is handed over to the 
police for due investigation, instead of being killed according to local 
tradition.15 
Not only in films but also in the real world are Farid Shawqi and 
Zaki Rustum representatives of two very different backgrounds. Zaki 
Rustum is the son of a Pasha, born into a noble and rich family, with an 
aristocratic name. Farid Shawqi, however, is not only a popular 
working-class hero in his films; he was actually born into a working-
class family in the popular and lower-middle class Cairene 
neighborhood Sayyida Zaynab. There is another very important 
difference between the two star actors. Whereas Farid Shawqi actively 
used films and other media to construct his image of a ‘he-man’ 
(Armbrust 2000: 202-3), Zaki Rustum mostly avoided the spotlights 
whenever he was not on a film set, slighty contradicting his stardom. 
                                                   
15 Southern Egypt is up until today famous for its vendettas (tār, in Standard 
Arabic thaʼr), which are often portrayed in films situated in the rural south. 
Their portrayal is part of the modernism-traditionalism paradigm in Egyptian 
cinema, to which Armbrust (1995) has alluded with the ‘codes of modernity’. 
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Both actors started their careers in one of the many theater troupes 
that were active in Cairo in the 1920s-40s; Zaki Rustum acted in the 
troupes of Georges Abyad and Ramsis, while Farid Shawqi was 
headhunted by the famous theater actor (and later film actor, 
scenarist and director) Yusif Wahbi. Both men have played slightly 
similar roles, as utterly evil bad guys or as loving and caring father 
figures. Zaki Rustum’s physique did not allow him to be cast as a 
violent tough guy; he was too short and too old to convincingly stage 
such a muscular performance by the 1950s. On the other hand, his 
facial features – and particularly his piercing eyes and hawkish nose – 
allowed him to perform roles of strict, threatening and occasionally 
psychopathic figures. As such, and also because he was already a few 
decades older than his co-actors, he usually took on guiding roles, such 
as his character Abu Zayd, the boss, in The Tough Guy. 
Violence is essential to the ma‘allim type in this film, as a means to 
control his surroundings, while the type inhibits inconsistencies being 
both a ‘traditional’ local type, as well as venturing into the world of the 
rich. His dominance is protected through an extensive network of local 
footmen all the way to the top. If one were to venture into the realm of 
the ma‘allim, the latter would be quick to destroy him or her and 
safeguard his dominant position. Farid Shawqi’s character Haridi is 
obviously made of different material. He starts out as the naive 
ignorant peasant moving from the countryside to the city, but ends up 
as one of the strongest and most powerful men in the market – in part 
thanks to his physical power. The clash between the two men can also 
be read as a struggle between generations, the older ma‘allim Abu Zayd 
against the young and ambitious ma‘allim Haridi, as Malkmus and 
Armes did in their analysis of the film, labelling its genre ‘male 
melodrama’ (Malkmus and Armes 1991: 102). They argue that the 
‘genre’ of the futuwwa films exposes a circular narrative, basing their 
analyses primarily on this one film where indeed a younger futuwwa 
replaces an older one. Yet, they failed to note the importance of one 
particular character in the film, Hosna, ignoring the film’s gender 
relations – both among men and between men and women. Careful 
attention to the film’s plot development shows that, for a film about 
‘tough men’, it has very little to do with male agency. 
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Women actively participate in the plot, if not guiding it, similar to 
other films by Salah Abu Sayf such as Raya and Sikina and La 
Anam/Sleepless (1957). In the man’s world, that is, the market place, 
there is one woman who plays an important role: Tahiyya Carioca’s 
character Hosna. The only other woman of note in the film is the 
corrupt rich woman, Thoraya Hānim (Lady Thoraya, played by Mimi 
Shikib). At a certain point, Hosna and Thoraya clash at a cocktail party, 
in which Hosna as the local ‘baladi’ woman gains the upper hand but is 
removed from the scene by her already rich husband Haridi. Haridi 
slaps her and tells her he does not want to see her again, a very 
important shift in the power balance between the two characters. 
While Hosna has played the main role in the plot against Abu Zayd and 
has always continued to support Haridi – she used him primarily as a 
tool to get what she wants – the roles are turned around when Haridi 
has enough money of his own and no longer needs Hosna, but rather 
Thoraya Hānim, to get more influence in higher political circles. 
Important to note is that Haridi had not shown any violence toward 
Hosna for as long as he himself remained in a subordinated position 
vis-à-vis not only the ma‘allim and Hosna, but the whole market place. 
Indeed, Haridi accepted a relationship based on equality with his 
girlfriend (and later his wife) Hosna, and with all the other men with 
whom he made a business deal. Having reached the peak of 
masculinity as the new ma‘allim, he changes entirely from a 
hardworking, honorable and respectable – though be it a bit naive – 
man into a lazy and ‘evil’ character who no longer considers his wife as 
his equal, but rather considers women as disposable means to an end. 
With regard to his partners, he no longer respects their opinions nor 
does he care for the weak in society, as he did when he was still one of 
them. After he fought and won the ‘cold war’ – but also the actual 
physical fight – between him and Abu Zayd, he himself starts to occupy 
a hegemonic position in the market and as such starts acting 
accordingly. 
His position can be considered hegemonic and not only 
authoritarian – the same is true for the previous ma‘allim as well as the 
next – because he was able to attain his statute through a limited use 
of violence (which is part of his power struggle) and, more 
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importantly, negotiations. In as much as his struggle for power is at 
first instigated by his girlfriend who inspires him with an ideal of 
equality in order to fight a corrupt ‘old system’ – represented by the 
ma‘allim – so is his final achievement of power accomplished through 
accepting and abusing that same system. The film as such does offer an 
opportunity to adapt for the better a corrupt and patriarchal system 
that oppresses and keeps subjugated a whole facet of the population: 
those who do not have the power nor the wealth to stand up for 
themselves. That chance for equality, where everyone – including 
women embodied by Hosna – works together on an equal footing, is 
ultimately squandered by the very man who profited from the support 
he received. 
The film also shows that power is a fluctuating and fragile ‘whole’, 
exhibited by the different ma‘allim-characters in the plot. Abu Zayd’s 
strength relied upon his good relations with the upper-classes 
essentially protecting him, as well as his forced cooperation with the 
smaller traders in the market. As tough as his masculinity appears to 
be in the public market space, his soft and flirtatious nature with both 
Thoraya Hānim and a young male secretary in an official’s office give 
away the internal inconsistencies and contradictions of his identity.16 
Haridi’s strength is the result of the successful cooperation between 
those smaller traders bearing a grudge against their common enemy, 
one of them – perhaps the ‘toughest’, definitely the smartest – being a 
woman. Further, he came to power through an intricate plot 
development, slowly but surely undermining his enemy’s hegemonic 
position with the help of his wife Hosna, a rather ‘feminine’ trait in a 
film that is supposed to deal with such ‘masculine’ and violent types. 
And just like Abu Zayd, Haridi turns soft and meek in the presence of a 
woman, allowing a glimpse behind this masquerade of a tough 
masculine façade. Shawqi’s Haridi, however, will not let himself be 
caught flirting with any official’s male secretary nor does he surround 
                                                   
16 A more explicit reference to a homosexual ma‘allim can be found in Hasan 
al-Imam’s film Zo’a’ al-Mida”/Midak Alley (1963), based on the novel by Nagib 
Mahfuz. The author is more explicit than the film about the homosexuality of 
the ma‘allim, yet the character is present in the film as well. In The Tough Guy 
the scene is short, open to interpretation and subject to a queer reading. 
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himself with tough muscular men, as opposed to Rustum’s 
contradictory character, Abu Zayd. 
 
5.1.2 Super ‘Aziza 
The second film is different in approach, perhaps less realist, certainly 
more comedic. The film Super ‘Aziza (Tolba Radwan 1961) also differs in 
representation of the timeframe, the 1950s and 60s.17 Tolba Radwan 
(n.d.) has not made many films, but the few films he did direct, were 
often great successes. He regularly co-directed with Salah Abu Sayf 
and was significantly influenced by the latter’s realist style. Most of 
the films in Radwan’s repertoire were co-productions with in the first 
place Abu Sayf18 but also others like the comedy-director Fatin ‘Abd al-
Wahhab19 and melodrama-director Hilmi Halim.20 Tolba Radwan’s 
Cairo is different from Abu Sayf’s in that Radwan is perhaps more of a 
cultural ambassador for the city. He has a talent for location hunting 
around the city, resulting in beautiful historical scenery in his films. 
Reminiscent of ‘Abd al-Wahhab he adds some comedy to the otherwise 
quite serious plot and subject matter, while Hilmi Halim’s influence 
has left a melodramatic mark on Radwan’s films. The results are very 
entertaining yet timely and topical films containing a wealth of 
information about 1960s Cairo and Egypt. 
Super ‘Aziza is a folkloric story loosely based on one of the stories of 
the Banu Hilal, a corpus of folk tales about the adventures of an Arab 
tribe moving through Northern Africa.21 The ma‘allim in this film, 
                                                   
17 The film Super ‘Aziza is often mistranslated. In Arabic, sifīra and safīra look 
similar and usually the title is thus incorrectly read as al-Safira ‘Aziza, meaning 
‘ambassador’ ‘Aziza. 
18 For example the films al-Tariq al-Masdud/The Closed Road (1958), Mugrim fi 
Agaza/A Thief on Holiday (1958), Ana Hurra/I’m Free (1959), Law‘it al-Hubb/Agony 
of Love (1960). 
19 For example Isma‘il Yasin Bulis Harbi/Isma‘il Yasin Military Policeman (1958), 
Hallaq al-Sayyidat/Womens’ Barber (1960). 
20 For example al-Qalb luh Ahkam/The Heart Has its Reasons (1956), Hikayat 
Hubb/A Love Story (1959). 
21 The Banu Hilal were a group of Bedouin tribes from the Arabian peninsula, 
but had moved towards Egypt and later to other parts of Northern Africa 
somewhere in the 10th and 11th centuries. The story that inspired the film is 
about ‘Aziza, daughter of the ruler of Tunis, who locked up the beautiful 
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played by the tall and strong ‘Adli Kasib, is yet another contradictory 
character that squanders his sister’s inheritance on beautiful women 
while simultaneously keeping a very close eye on the whereabouts of 
both his wife and sister. He is supposedly a ‘man of honor’ but is in fact 
an autocratic patriarch, challenged by ‘Aziza’s suitor, a young and 
handsome schoolteacher played by Shukri Sarhan. This time, ma‘allim 
‘Abbas is a butcher, and his criminal activity extends beyond selling 
illegally slaughtered meat. He also beats up and occasionally kills any 
man who tries to oppose him and his business or drops an eye on his 
beautiful sister. The schoolteacher, Ahmad, moves in the flat next to 
his and is introduced to ‘Aziza (played by Su‘ad Husni), whom he is 
infatuated with, but only after he realizes she is the ‘Super ‘Aziza’ 
everyone talks about. Ahmad is representative of the effendiyya, the 
educated yet impoverished middle class aspiring men that had taken 
on a prominent role in Egyptian mass media such as film. 
‘Abbas does not trust the suitor and reckons Ahmad is only 
interested in ‘Aziza’s money – the money he is spending on other 
women – and might claim it as soon as Ahmad marries her. In fact, it is 
‘Aziza who is using Ahmad as a tool to get her money back from her 
abusive brother. As in The Tough Guy, a woman is at the basis of the 
plot and takes initiative, but in a male-dominated society she needs to 
play by the rules in order to get what she wants. Both ‘Aziza in Super 
‘Aziza and Hosna in The Tough Guy are “bargaining with patriarchy” 
(Kandiyoti 1988: 275), or negotiating for their own benefit through an 
accepted set of rules in a patriarchal system. This attitude will 
obviously return in many more films, but it is particularly exemplary 
in films depicting an extreme variant of the Egyptian male that the 
ma‘allim with his lush mustache and muscular, virile body surely is. 
There is a big difference between the male characters that both 
women use in their bargain. While Hosna chooses another ‘tall and 
strong’ guy to be physically able to conquer the existing ma‘allim – 
which he eventually does, but is destroyed in the process – ‘Aziza 
                                                                                                                   
Yunis, son of the Sultan of the Hilal-tribe, in her palace. The stories were 
often told in the traditional ṣandūq al-dunya, a kind of puppet theatre, which 




chooses a schoolteacher who has no intention of becoming a new 
ma‘allim, but eventually does challenge ‘Abbas physically. As a result, 
although this was never intended by either party, Ahmad uses not his 
brains (against the illiterate ma‘allim) but rather his youthful physical 
strength to win the upper hand. In this way, Ahmad’s male type – the 
educated middle class – shows several paradoxes as well. He is 
portrayed as an educated man, respecting women as well as local 
traditions, but whose intellectual advantage is finally deserted and 
rendered useless against ‘Abbas. 
Super ‘Aziza is a comedy with melodramatic features and offers 
subversions of those images of physically strong men. But, as Dyer 
(2002b: 4) has noted, pointing at the constructed nature of those 
images and performances, does not necessarily deconstruct their 
normativity. The comedy and laughter work to differentiate, as the 
stereotypical figure of ‘Abbas proves to us. ‘Abbas is literally a 
caricature of the ma‘allim, with his imposing physique and prominent 
mustache – not coincidentally all his ṣubyān22 are young and skinny 
boys, and noticeably shorter than himself, emphasizing his tall and 
powerful figure. The film continuously refers to male strength in all its 
facets, including sexual performances. These references to male 
physique are simultaneously subversive through the caricature of the 
ma‘allim, but they are also reaffirmed at some point in the film. The 
male characters are contradictory, like ‘Abbas’ hypocrisy and double 
standards, or Ahmad’s renouncement of his ‘enlightened’ reasoning. 
However, by allowing Ahmad to ‘imitate’ ‘Abbas’s violence, the film’s 
ending discloses a kind of ambiguity towards gender identities and 
gender relations. For, while ‘Aziza refused any sexual relations with 
Ahmad as long as he would not ‘man up’, she is infatuated with his 
ultimate acceptance of primitive violence. 
 
In both films we can thus see that the aspirant-ma‘allim imitates his 
predecessor, either willingly or not. The movies seem to suggest that 
the only way to fight against this type of men is imitating their 
behavior and using their features in order to position oneself on top. 
                                                   
22 The word ṣubyān is plural of ṣabīy, which means ‘boy’, or here referring to 
the younger apprentices and men helping in his butchery. 
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Haridi obviously ‘imitates’ the ‘original’ ma‘allim, who also turns out to 
have replaced yet an earlier ‘original’ and so on, which shows that the 
masculine role they perform is just that: a performance, a continued 
imitation of a perceived ‘original’. Their own violent behavior proves 
to be self-destructive because the men at the end of the film lose and – 
in the case of Haridi – are replaced once again. As evidenced at the end 
of The Tough Guy, the continuous copying will go on as long as there’s a 
system in place that favors such types of men and such masculinities 
which are simultaneously required to keep such an abusive system in 
power. The men – on whose bodies these relations of power are played 
out – will continue to copy and imitate, to out-perform their 
predecessor, in such a way that eventually their masculinity is 
unveiled as a parody. 
For Frederic Jameson, parody offers “that still latent feeling that 
there exists something normal compared to which what is being 
imitated is rather comic” (Jameson 1983: 114). In this sense, the parody 
of this form of masculinity does not necessarily do away with a 
normative hegemonic ideal (its opposite). This normative ideal is 
embodied by the effendi masculinity of Ahmad in Super ‘Aziza, while 
Abu Sayf’s The Tough Guy is more pessimistic in his vision of the 
capitalist structure of the market place. This could well be the main 
reason for Nahid Salah’s criticism on the film’s use of the ideal 
masculinity of futuwwa in its title: its absence of an ‘honorable’ 
portrayal of a futuwwa-like male who would ‘save the day’. But for 
Judith Butler, gender parody shows that the ‘normal’ has already been 
destabilized simply by mocking it (Butler 1990: 138), as is the case with 
‘Abbas in Super ‘Aziza. For Butler, what is being laughed at and imitated 
is the very notion of an original. This masquerade of performances is 
only possible, however, within a specific order – in this case the 
market place – which allows for certain gender performances and 
gender relations to elaborate and develop. The Tough Guy demonstrates 
that the ‘original’ masculine type is the result of power structures 
enabling someone to embody that particular type – as an example of 
its performativity – while Super ‘Aziza comically portrays the 




5.2 The national hero 
 
The following type, the hero, is very different from the previous 
contradictory ma‘allim. A newly established state that had recently 
gained independence in 1952 needed heroes that depict the country’s 
struggle for freedom. This is why the ‘national hero’ is an important 
character in post-independence films alongside the realist melodramas 
in which the futuwwa and ma‘allim are positioned. The films were 
furthermore made in a context of euphoria over this newly acquired 
independence which resulted in depictions of strong, decisive men and 
women building the nation. Although I will focus on national male 
heroes, there are several films from this era that depict women as an 
essential part of the struggle for freedom and independence. 
Particularly Fatin Hamama and Lubna ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in their roles of 
women supporting the insurgents and independence fighters in the 
films al-Bab al-Maftuh/The Open Door (Henry Barakat 1963) and Ana 
Hurra/I am Free (Abu Sayf 1959) respectively. The first film was an 
adaptation of the novel by the female writer Latifa al-Zayyat, while the 
second film is an adaptation of the nationalist writer and journalist 
Ihsan ‘Abd al-Quddus’ novel, both with the same titles.23 
Images of national and Arab heroes in films were very common in 
the first decades of the republic, in addition to many historical films 
depicting a glorious Arab and Islamic past – fitting the government’s 
Nasirist pan-Arab ideology.24 In this part of the chapter I will describe a 
truly ideal representation of masculinity, portraying an image of 
leading, strong, decisive men. We can include many different films 
representing this group of men, such as glorified representations of 
historical figures, but also of legendary men and nationalist heroes in 
the wake of the struggle for independence. The men in these films all 
                                                   
23 The two films – as well as other films particularly with actress Fatin 
Hamama – developed a new narrative for women who play a vital role in the 
struggle for independence and in building the nation. Yet, this period is 
reminiscent of ‘Abd al-Nasir’s top-down state-feminism, rather than grass-
roots feminism. This state-feminism entailed ‘empowering’ roles for women 
albeit more often in supportive positions (see also Bier 2011). 




have similar characteristics as sturdy, ideal men. Obviously 
heterosexual, they are not sexually active with the possible exception 
of the slightly romanticized Arab poet, ‘Antar. They are all interested 
in the good of the country and romantic love is secondary. There is 
typically one girl they love, but her narrative is supportive for the sake 
of the greater goal of the nation. In the film I discuss here, the ideal 
hero is a young, revolutionary man, the war hero Ahmad in Allah 
Ma‘na/God With Us (Ahmad Badrakhan 1955), fighting corruption in the 
late 1940s against the British and their local Egyptian puppet-rulers. 
The movie’s storyline is written by Ihsan ‘Abd al-Quddus and 
glorifies the fight for independence through subversion. ‘Abd al-
Quddus was a well-known political writer, which landed him in jail a 
couple of times after the Free Officers’ coup (Bayyumi 2007). He was 
very critical about the establishment, before and after independence, 
but nevertheless received several awards for his writings, many of 
which were turned into films. God With Us tells the story of a shameful 
event for Egypt’s army: the largest army of the region defeated by the 
army of the newly established state of Israel because of the fraudulent 
weapons the former had bought. ‘Abd al-Quddus was the journalist of 
the weekly Ruz al-Yusif (established by his mother) who made the 
story known to the public; the figure of the journalist also appears in 
God With Us, played by the actor Shukri Sarhan. 
 
5.2.1 God With Us 
Director Ahmad Badrakhan (1909-1969) was one of the most well-
known early film directors in Egypt, with a background in Egyptian 
theater. He contributed to the scenario of Fritz Kramp’s Lashin (1938), 
and is famous for his multiple musicals with the singer Umm Kulthum. 
Together, they made three of her famous musicals, such as Dananir 
(1939), ‘Ayda (1942) and Fatima (1947). He was also hired as director of 
Umm Kulthum’s first musical, Widad (1936), but after a quarrel with 
Studio Misr’s director he was replaced by Fritz Kramp (Qasim 2010: 25). 
As a director he has worked with some of the giants of Egyptian 
cinema, like the actors Anwar Wagdi, Farid al-Atrash and ‘Imad Hamdi, 
and the actresses Amina Rizq and Fatin Hamama. Also behind the 
scenes several famous scenarists assisted him (Badrakhan often wrote 
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the scenario of his films), like the playwright Badi‘ Khayri25 and writer 
Yusif Gawhar.26 Badrakhan also directed the nationalist film Mustafa 
Kamil (1952) about the revolution of 1919, an important film in the 
sense that it is part of a number of political films portraying a view on 
the world of national and international politics from an Egyptian point 
of view. Also in God With Us, Badrakhan – who had studied cinema in 
Europe – appropriates this essentially European technology to 
visualize Egypt’s history. 
This leads to a number of questions, not limited to what exactly the 
film portrays, but also how it mediates the construction of a national 
identity. What are its meaning producing elements, and how might 
they be read? How does the film employ these signifiers of a national 
identity, and to what end? Gauntlett (2008: 108) writes about the 
construction of a self-identity that “to believe in oneself, and 
command the respect of others, we need a strong narrative which can 
explain everything that has happened and in which, ideally, we play a 
heroic role.” For this reason, the heroism of these films’ men is a 
necessary aspect of their identities. But it also informs the 
construction of national Egyptian identities, as an ideal pitted against 
the foreign and colonial ‘other’. Armbrust (1995: 118) notes that genre 
conventions in popular cinema are like a semantic field where the 
filmmaker and audience connect. For this reason, the film’s use of 
conventional plot elements (e.g. the love story, the battle between 
good and evil, and foreign materialism) together with its extensive use 
of film techniques such as sound, lighting, camera angles and editing 
work to engage the audience with the narrative and to have them 
sympathize with the hero’s fight. 
                                                   
25 Badi‘ Khayri (1893-1966) is the scenarist of the famous musical and comedy 
Ghazal al-Banat/Flirtation of Girls (Anwar Wagdi 1949) with singer Layla Murad 
and comedian Nagib al-Rihani. I refer to Walter Armbrust (2000b) for an 
analysis of the historical importance of this film as a representative text of 
the social and cultural context in which it was produced. 
26 Yusif Gawhar (1912-2001) has a long career as scenarist and playwright, 
spanning from the 40s well into the 90s (including several posthumous serials 
in the 2000s). Some of his most famous films are Amir al-Intiqam/Prince of 
Revenge (Henry Barakat 1950), based on the story of The Count of Monte Cristo, 
the ‘noir’-film al-Ragul al-Tani/The Second Man (‘Izz al-Din Dhu al-Fiqar 1959) 
and al-Beh al-Bawwab/Mr. Doorman (Hasan Ibrahim 1987). 
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Badrakhan is no stranger to heroic biopics as the director of Mustafa 
Kamil (1952). This film was produced before the ’52 revolution, but 
subsequently banned by the censor and only allowed to screen after 
the military take-over. Joel Gordon (1997: 67) notes the film’s attention 
to the hero’s selfless battle, very similar to the later film God With Us. 
Both films portray a loving home (caring mothers, though absent 
fathers) and herald family life, love and marriage. But both films also 
undeniably portray the heroes as diligent and steadfast men, placing 
the greater goal of independence before their personal lives and 
interests. 
The main characters in God With Us are played by famous actors, 
with each a very specific and distinct star persona. The somewhat 
melancholic looking ‘Imad Hamdi (1909-1984) plays the hero in the 
film, next to the ‘angel without wings’, actress Fatin Hamama (1931-).27 
Mahmud Qasim (2004: 362) describes ‘Imad Hamdy as someone with 
“calm features, resembling Marlon Brando, and with a characteristic 
voice”. The audience knows him as fatā al-shāsha al-awwal, “the first 
boy of the white screen”, because of his many romantic roles in the 
50s, often next to the object of his romantic love, the actress Fatin 
Hamama. Hamdi was cast as a hero against all odds, with the romantic 
connotations his star persona possessed. But his calm features and his 
persona’s determination, reason and wisdom are also reassuring for 
the ensuing narrative which is in need of a decisive, charismatic and 
experienced leader. 
Hamdi is cast against the epitome of roguish evil in Egyptian films, 
the actor Mahmud al-Maligi (1910-1983). Al-Maligi was from a Kurdish 
family, born in one of Cairo’s historical quarters, and started his acting 
career in Fatima Rushdi’s theater troupe. Although the actor has also 
portrayed more agreeable characters like the rebel peasant in Youssef 
Chahine’s al-Ard/The Land (1969), not to mention his contributions to 
theater, he remains mostly known for his performances as ‘bad guy’ 
next to his occasional counterpart, ‘tough guy’ Farid Shawqi. In God 
                                                   
27 Fatin Hamama was nicknamed First Lady of the Arab Screen (Sayyidat al-
Shāsha al-‘Arabiyya) for her performances of ideal women in many of her films. 
Her second nickname, as ‘angel without wings’ (malāk bilā ʼajniḥa) points at 
the often extremely tragic situations she finds herself in as aspects of the 
melodramatic mode of her films. 
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With Us, al-Maligi plays the role of the despicable weapons trader, held 
accountable for the death of thousands of Egyptian soldiers in the 1948 
Palestine war. In his role as uncle of Hamdi’s character Ahmad, he is 
thus also responsible for the latter’s mutilation during the war. Al-
Maligi’s strict facial features and piercing eyes, and a voice that seems 
unable to convey any sort of compassion, make him the perfect 
character for his part in the film. 
God With Us discusses the aftermath of the shameful event that led 
to Egypt’s defeat in the 1948 war. What is conspicuously absent from 
the film, are the large student protests demanding that those 
responsible for the defeat are punished appropriately. Instead, the 
whole film is centered on the military hero’s struggle against the 
establishment, in both society and the army. His struggle will turn 
personal, since his own uncle and father of the girl he loves is 
implicated in the illegal weapons deal with corrupted weapons that 
mutilated his body. It is common in Egyptian films to personalize 
national struggles and upheavals, being performed on the hero’s or 
heroine’s body and affecting their personal lives directly. 
I have briefly mentioned the way in which foreigners and colonial 
rulers were portrayed as ‘others’,28 which is one of the main elements 
in God With Us. They are distanced from the general populace, 
depicting them as completely dislocated from reality and from the 
people. Some of them do not speak Arabic fluently and live a lifestyle 
that is far removed from the average Egyptian’s daily life. The effete 
rich attend parties, drink, mingle with women and dancers and 
squander their money on gambling. Intriguingly, one of the Egyptian 
dancers who moves around in these aristocratic circles has an essential 
                                                   
28 Edward Said defined othering in imperialist terms, specifically as an active 
politics applied by the colonizers to define the colonial/imperial occupier as 
‘Self’ and the occupied population as ‘Other’, as weaker than the imperialist. 
Said uses it not only in a political context but rather in a cultural context as 
well, thus linking it to a politics of representation. Although here I use the 
term differently, it is actually the occupied who is represented as ‘Self’ while 
the occupier is othered, the goal is the same, namely to accentuate the need 
for – in the case of Egypt – independence and self-rule. This film is an example 
of how Egypt’s film industry enables the construction of an image of ‘self’ and 
an Arab identity, and how it was able to use and adjust an initially ‘Western’ 
technology for its own profit. 
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role in the narrative, giving inside information to the press about the 
business deals the ruling class makes during their soirees. One of the 
most telling examples of this ‘othering’ is the way the king is depicted: 
he is absent. King Faruq is continuously filmed from the back, 
motioning his hand holding a big cigar and wearing several large rings. 
We do not hear his voice apart from the occasional “do as I told you”, 
nor do we see his face. The king’s advisors do not use the actual word 
“king”, but rather refer to him (in colloquial Arabic) as “the big guy” 
(al-rāgil al-kibīr). The director makes a strong case for “depicting” the 
king this way in order to distance him from the audience.29 
On the other hand, the hero’s identity is constructed in masculine 
terms; he has a stable personality, he loves and cares for his mother as 
much as he does for his country, and he is a believer, but not a zealot. 
Ahmad did not yet hold a copy of the Quran, but received one from his 
mother “to protect him from all evil”. Although his uncle is rich, it 
seems his father was a more ‘honest’ citizen and thus never amassed 
vast riches, leaving his mother widowed and poor, but with a strong 
belief in God’s providence. It is too early to say that the hero’s non-
dogmatic religiosity is representative of the time or of the regime (as 
an army-officer, he clearly represents the officers who took hold of the 
country in ’52), since ‘Abd al-Nasir coopted religious institutions like 
al-Azhar under state influence from the 60s onward together with all 
facets of Egyptian society (Zeghal 1999: 371). Yet, the portrayal of 
popular manifestations of religiosity does point at a presupposed 
secularism of those working in the cinema industry. The film’s 
portrayal of our hero in middle class terms, signal an ideal image of an 
Egyptian (male) citizen, contrary to the womanizing and pompous 
gamblers.30 The film also does not shy away from depicting the army 
                                                   
29 In Fi Baytina Ragul/A Man in Our House (Henry Barakat 1961) only the king’s 
hand is shown on a singular occasion. As the person in front of him addresses 
the unknown man as mawlāna (an official way of addressing the king) there is 
no doubt that it was the king who gave orders to quell the student protests 
from 1946, which the film takes as a starting point. 
30 A similar depiction of the Arab hero is visible in Chahine’s Saladin. Saladin 
introduces himself to the kings and dukes of Europe as “servant to God and 
the Arabs” which stands in stark contrast to the pompous behavior of the 
Franks who emphasize the largess of their properties and land. 
119 
 
soldiers and officers as ‘average’ Egyptians, embodied by the 
empoverished (yet coming from a rather rich family) Ahmad. His 
down-to-earth character and strong interest in the good of the country 
is juxtaposed to his uncle’s corrupt and haughty character. 
The most telling scene in which Ahmad appears to investigate his 
uncle – unknowing of the latter’s implication in the arms deal – applies 
an interesting play of light and dialogue, juxtaposing shots of the two 
men to emphasize Ahmad’s solid personality and his uncle’s guilt. The 
film highlights both men’s relationship when Ahmad enters his uncle’s 
office without knocking, wearing his military outfit and standing next 
to his uncle who is sitting at his desk – underneath a picture of king 
Faruq – with a bright light on his face, interrogation-style. As soon as 
Ahmad enters, his uncle points a gun at the intruder, shouting quasi 
hysterically “Who’s there?”, to which Ahmad calmly replies “It’s me, 
Ahmad, uncle.” Then, Ahmad enters and stands next to his uncle’s 
desk who is looking up to the imposing figure of Ahmad, emphasized 
through the bird-angle shot from behind Ahmad’s left shoulder as a 
conspicuous reminder of his severed left arm. Expressive shadows play 
across al-Maligi’s face and body from the light seeping through the 
blinds of his office’s window. Significantly, he walks around his desk 
but stops right on time for the camera to frame Ahmad in the back and 
his uncle to the front addressing him with the king’s picture right 
there in the middle. The men continue their loud discussion, in the 
semi-darkness of the room, until Nadia enters and switches on the 
light, abruptly ending the escalating dialogue. 
Ahmad as investigator is thus ready to take on the establishment, 
maintained by the scene’s careful placement of light and camera. The 
dialectic opposition between the two men is symbolically – and 
literally – solved when Nadia enters the room, pinpointing her future 
crucial role in Ahmad’s quest. For most of the film, Nadia remains in 
the background, although her screen presence is essential to evoke 
emotional responses from the audience. She faces a dreadful dilemma: 
to help her country (and loved one), which means to betray her father. 
When she decides to steal the incriminating documents from her 
father’s strongbox, the close-ups on her facial expressions and 
conspicuous body movements signal her difficulty with the situation; 
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she is obviously torn between these two men in her life. In the film’s 
finale it turns out her help was unnecessary because her father is 
ironically killed by one of the corrupted hand grenades he had sold to 
the army. 
Hamama’s character plays an essential role in the melodramatic 
features of this film, through the continuous reverse shots and close-
ups of her face which are supposed to affect the emotional reactions of 
the audience. It is her ‘ordinariness’ that instills meaning on her and 
the other characters’ actions. Peter Brooks (1995: ix) remarks that 
melodrama “insists that the ordinary may be the place for the 
instauration of significance.” Also the actress’ ability to portray 
‘ordinariness’ in her role as an ideal Egyptian woman, is an important 
part of her star performance. The early years after the revolution were 
characterized by a sharp increase in melodramatic realist films. 
Although God With Us is arguably neither as a blend of thriller and 
detective, it nevertheless applies expressive modes of both melodrama 
and realism recounting a fictive story based on historical events. This 
melodramatic realism in films often indicated a strong social criticism 
and an anchoring in common perceptions and discourse of their time, 
as well as a sort of sensationalism to touch the viewers’ emotions and 
give them a sense of the significance and importance of the ’52 coup 




According to the new discourses and political situation in Egypt, 
several types of men turned out to be more ‘popular’ and attractive at 
the time which resulted in specific representational politics. The 
postcolonial state had to construct its image of a modern type of men, 
a truly Egyptian identity that is both local and located within wider 
colonial discourse, which we can see in the imagery of the national 
hero. Badrakhan’s heroic army-officer is clearly distanced from the 
rather ‘European’ lifestyle of his antagonists, the pashas and – at their 
head – the king, who are depicted as immoral traitors. Egyptian 
cinema made a great effort to ensure that the average moviegoer 
would understand that the coup d’état was necessary and supported by 
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a great number of people, in order to label it a true people’s 
revolution. That is why it applied an active politics of distancing the 
population from its previous leaders and enabling the audience to 
identify with more recognizable popular heroes. 
The ma‘allim represents the opposite of a hegemonic masculinity 
through his self-destructive nature and through the ridiculing of his 
preposterous masculinity. Depicting what is not desirable, the films 
herald heteronormative ideals for men to adhere to, namely marriage 
and respectful behavior towards women, while positioning men in 
naturalized roles of protectors and bearers of authority. Invested with 
a bourgeois modernist ideology, the film industry ridiculed the heavy-
handed traditional and uneducated masculinity of the lower class 
ma‘allim. Although the ma‘allim has plenty of financial capital, it is 
obvious he prefers emotion to reason, being depicted as an uneducated 
brute in need of a proper ‘punishment’ (or education?). Abu Sayf’s The 
Tough Guy is a fatalistic film which does not offer a viable solution at 
the end, while Radwan’s Super ‘Aziza most explicitly upholds middle 
class values like education and reason, and marriage based on love and 
companionship. But the latter film’s dubious ending also implies a sort 
of nostalgia to a primitive violent masculinity. 
Interestingly, both types of men, the hero and the ‘villain’, will 
return three decades later, albeit in a slightly adapted form. In chapter 
7 we will see how features of the hero – his calm and calculated 
appearance, his decisiveness and selfless goals – are present in the 
1980s anti-hero, while the ‘villain’ ma‘allim will be more idealized in 
the character of the ‘true’ futuwwa. Ideal men have never really 
occupied the Arab screen, with notable exceptions to the rule, such as 
the films on the lives of Saladin and ‘Antar. Men’s masculinity is 
always somehow jeopardized, such as the disabled Ahmad in God With 
Us – or for example the suicidal national hero Ibrahim played by ‘Umar 
al-Sharif in Fi Baytina Ragul/A Man in Our House (Henry Barakat 1961) – 
or the ridiculed muscularity of the ma‘allimīn. Not even the educated, 
middle class ideal in Super ‘Aziza is able to entirely uphold his 
principles and finally descends into the violent masculinity he so 
vehemently opposed for much of the film. Yet, the men’s 
performances as selfless and responsible in the ‘good versus evil’ world 
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of popular melodrama instill notions of a mythical idealized 
masculinity we will not find in later films. 
The films in this chapter are also portraying gendered images of 
progress (social, cultural, industrial), influenced by the dominant 
narratives emanating from the Nahḍa. Those narratives discussed new 
roles and ideals for both men and women (Elsadda 2007). Although the 
50s do not belong to the historical period that defines the Nahḍa, its 
narratives and discourses did not just disappear and have influenced 
modern thinkers and writers for years to come. Similarly, the films 
discussed in this chapter are informed by these narratives, portraying 
what Armbrust called the ‘codes of modernity’ (Armbrust 1995), 
synthesizing local and global, classic and modern elements into a 
modern and positive portrayal of Egypt. 
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6. Defeated men in crisis and ‘soft men’ as the new 
norm 
 
The end of the 60s was the start of a period with great upheavals. It 
was the end of an era and grand narratives – whether political, social 
or even academic – were withering, losing power to more diverse and 
less centralized discourses. The loss after the Six Day War in 1967 was 
larger than a military defeat. It entailed also the loss of a political 
ideology and a violent wake-up call for many in the Arab world who 
had grown up with the revolutionary slogans of their governments, 
their lies exposed. Also the film industry in Egypt – centralized, 
nationalized and riddled with high debts – was starting to feel the 
burden of the exacerbating financial and ideological crises in the 
country. Nouri Bouzid (1995: 244-5) observes that in the late 60s and 
early 70s new developments in filmmaking modes and practices were 
appearing, first in Egypt, later in other parts of the Arab world, away 
from melodrama towards a more realist cinematic mode. The point – 
according to him – of this new cinema was to create a conscience and 
take a more extreme, revolutionary, stance on society and more 
specifically those elements the filmmaker saw as problematic at that 
particular point in history. 
A notion of crisis lies at the basis of the films produced after the 
war of 1967, and the crisis of man was one of the crises worked out in 
films of the 70s. This is not a unique development, also in other 
cinemas a male crisis was visualized in the 1970s. For example, Derek 
Nystrom (2009) shows in his study of class representations in 1970s 
Hollywood cinema the fascination of filmmakers with white working-
class men and their “alleged […] propensity for anti-social violence” 
(id.: x). With al-Sadat’s politics of greater economic and social freedom, 
the Egyptian cinema industry of this era took advantage of this new-
found cultural freedom to discuss topics like sexuality, the failure of 
Nasirism, the Six Day War of 1967 and the first signs of a critical stance 
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on the (previous) governments’ modernist rhetoric.1 Salah Abu Sayf’s 
film Hamam al-Malatili/Malatili Bath (1973) explicitly depicts a gay 
character, spending his time in a public bathhouse drawing the 
patrons. Samir Sayf’s film Qitta ‘Ala Nar/Cat on Fire (1977) is even more 
explicit, with a gay hero, although too obvious references to the hero’s 
sexuality are never made.2 Not only male homosexuality, also women’s 
(hetero)sexuality was explored, although not always in a positive 
manner. Shams al-Barudi and Nahid Sharif are two of the most famous 
sex symbols of 1970s cinema. 
Political films critical about ‘Abd al-Nasir’s rule were forbidden at 
the start of the decade, Youssef Chahine’s al-‘Asfur/The Sparrow (1972) 
did not screen until two years after its production, and after the 
‘victory’ of the October war in 1973 – a pivotal moment in Egypt in 
terms of politics, economy and cultural production. The 1970s – also 
the period of the introduction of color as the new standard in Egyptian 
cinema – were thus more than merely a commercial intermezzo 
between the Golden Age of public sector filmmaking in the 1960s and 
the revival of realism and the emergence of a new cinema style in the 
1980s.3 Walter Armbrust (1995: 103) argues that “the middle class 
modernist hero so common in earlier films has, since the 1970s, been 
either beleaguered or humiliated”. Thus, the 70s are an essential 
turning point, setting the standards for the later developments of 
discourses of crisis in Egyptian films, evidenced by the 1980s and 90s 
lower class anti-heroes and the male middle class angst and threat of 
terrorism in the 2000s. 
                                                   
1 It should be noted that any critical stance was only condoned when it was to 
discredit the Nasirist regime. The films from the first part of the decade were 
still shy, but as of 1973 and the 6 October war, more explicit and direct 
critique of ‘Abd al-Nasir and the revolution was possible (Abu Shadi 1998: 21). 
2 For a more detailed account on these and other films with gay characters, I 
refer to Garay Menicucci’s article on homosexuality in Egyptian cinema. 
3 According to Malkmus and Armes (1991: 56), the 1970s cinema industry in 
Egypt saw a decline in quality. Armbrust (1995: 104) furthermore notes that, 
according to some critics, the decline was due to commercialism, although he 
questions this short-sighted analysis and argues that the public sector – 
including the public sector film industry – had incurred huge debts by the 70s, 
resulting in a general economic crisis and thus leading to cheap film 
productions aimed at making easy earnings. 
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I have stressed the importance of the aftermath of the 1967 defeat 
with regard to Arab socialism on the political scene, and its effect on 
the masses from a social and cultural perspective. Samira Aghacy has 
extensively discussed the effects of the war on literature of the region 
in the decades following the 1967 war. She notes that “patriarchal 
constructions of masculinity in Arab societies become constrictions, 
disrupting man’s quest for self-autonomy and creating contradictions 
for individual men” (Aghacy 2009: 4). These notions of ideal 
constructions of masculinity are equally problematic or unattainable 
for the defeated men in films of the 70s. The second prevailing type of 
men in this period is represented by a group of upper middle class men 
who were able to reposition men in their ‘naturally’ dominant 
positions through the use and abuse of what they perceive as 
commodities, namely women and money. 
Class is an important signifier in films from this era, as the two 
different types of men show. The defeated men are all working- or 
middle class men, unable to live up to an ideal, aware about and feeling 
betrayed by the government propaganda. These defeated men 
represent the growing instability and uncertainty of men assumed to 
have a stable identity. On the other hand, the ‘soft men’ – posing as 
desirable and romantic – have adapted themselves to the new ideals of 
consumerism and materialism, occupying hegemonic positions as the 
new upper classes, the ‘new money’. They associate themselves with a 
European lifestyle, educated and cultured but corrupted, abusive and 
patriarchal. These men enjoy the effects of patriarchy, here 
understood in terms of “institutionalized male control of female 
sexuality” (Hatem 1987: 818). As such, the masculine identity of these 
‘soft men’ is closely intertwined with the women in the film, albeit 
negatively in terms of abuse of women simply because the personal 
status laws – mainly unchanged under ‘Abd al-Nasir – allowed them to 
do so. 
Some of the films discussed in this chapter are adaptations of 
novels, most notably by Nagib Mahfuz and Ihsan ‘Abd al-Quddus. The 
themes in Mahfuz’ novels were increasingly critical about the 
achievements of the revolution with an ever more gloomy style. Many 
of these 60s novels were adapted to the screen, such as al-Siman wa-l-
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Kharif/Autumn Quail (Husam al-Din Mustafa 1967), Miramar (Kamal al-
Shaykh 1969), and Tharthara Fawq al-Nil/Adrift on the Nile (Husayn 
Kamal 1971). Also ‘Abd al-Quddus’ work was adapted for the screen, for 
example al-Khayt al-Rafi‘/The Fine Thread (Henry Barakat 1971), and 
Dammi wa-Dumu‘i wa-Ibtisamati/My Blood, Tears and Smile (Husayn Kamal 
1973). In the first part of this chapter I will discuss films portraying 
defeated men. The main films under discussion are al-Karnak/Karnak 
Café (‘Ali Badrakhan 1975), based on the novel with the same title by 
Nagib Mahfuz, and Ughniyya ‘Ala al-Mamarr/Song on the Mountain Pass 
(‘Ali ‘Abd al-Khaliq 1972), an adaptation of a theater play by ‘Ali Salim. 
In the second part of the chapter discussing the ‘soft men’ in 
hegemonic positions of power and domination, I discuss the films My 
Blood, Tears and Smiles and Imraʼa Sayyiʼat al-Sum‘a/A Woman With a Bad 
Reputation (Henry Barakat 1973). 
 
6.1 Defeated men 
 
In 1972, Youssef Chahine made his famous film The Sparrow. The film 
had some difficulty with being screened and distributed because of its 
harsh criticism of the ‘Abd al-Nasir-era. The film held government 
corruption responsible for the defeat, which is why the censor initially 
disapproved of it, fearing from a backlash from ‘Abd al-Nasir 
supporters. One of the strongest images in the film that is of interest 
for this chapter on ‘defeated men’ was the moment when the though 
guy ma‘allim heard the words of president ‘Abd al-Nasir blare from the 
television set, resigning after the military defeat against Israel. That 
same ma‘allim – never fearful or showing signs of weakness – burst out 
in tears and saw his world crumble down. Bouzid (quoted in Stollery 
2001: 51-2) commented on this character as symbolizing the ultimate 
Arab hero, the ‘he-man’ who lost his entire identity and sense of being 
when he burst out in tears after the cataclysmic defeat against Israel. 
This portrayal of ‘defeated men’ was, as we will see, not uncommon in 
films from the late 60s and early 70s. 
The era of great heroic men and women has ended and what we are 
left with are miserable reminders of a glorious past. But does this 
mean that men – or masculinity for that matter – are in crisis, or 
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purported to be in crisis? The point of this chapter is not to argue 
whether or not men are actually in crisis,4 but rather how the notion of 
crisis is constructed and results in a “narrative pattern” (Haschemi 
Yekani 2011: 34) of certain men in crisis. This ‘narrative pattern’ which 
Haschemi Yekani describes, “signifies a recurring set of storylines or 
tropes that shape specific figurations of masculinity” (id. 34). In the 
context of the political crisis after 1967, and the discourses of social, 
economic and moral crises impendent on the country in the early 70s,5 
these patterns combined could create the notion of ‘men in crisis’. The 
defeated men are examples of the ‘crisis as male’ (id. 15), a crisis that is 
perceived by men “from within” (Edwards 2006: 6). This internal crisis 
points at individual experiences as men and what it means for them to 
‘be’ male. In the next paragraphs I will outline how certain films of this 
period contribute to this notion of ‘men in crisis’. This contribution 
can be explicit through depicting men who experience specific forms 
of crises. It can also be implicit by portraying a certain type of 
masculinity as hegemonic, while portraying other types as an ideal, 
but in a marginalized rather than dominant position. 
 
6.1.1 Song on the Mountain Pass 
A film that focuses on the defeat of the 1967 war and its heavy toll on 
men particularly, is the 1972 film Song on the Mountain Pass (‘Ali ‘Abd al-
Khaliq), based on the play by ‘Ali Salim.6 The choice of adapting a play 
                                                   
4 The notion of masculinity in crisis is difficult to assert, as Beynon (2002: 75) 
observes. Beynon asks to what extent the notion of crisis is an actual fact or 
the result of discursive practices across media and within a specific historical 
time and place.  
5 For example, Sabrina Joseph (referring to Safia Mohsen) notes how media in 
Egypt showed a concern with an apparent ‘new’ phenomenon of middle class 
women participating in and being convicted for crimes such as prostitution, 
fraud, or smuggling (Joseph 2009: 84). Certain films of this period, for example 
Adrift on the Nile portrayed this concern vividly, with both married and 
unmarried women participating in extramarital sex and using drugs on the 
‘kingdom’ that the houseboat represents in the film and in the book, although 
the novel is decidedly less moralistic in its treatment of the women’s identity 
crisis. 
6 ‘Ali Salim has recently come into disrepute after an opinion piece in the 
Egyptian newspaper al-Masry al-Youm (dated 30 May 2014) in which he called 
for a vigilante police force ‘punishing’ citizens who attacked – or are 
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to the screen was not a convenient choice, particularly considering the 
subject. The play was one of three one-act plays the writer ‘Ali Salim 
wrote between ’67 and ’68 (Badawi 1987: 199). The plays touch upon 
topics like bureaucracy, war, and corruption and despotism (id. 199-
201). The director of the film, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Khaliq, has tried to 
incorporate these metanarratives into the film’s plot, through the 
flashbacks and personal narratives of each of the five individuals. Each 
one is singled out to tell his story, his background and reasons to fight 
a war for his country. The play focused more on the personal loss and 
the atrocities of war, while the film’s plot – through its flashbacks – 
dedicates itself to each of these men’s narratives. 
Director ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Khaliq (1944-) has studied at the national Film 
Institute in Giza, founded in the early 60s as part of the government’s 
interest in the film industry and after its nationalizations of industries 
across the country. He was also part of the Jamā‘at al-Sīnimā al-Jadīda, 
the New Cinema Group which vied for more activist movies. He directed 
some of the most famous films of the 1980s, particularly the films 
al-‘Ar/Disgrace (1982) and al-Kef/Mood (1985), both film about drug 
abuse and trading, which were well-received critically and also did 
well at the box-office. Song on the Mountain Pass is the director’s debut 
and starred famous and upcoming actors alike, such as Mahmud Mursi 
(1923-2004), Salah Qabil (1937-1992) and Mahmud Yasin (1941-). 
Mahmud Mursi often portrayed gloomy men, as well as fiercely 
patriarchal men, in films from the 1960s. Ahmad Ramzi (1997: 271) 
describes his diverse characters as such: “he sometimes looks like a 
dream, or like a horrible nightmare”. He is the patriarch defending 
bourgeois values and norms in al-Bab al-Maftuh/The Open Door (Henry 
Barakat 1963) against the freedom that the female protagonist tries to 
achieve for herself. He is also the victim-hero7 in Autumn Quail, playing 
                                                                                                                   
presumed to attack – the police. He refers to the French Honneur de la Police 
vigilantes who orchestrated a series of attacks in the late 70s to defend his 
claim. 
7 Victim-heroes are common also in other film industries, and I refer to Judith 
Franco (2008) about the redemption of white masculinity in European and 
American arthouse films. Through the films’ narrative and form white 
masculinity is put in crisis and finally reimposed as the only viable option. A 
similar argument is made by Erica Arthur (2004) in her essay about American 
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a government official who was removed from his post after the 1952 
coup and who was unable to cope with the dire social and economic 
consequences it had for his social class after being charged for 
corruption. He also plays the domineering patriarch in Zawjati wa-l-
Kalb/My Wife and the Dog (Sa‘id Marzuq 1971), boasting about his sexual 
activity, but fearful of his own wife’s sexuality although she had never 
given him any reason to doubt her. Not exactly a ‘star’, he played 
character-rich types as diverse as violent brutes as well as caring 
father-figures. 
Mursi shares the screen with the upcoming star actor Mahmud 
Yasin who will also return in the films with ‘soft men’, espousing his 
romantic, yet conservative masculinity. Yasin’s clean shaven, puppy-
eyed and tanned, attractive face forestalls a kind and sweet 
personality, yet his masculine identity is constructed around rather 
conservative notions of male domination over women. He usually 
portrays idealist men, though often his characters turn out rather 
conformist at the end of his films. Yasin’s portrayal of a conservative 
masculinity is partly due to the romances he is most famous for, 
including The Fine Thread (Henry Barakat 1971) and Ayna ‘Aqli?/Where’s 
My Mind? (‘Atif Salim 1974). His characters often portray an internal 
ambiguity, compromised by his surroundings and his beliefs, thus a 
perfect example of a man in crisis. 
The other actors in the film are not major star-actors, usually 
playing supporting roles in films. Nevertheless, each one of them took 
on a specific role in Song on the Mountain Pass, and their performances 
vary according to the character and the message the director tried to 
communicate. Each character represented a different stratum of 
society, from peasants to musicians, signaling a clash between 
individual aspirations and authoritarian regimes in this period (El-
Enany 1993: 101). In this and other films of the 70s we can notice a 
growing disgruntlement with the authoritarian implementation of the 
so-called goals of the revolution. All of the male characters in this film 
have in one way or another been let down by a regime that was unable 
                                                                                                                   
Beauty (Sam Mendes 1999). Victimhood is used as well to redeem the main 
character's transgressive behavior in his quest to impose his dominant 
position as a man. 
130 
 
to manage its own revolutionary propaganda. Particularly the 
character played by Salah Qabil, Munir, is a good example of one man 
unable to attain the hegemonic ideal masculinity that the bourgeois 
middle classes upheld. This actor’s masculine features allow him to 
convincingly perform this hegemonic masculinity, although, as an 
audience, we are aware of the lie behind the performance. I will return 
to this character later in the analysis of the film. 
Through a series of flashbacks the film displays the lives of five 
soldiers left alone after the June defeat in 1967. The film opens with a 
similar eeriness as in al-Mumya’/The Mummy (Shadi ‘Abd al-Salam, 
1969, 1975): the sound of wind blowing over a desolate area, signaling a 
sense of loss and displacement.8 It could be any desert, but a title 
informs the audience what day it is and, as a consequence, what place 
we are in: the Sinai desert on June 7 of 1967. The soundtrack of the film 
plays an important role as well, since there is basically no extra-
diegetic sound, except for the title song written by the Egyptian poet 
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Abnudi9 and for the occasional soundtrack during 
the flashbacks to set the mood. The film’s title song, Ti‘īshi ya Ḍiḥkit 
Maṣr [Egypt’s Smile, May You Live On], references the many hardships 
the country and more specifically its people, suffer – from foreign 
occupation or internal corruption and abuse. While at the start of the 
film its melody evokes a sense of loss and desperation, by the end of 
the film it signals a faintly sparkling hope. 
                                                   
8 The Mummy is a critically acclaimed film, made with state support. Contrary 
to common depictions of Europeans or foreigners in Egyptian films, Walter 
Armbrust claims, this film shows the “conceptual equivalence of Egyptian 
modernity and European science” (Armbrust 1995: 99) in its first scenes 
where the European Maspero explains the need to stop grave robbers in the 
south of the country from illegally selling Egypt’s national historical artifacts. 
But the film also portrays a modernist class ideal: the educated Cairene 
effendi heads southwards to stop the ‘ignorant’ grave robbers – although for 
them it has always been a source of living. 
9 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Abnudi is a famous Egyptian poet using colloquial 
Egyptian Arabic instead of the ‘higher’ variant, standard Arabic. His poetry 
often talks about the underprivileged and oppressed. He is also known for his 
oral performances of the Sīrat Banī Hilāl, the story about the Hilal-tribe in 
Northern Africa (see also chapter 5). 
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Song on the Mountain Pass tries to answer several questions in the 
course of the film, first and foremost the question of ‘self’ and a sense 
of identity for men as the pillars upholding the country. For what does 
it mean to be an Egyptian, or an Egyptian man for that matter? What 
are men’s roles in society, as farmers, students, artists, workers? These 
are questions that most of the men struggle with in this film. The only 
one who seemed happy with his future, is the worker Mus‘ad (played 
by Salah al-Sa‘dani) who is planning to settle down and get married. 
His only hope is to make it back alive so he can be with his fiancée. His 
flashbacks are also the most vibrant and romantic of all, including a 
romantic soundtrack playing in the back. Mus‘ad’s story is one of hope, 
which is then violently annihilated by the war. 
The film’s soundtrack emphasizes the importance of the title track 
and other songs written by al-Abnudi, but it also contributes to the 
raw realism the picture exposes. This is a time of war and no frivolities 
are necessary to recount one of the most devastating events in 
postcolonial Egyptian history. The camera’s eye is only interested in 
the lives of these men, their personal backgrounds as well as the way 
they deal individually with the current situation. The plot does not 
allow for any digressions, only the bare information needed to 
understand their personal struggles. The scenes in the Sinai desert are 
therefore nihilist, focusing on the men’s camaraderie in times of war, a 
time when masculine characteristics like bravery, strength and 
determination are necessary. The stark opposition between these 
men’s reality and their dreamy flashbacks bolsters their yearning for 
change. 
The individual flashbacks in the film point to these issues, as each 
of the men in the film is struggling to come to terms with the role they 
are assumed to play as men. Only one of the men, Muhammad (played 
by Mahmud Mursi), joined the army as volunteer and he is convinced 
of his role as a soldier. Muhammad is a farmer from rural Egypt who is 
recruited to fight in the 1956 war and is ordered to leave his land. The 
images of men dying in the field convinced him to stay in the army and 
fight for his country; he feels this is where he was needed most at the 
time. He represents the older generation, those who grew up under a 
colonial regime and felt the positive results of the revolution 
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personally through the land divisions after independence. The other 
men were still too young to experience the revolution, although they 
have lived through its aftermath. Each of them has his own personal 
narrative, to ‘fit in’ (Mus‘ad), to object (both Hamdi, played by Ahmad 
Mar‘i, and Shawqi, played by Mahmud Yasin), or to abuse the system’s 
excesses to his own profit (Munir, played by Salah Qabil). Needless to 
say, the two men who objected to what ‘society’ expected from them 
were also shunned by everyone around them. 
Hamdi was in real life a talented musician, but his talent was not 
respected by the music industry which led him to leave it all behind 
him. Hamdi experiences a personal crisis and looks for his role as an 
artist which he seems to find one night passing by a group of 
masculine, bare-chested tramline workers. He finds real art, stripped 
of its unnecessary embellishments, in the songs they sing or in the 
movements and noises they make with their bodies, shovels and tools. 
The film thus signals a return to the basic elements of life in which one 
may find beauty, without its hypocritical adornments, coded as 
feminine as opposed to the masculine rawness the workers expose. 
The film also seems to hint at a return to a ‘pure’ type of masculinity, 
the one of muscular men, building their modern country: they are the 
worker-heroes whose protests and objections were violently crushed 
under the rule of ‘Abd al-Nasir.10 They are furthermore working on 
tram lines in the modern part of Cairo built in the 19th century. It is an 
image of Egypt as a modern nation that is visible in films from as early 
as the pioneer films produced in the country. Ifdal Elsaket (n.d.) notes 
the politics of these modernist images in pre-1952 films, portraying a 
national image of Egypt as an industrialized country, modern and 
progressive. In Hamdi’s flashback, where decadence and a general 
disinterest in traditional culture reign, this emphasis on the workers’ 
traditional, a cappella song while working on a mechanic component 
only made possible through industrialization, is an indication of the 
                                                   
10 The protests of the 1960s in al-Mahalla are an example in this regard, 
considering they were also referenced to in the other film Karnak Café when 
the students were arrested again and accused of inciting the workers there 
with ‘communist ideologies’. Also in the past decade and particularly since 
the mass protests and strikes of 2006 and 2008 this city has played a major 
role in the protests that led to the ouster of former president Mubarak. 
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director’s leftist modernist ideology of progress and his social realist 
style. 
Shawqi for his part was an intelligent art student who rejected the 
university’s uncritical stance towards knowledge and questioning what 
we know, resulting in clashes with his professors one year after the 
other. Shawqi is as such explicitly defined as a failure by his father and 
his fiancée. The flashback’s use of zooming in and out is a bit dramatic, 
but certainly brings the message across. The use of this fast zooming is 
common in Egyptian television serials, but much less so in films. By 
zooming in or out so vehemently in the flashbacks, the director tries to 
unsettle his audience and emphasize the actor’s mental instability and 
intellectual distance from the society in which he lives. Shawqi only 
feels he has become a man again when he went off to war to fight for 
his country. He is apparently very adept in shooting missiles at tanks, 
which makes his comrades very appreciative of his work – in stark 
contrast to his father and fiancée. As a victim of a society that has 
succumbed to sheer consumerism and lacks an ideological direction, 
he is in search of his identity as a man, just like the musician Hamdi 
and the others. 
Munir is perhaps the most interesting character of them all, lying 
about his background but also representing all that could go wrong in 
a country that espouses socialism, but does not act on it. Munir comes 
from a poor family in a popular neighborhood, is not very bright and 
without opportunities in what he assumes to be (and media purport to 
be) the ‘normal’ world. He has a lot of ambition which he can only 
accomplish by going astray. He does this by exploiting women and 
pretending to live a life that is not his. 
The director’s take on Munir’s flashback is significant in this 
regard. Munir tells one thing to his comrades through a voice-over, 
while the audience is allowed a sneak-view into his ‘real’ world of 
criminality and prostitution. He calls himself namūḏag al-shābb al-nāgiḥ 
[exemplar of a successful youngster], considering that he is the only 
one who ‘made it’ financially. As such, the director shows us exactly 
what society expects of men: study well, be obedient, find a ‘decent’ 
job, get married and start a family, or: provide, protect and procreate 
(Gilmore 1990). Munir’s masquerade of hegemonic masculinity 
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interpreted as a heteronormative ideal, shows the effects of this 
restrictive ideal on ‘real’ men and their actual, lived, experiences. The 
role strain they all experience and which Munir so convincingly hides 
is a way for the director to portray the problematic burden of this 
idealized type of masculinity for the men in his film. The question now 
is whether the film criticizes this ideal, or whether it only critiques the 
inability, for various reasons, to attain it while still adhering to some 
sort of masculine ideal. This question will be answered in the following 
paragraphs. 
One element constantly recurs in the film, namely that the war they 
are fighting is a way for them to regain their masculinity, their 
identity as Egyptians and as men. Shawqi is literally described a failure 
and Munir – although presenting himself as a success story – is an 
example of yet another failure. Hamdi longs nostalgically for a 
masculine ideal of strength, while Muhammad has endured the 
hardships of war and as such is strengthened and encouraged to lead 
the other men and protect their country. Mus‘ad is the simple delta-
kid who has not yet come into contact with the hardships of life, 
dozing off in his romantic memories of him and his fiancée, stealing 
kisses in a back alley in Damietta, the city where they live. Muhammad 
the farmer left behind more than just his land and family, symbolized 
by the lonely shovel in the field, he left behind his whole sense of 
being, his identity, when he decided to join the army to fight against 
the tripartite aggression in 1956. Instead, he went looking for a new 
masculine identity, a masculinity which allowed him to continue using 
his strength, but this time to protect his family/country rather than 
provide for it. 
If we read these men’s masculine performances in the context of 
Trujillo’s (1991) analysis of what defines hegemonic masculinity in 
American popular culture, we can discern several similarities. 
According to Trujillo, hegemonic men are required to be physically 
strong (Hamdi’s enamored look upon the bare-chested workers), 
achieve professionally (Shawqi’s failure), and be familial patriarchs 
(Muhammad’s reality and Mus‘ad’s future). Another requirement is 
present in Muhammad, namely being an ‘outdoorsman’, which 
Muhammad certainly is as a farmer but also in terms of his 
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experiences as soldier where he found his goal in life and his true self. 
The hegemonic ideal – unattainable for all – is what Munir performs, 
or at least, pretends to perform, parodying hegemonic masculinity as 
defined by him and his surroundings and exposing it as a complex 
construct that men are supposed to identify with. Thus, while critical 
of a hegemonic ideal for men, the film nevertheless does not give up 
on a masculine ideal defined by men being able to be in touch with 
their inner selves, with nature and with their direct surroundings. 
Further, the film considers work and education as integral parts to the 
construction of a masculine identity, although the current (in the film) 
conditions are not accommodating enough for men to adequately 
perform, resulting in a so-called crisis of men. In the next film, Karnak 
Café, we will see how this abstract notion of crisis affects the male 
body. 
 
6.1.2 Karnak Café  
The second film portraying defeated men is the adaptation of Nagib 
Mahfuz’s novel with the same title: Karnak Café (‘Ali Badrakhan, 1975). 
‘Ali Badrakhan (1946-) is the son of the famous pioneer of Egyptian 
cinema, Ahmad Badrakhan, and has himself made fame with several 
critically and popularly acclaimed films, like Shafiqa wa-Mitwalli/Shafika 
and Metwalli (1978) and al-Go‘/Hunger (1986), both starring the 
director’s wife, Su‘ad Husni, who also participates in Karnak Café. Upon 
completing his film studies in Cairo, he continued studying for another 
two years in Italy. After his return to Egypt, he was assistant-director 
to both his father and director Youssef Chahine, for example for the 
latter’s The Sparrow. Badrakhan’s Karnak Café was a box office success 
and was the start of a series of films criticizing the July revolution’s 
outcomes (Abu Shadi 1998: 21). 
The main actor in the film, Nur al-Sharif (1946-), was a rising star in 
the 70s, often playing roles of underdog men. His younger characters 
in films were also often subjected to violence – both physical and 
psychological – as is explicitly the case in Karnak Café. Nur al-Sharif 
was initially a football player for Zamalek, according to Mahmud 
Qasim (2004: 579). He showed his football talent in the film Cat on Fire, 
playing the role of a gay football star. Nur al-Sharif studied theater and 
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started acting in plays, after which Adil Imam introduced him to 
director Hasan al-Imam. His great performance in the latter’s film Qasr 
al-Shoq/Palace of Desire (1969) meant the start of his film career. Al-
Sharif started out as the underdog anti-hero, convincingly thanks to 
his short physique. Slowly his characters developed towards more 
‘adult’ men, portraying patriarchs in films and serials alike. One of his 
most famous recent parts is as the patriarch Sa‘d al-Dali in the popular 
Ramadan-serial al-Dali, or as the shoe-polisher turned rich car trader 
in The Yaqoubian Building. 
The film Karnak Café is filled with great names from Egyptian 
cinema. Nur al-Sharif plays alongside the popular actress Su‘ad Husni 
(1943-2001)11 and other famous star actors. One of them is Kamal al-
Shinawi (1921-2011) in his role as horrid secret service director. 
Although he often played romantic roles in his younger years,12 later 
he played roles of corrupt officials. Farid Shawqi in his role as 
Zaynab’s/Su‘ad Husni’s father, has grown old and lost his dominant 
position, while the former belly dancer Tahiyya Carioca (1919-1999) 
keeps up her role as tough, ‘baladi’ woman in the role of Zaynab’s 
mother. Muhammad Subhi (1948-) plays the revolutionary Hilmi, in 
love with the elder café-owner Qurunfila, played by the beautiful, 
although nostalgic, Shuwaykar (1935-). The film boasts an impressive 
cast, and many more famous actors make an appearance, but for the 
analysis of the film’s portrayal of a ‘defeated man’, it suffices to focus 
on Isma‘il, the character played by Nur al-Sharif. 
Produced after the 1973 war, the film is allowed visual criticism and 
a condemnation of the human rights’ abuses during ‘Abd al-Nasir’s 
rule.13 The main character in this film is Isma‘il who, while taking his 
                                                   
11 Su‘ad Husni was not only famous as an actress; she was also often seen 
dancing and singing in her films. She is still revered for her songs up to this 
day, as well as for her more realistic portrayal of women in films. Her star 
persona is very different from the idealistic ‘first lady’, Fatin Hamama, or 
other contemporaries to the latter. Instead, Husni is a little daredevil, though 
usually conforming to ‘proper’ female behavior in terms of her sexual 
activity. 
12 A famous film in which he plays a cute swindler is the 1951 romantic 
comedy Master Bulbul (see also chapters 5 and 9). 
13 Because of its explicit images regarding human rights abuses in ‘Abd al-
Nasir’s prisons and police apparatus, the film was strongly criticized and at 
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daily nap in the café, hears on the radio about the 1973 war and the 
Egyptian army’s crossing of the Suez Canal. As a doctor he suddenly 
realizes he can help. As a man, he feels empowered and encouraged 
once again. His appearance does not give away his potential, either as a 
doctor or as a man: he looks forlorn, the miserable reminder of a once 
promising future. When he arrives at one hospital, he is denied entry 
unless he has a permit issued by the hospital’s director. He recognizes 
his friend and former fiancée Zaynab working as a nurse, who will try 
to put in a good word for him with the director. The rest of the movie 
is a visualization of Zaynab’s story to the hospital’s director about 
what turned Isma‘il into the present failure. Zaynab is telling the 
events that happened to Isma‘il and their friends Hilmi and Qurunfila, 
as part of the larger narrative, the 1973 war. This also has 
consequences for the way Isma‘il’s masculine performance is 
portrayed; it is Zaynab’s recounting these events that made him into 
the miserable man he is now. 
The men in this film are diverse and on more than one occasion the 
film turns to the issue of a generational clash rather than simply 
depicting the regime’s repressive methods. On the one hand there is 
the young generation, like Isma‘il and his friends from university; on 
the other hand there is the group of elder educated men who sit at the 
Karnak café liberally discussing politics and the role of art in society. 
While these young men and women, as “children of the revolution” 
(Mahfuz 2011: 69), are portrayed full of activity and ambition, the elder 
men are miserable and feeble remnants – therefore they are never 
arrested; these elder intellectuals’ words pose no threat to the regime. 
Another important space in the film, apart from the café, is the local 
popular neighborhood (the ḥāra) where both Isma‘il and Zaynab live. 
Within the ḥāra are a few recognizable male characters, namely 
ma‘allim Hasaballah (played by ‘Ali al-Sharif)14 with his enormous and 
                                                                                                                   
first denied screening permits. The pending censorship contributed greatly to 
the ticket sales of the film (Gordon 2002: 239). 
14 ‘Ali al-Sharif, regularly portraying traditionalist characters because of his 
appearance and rough voice, was convicted in the 1960s of being a member of 
a communist party, which makes his personal relation to this film particularly 




old-fashioned mustache, large, round face, deep voice and broad, 
muscular chest, and Zaynab’s father Diab. Both men are representative 
of what Milestone and Meyer labeled “old men” (2012: 114), not in the 
sense of age, but in the sense of the type of masculinity they represent, 
as uneducated ‘brutes’. Their bodies and appearances – as well as the 
audience’s cultural knowledge attributed to actors like Farid Shawqi 
and ‘Ali al-Sharif – are the main markers of their masculine identities: 
their masculinity ‘emanates’ from their bodies, as it were, as we have 
seen with the muscular performances of the ma‘allim in the previous 
chapter. 
The all-mighty Diab in this era can still pretend to be the provider 
and protector of his family, but not in the face of the authoritarian 
regime which has since long taken up – or perhaps always kept – the 
role of ‘father’-figure entitled to the use of violence. Swedenburg 
called this the “Daddy State” (2007: 5-6), where the state seems to have 
taken on the role of providing (and punishing) father. The paternalist 
goal of the ‘Daddy State’ is to guide youngsters into becoming proper 
national subjects. Stollery (2001) compares the authoritarian state to 
patriarchal constructions of the ‘family’, with a male provider – the 
head of state – entitled to violence to keep order in the family. His 
argument reflects Samira Aghacy’s argument of an intricate 
connection between representations of state and family in Arabic 
novels since 1967 (Aghacy 2009: 118-9). Within cinema, portrayals of 
such authoritarian figures are not necessarily limited to men alone. 
Women, too, can embody authority, as protectors of a patriarchal 
system. The depiction of the state in Karnak Café is, however, as a 
father failing to provide or protect, while imposing itself through 
violence and coercion. More specifically, the Nasirist myth is now held 
entirely responsible for the defeat, its violence as evidence of its failing 
ideology and policies. 
In the film – as well as the book – the group of students Isma‘il and 
Zaynab are part of, is arrested three times on trumped-up charges. The 
film’s narrative centers on the character of Isma‘il and the love story 
that ensues between him and Zaynab. A secondary love story in the 
plot is between the activist Hilmi and Qurunfila. The film portrays the 
youthful revolutionary spirit in the students that is crushed by the 
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state’s repressive politics and authoritarianism. The plot develops as a 
coming-of-age story, where the young men and woman try to 
disentangle themselves from the authoritarian state-as-father, 
embodied by the head of the university and the head of the secret 
services, Khalid Safwan. The young people’s own fathers are impaired 
old men: Hilmi’s father is a retired teacher, Zaynab’s father is a lower 
class man who has no real ‘power’ when he faces state institutions. 
In the film, the young men are also directly impaired by an abstract, 
corrupt, authoritarian state apparatus, in this case embodied by Khalid 
Safwan. Isma‘il, after his release from prison the third time and 
coerced by Khalid Safwan to work as an informer, is not able to 
continue his life in normalcy. Samira Aghacy’s analysis of novels shows 
that “[t]he strategy of coercion, intimidation, and torture is part of the 
state-controlled machinery and security apparatus […] which aims at 
producing submissive individuals” (Aghacy 2009: 94-5). But, contrary 
to Aghacy’s analysis of novels that turn prison time into a rite of 
passage constructing a man’s identity (id.), the patriarchal ‘state 
apparatus’15 in this film has entirely different effects on men. While 
the young men in the film seem defiant, particularly Hilmi who 
eventually pays the price for his defiance, the main character Isma‘il is 
a broken, defeated, man at the end. The most powerful image of the 
‘defeated man’ that Isma‘il has become is portrayed in his inability to 
perform sexually with Zaynab, reliving his memories from prison.16 His 
                                                   
15 The prison is not the only apparatus that is critically approached in the 
film. Also, and foremostly, the educational system is critiqued for its refusal 
to bolster critical thought. Instead, the university appears to be the first place 
where students run the risk of encountering the repressive state, while 
Hilmi’s father was forced to retire from his teaching position. The regime is 
thus shown to extend its influence not only through ‘correctional’ institutions 
like prison (which are actually considered as a place to cure citizens of their 
anti-regime thoughts), but also through schooling. Although absent in this 
film, also religion has been coopted by the state through its greater influence 
on both the Islamic and Christian establishments, a critique that is also 
directed at the current leadership in Egypt. 
16 Film critic Kamal Ramzi (2012) reads this scene entirely differently, saying 
that Isma‘il realizes that Zaynab is no longer a virgin after her rape by one of 
the secret service agents. Ramzi reads the images of people getting arrested 
and human rights abuses as images flashing before her eyes, reminding the 
audience in the first place of the reason why she would give herself to Isma‘il 
140 
 
time in prison has made him into what he is now, and places him in the 
position of a victim of the state’s ultimate betrayal, represented 
through Zaynab’s rape or Hilmi’s death. 
The film suggests here a ‘crisis from without, as well as from within’ 
experienced by the men (Edwards 2006: 6-7). Edwards relates the 
notion of ‘crisis from without’ to a perception of men’s positions 
within institutions such as work, education and the family. The crisis 
ensues when men compare their actual experience to those positions 
they deem appropriate within each of these institutions. The ‘crisis 
from within’ is far less easily discernable, since it relates to how men 
perceive their roles have shifted as men. In the film, these crises take 
place on the level of the state, namely in the university, which is the 
place where they – as students – are confronted for the first time with 
the state’s curtailing of personal rights. As the film progresses, 
Isma‘il’s confrontations with the state – whether in university or with 
the secret service represented by Khalid Safwan – turn this external 
crisis into a personal crisis of his male identity. In order for Isma‘il to 
forget what has happened, he needs an external instigator to take his 
life in his own hands. That abstract notion-turned-personal is the 1973 
war and particularly the images of soldiers crossing the Suez Canal on 
October 6. The film’s ending is patriotic and glorifies the army’s 
accomplishments, to the point that it is patronizing in its semi-happy 
ending. The fact remains that society’s woes have a direct impact on 
Isma‘il’s life: he is unable to cope with a defeat that was much larger 
than simply a lost battle, resulting in erratic and ‘unmasculine’ 
behavior. 
The lower class rough masculinity of the two ma‘allimīn stands in 
stark contrast to Isma‘il’s character, represented as a ‘defeated’ ideal 
as the medical student he is. They both radiate masculinity, something 
which Isma‘il lacks entirely at the beginning of the film, yet which is 
also expected of him. Connell (2005: 45) states that masculinity is 
somehow always thought “to be inherent in a male body or to express 
                                                                                                                   
before marriage: she is no longer a virgin anyway. I do not believe this is a 
correct reading, considering some of the images are personal memories of 
what happened to Isma‘il in prison. I find Ramzi’s inability to grasp Isma‘il’s 
mental breakdown striking, instead the critic insists on his own presumptions 
about marriage which do not seem to apply here. 
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something about a male body.” Isma‘il’s inability to perform 
masculinity on screen is coded as undesirable behavior. Depictions of 
men’s bodies are visibly different in this film compared to older films 
in an Egyptian cinema tradition. The lower class men perform their 
masculinity successfully within the ḥāra but they are contained once 
they venture outside of it. The old men at the café are unthreatening, 
while the tortured bodies of Isma‘il and his friends are an example of 
curbing their youthful enthusiasm into socially accepted behavior and 
to marginalize their activism. 
The contradictory figure of Khalid Safwan is at once a dandy, a rich, 
well-dressed man, residing in a villa with swimming pool, exacerbating 
the unequal class relations between him and his ‘victims’. But he is 
also the regime’s tool of coercion, effectively smashing people’s middle 
class dreams. Armbrust (1995) notes that as of the 1970s, “the sort of 
middle class modernist hero so common in earlier films has […] been 
either beleaguered or humiliated”. The students – Isma‘il and Zaynab 
are from lower class backgrounds and Hilmi is the son of a 
schoolteacher – aspire a middle class lifestyle, going to university and 
studying for a better future. Zaynab’s parents had subscribed to a 
government program to relocate them to the new concrete blocks built 
during ‘Abd al-Nasir’s reign – still considered a step up the social 
ladder compared to their current dwellings. But the students’ dreams 
and aspirations are crushed by the regime. The modernist and 
bourgeois ideal they aspire – and which is still portrayed as an ideal – 
is no longer as attainable as it used to be in 50s and 60s films. But, 
while Zaynab was able to put her past behind her by moving out of the 
lower class neighborhood into a new, ‘modern’ area, Isma‘il was not 
able to do so until – as the film suggests – his masculine identity is 
restored through the ‘victory’ of passing the Suez Canal by Egyptian 
troops in 1973. 
 
The protagonists of the films discussed in this chapter are all 
indicative of the defeated men that Bouzid (ref. in Stollery 2001: 51) 
talked about and saw embodied by the tough ‘he-man’ in Youssef 
Chahine’s film The Sparrow. These men feel the crisis from without 
creeping in on their identities as well. Their masculinity as performed 
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in the films is an ambiguous one, in a way reminding us of the pre-1967 
male ideal as provider and protector, but the ideal has been tarnished, 
difficult, if not impossible, to attain. The blame is put entirely with the 
regime’s inability to achieve the goals of the 1952 revolution (Abu 
Shadi 1998: 21), which eventually would culminate in the 1967 defeat. 
The performance of the men in these films is always dependent on 
their ability to perform successfully and heroically, to perform, in 
other words, masculinity because of the fact that they have, simply 
put, a body coded as male (Connell 2005: 45). The 1967 defeat was for 
these cinematic men (but also for women) a mental defeat, apart from 
the real and physical defeat of the Arab armies. In the political and 
social crisis of the 70s, men were depicted as unable to perform 
according to those ideals prevalent in earlier films and media. The 
defeat was also a violent wake-up call from the myth they had been 
living (El-Enany 1993: 116-7). Yet, in the following part of the chapter, 
we will see that the crisis that some men experience in films depicting 
the depressive mood after the defeat, is not at all a crisis for certain 
other men in films addressing the consumerism that had become – in 
the eyes of the filmmakers – detrimental to the goals of the revolution. 
 
6.2 ‘Soft men’ in the picture 
 
The type discussed in this part of the chapter is a type that is still 
prevalent today and perhaps has never disappeared altogether. These 
men generally present themselves as being open-minded, skilled, 
educated, and ‘westernized’,17 but there is one serious flaw: they are 
exactly the opposite, apart from, perhaps, being ‘westernized’. This 
type assumes that they are entitled to a sort of regulatory behavior 
over women and women’s bodies as well as other (marginalized, 
subverted) men. Thanks to their financial success, achieved through 
the subjugation of others, this type has successfully gained control of 
the consumerist, feminized society in which some men felt lost. As 
                                                   
17 ‘Westernized’ is depicted here as going to parties, drinking alcohol, 
entertaining superficial human interactions and traveling wide and far across 
the globe for work or leisure. 
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such, they set a new norm, a new ideal, of what it means to be a man. 
And all this fits perfectly and contradictorily within their concept of a 
cultured and Western bourgeois lifestyle. 
I will consider films that depict financially successful men living the 
life of the ‘cultured’ male. There are a few elements they all have in 
common: financial security, education, sexual activity and 
heterosexuality, and – most of them – living a ‘Western’ lifestyle. The 
films I will discuss here are Woman With a Bad Reputation (Henry 
Barakat 1973), and My Blood, Tears, and Smile (Husayn Kamal 1973). Both 
films are actually with a female protagonist. This, however, makes for 
an interesting female point of view – although the camera’s gaze is 
coded as male, the women are in no way ‘passive’ – on the men and 
their masculine performance defining her life. There are many more 
films portraying similar plot lines about the contradictory ‘nature’ of 
certain educated, westernized men. One such film is Tolba Radwan’s 
Qissa Mamnu‘a/A Forbidden Story (1963), in which the Cairene uncle of a 
peasant girl lives his libertine lifestyle, but all the while enforces strict 
social control on the girl’s whereabouts. Another film is Where Is My 
Mind? (‘Atif Salim 1974), which seeks to discuss the combination of 
strongly rooted traditions with a ‘modern’ European lifestyle. Another 
film, with a plot line very similar to Woman With a Bad Reputation, 
namely The Fine Thread, was also directed by Henry Barakat (1971). All 
these films have, however, two important elements in common: the 
subjugation of women, and men re-appropriating their dominant 
position in society through combining contradictory elements in their 
identities. 
Made in the 70s, the period that showed the initial distrust in the 
Nasirist state’s modernist rhetoric of individualism, education, and 
constructing the ‘modern’ Egyptian citizen, these films are also 
testimonies of their time. In the changing Egypt of the 1970s, moving 
away from socialism towards a more aggressive form of capitalism, 
women’s presence and role in public was starting to change as well. 
Women were also more public because of the Nasirist state feminism 
encouraging women to study and work (although mostly in 
government positions).18 The combination of these changing social 
                                                   
18 Mervat Hatem (1988: 413) reminds of the incredible increase in the number 
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conditions and representational practices in popular mass media in 
the 70s resulted in this ambiguous masculine ideal. The question 
remains, however, how much the directors contributed to or opposed 
the idea of men reappropriating their dominant positions. 
 
6.2.1 Woman With a Bad Reputation 
Henry Barakat (1914-1997), famous for his many romantic musicals, 
comedies, as well as his melodramatic realism, is a venerated director 
in Egypt.19 He entered the film industry as an editor while he was still 
studying Law. His career covered an extensive period, debuting as a 
director in 1942 with al-Muttahima/The Accused, continuing into the 
1990s. He not only directed his films, but also often wrote the scenario 
and produced several of his own films. He worked closely together 
with one of the female pioneers of Egyptian cinema, Asya Daghir, who 
produced many of his films, such as the epic Amir al-Intiqam/Prince of 
Revenge (1950) which is based on Dumas’s The Count of Monte Cristo. He 
furthermore worked often with Fatin Hamama in his melodrama’s 
critiquing society’s double standards when it comes to women and 
women’s behavior, as well as critiquing the abuse of women’s bodies, 
e.g. in al-Haram/The Sin from 1965. Through narrative techniques and 
the camera’s eye, the director privileges the victimized woman’s point 
of view, particularly so with the actress Fatin Hamama. 
The current film, Woman With a Bad Reputation stars actress Shams 
al-Barudi (1940-).20 In her younger years she often played roles of 
sexually active women. She is famous in Egypt and the Arab world as a 
sex symbol, not afraid to pose in sexually suggestive ways. Whoever 
                                                                                                                   
of educated women between 1960 and 1976, particularly the sixfold increase 
of women pursuing a higher education. 
19 Several of his films are on the list of ‘best Egyptian films’ compiled by the 
Bibliotheca Alexandrina in 2006, such as Du‘aʼ al-Karawan/Call of the Curlew 
(1959), an adaptation of the homonymous novel by Taha Husayn. 
20 Actually, the script writer Mamduh al-Lithi was criticized for having taken 
the plot from Ihsan Abd al-Quddus’ novel My Blood, Tears and Smile which was 
screened the previous season, before Woman (al-Akhbar 11.01.1974). Al-Lithi 
rebuked that he had already finished the script years earlier but was stopped 
by the censor which resulted in a delay in the production of the film (al-




was young and male in the 70s does not remember her legs, opened 
provocatively and standing over the camera, establishing a powerful 
reaction shot from her co-actor, staring up at her (unseen) naked body 
in Abu Sayf’s film Malatili Bath? After her marriage to actor and 
director Hasan Yusif (1934-) she acted in most of his films, but as of 
1983 she decided to quit acting altogether upon donning the veil.21 In 
Woman With a Bad Reputation, she is cast next to the famously romantic 
Mahmud Yasin (see earlier in this chapter) and the actor Yusif Sha‘ban, 
famous for his less than masculine roles. The latter’s characters’ 
masculinity is always in a way compromised, either too much 
concerned with their outer appearance, or ostensibly abusing their 
position of power as men. Also ‘Imad Hamdi plays an important part in 
the film, this time as a profiteering old man. In sum, there is not a 
single masculine ideal, not one man performing an acceptable 
masculinity, while Shams al-Barudi performs an exaggerated 
femininity, emphasizing her body and her emotional pleasure 
whenever a man pays her due attention. 
The film opens with an establishing shot, following Hana’s (al-
Barudi) large American car through mostly empty Cairo streets. She 
arrives at an impressive building, entering the large hallway while the 
gazing camera remains still, letting her body slowly disappear out of 
screen. The building’s doorman follows her up to the elevator, opening 
the door for her, cashing his baksheesh, addressing her respectfully 
with ‘hānim’ (madam). The film then cuts to Sa‘fan (‘Imad Hamdi), who 
is wearing a housecoat and preparing for a romantic night. He hears 
the elevator arriving and approaches the door to look through the 
peephole, after which the camera shows his point of view to the 
audience. After entering the flat, she feasts on Sa‘fan’s many expensive 
gifts he brought from Europe. This initial scene conveys several things. 
First, Hana is a wealthy woman; second, she is respected by the less 
wealthy doorman; third, Sa‘fan is her sugar daddy, which means her 
wealth is entirely thanks to him. And lastly, her body is depicted as an 
                                                   
21 She was one of many Egyptian actresses who quit their profession and 




object, desired by the camera’s male gaze, the audience’s gaze and her 
co-actors’ gaze as well. 
These details are important, since the film will later explain 
through a series of flashbacks how she has reached her current status. 
Class and gender are at the core of this film’s narrative. The audience 
is told how she got married at an early age, in order to alleviate her 
father’s growing costs of providing for his family. However, she 
married a low-ranking clerk in a construction company with a lot of 
ambition to climb the social ladder and adhere to the new idealized 
consumerist lifestyle, represented by Western-looking parties, alcohol, 
women and fancy clothing and other expensive gadgets. The type 
representing this new consumerist lifestyle is the businessman who 
lives a life of luxury, who is a world traveler, has one or more 
mistresses, and never seems to be going about any business. Next to 
this hegemonic type of man is Hana’s husband Kamal (Yusif Sha‘ban). 
He is a subordinated man, a simple employee of Sa‘fan, but also 
complicit to the hegemonic ideal. A third man in her life is her first 
love from her old neighborhood, Ahmad (played by Mahmud Yassin). 
He is a medical student (again!), somehow marginalized yet embodying 
the Nasirist modern ideals of education, marriage and a hopeful future 
in the service of his country as a doctor. He will initially pose a threat 
to the hegemony of the rich Sa‘fan but will later moralistically reaffirm 
masculine domination over the woman’s sexuality. 
The film’s plot has similarities with Barakat’s earlier film, Fine 
Thread, starring Fatin Hamama and Mahmud Yasin. The role of the 
woman in the plot functions as mediator to advance her husband’s or 
her lover’s career. Women have been sacrificing themselves for the 
sake of their husbands or male family members ever since the 
beginning of Egyptian cinema. Yet, they were rarely expected to engage 
sexually with other men in order to raise their family’s (read: 
husbands, lovers, male family members) social status.22 In Fine Thread 
the female protagonist has a life of illegitimate relationships with men, 
                                                   
22 Salah Abu Sayf’s film Bidaya wa-Nihaya/Dead Among the Living (1960) is an 
example of such a narrative, where a young woman decides to sell her body in 
order to provide for her family’s expenses. But important to note is that Abu 




as their good-looking mistress. However, her attention to a younger 
man (Mahmud Yasin) will eventually cast her downfall: as soon as he 
reaches a certain level of independence and financial success – on her 
account – his patriarchal surroundings convince him to leave her for 
the sake of his credibility and reputation. Thus, Fatin Hamama’s 
character had sacrificed herself for the sake of her lover’s career, but 
is ultimately unable to savor the fruits of her hard work, a similarity 
she shares with Shams al-Barudi’s character Hana in Woman With a Bad 
Reputation. 
Hana’s fate will ultimately be decided upon by the men in her 
surroundings. Sa‘fan as the patriarch is apparently entitled to all the 
women and her husband Kamal has no problem with this as long as it 
benefits his own career. But then she meets her ‘first love’, Ahmad, at a 
new year’s party and entertains a sexual relationship with him. He 
initially takes no issue to sleep with Hana and entertain an adulterous 
relationship with her; he even convinces her to leave Kamal and 
promises to marry her. The events follow each other quickly, and upon 
graduation, Ahmad as a doctor is appointed to a hospital in the south. 
But then Hana uses her personal connection with Sa‘fan to have 
Ahmad transferred back to Cairo, although without offering her body 
this time. Having divorced her husband – who kept all her possessions 
and forbade her from seeing their son based on the flimsy argument 
she is an adulterous woman – she meets Ahmad at a roadside café. 
Ahmad in the meanwhile has come to know who is behind his transfer 
and finally decides to leave her as well: he is suddenly reminded of his 
male pride and honor. The last shot is of Hana wandering off, her back 
to the camera, this time without fancy clothing or a large American 
car, in stark opposition to her status at the start of the film. She is 
literally cast out of the patriarchal, male-dominated society, which 
prefers to keep up appearances of feigned respectability. 
The film poses a few interesting questions, portraying the point of 
view of Hana. It is her narrative, although she is also the object of a 
male gaze – literally at the start of the film through Sa‘fan’s hungry 
eyes peeping through his door. Can she then be described as a passive 
object of desire? Not really, since she herself was also infatuated with 
the promises of a ‘better’, materialist future. Weighing off her 
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possibilities within her family, she decides to participate and give in to 
her husband’s requests “to be nice to Sa‘fan Bey”. But this focus on her 
narrative and the use of her body as object of desire make the film also 
ambiguous towards ‘accepted’ male behavior – accepted, that is, in the 
film’s reality. Why would Sa‘fan have the right to play around with his 
employee’s wife? Why would Kamal not be implicated with his wife’s 
‘bad reputation’? And why is it that the romantic Ahmad is allowed 
sexual intercourse out of wedlock with her, his conscience apparently 
not gnawing on him, but ultimately refuses to be with her? The next 
film, My Blood, Tears, and Smile, partly answers these questions, focusing 
less on the protagonist’s body and more on her personal life as it is 
defined – against her will – by patriarchal authorities embodied by her 
mother in the first place, her husbands in the second place. 
 
6.2.2 My Blood, Tears, and Smile 
The plot of the film My Blood, Tears, and Smile is adapted to the screen 
by Kawthar Haykal, as she did with ‘Abd al-Quddus’ Imbiraturiyyat 
Mim/M’s Empire (Husayn Kamal 1972). Husayn Kamal (1934-2003) is 
“one of four Egyptian directors who captivatingly adapted literary 
works to the screen” (Qasim 2010: 156).23 According to Qasim he not 
only adapted the works of famous novelists, but also of young and 
lesser known writers. The director, son of an Egyptian father and a 
Greek mother, is no stranger to controversy, famous for his musical 
Abi Fawq al-Shagara/My Dad’s Up the Tree (1969), starring the romantic 
singer ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz (1929-1977) in an unlikely role as a twenty-
something college student and the boyfriend of the ‘elder’ Nadia Lutfi 
(1938-) in the role of seducing dancer in a nightclub.24 The movie is 
famous for its presumed ‘100 kisses’, but has also continued to play in 
the cinemas for an astonishing 53 weeks. Another of Kamal’s films, Sheʼ 
Min al-Khof/A Touch of Fear (1969), was about to be censored because of 
its political critique of the regime. ‘Abd al-Nasir is said to have allowed 
                                                   
23 The other three directors Qasim mentions are Salah Abu Sayf, Henry 
Barakat and ‘Atif al-Tayyib. ‘Atif al-Tayyib is known as the proponent of neo-
realism in post-1970s Egyptian cinema. 
24 It seems that famous singers are more likely to continue to play young 
roles, and to get away with it successfully. Umm Kulthum, for example, 
continued to play adolescent girls well into her forties. 
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the screening personally after watching the film, stating about the 
main character (played by Mahmud Mursi): “if I were truly so terrible, 
the people are right to kill me off”.25 It is doubtful that ‘Abd al-Nasir 
would have said this, but the rumor serves to prove the former 
president’s presumed ‘democratic’ principles and is testimony to the 
leader’s charisma inspiring Egyptians up to this day. 
The female protagonist in My Blood, Tears, and Smile is played by the 
actress Nagla’ Fathi (1951-), famous for her victim-heroine roles. Her 
characters often bear the brunt of a patriarchal society with a stoic, 
almost masculine, acceptance of her fate. In this, she resembles Fatin 
Hamama, whose work she occasionally remade.26 Here she plays next 
to the star actor Husayn Fahmi (1940-) and Nur al-Sharif. Husayn 
Fahmi is also known for his many romantic roles, although he also 
played less attractive roles of domineering – and even murderous – 
men. He acted opposite Su‘ad Husni in Muhammad Khan’s Maw‘id ‘Ala 
al-‘Asha’/Dinner Date (1982) as her jealous and domineering husband. 
But he was also the star actress Nadia al-Gindi’s pet (and finally jealous 
murderer) in Husam al-Din Mustafa’s Shahd al-Malika/The Queen’s Honey 
(1985) in an adaptation of one of the Harafish-stories written by Nagib 
Mahfuz. His characters are compromised: his blue eyes and blondish 
hair cast him in roles of seductive, romantic men, but he plays either 
hard to get – beautifully described in Su‘ad Husni’s song Yā Wād yā Ti’īl 
[You Difficult Boy!] in the popular musical Khalli Balak Min Zuzu/Watch 
Out for Zuzu (Hasan al-Imam 1972) – or he plays rather hard to get rid 
of, as per the films mentioned above. 
In the film My Blood, Tears, and Smile class conflict and financial 
hardship play once again an essential role. Contrary to the previous 
                                                   
25 From elcinema.com.: http://www.elcinema.com/work/wk1005191/ 
retrieved 16.05.2014. 
26 Nagla’ Fathi’s remakes of older films starring Fatin Hamama include Hobb 
wa-Kibriyaʼ/Love and Pride (Hasan al-Imam 1972), a remake of Hamama’s Irham 
Dumu‘i/Pitty my Tears (Henry Barakat 1954) which itself was a remake of the 
film Qalb al-Marʼa/Woman’s Heart (Togo Mizrahi 1940), starring ‘the mother of 
Egyptian cinema’, Amina Rizq. Another of Fathi’s remakes is Wida‘an… li-ʼl-
‘Idhab/Farewell… to Torture (Ahmad Yahya 1978), a remake of Hamama’s 
Ayyamna al-Hilwa/Our Beautiful Days (Hilmi Halim 1955). For more information 
on Nagla’ Fathi’s star persona, I refer to chapter 9 on female directors and 
representations of female masculinity. 
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film, Woman With a Bad Reputation, the female protagonist Nahid (Nagla’ 
Fathi) is squarely portrayed as the victim of patriarchal abuse. The 
film’s opening credits show how the family has to sell part of their 
furniture and pack the rest to move to another apartment. Their 
bourgeois lifestyle comes under threat and they now have to live in a 
noisy popular area. It turns out her father had done a bad business 
deal and lost a large amount of money. The solution for this family – 
and a solution which the matriarchal mother in the first place 
encourages – is to marry her off to the cousin of a rich businessman 
and acquaintance of her father’s, ‘uncle’ Salim (he is no actual 
relative). The marriage, however, is a sham and a cover-up for Salim’s 
illegitimate interests in the girl. After running away from her forced 
marriage, she meets Mamduh (Husayn Fahmi), who initially seems to 
be able to help her and care for her. 
Interestingly, her mother does not care about what Salim’s 
intentions were; she argues that ‘girls of good families don’t get a 
divorce’ and that her daughter is ultimately responsible for the fate of 
the family: her father made a good business deal with Salim after 
marrying his daughter to the former’s cousin. Her daughter is a 
commodity which she trades (twice!), pointing at the new moral 
standard in society: money. She only agrees to Nahid’s divorce and 
subsequent marriage to Mamduh after hearing how wealthy he and his 
family are. Both Salim and Mamduh embody a hegemonic masculinity 
as businessmen in an era of consumerism and materialism. Their 
hegemonic power is symbolized through different objects such as 
luxurious clothes (taken to its extreme with fur coats and gold 
watches), expensive jewelry and the stereotypical cigar. Mamduh for 
his part is the penultimate embodiment of the nouveau riche with all 
their contradictory character elements. Indeed, Nahid’s and Mamduh’s 
families’ bourgeois Western lifestyles are juxtaposed with their affinity 
towards a traditionalist ‘rational’ marriage based on agreement 
between families rather than romance and love between two 
individuals, an individuality otherwise associated with Western 
capitalism. 
The businessmen’s masculinity is contrasted to the romanticized 
masculine performance of Nahid’s ‘first love’, the student ‘Isam (Nur 
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al-Sharif). ‘Isam is a poor man, as a student, and as such does not 
occupy a strong negotiating position if he ever were to ask for the 
girl’s hand. He is nevertheless portrayed as an ideal male: he cares for 
his mother, he is loved in the neighborhood and the neighbor’s 
children love to play soccer with him. Ironically, they meet in the same 
‘poorer’ neighborhood where Nahid and her family had recently 
moved in to at the start of the film. With the increasing presence of 
women in universities and public life (Hatem 1988: 413), films’ 
narratives contributed to the idea of romantic love, meeting in public 
spaces such as universities, the work place and public transport – in 
the case of Nahid and ‘Isam, a taxi. Contrasted with the arranged 
marriages of the patriarchal families – depicted negatively as coercion 
and abuse – the film challenges patriarchal norms, a longstanding 
tradition in Egyptian cinema (Armbrust 1998: 29), through the 
romantic counternarrative developing between Nahid and ‘Isam. 
The film starts and ends with this romantic side-narrative of the 
main plot. Nahid and ‘Isam meet for the second time in front of his 
apartment building (the first time was in the taxi), and will meet for 
the last time – Nahid is a married woman now – at the end of the film, 
closing their narrative. They even share a passionate kiss, for which 
she is redeemed because of her husband Mamduh’s demand to 
entertain his business partner, ‘Abbas Bey, similar to Hana’s husband 
Kamal in Woman With a Bad Reputation. However, Nahid decides to 
sacrifice herself for ‘Isam’s love: she is unable to run away with him 
and unworthy of his love for her because of the actions she has allowed 
herself to do. This way ‘Isam’s integrity and masculinity will remain 
uncompromised. The mistake Hana made in the other film is that she 
thought her actions would not matter that much for her boyfriend 
Ahmad, resulting in her expulsion from society. 
 
Both these films – and other films from the 1970s27 – have a number 
of similarities in terms of protagonists, plot development and themes. 
                                                   
27 Some examples of films from the 1970s with similar themes and narratives 
are The Fine Thread (Barakat 1971) with Mahmud Yassin and Fatin Hamama; 
Where Is My Mind (‘Atif Salim 1974) with Mahmud Yassin and Su‘ad Husni; and 
Anf wa-Thalath ‘Uyun/A Nose and Three Eyes (Husayn Kamal 1972). Not 
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The films’ protagonists are women whose actions and narrative are 
guided by patriarchal figures surrounding them. But these patriarchal 
authorities – mothers, fathers, husbands, male relatives – are 
questionable characters, portraying internal contradictions. Central in 
this contradictory behavior lays the abuse of the female protagonists’  
bodies. But simultaneously these same protagonists are willing to 
sacrifice themselves entirely, whether for their husbands or their 
lovers. I like to define the power these men exert as ‘soft’, considering 
they have “the ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye 2009: 
5). They have the ability to convince the women, with the lure of a 
progressive future of luxury and money, to do what the men want. It is 
presented as a need as well as a responsibility of the women towards 
their families. The women’s desire for the underdog men in the films is 
potentially threatening, and ultimately the women are punished for 
their transgression – whether by losing everything or by continuing to 
live the morally questionable life they were forced in to. 
On a more conceptual level, the films’ plot is representative of a 
new discourse in 1970s Egypt. Women’s position in the family and the 
personal status laws defining women’s rights within the private sphere 
had come increasingly under scrutiny.28 Films from the 70s contribute 
                                                                                                                   
coincidentally, all four films – including My Blood, Tears, and Smiles are – as 
already mentioned – adaptations of novels by Ihsan Abd al-Quddus, which 
partly explain their narrative similarity. But, the trope of women using their 
bodies might also be an indication of the writer’s and society’s perception of 
the impending danger of women venturing outside the sanctity of the home, 
whether to study, work, or ‘illicitly’ meet men, which will eventually result in 
their dramatic downfall. 
28 Personal status laws had not changed as progressively as women’s 
movements had wanted. The personal status laws throughout the 50s and 60s 
had remained rather similar to those laws from the 1920s. In the 70s, these 
came more and more under pressure and one film has made them its central 
topic. Sa‘id Marzuq’s Uridu Hallan/I Want a Solution (1975) discusses these 
personal status laws and the inequality between men and women in terms of 
divorce. It is said that the film has contributed to a change in the divorce law 
in 1979 which stated that women were allowed to initiate divorce if their 
husbands were to marry a second wife.  Under Mubarak, this law was 
weakened, with the additional clause that a divorce is only granted if women 
can prove the second marriage harms them, emotionally or physically. Under 
Mubarak’s rule, in 2001, the khul‘ law came into effect, allowing women to 
initiate divorce. An important issue is that women in this case have no rights 
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to the discourse of male-female relations in the private sphere and 
indirectly signal what is coded as ‘correct’ male behavior as opposed to 
the patriarchs’ prominent immorality. The marginalized but 
romanticized male in both films is then the embodiment of this ideal 
masculinity, although he finds himself in a subordinated position. He is 
nevertheless the one who might care and provide for the female 
protagonist and who might protect her from the perils of society, 
ironically signaling a return to patriarchy. In the end, masculine 





In this chapter I have dealt with two different types of men. On the one 
hand there are the defeated men who are unable to cope with the new 
reality they live in after 1967. Everything they believed in or stood for 
appeared to have been either a dream or a blatant lie. They flee from 
society and from reality, escaping their responsibilities and lives and 
looking for their quintessential responsibility as protectors of the 
nation. They remind themselves nostalgically about an antiquated 
masculinity: the strong, confident man seeking his true self to be in 
symbiosis with everything around him, a man who can serve his 
country appropriately and not wither away in some café or a society 
inimical to masculine behavior. The defeated men are in search of a 
lost masculinity, foretelling a conviction that whatever it is they are 
longing for, or are lacking, they conceive of it as a lost item essential to 
construct their masculine identities. 
On the other hand there is the compromising type of ‘soft’ men, the 
‘pretending intellectual’. He has proven to be able to adapt himself to 
his changing surroundings and reposition himself on top of the 
pyramid, so to speak. He has found a way of dealing with the feminine 
consumerist culture around him and appropriate it for himself as 
                                                                                                                   
as divorcees (such as housing, allowances), essentially recreating women’s 




simply a new environment but nonetheless one where he and his 
masculinity can thrive. These men are not looking for a different 
society or feel disabled because of it; they have changed masculine 
ideals of outdoors men, providers and protectors into softer indoor 
versions of men – neither providing nor protecting. Essentially these 
men too represent an implied masculine norm; the former cannot “be 
a man” without his (idea of) masculinity, while the latter has simply 
changed his (idea of) masculinity to suit the new reality and to 
perform adequately. 
The juxtaposition of these ‘new men’, the antagonists of the female 
victim-heroine, to the marginalized masculinity of the romanticized 
student, functions, then, to reinforce the ‘older’ ideal of provider and 
protector. The romanticized students (as doctors, engineers, or other 
‘useful’ professions to build the nation) are the unattainable modernist 
and bourgeois ideals, the men who are the most useful to society but 
are the least positioned to assert themselves. These films thus portray 
a sort of middle class angst towards the loss of the socialist goals of 
progress and education that the previous regime espoused. The young 
men’s masculine performances on screen are idealized, yet they are 
also inadequate against the feared monopoly of the nouveau riche’s 
immorality. In this way, the ideal young men and students are similar 








7. Eighties Men: Historical Heroes and 
Contemporary Anti-Heroes 
 
The previous three decades witnessed the portrayals of strong men, 
bullies and heroes in the 50s and 60s and of defeated and ‘soft’ men in 
the 70s. The present decade, the 1980s, signals a mixture of on the one 
hand representations of historical strong men and futuwwāt,1 and on 
the other hand representations of contemporary anti-heroes. The era 
in which these films were made correspond to the early years of 
former president Husni Mubarak’s reign. Tarik Osman described his 
public image as a calm leader, one that could offer “the hope of an 
Egypt restored to balance and given the time to nourish its weakened 
self-confidence” (Osman 2013: 166). The 80s followed tumultuous 
political and economic changes since the Free Officers coup in 1952, 
ushering in socialist inspired Nasirism and, following ‘Abd al-Nasir’s 
death in 1970, Sadat’s liberal economic policies. The country had also 
entered into three major wars in less than two decades, the 1967 war 
virtually bankrupting Egypt and many of its nationalized industries. 
In the cinema industry, which had recently been reprivatized under 
Sadat, we can discern new aesthetic developments as well. The 1970s 
were the start of a new mode of filmmaking, which Nouri Bouzid 
(1995) saw mainly as the results of the efforts of three filmmakers in 
Egypt, namely Youssef Chahine, Tawfiq Salih and Shadi ‘Abd al-Salam. 
Bouzid did not believe this new activist mode continued in Egypt, 
although it constituted the basis of the new realism of the 1980s and 
90s, with directors like Dawud ‘Abd al-Sayyid, ‘Atif al-Tayyib, 
Muhammad Khan, Ra’fat al-Mihi and Bashir al-Dik. Film critic ‘Ali Abu 
Shadi (1998: 25-6) notes that the main characteristics of this new 
realism were a concern with contemporary reality through anti-heroes 
                                                   
1 In Egyptian Arabic, futuwwa is actually pronounced fitiwwa (see also Badawi-
Hinds, A Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic for the transliteration of the word). I 
have opted to use the Standard Arabic transliteration in order to avoid 
confusion, because the word appears in titles of books and articles (that are 
mentioned here) in Standard Arabic transliteration. 
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and filming in the streets. This new realist mode also meant a new 
approach to portrayals of gender relations. For both Bouzid and Abu 
Shadi, the main interest of this new realism, or at least its main 
purpose, was a truthful portrayal of reality. 
Their accounts, however, assume a straightforward and one-way 
transmission of meaning. Indeed, for Bouzid, new realism is not so 
much a ‘mode’ but rather “a specific content that has a form” (Bouzid 
1995: 249). Armbrust (1995), on the contrary, argues against both, 
claiming that the production of meaning is never a straightforward 
process. Films labeled as realist based on formal characteristics and 
their presumed ‘truthful’ depiction of reality, are not of interest for 
these subjective reasons. They are as much of interest as films 
critically denounced as ‘commercial’. It is preferable to keep the 
meaning of realist films open to interpretation here, since they could 
anyway include multiple genres and filmmaking modes. Even 
melodramas from the previous decades are often talked about in terms 
of their depiction of an Egyptian reality, and we have seen in earlier 
chapters that melodrama and realism are not mutually exclusive. This 
tradition of earlier Egyptian films also continues in the present decade, 
the 1980s. 
Armbrust’s “myth of modernism” (id. 84) is a useful tool for 
analyzing the films of this era. He argues that films from before and 
after the 1970s apply a similar modernist discourse, although with 
different outcomes. The fact that he refers to it as a myth does not 
mean it is nonexistent, but rather that “its meaning differs according 
to social perspective” (id. 84). For those believing in this myth, it is 
thus experienced as real and tangible. Armbrust furthermore refers to 
the filmmaking practices as codes that convey modernist or (in the 
case of 80s films) anti-modernist messages. His conclusion is similar to 
Cavelti’s argument that “not only the traditional genres but the 
cultural myths they once embodied are no longer fully adequate to the 
imaginative needs of our time” (Cavelti 2012: 296). As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, the devastating effects of the war of ’67 had left 
the country (and the region) with no clear ideological path left. Pan-
Arabism started to whither and even al-Sadat’s liberal economic 
policies and peace treaty with Israel did not have the expected results 
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of more freedom and economic growth. In these changed times, the 
tragedies of poetic realism and melodrama as popular modes, with 
their modernist ideals, proved no longer relevant or desired. 
The codes Armbrust refers to regarding 1980s films (and later) are 
grounded in the classical modes of earlier cinema, but with different 
outcomes. These codes consist of a juxtaposition of local versus 
foreign, but also folkloric versus classical expressions (as in ‘low’ 
versus ‘high’ language and culture), both in terms of narrative and 
image. These juxtapositions have already been discussed in the 
previous chapters, for example on how films portrayed the aristocratic 
ruling monarchy and their vassals as ‘other’ through their Western 
lifestyles. Egyptian cinema, Armbrust continues, has always used this 
binary in order to convey a modernist ideology based on the synthesis 
between local tradition and Western science and modernity. In pre-70s 
films this consisted of a modernist ideal, a synthesis of both binaries as 
ideal image of the nation. In post-70s films, this synthesis is absent. 
What remains are only the binaries, without a synthesizing resolution 
at the end of the film. As I have shown in the previous chapter, 
modernist and bourgeois ideals of education and a work ethic are 
slowly being problematized and replaced by social commentary on the 
loss of the ideal. 
In the films analyzed in this chapter two paradigms of men with 
relatively similar ideals appear. On the one hand there is the group of 
men with an idealized masculinity, the futuwwāt, portrayed in 
historical dramas. On the other hand, there are the men portrayed in 
films that are generally considered examples of the new realist style of 
the 1980s, namely men as antiheroes. Both types of men and the 
corpus of films surrounding them have several things in common. 
Firstly, space plays an important role in the films, whether historical 
futuwwa- or underdog-films. The historical films always take place in 
the urban ḥāra, the local lower class neighborhood that is the 
centerpiece of the narrative. It is the place that defines people’s lives, 
their futures as well as their pasts, it is an all-encompassing entity that 
welcomes those who play by its manmade rules, and threatens to kill 
or – more scandalous for the victimized male – exile its perpetrators. 
This space is prominent in the novels of Nagib Mahfuz, whose Children 
158 
 
of Gebelawi and The Harafish lie at the basis of the cosmos of a great 
number of futuwwa-films. The ḥāra in Mahfuz’s novels is a microcosm 
and could be read as a metaphor for Egyptian society more general 
(Vatikiotis 1971: 171).2 A similar metaphor is visible in the films based 
on Mahfuz’s stories. Important to note is the author’s undefined time 
and place in The Harafish, it takes place ‘in a period before the rule of 
law’, as a sentence at the start of the film al-Shaytan Ya‘iz/The Devil 
Preaches (Ashraf Fahmi 1981) reminds us. 
In the other corpus of films that present a contemporary crisis and 
underdog men, the ḥāra is exchanged for the more abstract city. This is 
a necessity because those new realist films attended to contemporary 
issues, with the city as their décor. One of the reasons to go out into 
the streets was also a practical one. After the bankruptcy of the public 
sector film industry, directors had not much choice but to go out in the 
streets instead of using the (bankrupt) nationalized studios. The focus 
is on the urban underground, usually in the capital Cairo. The modern 
city is a place of divisions and opposites, similar to the traditional and 
historical ḥāra: rich versus poor, strong versus weak, good versus bad. 
Another common element is the films’ social critique, replete with 
class distinctions and generational and gender conflicts. Social critique 
is not a novelty; many of the films discussed in previous chapters 
convey social messages. The difference with older films incorporating 
social messages is not in topic, but rather in the style of the current 
films’ critical stance towards modernism and a progressive future. 
 
7.1 Fatwana in Egyptian historical dramas of the 1980s 
 
“Fatwana isn’t words, but deeds” (‘Atris, The Harafish) 
 
According to Malkmus and Armes (1991: 101) there is continuity in the 
narrative of futuwwa-films, what they call “men’s melodrama”, in a 
continuous loop of rise and fall only to be replaced by the next. But the 
films discussed in the present chapter are not always strictly following 
                                                   
2 Also Samia Mehrez makes a similar remark, noting that the ḥāra symbolizes 
Egyptian society in Mahfuz’s novels (Mehrez 2008: 144). 
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the circular narrative pattern that Malkmus and Armes describe. 
Either by death or some other fateful event, the circle is broken. Lila 
Abu-Lughod’s definition of ‘development realism’ (2005: 81) is a less 
constricting and more applicable way of approaching the particular 
genre, or rather, mode, of these films’ aesthetics. Abu-Lughod 
continues, saying: “development realism idealizes education, progress, 
and modernity within the nation”. As explained above, the modernist 
message – of education and progress – that cultural products are 
supposed to proliferate is questioned and critiqued in films from later 
decades, starting from the early 70s and more explicitly in the 80s. 
In the context of the infitāḥ and the exponentially growing gap 
between rich and poor in Egypt in the late 1970s we can discern an 
emerging socially inspired cinema in the 1980s. The futuwwa is in this 
context a significant appearance on the screen. The futuwwa-films 
based on Mahfuz’s novels have a political and revolutionary message, 
threatening the ruling classes to acknowledge the rights of the poor 
because if they don’t “[the poor’s] strength is in their numbers” as one 
futuwwa threateningly reminds us (al-Tut wa-ʼl-Nabut/The Mulberry and 
the Cudgel, Niyazi Mustafa, 1986). Their narratives are inspired by other 
stories and films, for example the Egyptian films Lashin and The Tough 
Guy, or even similar to Hollywood’s version of Spartacus in 1960 by 
Stanley Kubrick. It is not a novelty to portray mutiny and revolts in an 
unjust society; the bread revolts in Egypt of 1977 were still fresh in the 
public’s mind when these films were made.3 Nevertheless, not all these 
films are per sé ‘revolutionary’ and depicting popular uprisings. Some 
of the films portray a coming-of-age narrative of the oppressed victim-
hero (specifically with actor Nur al-Sharif). How does this particular 
male type, placed in the historical context in which the films are made, 
assert the necessity of change and who does the narrative hold 
responsible to initiate it? Through an analysis of the films’ male types I 
will be able to answer this question and discuss how male hegemony is 
questioned, adapted and eventually reimposed. 
                                                   
3 Anwar al-Sadat had decided to remove the state support for basic staples 
(sugar, flower, oil, etc.) which resulted in huge riots across the country only 
to end when al-Sadat reinstated the support. 
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The masculinity of the futuwwa is essential in this process of 
reappropriation, as an idealized masculinity represented by local 
strongmen. The world of the futuwwa is per definition a binary world 
(drama versus action film, outside versus domestic world, strength 
versus intelligence, good versus evil, masculine versus emasculated, 
man versus woman, rich versus poor) and a male-dominated world. 
Just like most of the futuwwa in history were men – with the occasional 
woman (Salah 2012: 45) – so are most of the futuwwa-films about men.4 
Yet, the meaning of futuwwa and fatwana has changed over time (see 
Vatikiotis 1971; Jacob 2007) and its character rendered obsolete in the 
modern nation-state with institutions like a police force. According to 
Salah (2012: 13), it was most prevalent in the 18th and 19th centuries 
and particularly to cover the absence of a centralized government 
protecting its citizens after the fall of the Mamluk Empire resulting in 
localized strongmen. According to Jacob (2007), the futuwwa as an 
institutionalized form might have survived in Cairo among craftsmen. 
It is not my intention to use this type as evidence of a pre-modern time 
in transition towards a modern society, somehow represented in films 
in a postmodern era. Rather, the main argument is how this type 
might be understood in the context of the 1980s when the films were 
made, and what it says about gender representations in films from that 
era. 
Considering the films’ return to a ‘violent’ past, before the rule of law 
as they are often introduced, the films’ narrative and genre are 
gendered too. It is reminiscent of action movies with multiple fights 
and deaths, rape, extortion and kidnapping, generally considered male 
activities in a male genre (action). The 1980s in other film industries 
also contained a hard masculinity with hard-bodied men.5 Hard-bodied 
                                                   
4 With the exception of Shahd al-Malika/The Queen’s Honey (Husam al-Din 
Mustafa 1985) that talks about the female futuwwa Zuhayra, played by Nadia 
al-Gindi and is also one of the stories of Mahfuz’s novel The Harafish. 
5 See Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era (1994). 
Although according to Jeffords Hollywood productions in the 80s were 
affected by and affected right-wing politics, the hard-bodied masculinity in 
Egyptian cinema does not follow in that same line and instead contributes to a 
new realist mode in cinema. Yet, it is also proof of the middle class fear of 
social disintegration and lack of implementing the law, resulting in corrupt 
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males return in other Egyptian films of the era, like the Egyptian 
version of Rocky, al-Nimr al-Iswid/The Black Panther (‘Atif Salim 1984) 
with Ahmad Zaki playing the role of migrant worker in Germany.6 
Other Egyptian examples abound, particularly in the 1990s with 
Egyptian action-heroes like al-Shahat Mabruk, the Egyptian body-
building champion, and the Kung Fu fighter Yusif Mansur who both 
made several pulp action films displaying their muscularity. 
 
7.1.1 The Devil Preaches 
One of the first futuwwa-films made in the 1980s is The Devil Preaches 
(Ashraf Fahmi 1981, original story written by Nagib Mahfuz in 1979). 
Director Ashraf Fahmi (1939-2001) belongs to the first group of 
students that graduated from the Cinema institute, established in 1959. 
Upon graduation he continued studying cinema in the United States. 
Mahmud Qasim describes his cooperation with screenwriter Mustafa 
Muharram as the most important period in his career (Qasim 2010: 78), 
adapting novels to the screen and remaking films – both Egyptian and 
foreign –such as the films al-Raqisa wa-ʼl-Tabbal/The Dancer and the 
Drummer (1984) from a novel by Ihsan ‘Abd al-Quddus and Imraʼa 
‘Ashiqa/A Desiring Woman (1974), a remake from the American film 
Phaedra by the American director Jules Dassin. The main characters in 
his films are always subjected to a great deal of injustice and an 
unlikely accumulation of bad luck, as is the case with the main 
character in The Devil Preaches, the young futuwwa Shata, played by Nur 
al-Sharif. 
                                                                                                                   
and immoral nouveau rich taking over. This is occasionally embodied by the 
‘corrupt’ futuwwa in some films, as opposed to the more appropriate and 
acceptable – yet also not flawless – performances of other futuwwāt. This 
‘ideal’ masculine performance changes in more recent films as of the 2000s, 
with new, ‘muscular’ men presenting a tough masculinity, based on the 
external properties (bodily strength and muscularity) of ‘futuwwa’ idealism. 
6 The film The Black Panther is in the first place a critique of the consequences 
for and treatment of migrant workers, whether in Germany or elsewhere. The 
fact that Ahmad Zaki is also a capable boxer enables him to build a career as a 
foreigner in a new country. His masculine identity is defined in terms of his 
race and gender, being an Arab man in Germany, although the film only 
superficially touches upon the subject of race. 
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The antagonists of the young and inexperienced futuwwa are first of 
all ma‘allim al-Dinari (Farid Shawqi), the leader of the futuwwāt in 
Shata’s old neighborhood. The other one, al-Shibli, is al-Dinari’s 
archrival. The actor playing ma‘allim al-Shibli is ‘Adil Adham (1928-
1996). Adham started his acting career with serious critique from one 
of the giants of theatre; Anwar Wagdi told him he should “only act in 
front of the mirror” (Qasim 2004: 295). He was a tall and athletic man, 
playing various sports and working as a cotton trader at the 
Alexandria Stock Exchange. But he would eventually find his way to 
the cinema. His nickname is al-brins, The Prince, for the many diverse 
roles he could convincingly deliver. He is mostly known for his roles as 
the bad guy, probably because he was cast for these roles considering 
his imposing figure and loud, deep voice. He appeared dominant and 
violent, inducing fear in those he opposed, and as such is cast as the 
perfect actor to play the role of the dominant man that al-Shibli is. 
The film is squarely placed in a historical cadre (although we do not 
know when exactly), opening with the statement “Egypt, in a period 
before the rule of law”, referring to the futuwwa’s policing role prior to 
the establishment of a working police force. The opening shots – 
people shouting and running away, emptying the streets – are an 
indication for the arrival of a fearful person, in all likelihood one of the 
futuwwāt. The star actor Farid Shawqi, in his role as al-Dinari, walks 
steadfastly towards the now empty ḥāra, stopped by three men who 
are holding a knife or wearing brass knuckles, while al-Dinari is only 
holding on to his nabūt (the stick that symbolizes the futuwwa’s status, 
power, and honor). Although aged and slightly obese, he easily 
manages to beat all three of them in a single blow: Shawqi’s star 
persona still does him right after thirty years of portraying ‘tough 
guys’. Then, the film’s opening credits appear, after which it 
introduces us to the main character, Shata. 
Shata is sitting in a local café, talking with the close adviser of al-
Dinari, ma‘allim Tabba‘. Although the film is situated in the past, the 
café already has a radio, and a song by the singer Muhammad ‘Abd al-
Muttalib is playing, singing “the time that’s passed won’t return”.7 
                                                   
7 The song that is playing is called Wada‘ Hawak, by the singer and film 
producer Muhammad ‘Abd al-Muttalib. His music is characterized by the use 
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Tabba‘ is annoyed by the song’s lyrics and asks to put the volume 
down, which Shata uses as a pretext for smashing the radio altogether. 
This will eventually be his way in to the close circle around al-Dinari. 
The film is an interesting play on the codes of modernity that 
Armbrust (1995) mentions. The radio embodies these modernist codes 
all at once: it is an example of Western science, symbolizing a 
progressive future, playing a folkloric song that is combining 
traditional Arab instruments and rhythms with European instruments 
and style, while its lyrics remind the listeners about the fact that time 
progresses and the past will not return. By smashing the radio device 
and silencing the singer’s words, the film immediately puts an end to 
this modernist ideology of synthesis between a classicist and local, 
vernacular, identity, strengthened by Western science and technology. 
The film then continues to present the ‘new’ hegemonic power 
structure – if we read it as a metaphor for contemporary Egypt – based 
on power and coercion, rather than education and a bourgeois work 
ethic. 
Shata looks up to the man that al-Dinari is, and the masculinity he 
espouses, because he dominates whatever space or situation he finds 
himself in, winning one fight after another. Shata is literally enticed 
(mughrā) by the man, hoping to become like him one day. He tells 
Tabba‘ that he is not an ironer;8 his body is fit for fighting and 
protecting the neighborhood, just like al-Dinari does. He is a young 
and ambitious kid, but the ma‘allim and fitiwwit il-ḥāra9 al-Dinari is not 
yet convinced of the young man’s intentions. The film then gives a 
clear definition of what the values of fatwana are when al-Dinari talks 
to his men, saying: “True fatwana isn’t just strength (ʼiwwa) and 
                                                                                                                   
of traditional instruments and melodies. In 1964 he received ‘The Order of the 
Republic’ from then president Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir. 
8 Ironing is typically a man’s job in Egypt. Ironing shops are visible all over 
the city up to the present day, where only men work. This is not such a 
strange fact, considering the iron in earlier periods was a heavy iron cast 
which the men guided with their legs and feet rather than with their hands. 
The point in the film is not that he has to iron, the point here is that he no 
longer wants to be merely an inhabitant with no claims to make about his 
neighborhood or how to protect it (and his family). 
9 As a reference to what is being said in the film, I have chosen an Egyptian 
Arabic transliteration (see also reference 1). 
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bravery (shagā‘a), it requires toughness (magda‘a), manliness (rugūla), 
and morals (akhlāʼ).” Although these descriptions are often associated 
with men, in Egypt it is not uncommon to hear these with regard to 
women as well, for example in the expressions “il-bint di gada‘a” [that 
girl’s tough],10 or “is-sitt ʼadd mīt rāgil” [a woman equals a hundred 
men]. Each of these elements encompass a set of characteristics on 
their own (e.g. gada‘), associated with masculine behavior (rugūla), a 
masculinity that is coded as positive and desirable. 
Particularly the aspect of ‘manliness’ as a requirement to be a true 
futuwwa is an indication of which gender is more suitable to actually be 
one in al-Dinari’s and the film’s view. In this all-male film with al-
Dinari addressing a mustache-bearing and stick-wielding audience, his 
description is clearly intended for men only.11 This brings to mind 
Connell’s assertion that “[t]rue masculinity is almost always thought to 
proceed from men’s bodies – to be inherent in a male body or to 
express something about a male body” (Connell 2005: 45). These 
idealistic values of fatwana as ‘true masculinity’ are here clearly 
associated with men, rather than women. In part, this is also due to the 
etymology of the word, which is derived from the same triradical root 
as fatā (f-t-w), meaning ‘boy’, and historically referred to brotherhoods 
or groups of young men who were taught the principles of fatwana.12 
                                                   
10 Badawi-Hinds gives a much more extensive translation for the word gada‘, 
which includes a whole range of adjectives coded as positive and masculine: 
noble and integer; witty; tough and courageous. It means that not being gada‘, 
means not being manly. It is telling that the term, often associated with men, 
is used to describe women as well, although it forestalls a masculine norm 
because they are foremost characteristics coded as masculine that only best of 
men and occasionally women may inhibit. 
11 Some historical lower class women have been able to obtain high-regarded 
positions within the confines of the ḥāra. For this I refer to Sawsan el-Messiri 
(1978) and Nahid Salah (2012) and the chapter on female masculinity in this 
study. 
12 The futuwwa remains until today a complex concept. Early orientalist 
accounts described it in terms of a medieval chivalry, although it might also 
be described in religious terms as the groups of (mainly young) men 
practicing taṣawwuf, or mysticism. Of interest is the way in which they appear 
in Egyptian cinema, which is either somehow chivalrous – occasionally, and 
whenever it suits them – or as a criminal. Personally, I would not describe 
these portrayals as romanticized medieval chivalry, nor approach it as an 
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Although masculinity is associated with men’s bodies, Connell notes 
that this does not mean that a body coded as male ‘naturally’ performs 
masculinity, as the etymology of the word futuwwa also indicates. True 
fatwana is a process of learning, of incorporating a set of religiously 
and culturally sanctioned values which are coded as masculine. 
In The Devil Preaches the main character Shata al-Hagari considers 
himself up to the heavy task of fatwana and accepts the initiation job 
that al-Dinari has in store for him. The ma‘allim’s main concern is that 
the one accepting the task will execute it exactly as requested by him, 
no questions asked. This, in my opinion, contradicts one of the ideals 
of fatwana, namely morals. Shata, however, agrees to the terms and 
conditions of becoming a futuwwa, receives a nabūt and starts with his 
task. The first test that Shata has to undergo is to lure al-Dinari’s 
fiançée in a trap. Shata refuses to continue with the task, his morality 
does not allow him to do so, escaping with the girl to a different ḥāra 
under the protection of al-Dinari’s arch-rival al-Shibli. This way, Shata 
already portrays the internal contradictions of the ideal values of 
fatwana. Upon arrival, it is obvious that al-Shibli will assert his 
dominance over this new intruder, effectively emasculating him by 
first of all taking away Shata’s nabūt, and degrading him once again to 
the rank of mere inhabitant (working in an ironing shop) in his new 
neighborhood. This continues for a few months, until al-Shibli shows 
his true intentions with Shata’s wife Widad. As the ma‘allim and 
futuwwa of the neighborhood, al-Shibli is not only the head of a sort of 
policing force, he is also a local governor and a judge. As such he 
decides on all matters in the neighborhood, including who marries 
whom. Al-Shibli thus forces Shata to divorce his wife, who then 
refuses, after which the former affirms his dominance over these 
intruders by raping Widad and ultimately shaming Shata.13 With 
                                                                                                                   
ahistorical masculine ideal sometimes imbibed with Islamic morals and values 
as per orientalist descriptions of the term. Jacob (2007) explains most clearly 
why, as it very much depends on the local contexts in which it was allowed to 
emerge, flourish or to be marginalized. 
13 Viola Shafik (2007: 256-8) mentions the prevalence of the rape narrative in 
Egyptian melodramas from the start of Egyptian cinema and particularly in 
the period preceding the ’52 coup, thus under British occupation. She reads it 
as a metaphor for class differences, as well as referring to the ‘rape of the 
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bowed heads, they both have to return to al-Dinari who – as a true 
futuwwa – accepts their return unconditionally. 
The two men clashing initially in this film are al-Dinari and Shata, 
the older ruler and the ambitious and idealistic youngster. Shata has 
his own ideas about what it means to be a futuwwa; harassing women 
or luring them into a man’s arms is not one of them. But he is mistaken 
and ‘misunderstood’ the task, resulting in a harsh, moralistic 
punishment for him and Widad. Indeed, the rape scene shows that it is 
not so much the woman’s suffering that is emphasized, but rather 
Shata’s (and by extension al-Dinari’s and the ḥāra’s) subsequent shame 
and further emasculation by al-Shibli that is the main issue in the film. 
Shata thus has to regain his masculinity and the only way to do so is by 
killing al-Shibli. In the final fight between the two futuwwāt, Shata is 
allowed to fight as well (regaining possession of the prized nabūt). The 
final battle between the two men is juxtaposed with his wife Widad 
giving birth to a child – his or al-Shibli’s? – comparing the pain she is 
undergoing during labor with Shata’s injuries in the fight. But he is 
able to kill his adversary, cutting out his heart and holding it up for 
the ḥāra to see. Inattentive, Shata is attacked from the back and his 
throat is cut, right at the moment the child is born. The line thus ends 
here, for Widad is not willing to raise her son to become a killer – like 
the futuwwa – but rather to teach him love and compassion. The last 
scene of the film returns to the café where Shata first met with Tabba‘. 
The owner has already replaced his radio, and the same song is 
playing, and the next boy to become al-Dinari’s assistant is presenting 
himself. 
The masculinity that al-Dinari lauded at the start – the idealized 
fatwana he talked about – is divided over three characters: al-Dinari, al-
Shibli, and Shata. Al-Dinari’s dominance was initially challenged by 
Shata, who subsequently will have to accept it. Al-Dinari is tough, but 
just; he rules firmly, but with the required compassion and humanity 
as well. He rules unchallenged, since Shata’s only way of avoiding his 
                                                                                                                   
nation’. In this film, it might be both, but I prefer to read it as it is: a violent 
attack on the woman’s body in order to assert a dominant position over the 
powerless, on-looking husband as well as an act of violence and insult against 
al-Shibli’s rival, al-Dinari. 
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hegemonic rule, is by fleeing the neighborhood. Al-Shibli is presented 
as evil, although he is the one who takes in the refugees, initially pays 
for the marriage of Shata and Widad, and offers him a little shop where 
he can work. But al-Shibli is ultimately only interested in safeguarding 
his dominant position – and the intrusion of two refugees from his 
archrival might endanger his status in the neighborhood. The 
idealistic Shata is different from the other two. Shata the ironer 
questions al-Dinari’s authority, but out of fear for his life has to run 
away. Only at the end, Shata is able to regain his honor and 
masculinity by using violence himself, a similarity with the effendi 
masculinity of the schoolteacher Ahmad in Super ‘Aziza. Only this time, 
Shata is killed and the fact that he was able to stop ‘evil’ in favor of a 
more just society is eliminated with his death. Shata is thus only 
considered a man when he not only resorts to violence – what he 
wanted to do from the beginning and what he considered the essence 
of fatwana as a means to protect the weak – but also when he agrees to 
the rules set out and reinforced by the elder al-Dinari. Being a man is 
thus something Shata has to learn. But once he learned it, he is killed, 
his masculinity – defined by the honor-revenge paradigm – directly 
responsible for his death. 
But how are we to understand this aspect of honor? Abu-Lughod 
(1986: 33) argues that a code of honor functions ideologically and 
“serves to rationalize social inequality and the control some have over 
the lives of others in a system that idealizes the equality of agnates and 
the autonomy of individuals.” It is a system of control for those in 
dominant positions – assured through their economic autonomy – over 
those in subjugated positions, whose only recourse is modesty. The 
futuwwa’s code of honor is an essential element to ensure his 
domination over his lower ranks and the people in the neighborhood 
he has laid his claims on. Thus, al-Shibli makes sure that Shata is 
subjugated, by taking away his autonomy, represented by his nabūt. 
Shata’s only recourse to regain his autonomy and masculinity and to 
regain his honor is by taking revenge on the man that had taken it 
away from him. Ultimately, the film questions the masculinity that the 
futuwwa represents, by cutting off Shata’s prospects for the future, but 
unlike Abu Sayf’s The Tough Guy from 1957, it ends with an ironic 
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question: if everyone were to become a futuwwa, Tabba‘ asks himself, 
then who will get beaten? Returning to Armbrust’s argument about 
the anti-modernism in post-70s films, Tabba‘’s question evokes the 
lack of belief from the point of view of the film and the filmmaker in 
the modernist discourses that were so prevalent in earlier Egyptian 
cinema. Further, it breaks with the presumed circularity that Malkmus 
and Armes noted, when Widad decides to do away with masculine 
domination and to teach her son humane values rather than dated 
notions of a presumed idealized and valorized masculine type. 
 
7.1.2 The Harafish 
The Harafish is also based on a novel with the same title by Nagib 
Mahfuz, published in 1977. The novel is a family saga, starting with the 
famous ‘Ashur al-Nagi, futuwwat al-ḥarafīsh, the defender of the weak 
and the commoners. The al-Nagi family has since taken control of the 
neighborhood, which remains unnamed and undated in the novel and 
the film. Without apparent descriptions of anything modern, apart 
from an occasional reference to the police, an element of the modern 
state, it remains unclear when exactly the story takes place. This is 
important for the film as well, since the mythical world of Mahfuz 
should be read metaphorically. El-Enany reads The Harafish as a novel 
portraying Mahfuz’s world, “condensing reality into a tail-made myth 
of his own” (el-Enany 1993: 145). The author intended to keep the 
exact time and place ambiguous, in order to focus on the human 
nature more prominently. The film, adapted to the screen by Husam 
al-Din Mustafa in 1986, presents us with a human futuwwa, not flawless 
at all, who has to fight his way to the top. 
Husam al-Din Mustafa (1926-2005) was a prolific director, famous 
for his action films and adapting many novels to the screen. 
Throughout his fifty-year career he has directed more than a hundred 
films. Some of his most famous films are Adham al-Sharqawi (1964), 
about the life of the ‘Robin Hood of the Arabs’, and al-Naddara 
al-Soda/The Black Sunglasses (1963) with Nadia Lutfi in the main part as 
the bored daughter of a rich aristocratic family. The film was an 
adaptation of a story by Ihsan ‘Abd al-Quddus. He has also adapted 
foreign literature to the Egyptian screen, most notably by the Russian 
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author Dostoyevsky (Qasim 2010: 130). In the 70s and 80s he has also 
directed several films situated in lower class neighborhoods, one of 
which will be discussed in chapter 9 on female masculinities. His 
interest – like Nagib Mahfuz – in lower- and working-class areas 
returns in many of his films, depicting men and women facing a rough 
world. The current film, The Harafish, with its timeless setting, also 
portrays a tough reality in which the commoners are trying to survive 
notwithstanding the whims of the rich. 
The main character in the film is Sulayman al-Nagi, played by the 
actor Mahmud Yasin. Because of his soft appearance, his claim to 
become futuwwat al-ḥāra is laughed away by the inhabitants of the 
neighborhood. The more masculine-looking tough guy, ‘Atris (played 
by Salah Qabil), has more credibility for the position and claims his 
‘right’ to the title. An important role is played by the actress Safiyya al-
‘Imari (1949-), portraying Saniyya, the daughter of a wealthy 
merchant, who is soon to be married to Sulayman in order to reel him 
in and work for the rich’s advantage. She plays alongside Sulayman’s 
first wife, played by Sawsan Badr (1957-), one of the most famous 
actresses to this day, usually portraying caring mother figures, but 
with a tough no-nonsense attitude. She was instantly propelled into 
fame because of her performance in the controversial British 
documentary-drama Death of a Princess (Antony Thomas 1980). It is 
interesting to note that Mahmud Qasim’s Encyclopedia of Actors does not 
mention this controversial episode in her life, which caused the 
Egyptian television to banish her from the small screen. The media 
exile did not last long, however, since she continued acting in major 
film productions, in the first place portraying oppressed women like 
her role as Fathiyya, Sulayman’s barren wife in the current film. 
The Harafish is different from the previous film, The Devil Preaches, in 
that it contains the actual revolutionary force of the poor, the harafish 
or commoners. The film follows the lives of the Nagi-family after the 
death of the “father of the harafish”, ‘Ashur al-Nagi. His grandson, 
Sulayman, intends to follow in his father’s footsteps, although his 
father on his death bed tells him he “did not leave behind a man [who 
inherited his fatwana].” Sulayman promises he will learn it, yet nobody 
takes him seriously. The discussion in the beginning of the film 
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between Sulayman and the shaykh al-ḥāra (neighborhood’s elder and 
respectable inhabitant) is informative in this regard: 
 
Shaykh al-ḥāra: What’s this Sulayman, why are you carrying your 
deceased father’s nabūt? 
Sulaimain: I want the title [of fatwana]. 
Shaykh al-ḥāra: Your father would’ve given it to you before he died. 
However, all his life he was saying... 
Sulayman: … that I am not into fatwana. But I can’t accept that 
justice and fatwana are taken away from the House 
of al-Nagi. 
Shaykh al-ḥāra: My son, fatwana is not an intention. 
Sulayman: I'll learn it. 
Shaykh al-ḥāra: It's a long road. 
Sulayman: I'll take it. 
Shaykh al-ḥāra: And difficult! 
Sulayman: I'll bear it. 
(Husam al-Din Mustafa, The Harafish) 
 
A futuwwa is not only a set of characteristics like strength, morality 
and integrity; it is a lifestyle that once you take it there is no way back. 
In Mahfuz’s world, the futuwwa is a human being and not an ideal 
figure: he too makes mistakes or takes questionable decisions. This 
more natural depiction of the futuwwa with internal contradictions is 
also visible in this and other futuwwa-films of the 80s. In the next part 
of the chapter, I will show how the anti-heroes are also portrayed in a 
less ideal, more credible manner. 
Sulayman starts his career as an ideal, principled futuwwa, but soon 
his virtues start to wane and he descends into a life of luxury. His 
marriage to Saniyya is the start of the decline of the man’s credibility 
as futuwwa. His older, barren wife Fathiyya no longer interests him, 
although he promises her he will live under one roof with his two 
wives, as a down-to-earth man. During the wedding procession, full of 
luxury, horses, music and flags, the camera cuts and zooms in on 
Fathiyya, standing behind a barred window, as if imprisoned by her 
husband, but also restrained by her poverty, her gender, and the fact 
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that she was unable to give him a child.14 The film goes on to show the 
different upbringing of Sulayman’s two sons, Khidr and Bakr. Khidr – 
his firstborn – was raised under the code of ‘fatwana’ by his father, 
while Bakr was left for his mother to raise him as she wanted. Two 
decades later when the boys have grown up, the difference is 
immediately visible. Khidr is calm, reserved, rational and reasonable, 
brave and courageous, just and protecting the poor and the weak. Bakr 
on the other hand is spoiled, hysterical, emotional and weak; he is 
shown beating his wife and is on more than one occasion derogatorily 
referred to as ibn ummu [son of his mother]. The insult is meant to 
illuminate his lack of masculinity, characterized by fatwana, and 
embodied by his brother, Khidr. Bakr is the ‘other’, the ‘unmasculine’ 
man. His unmasculine performance is, however, not ridiculed. On the 
contrary, he is backed by his rich mother and wealthy family. Further, 
he is not always bad; he does love his family, including his brother and 
father who never got involved with his upbringing, but was only 
interested to instill the values of fatwana in his eldest son. 
The film therefore does not presume an inherent nature for all men. 
Masculinity and fatwana are not born or inherited, but learned and 
fought for. This also means that there is a great deal of effort that goes 
into this performance of fatwana, pointing at its artificiality and the 
‘spectacle’ of this masculine performance. Yvonne Tasker, in her 
account of bodybuilding, notes that it “raise[s] a familiar paradox over 
the coming together of naturalness and performance” (Tasker 1993: 
232). The futuwwa here is not exactly a bodybuilder, but the 
requirements and effort that go into taking its heavy weight (as 
                                                   
14 The power the first wife exerts on the second is beautifully portrayed by 
director Salah Abu Sayf in the film al-Zoga al-Tanya/The Second Wife (1967). The 
village chieftain desires his young, pretty servant, but she is already married 
to a poor peasant. He forces them to divorce in order for him to take her as a 
second wife. Initially, his first wife – unable to give him a child – continues to 
treat her as a servant. The young girl refuses to consume the marriage with 
her new husband; instead, she has sex with her first husband and gets 
pregnant from him. Once she is pregnant, she assumes the role of first wife in 
the chieftain’s house, who is then struck down with a stroke and unable to 
speak because he is the only one who knows that the child is not his. The 
pregnancy is what gave her more rights in the house, an essential element 
also in the current film. 
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explained in the dialogue above) are recognizable demands, similar for 
those wishing to do the immense workout regime in order to obtain 
and maintain a bodybuilder’s physique. Being a futuwwa is also a 
performance, it is something which one has to learn and perform on a 
daily basis, although its characteristics are assumed to be natural, 
masculine ideals. The masquerade that the futuwwa proves to be is one 
of an ‘original’. Although this and the previous film focus on men – and 
so do most of the futuwwa-films – the ideal is not only available for 
men; hence, those women who take leading positions and who are 
respected by their surroundings and consulted on important matters 
can be described as gada‘a in Egypt, one of the ideals of fatwana. 
The performative element of fatwana lies in the fact that both 
Sulayman and his eldest son Khidr had to prove themselves to attain 
the ‘highest’ of titles a man can hold. This way, however, the film 
assumes that fatwana is the ideal, one that ‘good men’ should try to 
attain, while being off limits for other, subjugated and marginalized 
men as well as women. Through a portrayal of what a futuwwa is not – 
either through women, unmasculine men, or abusive patriarchs – this 
and similar films make a clear statement of what it means to be a 
(good) man. The hegemony of (certain) men is not questioned by it, 
neither is the patriarchal structure governing this microcosmos, the 
film only distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable male 
behavior. Although revealing the fictive norm that the futuwwa is, it 
also reaffirms its desirability. The futuwwa’s world remains a man’s 
world: women are only depicted as supportive wives; they can move 
around the ḥāra to buy products from the market, they can even take 
on high positions as traders. But they cannot decide on matters 
regarding the ḥāra; Sulayman al-Nagi makes it clear that he “doesn’t 
negotiate with women” at the beginning of the film, soon after doing 
exactly the opposite and marrying Saniyya to satisfy his desire for her 
body. 
 
We should keep in mind that the world of the futuwwa is strongly 
informed by Nagib Mahfuz’s mythic world of social relations. All the 
films are either adaptations from his novels or he has contributed to 
writing the scenarios. As a value system of ideal human behavior, 
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fatwana is in this world, however, mostly associated with men. 
Nevertheless, they all exhibit certain internal contradictions: Shata’s 
morality does not allow him to blindly perform the task that the 
futuwwa had given him; Sulayman had to prove his fatwana through a 
fight, but eventually will also give in to his desires and a life of luxury, 
ignoring his values. In each of the films, the futuwwa’s hegemonic rule 
is questioned at a certain point by another, sometimes younger, 
futuwwa. The man’s internal contradictions are laid bare. Eventually 
the masculine ideal of the futuwwa is reimposed in The Harafish, while 
its ideal is questioned in The Devil Preaches. 
Male agency is, however, never questioned. On the contrary, it is 
expected, while female agency is only slightly mentioned in one film 
while painfully neglected (or worse, punished) in most other, similar, 
films. The fact that these films are all placed in an undefined past, adds 
to the ahistorical ideal that true fatwana is considered to be. This ideal 
is furthermore inscribed onto the male body, through the embodiment 
of fatwana and its values by mainly male actors and characters. The 
one film with a female futuwwa is The Queen’s Honey, with the actress 
Nadia al-Gindi in the main role. Her role as futuwwa is directly 
connected to her body in her ability to attract men. This singular 
female futuwwa’s body is portrayed as desirable, similar to the male 
futuwwa’s ideal and desirable physical characteristics of strength and 
power. Her agency as a woman and as futuwwa is, however, violently 
punished at the end of the film when she is murdered by one of her ex-
husbands, a rich trader. Such plot developments point at the films’ 
ambiguous stance toward a presumed masculine ideal, an ideal that is 
portrayed as ineffective in the current surroundings. In the next part 
of the chapter we will deal with another paradigm of inadequate 









7.2 The pessimistic future of the anti-hero 
 
“Don’t bite your masters, dog!” (Ratib Bey, The Kidnapped Girl) 
 
The quote in the title comes from the film al-Makhtufa/The Kidnapped 
Girl (Sharif Yahya 1987), and perfectly explains the social critique of 
these films and the subjugated positions the anti-heroes occupy. The 
films with an underdog main male character are pessimistic films 
about the present with a negative outlook for the future: in the end, 
the anti-hero dies, enters prison, or loses everything he worked so 
hard for during the film. The films emphasize the underdog position 
that these men possess, for example through insults like the quote 
above signaling a strong class divide that even reminds of the 
country’s colonial past. In social realist films from the 50s and 60s it 
was not uncommon to hear a similar tone from the ruling classes 
addressing the working and lower classes in films set in feudal Egypt. 
In the introduction to this chapter I mentioned the emergence of a 
new realist cinema, a tendency that had started already in the 1970s 
with directors like ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Khaliq, Ashraf Fahmi and ‘Ali Badrakhan 
(Abu Shadi 1998: 23-5). Whereas films in the 70s had to deal with the 
new reality of Sadat’s economic infitāḥ, the 80s directors dealt with its 
effects: a polarized society with a growing class divide, unfit housing 
for the poor, a pauperizing middle class and the increasing morality of 
money, a feature already emerging in the 70s. While the futuwwa-films 
talked about this indirectly and metaphorically – they were situated in 
an undated past – these contemporary films tackle those issues head 
on. Of course not all men in films from this era are either historical 
futuwwāt or contemporary underdogs. A notable exception in the 
realist films of this period is Khayri Bishara’s al-Tawq wa-ʼl-Iswirra/The 
Necklace and the Bracelet (1986). It is a film set in the rural south of the 
1930s about a strong, Ṣa‘īdi (southern-Egyptian) man, but who is unable 
to sleep with his wife and ultimately blames her for his impotence. The 
film is not only set in the past, it for once also portrays the personal 
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struggles of that Ṣa‘īdi man’s sexuality, whose masculinity is otherwise 
ridiculed and the object of laughter in Egyptian cinema.15  
The underdog-films have several elements in common, for example 
class and racial differences, generational conflict, or the anti-hero’s 
troubles with official representatives of the government or the law. 
Police and police officers are not usually playing a positive force in the 
films, rather the opposite. In previous decades police were perhaps not 
pivotal characters in the films, they were nevertheless part of the 
modernist discourse and the presence of the state in, for example, 
traditional neighborhoods. Now they do have a more visible presence 
in the narrative, though mostly as a force that obstructs the anti-
hero’s desires. In part this relates also to the films’ anti-modernist 
rhetoric, but more important here are the political implications. The 
police are not always actively obstructing the anti-heroes; rather 
mostly due to their passiveness and inability to implement the law, the 
anti-heroes are unable to receive what is rightfully theirs. The police’s 
presence is mostly necessary to emphasize the law’s siding with the 
rich, rather than with the ‘poor citizen’, al-muwāṭin al-ghalbān, that the 
hero embodies.16 
The ‘poor citizen’, the anti-hero, also embodies the demise of the 
middle class, or in the words of Armbrust (1995: 105): “a middle class 
in danger of extinction”. He is a citizen who struggles to survive and 
provide for his family; his work ethic, that assumes the man is the 
                                                   
15 Ziad Fahmy (2012) attributes the Ṣa‘īdi’s negative portrayal in cultural 
products to their different dialect, different from the ‘standard’ Cairene 
Egyptian dialect. In popular culture like films or series and even jokes, the 
Ṣa‘īdi is often the object of ridicule, the “other” (Fahmy 2012: 8) inside the 
nation. Up until the present day these stereotypes – of the ignorant, violent, 
misogynist, extremist Southern male – are reinforced in comedies, dramas 
and action films.  
16 The police’s presence in films has changed significantly over time: 
undesired in the 1940s, heroicized in the 50s and 60s, corrupt in the 70s and 
80s, they have returned to a positive representation from the 90s onward. The 
representation of corrupt officials is not omitted entirely in the recent films; 
there is always at least one honorable high-ranking officer. The ‘bad guys’ in 
the police force are also associated with backwardness and ignorance, 
signaling a class divide within the police force as well. This way, however, 
films continue to ignore and deny the structural corruption and violence in 
Egypt’s Ministry of Interior. 
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provider, is in danger. The male characters are either married and sole 
breadwinners, or they are unmarried and need to provide for a sick 
father or mother and several siblings all the while trying to prepare 
for marriage – a marriage crisis that will become an essential narrative 
element in future films and part and parcel of the discourse of crisis.17 
They all have a job, however, sometimes even more than one, although 
usually in the informal sector.18 Central to this problem remains the 
men’s conviction that “work not only matters to men, but is also part 
of them as a key dimension of their identity and masculinity” (Edwards 
2006: 7). It is an essential element, and being without work somehow 
emasculates them. Although Edwards’s claim is based on Western 
research, there are similarities with Egypt. Egypt, too, has recently 
witnessed privatization and declining work opportunities for men, not 
to mention the increasing presence of women on the work floor since 
‘Abd al-Nasir, a policy that was continued by al-Sadat as well. Men thus 
felt threatened in their traditional role as provider, increasingly 
unable to adhere to that masculine ideal. 
 
7.2.1 The Bus Driver 
A prominent new-realist director who has directed several films with a 
pessimistic view on humanity and society is ‘Atif al-Tayyib (1947-1996), 
the director of Sawwaq al-Utubis/The Bus Driver (1982). He was greatly 
influenced by Salah Abu Sayf and other earlier realist film directors, 
but adapted cinematic realism to his own surroundings and time. 
                                                   
17 I refer here to Hanan Kholoussy’s commentary on the discourse of a 
marriage crisis in Egypt. She notes that the recent discourse (particularly 
since 2008) and the earlier one in the early 20th century point at anxieties 
that “have peaked whenever Egypt finds itself in the midst of socioeconomic 
and political upheaval” (Kholoussy 2010b, para. 12). Rather than investigating 
causes and concerns of the marriage crisis, the discourse about this assumed 
crisis is primarily informative regarding popular assumptions about this 
crisis. For example, as Kholoussy points out, focusing on the delay in marriage 
among young men and blaming women for this, assumes that women are 
passively waiting for an appropriate and actively searching male. 
18 Informal sector jobs are extremely wide-spread in Egypt. It is estimated 
that about 40% of the economic activity is accounted for by the informal 
sector (Saif 2013, para. 1).This also means that those working in the informal 
sector have no social security, health insurance, or recourse to labor rights. 
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Armbrust describes his films as “unsurpassed not only in laying bare 
thorny issues of sexuality, but in doing so largely within the 
conventions of commercial cinema” (Armbrust 1998: 31). Armbrust 
focuses on how men and women’s sexuality is controlled and 
contained in films by al-Tayyib, mainly by an autocratic regime, a 
conservative society or personal status laws that are applied by too 
diligent officials. 
I will not look at sexuality in se, but rather how the anti-hero’s 
masculinity is constructed, whether in terms of his work, his sexual 
identity, and his family. Al-Tayyib’s films largely partake in the 
conventions of commercial cinema by using for example famous actors 
and actresses. But this element is but one of the reasons. His films 
mainly follow straightforward narratives with the usual ‘unlikely’ 
string of events, using melodrama to convey emotions and elicit the 
audience’s sympathy for the anti-heroes. But he also applies the ‘codes 
of modernity’, juxtaposing modernity and traditions, whether 
positively or negatively. This juxtaposition usually takes place in the 
modern city, which plays an important role in al-Tayyib’s films. It is, 
however, a dark side of the city as the setting where his characters 
live, work, eat and love. The film The Bus Driver is a good example of a 
film incorporating these topics, set within the corrupting 
surroundings of the contemporary city. But it remains an unknown 
city in the film; although the anti-hero moves around between Cairo, 
Port Said and Damietta, there are never really clear markers or famous 
landmarks – the city is an abstract and distant place. All three cities 
look rather similar, its streets and quarters not distinctive. New-realist 
directors Muhammad Khan and Bashir al-Dik wrote the film script; 
this group of directors (it also included Dawud ‘Abd al-Sayyid, Khayri 
Bishara, ‘Ali Badrakhan and Ra’fat al-Mihi; Abu Shadi 1998: 25) 
regularly assisted each other in writing the script, acting in the film or 
in another way contributing to it. 
In the film The Bus Driver we find Hasan (Nur al-Sharif), a middle-
aged man working three jobs: a bus driver in the early morning, taxi 
driver in the afternoon, and occasionally helping out his father in the 
latter’s wood factory. He does not have a lot of money to offer his 
family a life of luxury, but they are happy. His wife Mirvat (played by 
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Mirvat Amin) loves him and money is no issue for her. Mirvat’s 
materialist mother (played by Zahra al-‘Ula, famous for her roles as 
aristocratic and/or arrogant woman), however, has always opposed 
her daughter’s marriage with Hasan, considering he barely has money 
to buy her gifts or to get a decent flat. The class difference between 
Mirvat and Hasan is quite big; Mirvat’s family is relatively rich which 
explains their opposition towards Hasan. Their luxurious flat stands in 
great contrast to Hasan’s flat or his family’s dwellings. The crisis starts 
when Hasan is informed that his father (played by the tragic ‘Imad 
Hamdi) is about to lose his factory due to unpaid taxes. It is only then 
that the audience is informed that Hasan is a war veteran, perhaps to 
strengthen the audience’s empathy with the sad character and to link 
the film’s characters directly to political events in the country and the 
region and to the defeated men-motif of earlier films. As war veterans 
they were lauded and welcomed after the war for the victory of the 
Egyptian army. In real life, they were unable to bear the fruits of this 
victory.  
Hasan is a good example of the underdog male; everyone seems to 
be against him, no recourse to any support except for his friends and 
in the end he is deprived of his sole purpose – his father and his family. 
The city he lives in and his work are rife with crime; on a daily basis he 
is confronted with a robbery on his crowded bus and during a nightly 
ride in his taxi he himself is the victim of armed robbery – committed 
by university students we learn later. The film is thus typical for a 
post-infitāḥ Egypt where money talks and education is no guarantee 
for the future, hence the student-robbers. The film furthermore 
conspicuously sides with the working classes and not with the middle 
classes – now turned materialist – that had continued to occupy the 
white screen in previous eras. Hasan’s mother-in-law and brothers-in-
law are all examples of that new ethic too, with their focus on money 
and disregard for their family. This does not necessarily make the film 
a conservative display of family values; on the contrary, the nucleus 
family is no longer deified but problematized in the film’s critique of a 
bourgeois ideology. 
The presence of family in these films is often the source of a crisis, 
considering the requirement for young men to provide for their 
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younger siblings and elder parents in an economy that had become 
increasingly competitive. The problematic family is a returning trope 
in films from this era, but also earlier films occasionally problematized 
the family as a support structure.19 While the crisis originated from an 
abstract and distant crisis in ideology, government or politics in the 
previous decades, in the 1980s the crisis has literally been familiarized 
and has entered the personal sphere of the male anti-hero in a very 
tangible form. The film’s focus on Hasan’s crisis and quest for money 
(for a good cause!) makes the viewer empathize with the anti-hero, 
even though his wife makes legitimate claims too. She wants a 
husband who is available for her, not someone who is only working to 
provide for them, critiquing Hasan’s way of defining his masculine 
identity through his work.20 Al-Tayyib’s world is a paradoxical one; the 
characters’ sole recourse to safety is the family which is at the same 
time not at all supportive. 
Hasan’s masculinity is fundamental for the film’s narrative. His 
masculine identity is centered on his conviction that he is the sole 
breadwinner. As soon as his father informs him of the impending 
bankruptcy, he takes it upon him to find a solution. His elder father is 
no longer able to do so, while he is the man’s only son among four 
girls. He then visits his brother-in-law ‘Awni, who works together with 
his father in the wood-factory. As the responsible for the factory’s 
finances, Hasan would like to know what has happened. Before he 
enters, the camera gives an overview of the living room where ‘Awni 
                                                   
19 Salah Abu Sayf’s film Bidaya wa Nihaya/Dead Among the Living (1960) is a 
painful example of this. In the film, the daughter of a poor family has to take 
responsibility for her younger, studying, brother after their father dies. The 
elder brother has found a new life in crime and women, but the younger has 
ambitious plans. The film does not end well when the younger finds out his 
sister had sold her body to provide for his studies. He kills her by forcing her 
to jump of a bridge, but a bit later jumps in the water as well, remorseful of 
his deeds. Contrary to most films of the era, this film’s fatalism is relatively 
odd, ending so abruptly and negatively. 
20 Muhammad Khan’s film Zawgit Ragul Muhimm/Wife of an Important Man 
(1988), also with Mirvat Amin, is another beautiful example of a man (played 
by Ahmad Zaki) defining his masculinity through his work and his standing in 
society. As a police investigator, his position demands respect from those 




and Hasan’s sister Khadiga are eating through a medium shot. It 
immediately strikes us that their house is not too fancy, in contrast to 
the amount of food on the table for only two people. When Hasan rings 
the bell his sister opens the door. The camera pans to the right, 
following Khadiga to the door and giving an overview of the rest of the 
room: simple decoration, a couch under a closed window, and 
Khadiga’s sewing machine, all cramped together in this one small 
room. These details are important to understand that they do seem to 
have some money aiming for a middle class lifestyle (for example the 
rather large dinner on the table, and a simple, yet clean apartment), 
they are definitely not of the richest and are originally a working class 
family. 
Up until now the camera has only offered us medium shots to 
include the surroundings of the characters, but as soon as Hasan and 
‘Awni sit down in the latter’s ‘salon’,21 the camera cuts to a close-up of 
Hasan’s face, his piercing eyes scrutinizing his brother-in-law. He 
would like to know what had happened to the factory’s profit, 
considering they haven’t paid any taxes for the past decade. According 
to him, the factory owners he knows “have all built blocks of flats and 
drive Mercedes.” Hasan’s remark echoes the modernist tenets of 
progress and social mobility as they were depicted in the 50s and 60s. 
In this cinematic context of the disruption of middle class ideals 
(Armbrust 1995: 105), progress and social mobility is the outcome for a 
lucky few while the middle class is hollowed out. The camera then cuts 
to a close up of ‘Awni, lighting his cigarette apathetically before 
answering: “You forgot about your sisters’ weddings, and the costs of 
mine and your father’s house?” Although Hasan does not trust him, he 
is in no position to blame ‘Awni of anything at this point. Then the 
escalating dialogue is paused when a medium shot shows ‘Awni 
standing up and walking towards the camera. But Hasan follows him, 
picking up the dialogue and threatening him. From ‘Awni’s evading 
looks, continuously walking away from Hasan towards the receding 
                                                   
21 The ‘salon’ is a reception room for guests usually with more expensive 
furniture, typical in Egyptian middle and upper class houses, similar to the 
Ottoman palaces’ salamlik where visitors were welcomed though with stricter 
gender segregation at that time. 
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camera, we clearly understand that Hasan is telling him the truth, and 
that ‘Awni’s less than honorable business practices have been exposed. 
The same techniques are used when he visits his other sisters: as 
soon as he enters the house, several medium and long shots allow us to 
take in the décor of the house, pointing at their presumed wealth that 
increases with each sister he visits. Compared to the rundown flat of 
Hasan’s father (including broken, unrepaired windows and flaking 
paint), his sisters’ dwellings are all examples of their lifestyles. His 
sister in Port Said – home to a duty-free port – has a house stacked 
with consumer goods. To cap it all, she offers him a can of Pepsi, 
symbolizing their love for Western consumer goods. This excessive 
lifestyle is continued when her husband and sons return and they eat 
an expensive dinner consisting of fish and scampi, a can of Pepsi for 
each, and a bottle of wine. The close-up of his brother-in-law filling 
Hasan’s cup to the brim – and then some more, spilling on the table – 
emphasizes their consumerist lifestyle; they have enough money, but 
no style. His third sister’s family is even richer, and their pretentious 
religiosity and nouveau riche morality does not compel them to help 
out Hasan’s father, either. This escalating exposé of each family’s 
wealth fits Viola Shafik’s assertion of a ‘fat cats myth’ (Shafik 2007: 
275-80), informed by a middle class angst for lower classes climbing 
the social ladder without the cultural capital of the ‘old’ middle and 
upper classes. As she argues, this myth is widely exaggerated in films 
of this era, ignoring the dire social conditions that Egypt’s lower 
classes live in and the difficulties they face in actually improving their 
economic position. 
Hasan – according to ‘Awni – went ‘begging for money’ with his 
family, but returned unsuccessfully. Hasan’s masculinity, however, 
does not allow him to accept assistance from his wife, Mirvat, who was 
prepared to work outside the home. Hasan cannot adapt to this ‘new’ 
idea and even hits her, causing her to leave and her mother angered 
because a bus driver has slapped her daughter.22 Why is he unable to 
                                                   
22 Not the fact that he slapped her, but his lower rank and status in the eyes 
of the mother did not qualify him to slap her or control her daughter’s life. 




accept financial support from his (wealthier) wife? Hasan does not 
strike us as an overtly traditionalist person and he and his family are 
obviously in need of money. Yet, he is unable to deal with his wife’s 
ambition, who, according to him, might neglect her duties inside the 
home. For his idea of masculinity, composed of him being the sole 
breadwinner, it is inconceivable to accept that his wife takes on a part 
of his male role as provider, betraying his dominant middle class 
values. According to him the fate of his family depends on his work 
outside the home, supported by his wife’s work inside the home. 
Hasan’s masculinity is thus constructed around a set of elements, as 
provider of the family, but also the protector of his family and, with 
extension, the nation – as a war veteran – which he did successfully, 
considering the official rhetoric of the victory in the war of ’73. His 
working-class mentality collides with his wife’s family’s middle class 
values. Eventually, his masculinity will prove to be unable to solve the 
issue, as he will lose everything: his wife, his father, the factory, as well 
as his taxi. His entire identity, as provider and protector, is destroyed 
at the end, resulting in an existential crisis with which the film 
dramatically ends. His masculine performance, defined in terms of his 
ability to provide, protect and procreate, is inadequate. Hasan Haddad 
notes that Hasan’s and his friends’ masculine identity is defined by 
their shared “moments of heroism and defeat, while authentic 
elements like masculinity (rujūla) and gallantry (shahāma)23 brought 
them together” (2013: 18). The quote points at the ‘authenticity’ of 
masculinity, in terms of the high values that were supposed to be 
visualized by fatwana. In earlier (pre-1967) films, the modernist 
rhetoric allowed for a successful performance of this masculinity. In 
this and other films of the era – namely after the ’67 defeat – the same 
terminology defines the men’s masculinity, but they are no longer 
                                                   
23 Peterson (2011), referring to El-Messiri and Wassef, describes shahāma in 
terms of gallantry, but also as “a self-possession bordering on audacity, which 
reveals a noble character” (Peterson 2011: 106). He continues, saying that “it 
is not only an individual characteristic but is linked to social order.” In this 
way, it might also result in male domination over women’s behavior and 
freedom of movement, as Peterson exemplifies. Hasan Haddad’s remark 
points at an understanding of shahāma in terms of the men’s shared 
experiences, comforting as well as protecting each other. 
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capable of successfully performing it. The quote also shows the 
positive connotations that are made with rujūla or 
masculinity/manliness, as a set of positively coded values. Haddad 
thus does not understand it as a gender identity, but as a fixed value 
system to which we can and should subscribe in the performance of 
our gendered identities. 
 
7.2.2 The Kidnapped Girl 
The director of The Kidnapped Girl (1987), Sharif Yahya (1951/55-2003), 
has not made a lot of films, his career cut short after he lost the battle 
against cancer. He has made several TV-films, among the few other 
action-films he directed for cinematic release. He is the younger 
brother of director Ahmad Yahya, whom he regularly cooperated with 
in the latter’s films. The film The Kidnapped Girl is perhaps not one of 
the most famous films of the era, although it features the immensely 
popular star actor Ahmad Zaki (1949-2005), as well as the famous 
actors Kamal al-Shinawi (see Karnak Café, chapter 6), and the actresses 
Layla ‘Ilwi (1962-) and Amina Rizq, the ‘mother of Egyptian cinema’ 
(1910-2003). 
Ahmad Zaki, known as ‘The Dark Boy of the Screen’ (fatā al-shāsha 
al-asmar) because of his tanned complexion, is the most lauded and 
loved actor of the 80s and 90s. His performances in ‘Ali Badrakhan’s 
film Shafiqa wa-Mitwalli/Shafika and Metwalli (1978) and Youssef 
Chahine’s Iskandiriyya Leh?/Alexandria… Why? (1978) made him 
instantly famous. He was a talented actor, acting in comedies, action 
films and dramas with the same conviction and credibility. He took on 
roles as Ṣa‘īdi boys and men (al-Bari’/The Innocent, ‘Atif al-Tayyib 1986), 
educated middle class Cairenes (al-‘Awwama Raqm 70/Houseboat Number 
70, Khayri Bishara), police officers (see footnote 20 above), ‘ordinary’ 
white collar employees (al-Hubb Fawq Hadbat al-Haram/Love on Top of the 
Pyramid Plateau, ‘Atif al-Tayyib 1986), working class men 
(Kaburiyya/Crab, Khayri Bishara 1990), and doormen (al-Beh 
al-Bawwab/Mister Doorman, Hasan Ibrahim 1987). He acted in several 
films where his masculine identity plays an essential part in the plot, 
for example in Istakoza/Lobster (1996) a film by female director Inas al-
Daghaydi. In the film, a woman, who had nearly castrated his 
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character, is forced to marry him for the period of one month in order 
to care for him until his ‘masculinity’ (the term rugūla is used in the 
film, although they mean the proper functioning of his male sexual 
organ) is restored. Amina Rizq plays the woman’s great aunt, the 
family’s matriarch who agrees to the scheme, secretly hoping that the 
emasculated man will be able to turn the too masculine girl into a 
“proper lady”.24 
The film The Kidnapped Girl uses a similar style as The Bus Driver, 
displaying similar topics and issues: a working class man (Husayn, 
played by Ahmad Zaki), a family that depends on him after the death 
of his father, a sick mother (the ensuing crisis), class differences, and a 
taxi (and thus also the streets and the city as the décor). Husayn’s taxi 
is the family’s sole livelihood, which is completely ruined in an 
accident caused by an inattentive girl. Husayn – knowing the 
disastrous consequences of losing his taxi – by accident slaps the girl 
(hence the quote in the title for this part of the chapter), unable to 
retain his anger and feelings.25 In order to get money for a new taxi, he 
is then convinced by his friends to kidnap the girl since the law will 
not help a poor man like Husayn and on the contrary will side with the 
rich Ratib Bey Barakat (played by Kamal al-Shinawi), father of the girl. 
Once again, the film uses similar ‘codes of modernity’ in its 
portrayal of Husayn and the othering of the rich girl and her family. 
This is done from the beginning of the film. The sympathetic Husayn, 
singing Arabic songs in his simple taxi, waving his happy customers 
goodbye, is in a good mood. The film then cuts to the girl in her 
expensive Mercedes, listening to foreign music. She is immediately 
distanced from the audience through this simple sound technique and 
                                                   
24 The plot is based on Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew, a play that has 
been adapted several times into films in Egyptian cinema. An older example is 
Fatin ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Ah Min Hawa’/Oh Eve! from 1962 with Lubna ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz in the role of ‘the shrew’ and Rushdi Abaza in the role of doctor Hasan, 
or Petruchio in the original play. 
25 Similar to The Bus Driver, Husayn’s slapping a girl is not the main issue in 
the film; the problem arises only from the class difference between the man 
and the woman. The lack of critical stances toward violence against women in 
Egyptian cinema – at times portrayed as a male’s ‘educative’ slap as in these 
two films – is striking (pun intended). 
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her ‘un-Egyptian’ attitude and culture.26 After the accident and 
slapping the girl, Husayn tries hard to get things right, but the lonely 
man is no match for the financial and physical power of the girl’s 
father and his gang (comprised of lawyers and unlawful bullies). Thus, 
when he decides to kidnap the girl on ill advice from his friend, we 
cannot but empathize with him: he is an unfortunate young man and 
‘victimized’ by an unjust society. Even his victim sympathizes with him 
briefly during the kidnapping, particularly after he saves her from his 
friend who tried to rape her. 
The redemption of his actions is complete because of the film’s 
siding with Husayn. The dramatic narrative features – the accident, a 
sick mother, a sloppy legal system, his marginalized position – place 
the man into an outsider position. He symbolizes the growing disparity 
in Egyptian society between the upper classes, embodied by Ratib 
Bey,27 and the working and middle classes, embodied by Husayn. But 
the modernist synthesizing ideology had been in decline since the 70s 
to the same extent as the middle classes were diminishing (Armbrust 
1995). The film goes to great lengths to depict Husayn as the victim of 
this class divide and the country’s adoption of a Western imposed 
economic system of the free market and privatization. When Husayn’s 
mother gets sick, she is forced to go to a private hospital where the 
costs for the operation are massive compared to the (supposedly) free 
government hospitals. Unable to pay for her treatment, she dies, 
convincing Husayn to forcefully take what is his. 
                                                   
26 These foreign elements come back in many Egyptian films, and since its 
very beginning, in order to distance viewers from certain characters 
(Armbrust 1995: 107). Similar to the foreign consumer goods and the Pepsi 
can in The Bus Driver, the foreign English-language music is here associated 
with money, corruption, arrogance and a non-Egyptian identity. 
27 It is interesting to note here that Ratib Barakat is constantly addressed by 
Husayn as well as Ratib’s assistants as ‘bey’, an old Ottoman title which was in 
monarchical Egypt also one of the higher administrative titles. This return to 
pre-1952 titles (including the term bāshā/pasha) is another example of the 
post-70s films’ critical stance towards modernist rhetoric of equality and 
revolutionary social change. These terms have never really been abolished, 
used to express someon respectfully, but they nevertheless are not entirely 
void of their historical meaning of inequality (and oppression). 
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To emphasize the differences between Husayn’s and Ratib’s 
background and class, the film contrasts both men’s dwellings and 
work area: Husayn lives in a simple, small apartment with his mother 
and siblings, while Ratib lives in a luxurious villa. Ratib works in a 
fancy high-rise on the banks of the Nile, symbol of capitalism, Husayn 
works in the streets, driving a taxi, the marginalized side-effect of 
unbridled capitalism. The differences between the two classes also 
extend to their lifestyles. Husayn’s family is rather easy-going when it 
comes to ‘propriety’, for example when his sister’s long-time fiancé 
asks him to agree with a quick, inexpensive marriage ceremony 
because he had found work abroad and intends to travel with her. 
Ratib on the other hand is only interested in a good match for his 
daughter Nevine in financial terms and thus does not allow her to 
choose her suitor but agrees himself with the father of the future 
fiancé. Their marriage will not be one of love, but one of convenience. 
Compared to earlier films, in which love marriages were always the 
ideal, the marriages in this film have lost their romantic appeal. 
Husayn’s sister is unable to marry because there is practically no 
money for the wedding, while Nevine is refused any input whatsoever. 
The film brings to mind Nystrom’s argument about 1970s American 
cinema in which class depictions – and particularly depictions of the 
white working class male – have become so crucial for those 
filmmakers’ “rendering of the social world” (Nystrom 2009: x). His 
example of Scorcese’s Taxi Driver (1976) can be partly extended to this 
film as well. The Egyptian filmmaker’s rendering of lower classes as 
tightly knit families, looking out for each other, with the working class 
male inclined to violence, is visualized in The Kidnapped Girl, betraying 
the filmmaker’s middle class view on social relations in an increasingly 
dichotomized Egypt. Dai Xiaoqi (2012) argues that the decline of the 
middle classes resulted in a “‘dumbbell’ shaped Egypt” (id. 70-1). This 
dumbbell shape meant a relatively growing upper class, as well as an 
exponentially expanding lower class, with a small number of middle 
class lingering somewhere in between. The upper and lower classes are 
represented in this film, while the middle class absence is then actually 
embodied by the camera and the narrative, applying a plot 
development reminiscent of Shafik’s argument of the ‘fat cats myth’. 
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Through the narrative’s use of the codes of modernity in a contrasting 
rather than a synthesizing manner, the modernist, middle class ideals 
of pre-70s films are strangled between the two extremes, yet, they 




The masculinity of futuwwa, which is constructed through all kinds of 
chivalrous characteristics based on physical strength and codes of 
honor, is not possible for the antiheroes of the 80s because presently 
physical strength is no longer a guarantee, which it was in the past, 
according to these films. These films – and similar to the futuwwa – 
consider masculinity as a set of actions and values supposedly 
emanating from men’s bodies, which men are no longer able to 
perform, and therefore they cannot be men anymore. This leads to two 
sets of problems. First, this requires an understanding of masculinity 
in essentialist terms, as a fixed set of actions and characteristics, 
ahistorical and unchanging. We know now, however, that masculinity 
and how we understand it today is a changing historical and social 
construct, depending on place and time. Second, this also includes the 
assumption that the present conditions are detrimental to men –whose 
dominance is never questioned – in the first place, and to ‘others’ – 
women and children – in the second place. Another element that 
defines all the men’s lives (from the historical and heroicized futuwwa 
to the contemporary antihero) is their work. We have seen that in all 
the films, work has proven to be essential to the construction of their 
masculine identities. They take pride in it, and without it they fear 
they will lose part of their masculine identity. 
Can we call this then a continuation of the men-in-crisis discourse? 
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the country was in 
need of calm after the tumultuous years of socialist and then liberal-
capitalist policies. The country went from one upheaval to the next, 
entering wars that were devastating and expensive. It was ‘obvious’ for 
many that Egypt was in crisis. With the growing inequality in the 
country, the crisis was very tangibly for most people (the diminishing 
purchasing power of the middle class and expending lower classes). 
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Debby Phillips (referring to Kimmel) notes that during times of 
transition and instability, “the search for a timeless and eternal inner 
essence of manhood becomes most urgent” (Phillips 2006: 405). This 
might explain the emergence of the futuwwa-films metaphorically 
portraying idealized versions of masculinity, the gallant and 
chivalrous strongmen restoring stability and social equality. 
The antihero, too, portrays a similar inner essence of masculinity, 
looking for ways to perform adequately as a man. The anti-heroes of 
these two films construct their masculine identity through ‘classic’ 
elements like the male breadwinner, responsible for the family’s 
wellbeing in all its facets. Both Hasan and Husayn are underdog men, 
trying to cope with the ensuing crisis in their respective families and 
lives. The crisis from without is experienced by these men as a crisis 
from within when they realize they will be unable to solve the 
problems they face. The films discussed here focus on the crisis as it is 
experienced by men, portrayed as morally superior characters to their 
antagonists, whether family, women, or the rich in general. These 
films’ emphasis on the crisis as a man-only issue, threatening his 
‘proper’ masculine performance (either as breadwinner, protector of 
the family, or father-figure), contribute to the wider discourse of men 
in crisis. In the next chapter we will discuss how this perceived crisis 
affects the portrayal of men and masculinities in the most recent 




8. Rebel Masculinities, Revolution and New Patterns 
of Paternalism 
 
By the end of the 90s and specifically in the decade running up to the 
2011 revolution, films discussed the untenable political, social, and 
economic situation that many middle and lower class Egyptians were 
experiencing.1 But this does not mean that all films are therefore 
revolutionary – either in style or topic; some films might even contain 
a reactionary agenda. Armbrust (2012) notes how one 2008 film (Rami 
al-I‘tisami/Rami the Protestor, Sami Rafi‘) portrays demonstrations in a 
negative light. “The vision of Egypt promoted in Rami”, Armbrust 
continues, “is depressing for anyone who hopes to see a revolutionary 
outcome in which social and economic justice prevail” (Armbrust 2012: 
148). The films from the past decade are once again topical and timely 
for the period in which they are made. In terms of gender 
representations, we will see how two very distinct types of masculine 
identities are portrayed; two types that reveal the prominent politics 
of gender in Mubarak’s last decade. 
The films from this decade come after a period that saw the 
development of new discourses, as well as new cinematic styles in 
what Malek Khouri (2005) calls New Arab Cinema. Khouri argues that 
since the end of the 90s new developments were visible in Arab 
cinemas, including diaspora films made by Arab filmmakers abroad, 
often for non-Arabic speaking audiences. Of interest here are the 
different subjects Khouri discerns in the films from this period, one of 
them being a new discourse on gender and sexuality. Khouri is 
interested in the new discourses on female sexuality as well as non-
heteronormative sexualities trying to break free from patriarchal 
                                                   
1 The death of the middle class in cultural products has been extensively 
discussed by Armbrust (1995, 1996). Xiaoqi (2012) notes the demise of the 
middle classes in Egypt, with a growing upper-class and vastly expanding 
lower classes, as discussed in chapter 7. The growing disparity between 




domination. But I would like to add to this a number of films that 
question and problematize male heteronormative sexuality. The film 
al-Na‘ama wa-ʼl-Tawus/The Ostrich and the Peacock (Muhammad Salah 
Abu Sayf 2002) is a film that depicts a man who lacks in sexual 
performance, yet is too proud to admit it (the symbolic peacock), while 
his wife denies her traumatic experiences with her body when she was 
a child (the symbolic ostrich). The film criticizes common 
misconceptions of a man’s and a woman’s body and sexuality in Egypt 
and tries to overcome the taboo of talking about sexual problems 
within the context of marriage. 
In the previous chapter I have briefly mentioned Khayri Bishara’s 
film The Necklace and the Bracelet (1986). It is one of the first films to 
openly portray a Ṣa‘īdī man’s impotence and his inability to properly 
perform his masculinity, a taboo subject even to this day. The last 
decades and particularly from the 70s onward, we have seen that 
masculine identity is increasingly portrayed as being in a perpetual 
crisis, similar to the country’s (and the Egyptian film industry’s) 
continuing crisis.2 That crisis had thus reached unsustainable levels in 
the past decade, as evidenced by the continuous ‘down-grading’ of 
male characters in films: the turn of the millennium saw the 
emergence of ‘the age of the baltagi’3 and the lower class unemployed 
                                                   
2 John MacInnes (1998: 11) argues that masculinity has somehow always been 
in crisis from the moment it came into the picture and its normativity came 
under scrutiny. However, masculine normativity is not questioned in popular 
films from Egypt; its normativity is adapted and restored. Nevertheless, we 
can discern an increasingly critical stance toward masculine identities, and 
more diversity is visible thanks to contributions from female directors and 
screenwriters, but also critical male directors such as Muhammad Khan and 
his recent film Fatat al-Masna‘/Factory Girl (2014). 
3 The correct transliteration of the word is balṭagī, an Arabic word from 
Turkish origin (balta, meaning ax). For the sake of convenience, I have chosen 
for a basic transliteration. The word baltagi is now commonly used to describe 
lowlifes, often from popular, crowded and poor neighborhoods. Particularly 
since 2011 the word is also used to describe anti-regime protesters (and 
thugs) or pro-regime supporters (and thugs) by each opposing faction. It has 
also come into use to denounce anyone whose actions are not deemed 
‘appropriate’. To cover the entire social meaning of the word in its present 
setting, I will use the Arabic baltagi and not its less explicative translation. The 
baltagi is understood here to describe a lower class, often unemployed, male, 
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male. But a discourse of crisis (whether an economic, political or social 
crisis, or a crisis in masculinity) also points at a need for stability that 
Mubarak’s presidency initially seemed to propose (Osman 2010: 166). 
Hegemonic masculinity came to be defined in terms of stability and 
control, an eternal masculine ideal authorized to make sense of the 
chaos surrounding us through its paternalism. 
This masculine ideal was embodied by the futuwwa in the 80s, 
although those films – as we have seen in the previous chapter – also 
portrayed men realistically, with all their flaws. Nevertheless, the tone 
was set for a return to a patriarchal masculinity and apparent rule of 
man. This does not mean, however, that all the films produced from 
this era unequivocally portray men and masculinity in a unilateral 
manner. Indeed, such films as Muhammad Amin’s Film Thaqafi/A 
Cultural Film (2000), Hani Khalifa’s Sahar al-Layali/Long Nights (2003) or 
Dawud ‘Abd al-Sayyid’s Rasa’il al-Bahr/Messages from the Sea (2010) 
portray different men and their struggles to come to terms with their 
respective masculine identities. Much relates to these films’ genres, as 
comedies or melodramas, contrary to the action film ‘criminal hero’ 
that the baltagi portrays. 
In the anti-modernist films from the 70s onward we saw the critical 
assessment of the family in the individual’s life. The problem arose 
when men were no longer able or felt restrained by the roles they were 
expected to adhere to. The problematic family – as origin of crisis – 
developed further in the 80s and also in the most recent decades it 
continued to be presented as a limitation on the development of 
masculine identities. Men somehow have to adapt to family life; it is 
not what they are ‘naturally’ inclined to do, at least not in popular 
culture, but marriage and fathering children nevertheless remains the 
dominant ideal. In her analysis of contemporary Arab literature, Samia 
Mehrez notes that “dominant cultural representations continue to 
reinforce traditional values of the family and moralize its reality” 
(Mehrez 2008: 123). Men in the Arab world, too, negotiate their 
                                                                                                                   
and occasionally involved in criminal activities, such as drugs, theft and 
murder. I need to point out as well that the actual word was not commonly 
used until 2011, when the protests erupted. The word only gained prominence 
in films after 2011. The type (as a common thug) already existed well before 
that year, however. 
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masculine identities within the constraints of patriarchy and the 
institution of marriage. Homa Hoodfar argues that “through marriage 
and having children […] adulthood and self-realization are achieved” 
(Hoodfar 2009: 262) for both men and women. Nevertheless, some 
popular films portray men as ‘settling down’ when starting a family, 
while women are portrayed as naturally ensuring their expected social 
position. 
Simultaneously, the dominant ideal of family life as the ultimate 
goal is represented in popular culture as a generational conflict. The 
struggle to break free from patriarchal bonds is an old theme in 
Egyptian cinema ever since its early beginnings. Walter Armbrust, in 
his discussion on sex on the silver screen in Egypt, shows that “[f]ilm 
narratives commonly articulate conceptual extremes of both 
patriarchal control and individualized love rather than real life 
situations” (Armbrust 1998: 29). The generational conflict is closely 
linked to gender and the individuals’ struggles for constructing their 
(gendered) selves. Young men and women come into conflict with 
patriarchal figures, representing older generations. Nevertheless, the 
family ideal is always restored. From the films discussed in this 
chapter it will become clear in what way generational conflicts and 
gender struggles are informed by class and heteronormativity. 
 
8.1 Rebel Masculinities 
 
“Masculinity means manners, not shaking your shoulders” 
(Principal Saladin, Sharif ‘Arafa) 
 
In the first part of this chapter I will discuss a specific type of men, the 
young, unemployed male. Occasionally, and specifically more recently 
since 2011, the word baltagi is used. Characters similar to the baltagi 
have a long history in Egyptian cinema, but have only recently been 
described as such. Balṭaga (its verbal noun) are actions that can be 
described as thuggery, whether in violent, physical terms or as 
economic thuggery. As such, Farid Shawqi’s performance in The Tough 
Guy could be described as a baltagi rather than the more honorable, 
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chivalrous denunciation of the ideal that the futuwwa is supposed to be 
(as represented in 80s futuwwa-films). Shawqi’s character both 
physically and economically controls the other traders in the market 
place through his balṭaga, although he is not exactly participating in 
criminal activities (if one does not count the numerous bribes). Also 
‘Adil Adham’s performance as ma‘allim al-Shibli in The Devil Preaches, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter, could now be described 
as baltagi. Adham’s character is more visibly criminal, as a violent 
rapist and murderer. From the 70s onward, cinematic balṭaga focused 
primarily on economic thuggery with occasional ‘violent’ diversions 
like the antagonists in the futuwwa-films of the 80s. In the years since 
the new millennium the baltagi has become the foremost lower class 
male type in popular Egyptian films together with stereotypical 
representations for women as prostitutes and dancers. 
These continuing exploitative representational politics of popular 
and lower class neighborhoods are reminiscent of this most recent 
period, characterized by police brutality and political oppression. Male 
(but also female) identities are constructed around this ambiguous 
criminalization of popular lower class neighborhoods. It would be too 
naïve to deny any criminal activity taking place in lower class areas, 
but these areas’ continued criminalization in popular culture and 
media affirms the official rhetoric of ‘dangerous’ ‘ashwāʼiyyāt (informal 
settlements)4 that need to be controlled at any cost. These generalizing 
representations result in a stigmatization of a large number of the 
population, of whole areas within the city, and of specific, 
marginalized classes.5 Poverty almost automatically leads to 
                                                   
4 The lower class neighborhoods that are described here are the new and 
informal settlements or ‘ashwāʼiyyāt that have sprouted around the city. They 
have to be distinguished from historical working class neighborhoods like 
Bulaq, Sayyida Zaynab, and others which are situated right in the center of 
the city and part of its historical areas. The ‘ashwāʼiyyāt are the informal 
“haphazard” (lit. translation of ‘ashwā’ī) settlements built from the 80s 
onward at the edges of the town and which are now starting to be integrated 
in the greater urban areas of (mainly) Cairo and Giza. 
5 In this regard I refer to Armbrust’s article titled “Dreaming of 
Counterrevolution” (2012), in which he analyzes a 2008 film, Rami the Protester. 
Armbrust argues that the film unites poverty and criminality within ‘ashwā’ī 
neighborhoods (id. 147), what the films discussed in this chapter also seem to 
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criminality in these films – notwithstanding the occasional (naïve) 
‘good guy’. The good guys are almost always depicted as lesser men, 
unable to survive in the selfish, each-on-his-own neighborhoods. The 
good men could be disabled, as unknowing victims of their 
surroundings, or they could be naïve and cowardly, simply trying to 
cope with the hardships of daily life. The ‘real’ men, on the other hand, 
are those who perform their tough guy masculinity successfully.6 
The main films analyzed in this part of the chapter have a few 
elements in common. Their décor is set in popular neighborhoods, 
whether portrayed comically or realistically, and they talk about 
themes like drug abuse and unemployment. The prominent male type 
in these films is the rebellious, young male, although the men’s 
performances differ depending on the film’s genre. The action films 
take themselves seriously, to the point of irony. The irony lies in the 
fact that these action films portray the muscular male body with great 
detail and emphasize its strength and ability, but also its beauty. These 
ambiguous portrayals of male bodies put them in a feminized position 
as desirable objects, although their actions and point of view require 
them to be in an active position of male control. The comedies make a 
joke of the tough guy masculinity in lower class areas (similar to the 
decades-old comedies comically depicting the ma‘allim’s tough guy 
masculinity), and might transgress assumptions of generic portrayals 
of class and gender. But laughter can also function to emphasize 
stereotypical representations and infantilize the inhabitants of lower 
class neighborhoods. 
 
8.1.1 Al-Limbi and masculinity in disguise 
The first film in this part about lower class masculine performances is 
al-Limbi (Wa’il Ihsan 2002), with star actor Muhammad Sa‘d (1968-), 
which was a successful attempt to give the contemporary lower class 
                                                                                                                   
be doing. 
6 A notable exception is the popular actor Karim ‘Abd al-‘Aziz who portrays 
lower class men more positively, as ibn al-balad (el-Messiri 1978: 54), defined 
in terms of his wit, honesty and courage. Yet, his teaming-up with popular 
actress Muna Zaki in the film Abu ‘Ali (Ahmad Nadir Galal 2005), in which she 
plays the role of an upper-middle class woman, downplays the stark class 
differences that constitute Egypt’s social reality. 
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unemployed male a central role in Egyptian films. It is a comedy which 
is not immediately the most ‘masculine’ of genres (though often 
associated with men as comedians), considering the continuous 
ridiculing of ubiquitous masculinity in many comedies.7 Particularly 
the ‘apex of masculinity’,8 the mustache, is often central in jokes about 
the manliness of men donning it. The mustache could be read as 
symbolizing the penis, its presence central to the construction of a 
masculine identity. The removal of the mustache could be understood 
as castration in this sense. In each of the chapters and eras in this 
study, there was a reference to the masculine sign that the mustache 
can be, not to mention the emasculation one suffers when his 
mustache is shaven. This will be particularly prevalent in chapter 9, in 
the discussion of the film ‘Afwan Ayyuha al-Qanun/Pardon Me, Law! by 
Inas al-Daghaydi (1985). 
The main character of the present film, al-Limbi, juxtaposes lavish 
facial hair to non-masculine behavior. Muhammad Sa‘d’s characters do 
this in all of his films, considering his attention to different and 
remarkable sorts of facial hair for each of his types. Yet, non-
masculine behavior is what defines the actor’s famous type. The quote 
at the beginning of this subchapter is taken from an earlier film, al-
Nazir Salah al-Din/Principal Saladin (Sharif ‘Arafa 2000); the film’s title is 
a play of words on Youssef Chahine’s famous 1963 epic al-Nasir Salah al-
Din/ Saladin the Victorious. In the former film, Muhammad Sa‘d 
appeared for the first time with his trademark al-Limbi character. In it, 
he tries to teach one of his former classmates (‘Ashur Salah al-Din, 
played by another famous comedy actor, ‘Ala’ Wali al-Din, 1963-2003) 
how to toughen up. One of al-Limbi’s classes entails a course in 
‘masculinity’: ir-rugūla adab, mish hizz kitāf (masculinity means 
manners, not shaking your shoulders), meaning that true masculinity 
is not limited to muscles and showing off, but is comprised of more 
                                                   
7 Stuart Hall (1981: 228) argues that, when studying popular culture, we 
should keep in mind its contradictions: “the double movement of 
containment and resistance”. As such, the comedy can here simultaneously 
reinforce and contain common perceptions of what constitutes masculine 
performances, as well as ridicule and resist them. 
8 In Sa‘d’s film Katkut/Chick (Ahmad ‘Awad 2006) the main character Katkut 
calls his mustache rās al-rujūla, the apex of masculinity. 
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noble characteristics as described in the chapter on the futuwwa. 
Confronting al-Limbi’s words with his deeds reveals his understanding 
of masculinity, but his inability to appropriately act upon it. 
The present film’s director is Wa’il Ihsan (1964-), known for his 
comedies with popular comedy actors like Muhammad Sa‘d, 
Muhammad Hanaydi and the octogenarian Hasan Husni. Critics in 
Egypt often scorn the director’s commercial products, denouncing 
them as simple entertainment and referring to them as “shopping mall 
films” (Shafik 2007: 290-1). Mahmud Qasim’s critique of one of his 
films, Zaki Shan/Zaki Chan (2005), a word play on Jackie Chan’s action 
star persona, is extremely negative, although he does not say why, 
apart from the film’s failed humor (Qasim 2010: 459-60). Yet, it is 
interesting to note the director’s references to other films and film 
cultures as well as historical figures. The only link to the actual Jackie 
Chan in Zaki Chan, is the main character Zaki’s willingness to become a 
bodyguard, pretending to be an adapt fighter and trying to disentangle 
himself from the clutches of his domineering father. Whether or not 
the film’s humor is successful is a subjective matter and should not 
concern us. What is more relevant here is the director’s known use of 
multiple post-modern references to pop culture, history and historical 
figures. 
Similar references to films and historical figures are present in the 
film al-Limbi as well. Viola Shafik notes the nominal reference the 
character makes to the historical figure of the British field marshal 
Edmund Allenby (Shafik 2007: 289), although the comparison ends 
here. Muhammad Sa‘d’s character is in nothing similar to the British 
soldier, as an unemployed, marihuana smoking, alcohol drinking 
‘lowlife’. Al-Limbi’s mother is called Faransa, a reference to France, 
while his best friend is called ‘Amm Bakh (‘Uncle’ Bakh), referring to 
the Baroque composer Johann Sebastian Bach. Apart from Bakh 
playing a classical instrument (the violin), there is no clear indication 
to the reasons behind such names for al-Limbi’s friend, or for his 
mother’s name. Another recognizable element in the director’s films is 
his use of coming-of-age stories, which al-Limbi’s plot also reminds of. 
The actor Muhammad Sa‘d continues to spark reactions from 
critics, although he has lost much of his initial rebellious anti-
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establishment attitude for which he was scorned after the release of al-
Limbi. He often makes references to the classicist cultural icons of the 
Arab world in his films, as he did in al-Limbi when his character 
performed a popular version of a song by the singer Umm Kulthum. In 
an interview in the Egyptian state-run newspaper al-Ahram, he 
rightfully says that it is not he himself who performs the song, but his 
character, al-Limbi, countering other critics’ claims that this scene 
mutilated Umm Kulthum’s song in the context of a “film without 
content” (Musa 2002). As the actor sees it, al-Limbi’s performance 
takes place in the context of his wedding. Viola Shafik argues that the 
concept of a singing comedian places him in a long line of famous 
comedians from the 40s and 50s like Shukuku and Isma‘il Yassin 
(Shafik 2007: 289), making al-Limbi’s performance not so out-of-place 
as some of the critics might claim. The affront they took, however, was 
with the fact that Umm Kulthum’s song – an icon of Egyptian culture 
to this day – was performed in the mode of a popular sha‘bi song. 
In the same interview with Musa (2002), the actor also sees 
similarities between his character and himself in earlier years, 
particularly when he was suffering from the same ‘torture’, namely 
unemployment and financial issues, perhaps also referring to his 
character’s drug abuse. Generally, al-Limbi represents for him the ‘lost 
youth’, unable to find a job, seeking recourse in drugs. Muhammad 
Sa‘d (from a popular neighborhood himself), embodies a recognizable 
lower class character, unique amongst the usual clean and 
‘respectable’, slightly elitist productions. By now, Sa‘d’s comedies have 
meted out a part for themselves in Egypt’s contemporary pop culture 
but have also grown into parodies of their own genre. In sum, the actor 
has appeared in four films with this character and promises to give 
more of the same. 
Muhammad Sa‘d acts alongside several famous actors, the most 
famous of them are Hasan Husni (as Bakh) and ‘Abla Kamil (as his 
mother Faransa). ‘Abla Kamil (1960-) is famous for her portrayals of 
mother figures. Although she is only 8 years older than Muhammad 
Sa‘d, his character’s infantile behavior allows him to play the son of 
this slightly older actress. She often portrays the downtrodden, lower 
class woman and mother, in such films as Bultiyya al-‘Ayma/Swimming 
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Bultiyya (‘Ali Ragab 2008) and ‘Awdat al-Nadla/Return of the Wretch (Sa‘id 
Hamid 2006). Next to her, we find Hasan Husni (1931-), who acts in 
more than a dozen films each year as the comedic sidekick to the main 
actors. Particularly in the last decades of his career he focused on 
comedies and his role in it as a ‘fun’ father figure. However, in al-Limbi, 
Husni’s character is not the stereotypical father figure one would 
imagine him to portray: he is more of a good friend, smoking hashish 
and getting drunk together with al-Limbi, while occasionally getting 
entirely occupied with a musical intermezzo on his violin. 
Muhammad Sa‘d’s al-Limbi character is a drunk and a drug addict 
and his films touch upon social issues like youth unemployment, 
marriage crisis and housing crisis.9 Although socially relevant and 
occasionally shocking, he considers his films to be ‘clean cinema’ 
(Faruq 2010). The label was applied in the nineties to certain films 
which avoided the ‘hot’ topics sex, religion, and politics (Karawya 
2010; Mehrez 2008: 203).10 The actress playing his fiancée in the film is 
Hala Shiha, a now retired actress. In the late 80s and 90s, many 
actresses stopped their profession in favor of donning the veil, 
sometimes to return later, performing a newfound piety in public life 
(van Nieuwkerk 2013). Hala Shiha has, however, decided not to show 
herself in public anymore, similar to the famous star actresses of the 
                                                   
9 Egypt’s marriage and housing crisis are a decades old policy issue. Nadia 
Ramsis Farah (2013: 33) notes that already in the 70s a perpetual shortage of 
housing units struck the country’s middle- and lower classes. Also Fahmi and 
Sutton (2008) discuss the failure of decades of housing policies to provide 
affordable units for lower and middle income families. The marriage crisis 
also has a long history, perhaps even longer than the housing crisis. Hanan 
Kholoussy (2010b) argues that in the early 20th century in Egypt, a marriage 
crisis due to rising inflation, among other reasons, disabled young bachelors 
of paying the hefty price of marriage (which includes dowries, an apartment 
and stable sources of income). A similar economic crisis also forces many 
youngsters in the 21st century to postpone marriage to a later age – 
particularly young men, although women in urban centres also suffer from 
the marriage crisis. Regarding the marriage crisis, see also chapter 7, footnote 
17. 
10 In a recent publication, Mahmud al-Ghitani (2010) claimed that the name 
‘clean cinema’ has been in use already since the 1950s. Back then, it did not 
have a ‘moral’ meaning, but was used to identify those films that had high 
artistic production standards. 
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50s through 80s like Shadia (1931-) and Shams al-Barudi (1945-). Other 
artists who have returned to the screen, albeit with veil, are for 
example the TV-actress Sabrine (1967-), the cinema star Hanan Turk 
(1975-) and the singer Shahinaz (1979-). 
The film’s main character is all but heroic. The original character 
al-Limbi (in Principal Saladin) was a man without family, without work, 
without a partner and with a speaking disorder, perhaps due to 
constant alcohol and drug abuse. His character is stereotypical, but he 
is also sympathetic and for the first time this film put the lower class 
young unemployed male – the one who was and still is often 
considered and described in terms of a problem in official rhetoric – on 
the screen. Salwa Isma‘il (2006: xiv) notes how discourses on thuggery 
(balṭaga) reemerged in the 90s culminating in the new ‘thuggery law’ 
(qānūn al-balṭaga) in 1998. She further argues that public discourse on 
the newly developed popular areas describing them as ‘informal’ and 
‘ashwāʼī (haphazard) constructs the need for law and order in such 
areas, condoning state repression. It furthermore neglects the 
grassroots civilian organization of these areas which are without any 
recourse to state support (Isma‘il 2006: 1-4), while new and planned 
upper class areas receive a disproportionately large portion of state 
money, e.g. in the construction of these areas’ infrastructure. 
Not only official state rhetoric, but also popular culture contributes 
to the identification of these popular and crowded areas with balṭaga. A 
good example of such criminalization is the recent number of films 
starring the young actor Muhammad Ramadan (1988-). Although 
Ramadan has acted the role of a marginalized male in diverse films, 
including dramas, without stereotypically portraying them as 
criminals (e.g. Ihki ya Shahrazad/Tell Me a Story, Shahrazad, Yusri 
Nasrallah 2009), he now focuses on that one type, the criminal post-
2011 baltagi. Yet, his recent films are incredibly popular, in part thanks 
to his rebellious star persona, and the filmmakers claim to give an 
insider’s view on the ‘hidden secrets of the life of baltagiyya in Egypt’, 
as it is written on the publicity poster of the 2012 film al-Almani/The 
German (‘Ala’ al-Sharif). 
Isma‘il further defines the state’s discourses on the lower class 
areas and unemployed youth as ‘politics of security’ (Isma‘il 2006: 97), 
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to which Paul Amar also adheres in his analysis of global reactions on 
the uprisings in 2010-11 (and continuing) in different Arab countries. 
Amar’s focus is on certain state institutions, the so-called security 
masculinities that create notions of ‘dangerous’ Arab male subjects 
(Amar 2011: 40). In addition, there are the paternafare masculinities 
that promote a rigid form of patriarchal masculinity (and 
accompanying femininity) within the accepted boundaries of legal 
marriages. They furthermore criminalize any diverging masculinity or 
femininity which, according to Amar, eventually leads to the 
impression that the region is volatile and in need of heavy-handed 
patriarchs (id. 41). The subversive power that the unmarried, 
unemployed and able-bodied youths possess is then described in terms 
of a problem. Particularly the attention on the body of the baltagiyya 
returns in the films, too. This fits within the context of the Egyptian 
cinema industry, which has always paid a lot of attention to the 
muscular bodies of the different male types, for example in earlier eras 
like the 50s ma‘allim and the 80s futuwwa. 
Muhammad Sa‘d’s type is not per sé portrayed as the criminal 
baltagi as the above discussion would suggest, yet he inhabits a similar 
lower working class neighborhood as the one that Salwa Isma‘il 
studied. Portrayed as a true ṣāyi‘11 he adeptly catapults a cigarette 
between his lips at the start of the film. Then the camera cuts to a close 
up of his fancy-looking watch which turns out not to be for reading the 
time, but to light his cigarette with. The attention the subsequent 
scene gives to his dress and behavior are essential for introducing the 
character to the audience: his black leather jacket, a bright blue scarf, 
canary-yellow shirt underneath, and a generally confused look on his 
face conveying his disturbed character. Then he starts singing a 
famous modern poem by Muhammad Hafiz Ibrahim,12 later performed 
                                                   
11 The meaning of ṣāyi‘ can be diverse. On the one hand it could be 
understood as a good-for-nothing; on the other hand, it can also refer to a 
person who is very handy and witty in a specific action. 
12 Muhammad Hafez Ibrahim is a late 19th, early 20th century Egyptian poet, 
known for his nationalist poems, of which the one performed in the film is an 
example. According to Rizzitano (1971: 59), the poet “must be counted among 
the representatives of the innovating Egyptian poetical school”, although 
Ibrahim’s poems “set himself apart […] by his more spontaneous adherence to 
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by the singer Umm Kulthum, Miṣr Tataḥaddath ‘An Nafsihā (Egypt Talks 
about Itself). This nationalist song – reminiscent of the great modernist 
discourse of the 50s and based on a poem from the Nahḍa period of 
socio-cultural renewal – sung by a drunk in a 2002 film, is more than 
just a parody of that song. Al-Limbi’s performance hints at the myth of 
modernity which Egyptian cinema conveyed in the 50s and 60s, and 
which was slowly demolished starting from the 1970s, as discussed in 
previous chapters. But in this post-modern film, filled with empty 
references to past times and historical figures, it is a message without 
meaning, a parody of something non-existent in the first place, a 
pastiche. 
His performance reminds us of the failure of the nationalist and 
modernist rhetoric; although – as Viola Shafik notes – al-Limbi’s 
character continues to represent the dream of social mobility that 
these modernist messages conveyed (Shafik 2007: 290). Shafik 
continues, saying that the film could be interpreted “as an 
emancipation story from the all-devouring mother or father”, a 
recurring topic in some of the director’s films as well as a recurring 
motif in Egyptian cinema. Al-Limbi’s mother is a domineering woman, 
a self-employed woman renting bicycles to the children in the 
neighborhood, and incredibly cruel to anyone who returns his or her 
bike late (e.g. hanging them from a nail in her workshop, or 
hammering their shoes to the wall). Later, al-Limbi is forced to move 
with his mother to Sharm el-Sheikh to earn money renting bikes to 
foreigners there. This project fails, and they are forced to return to 
Cairo. Faransa continues to control her surroundings, though, for 
example when refusing to pay the rent to Bakh, her landlord. Everyone 
in the neighborhood fears, but also respects her, thanks to her strong 
personality. Trying to free himself several times and gain financial 
independence, al-Limbi is nevertheless assisted by his mother in order 
to pass his literacy exam in a scene in which he is effectively 
infantilized. He is dressed up as a school kid, although she also gives 
him an extra 4 Egyptian pounds pocket money “to get a beer after his 
exam.” 
                                                                                                                   
the cause of the people and the cause of the Arab community in general”. 
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Al-Limbi’s masculine performance is not only contained by his 
infantile behavior, emphasized by his subordinate position vis-à-vis his 
mother, his problem to find the right words or to pronounce them 
correctly. His masculinity, a parody of the masculine ideal that ibn al-
balad (el-Messiri 1978) represents, is also defined by other tactics, 
including references to homosexuality – whether in the form of gay 
jokes or cross-dressing – or the actor’s putting himself on display on 
several occasions during the film. The male actor is placed in a female 
object position, as object of the camera’s gaze, for example when he is 
performing one of his many belly-dance acts. Sa‘d’s parody of a 
masculine ibn al-balad type reveals the masquerade that his masculine 
performance eventually is. Judith Butler states that “gender is a 
repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly 
rigid regulatory frame” (Butler 1990: 33). Muhammad Sa‘d crosses the 
boundaries of this regulatory frame through his non-masculine 
performances, i.e. his childish nature, his occasionally gay acts, and 
the objectification of his body in an act that refutes the notion of an 
‘original’ masculine performance. 
Similar to Salwa Isma‘il’s interviewees (2006), al-Limbi is also seen 
in encounters with the state, represented by a police officer checking 
his identity since his looks and behavior seem out of place in the fancy 
area of the city he is walking through at the start of the film. Soon 
after he is trying to remember the words and sing the famous poem, he 
is stopped and frisked by the police. Fearless, or unable, he gives 
ridiculous answers to the police officer asking him questions about 
what he is doing there at that nightly hour. The police officer, a 
representative of the state and hegemonic masculinity defined by 
power and control, is but one of three encounters with the state. The 
next one is with the tourist police in Sharm el-Sheikh, stopping al-
Limbi and his mother from renting bikes, and the last one is when the 
infamous baladiyya (a municipal police force) destroys his unlicensed 
liver sandwich cart. If the film can be read as a coming-of-age story, 
then al-Limbi is the young man who tries to construct his own 
masculine identity independently from his controlling mother and the 
patriarchal state institutions that continue to constrain an 
independent development of his identity. Next to that, through his 
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parodying every element of the cultural establishment (elitist culture, 
ruling classes, hegemonic masculinity in the form of state thuggery 
and male domination) to the point of pastiche in a post-modern 
context, the film also critiques official culture and rhetoric. The most 
obvious example is his parody of the song at the start of the film, not 
to mention his performance later in the film of another Umm Kulthum 
song, Hobb Eh? [Which Love?]. 
There is another trait this type uses as a tool for laughter, namely 
his cowardice. His words and ideas of what being masculine means are 
entirely the opposite of his attitude, reinforcing the gender binary 
between male and non-male (whether female, gay, or being a boy). 
Reeser (2010) called this ‘masculinity in disguise’, in which men would 
appropriate tools that are apparently non-masculine but in ways that 
ultimately reinforce male hegemony (id. 121). Reeser focuses on cross-
dressing, but al-Limbi adds several tactics to the one of cross-dressing. 
His infantile behavior and occasional references to homosexuality are 
part of his lengthy masquerade of masculinity. His performance comes 
across as unconvincing, although he also exhibits certain principles 
associated with ibn al-balad masculinity, such as standing by his friends 
and family, and doing his best for what he conceives as right. The 
audience is aware of these specificities of his character, knowing what 
is deemed correct masculine behavior and what is not. His 
performance, in terms of a failed masquerade, unveils certain ‘truths’ 
about how masculinity is understood. Al-Limbi, as the anti-hero who 
nobody would willingly or knowingly aspire to, portrays that opposite 
of masculinity, hinting at what a ‘true’ masculine performance then 
should be: providing for his family, educated in order to aspire a 
higher standard of living, and construct his own, independent, 
identity; an image with which the film ends. 
 
8.1.2 White Ibrahim: the baltagi enters Egyptian cinemas 
The second film under discussion is Ibrahim al-Abyad/White Ibrahim 
(Marwan Hamid 2009) by the same director from the international hit 
‘Imarat Ya‘qubiyan/The Yaqoubian Building from 2006, which was also his 
debut as a filmmaker. He grew up in a cinematic milieu as the son of 
scriptwriter Wahid Hamid, known for many socially and politically 
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critical films, such as ‘Atif al-Tayyib’s Malaff Fi al-Adab/File in Vice 
(1985) and al-Bariʼ/The Innocent (1986), and Yusri Nasrallah’s Tell Me a 
Story, Shahrazad (2009). He has furthermore written the scenario for his 
son’s film The Yaqoubian Building. Marwan Hamid is also one of the 
participating directors of the controversial post-2011 film 18 Yom/18 
Days (2011). The film remains controversial because it has not yet been 
screened for the public in Egypt, apart from its participation in the 
Ismailiyya International Short Film Festival and a screening at the 
French Institute in Cairo. Furthermore, two of the directors of the film 
(Marwan Hamid and Sharif ‘Arafa) had also made the campaign video 
for deposed president Husni Mubarak in 2005 and a pre-election 
interview with Mubarak, respectively, resulting in strong criticism 
from the Tahrir-square protestors for these directors’ participation in 
a post-2011 ‘revolutionary film’. Director Muhammad Khan has also 
publically criticized the participation of these two directors in the 
making of 18 Days because of their support for the former regime.13 
Marwan Hamid’s The Yaqoubian Building was also controversial, 
among other things because of the inclusion of a gay character in the 
film and numerous suggestive scenes of male intimacy. Another 
controversial scene in The Yaqoubian Building is when the abused Taha – 
now turned into a ‘terrorist’ – shoots and kills the officer who had 
ordered his rape when he was in prison. Yet, the film ends in a 
condescending tone, when actor ‘Adil Imam’s character tells his young 
bride that “we should forget all the humiliations, if not we’ll explode 
from grief”. Consistent with his other films, also White Ibrahim stirred 
some controversy. The film’s plot is loosely based on a real-life figure 
with the same nickname, White Ibrahim, which did result in a backlash 
from the man’s family. They demanded 5 million Egyptian pounds 
from the film’s producers for the emotional and material damage they 
suffered, and to stop screening the film immediately.14 The film crew’s 
                                                   
13 From http://www.elcinema.com/news/nw678921610/ (acc. September 19, 
2014). 
14 Several blogs reported this story, although none of the major newspapers 
picked it up. One 2012 article of al-Ahram reported that the court had refused 
the family’s plea (al-‘Izab 2012, from 
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/254570.aspx accessed 16.06.2014). Other 
blogs and websites reported in 2009 the story of the so-called ‘real’ White 
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counterclaim was that it was only fiction with a nominal reference to 
the actual ‘White Ibrahim’. In any case, the controversy – together wth 
star actor Ahmad al-Saqqa’s performance – led to a box office success 
for this technically very good film. 
The actor playing the part of Ibrahim is Ahmad al-Saqqa (1973-), 
famous for his roles in action films like Mafiya/Mafia (Sharif ‘Arafa 
2002), Harb Italiyya/War in Italy (Ahmad Salih 2005) and al-Jazira/The 
Island (Sharif ‘Arafa 2007). His fans laud him for personally performing 
all the stunts in his films, without the use of stuntmen. But the actor’s 
paternalism is also one of the features that seem to be part of his 
popularity. His action-film star persona regularly associates him with 
violent characters, whether criminals, policemen or bodyguards, 
although the films are usually replete with a romantic storyline as well 
(see also part 2 of this chapter for an example of the actor’s stern 
paternalist attitude towards women, veiled by true love and sacrifice). 
The explosive action-film genre with fast-paced camera movements 
and cuts – a new experience for Egyptian cinema – is replete with 
masculine men, using force and muscles. The actor – not entirely an 
ideal Spartan – is nevertheless muscular and fit for Egyptian actors’ 
standards. The actor’s muscular physicality, combined with the action-
films’ inclusion of romantic storylines, posits him as the ‘natural’ 
protector of women and the weak in society, a complete opposite to 
Muhammad Sa‘d’s petty-criminal al-Limbi character. 
Not only al-Saqqa’s muscularity turns him into a patriarchal figure 
on screen, more important is his characters’ bourgeois propriety. In 
the 2006 film ‘An al-‘Ishq wa-ʼl-Hawa/About Love and Passion (Kamla Abu 
Dhikri), for example, he plays the role of a man who is forced to leave 
his long-time girlfriend after his brother finds out that her sister is a 
prostitute. Propriety and social constrictions do not allow him to 
marry a girl with such family. Nevertheless, the female director stays 
wary of stereotypical depictions of the prostitute (who will eventually 
marry one of her former clients) as well as al-Saqqa’s character, who is 
devastated by this decision. But the director also portrays the man’s 
                                                                                                                   
Ibrahim (called thus because of his clean police record and his use of ‘white 
weapons’, i.e. knives), who was a resident of one of the ‘ashwāʼiyyāt, but who 
had educated siblings as opposed to the film’s story that he was a single child. 
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inability to overcome propriety, without, however, judging any of the 
characters. 
A telling image from White Ibrahim in terms of the changed gender 
relations in Egypt is at the end of the film. Ibrahim – after a long and 
bloody battle with his opponents, being cut and suffering from severe 
burn wounds all over his body – is framed picking up his shot 
girlfriend. This stands in stark contrast with Farid Shawqi’s muscular 
star persona and his performance in Salah Abu Sayf’s The Tough Guy 
who is supported by his wife after the enduring fight scene at the end 
of that film. In the next part of the chapter and the discussion on the 
film Taymur wa-Shafiqa/Taymur and Shafika (Ahmad Mar‘i 2007), the 
actor’s masculine performance visualizes this distinct change in 
representations of gender relations more prominently. But let me first 
take a look at the specific performance of the baltagi in White Ibrahim. 
With a film like White Ibrahim – and with an action actor like Ahmad 
al-Saqqa – the baltagi had forcefully and prominently taken his place in 
Egyptian cinema. Ahmad al-Saqqa, and other actors before him, had 
played roles of thugs and criminals, but this film focused on the local 
criminal: the one from the urban informal dwellings. Whereas the 
threat to the nation came from terrorists residing in these informal 
settlements, as for example in the film Hina Maysara/Till Things Get 
Better (Khalid Yusif 2007), the new threat comes from the young and 
unemployed male who is denounced as baltagi in order to stigmatize 
him, criminalize his activity and facilitate violent oppression of these 
young men. 
The film’s plot is intertwined with flashbacks and memories from 
the main character, Ibrahim, in order to ‘explain’ the character’s 
growing up into the criminal male he is today. The opening scene is 
the murder of Ibrahim’s father when Ibrahim himself was still a child. 
He witnessed the murder at the hand of the ma‘allim of the 
neighborhood together with his wife, who gave the final blow, and one 
of his baltagiyya. The film is fatalistic in the sense that it assumes a 
straightforward cause and effect development, explaining the reasons 
behind Ibrahim’s present-day balṭaga. Ibrahim is immediately placed in 
aggressive surroundings, linked to poverty and ignorance. 
Furthermore, he needs to care for his sick mother after his father died, 
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requiring him to start working from a young age. In another flashback 
he is shown being abused by the baker, who had discovered the young 
Ibrahim sleeping next to his daughter, after which Ibrahim took a 
knife and stabbed the man. The boy’s fall into criminality is 
condescendingly depicted as a logical effect of his background, teasing 
with the audience’s sympathy for this otherwise criminal character. 
Although Ibrahim is surrounded by violence and criminality, the 
place he inhabits, the ḥāra, is coded as female. Samia Mehrez (2008: 
144-67) notes in her study Egypt’s Culture Wars the parallels between 
the ḥāra and the nation. Unlike the historical ḥāra that Nagib Mahfuz 
wrote about, or that was the décor for films of the 50s, 60s and again in 
the 80s, the ḥāra now, such as the one in White Ibrahim, is not the neat 
historical area of those earlier films, but the decrepit, lower class 
dwellings, awash with unemployment, poverty, drug abuse and 
criminality. But, similar to the historical ḥāra, the new areas are also a 
tightly knit-together social structure that functions to protect its own, 
almost like an extended family. However, within the film, we should 
ask the question of whose ḥāra it is, and what is Ibrahim’s role in it? 
The film takes great care in the portrayal of its action scenes, shot 
in one of the neighborhoods south of the Cairo citadel, al-Abagiyya. At 
the start of the film, the neighborhood is mentioned by name, and the 
outdoor scenes indicate the approximate location. Ibrahim is only one 
of many criminals dealing drugs in the neighborhood, but as the film’s 
hero his story is singled out. His role in this area is defined by his 
criminal activity; his masculine identity defined by him taking what he 
believes is his right, by force if necessary. His masculinity is also 
defined by a defunct understanding of a work ethic. Where work 
defined a masculine identity in earlier films, and particularly those 
films depicting men in crisis in chapter 7, work in this film is but a 
necessity in order to survive. The men in the film, as well as other 
films placed within the ‘ashwāʼiyyāt, no longer take any pride in their 
work. Partly this is because of the nature of the job they perform (in 
this film, dealing drugs; in other films it can be small jobs here and 
there but nothing substantial); partly it is because of the absence of a 
positive outlook on the future, linked to the nature of those métiers. 
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There is an additional element of his masculine performance 
emphasized in the film’s plot, namely Ibrahim’s friendship with ‘Ashri 
(‘Amr Wakid).15 The film starts with the lifelong friendship between 
the two men, who have always worked together and helped each other, 
and dramatically ends with the murder of ‘Ashri. The first part of the 
film focuses on the two men’s relationship, as if it were a buddy-film, 
alongside a short-lived romance between Ibrahim and Hurriyya, after 
which Ibrahim moves out of the picture during his time in prison. The 
plot then moves to Hurriyya’s story and her personal struggle to 
reconcile her love for Ibrahim with the knowledge that he killed her 
father avenging his own father’s death. The last part of the film when 
Ibrahim has left prison refocuses on his relationship with ‘Ashri, the 
friend who betrayed him and will be killed in front of him. His lifelong 
friend – and the ultimate trust he has continued to put in him – is an 
essential part of his masculine identity: for him it is inconceivable that 
his best friend would ever betray him, and he thus places all his trust 
in the man. 
Physically, the body of the baltagi and of the star actor Ahmad al-
Saqqa plays a central role in the film.  The final part of the film is so 
dramatic, bloody and violent that it reminds of the Passion story, 
glorifying the ‘fit’ male’s body – Ibrahim’s body – that is able to 
withstand all these violations. Ibrahim uses his body on more than one 
occasion, which the camera frames as the masculine, virile and 
muscular male. It is the only site he controls himself and it is the basis 
for his masculine identity. Yet, although Ibrahim’s masculinity is a 
violent one centered on his physique, he is also depicted as a man with 
principles, although questionable. He will stick by the girl he loved, 
even when she marries his archrival, and he also mourns his best 
friend, although the latter betrayed him. He thus possesses 
characteristics of the futuwwa like gad‘ana (integrity), shahāma 
(gallantry), and shagā‘a (courage), as well as the physical strength 
                                                   
15 ‘Amr Wakid (1973-) garnered international fame with his performances in 
the US film Syriana (Stephen Gaghan 2005) and the UK film Salmon Fishing in 
the Yemen (Lasse Hallström 2012). But he has also acted in many critically 
acclaimed films in Egypt, such as Gannit al-Shayatin/Fallen Angels’ Paradise 
(Usama Fawzi 1999), Ahla al-Awqat/The Best of Times (Hala Khalil 2004) and 
Ginent al-Asmak/Fish Garden (Yusri Nasrallah 2008). 
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needed to carve out a path for himself in that relentless society. It is 
not only him. All the other men in the film are tough and ‘courageous’ 
in the sense that they do not shy away from a fight or fear police 
beatings. One scene inside the police station is extremely explicit in 
this regard. One of the arrested men, after being beaten by the officers, 
cuts his testicles with a razor blade causing a huge stir. These are 
marginalized men, who feel they are already emasculated anyway and 
who wonder how they – as men – could still perform, hence the 
symbolic castration scene.16 
 
To answer the question of whose ḥāra it is, I would like to point out 
in the first place the director Marwan Hamid’s controversial history 
and links to the former regime. The son of a famous screenwriter who 
has written some controversial films himself in the previous decades, 
the filmmaker seems to be strongly influenced by the middle class 
angst of the so-called ‘fat cats myth’. The criminal character that 
Ahmad al-Saqqa embodies is idealized, its muscularity and recourse to 
violence naturalized. This stands in stark contrast to Muhammad 
Sa‘d’s characters, who, although whole-heartedly enjoyed by the 
audiences, is not exactly the ideal type of man to look up to. While the 
ḥāra in Sa‘d’s films is equally a place of misery and selfishness as in 
White Ibrahim, it is different because of its lack of realism, its 
theatricality and its obvious set-design. The reality in White Ibrahim, 
although equally surreal in the imaginary of the film, has more direct 
effects on how we perceive popular, lower class neighborhoods 
precisely because of its claim of a realistic portrayal. But it is exactly 
that, a portrayal within the film’s perception of reality, from the point 
of view of the filmmakers, conveying messages of gender and class. 
Within the wider discussion on balṭaga, particularly with the recent 
qānūn al-balṭaga, White Ibrahim contributes to a narrowed-down 
discourse on this so-called phenomenon. Simultaneously, its narrow 
scope on the reasons behind its ‘emergence’ puts the blame squarely 
                                                   
16  The ‘castration scene’ can also be read in a more conservative way, namely 
that the police have to go through great lengths and difficulties in order to 
keep law and order in the country when dealing with those criminals. The 
latter are portrayed as being capable of doing anything (i.e. castrate 
themselves) in order to blemish the police’s honorable reputation. 
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within the lower class neighborhoods, those ‘informal’ hotbeds of 
danger and fanaticism. Al-Limbi is less direct in its criticism of lower 
classes, but eventually also represents the ideal of progress and 
climbing the social ladder, while infantilizing lower class areas. Both 
films were immensely popular for their own specific reasons, White 
Ibrahim because of its action scenes and al-Saqqa’s appeal to young 
men and women alike, al-Limbi because of its initially innovative 
humor poking fun of Egypt’s and the Arab world’s bourgeois art scene. 
Referring back to Fayruz Karawya’s argument on the binary way of 
representing popular neighborhoods, either as jokes or as places of 
misery, the result is a juxtaposition of the neighborhoods to the 
presumed ‘organized’ (which area in Cairo does not show a certain 
degree of chaos these days?) middle class areas. The gaze is not 
directed towards women in these films, but towards the passive lower 
class male. No matter how ‘active’ he appears to be in action- or dance 
scenes, the lack of control over his life and his failing adherence to 
ideals of providing and protecting, places him in an object-position 
rather than a subject-position, whose body is the site on which the 
films’ politics of class and gender play out. 
 
8.2 The ‘New’ Man 
 
A completely different form of masculinity is visible in films that 
portray (upper-) middle and upper-class men. These are the ‘New 
Men’, men who have money to spend and who are young, trendy and 
successful professionals. They live in a totally different age of free 
encounters with women because of the latter’s increased mobility and 
visibility through mobile phones, the internet and venturing outside 
the home as students and professionals. These ‘new men’ are able to 
cope (financially or otherwise) with the new social context they and 
others around them find themselves in. I have talked at length about 
the traits deemed necessary to construct a masculine identity based on 
providing, protecting, and procreating; all are very important factors 
in Egyptian cinema. The films under discussion here represent men 
who have no financial or political worries to consider and could thus, 
theoretically, live up to this ideal. The question that we could ask 
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ourselves here is, do they? And to what extent, with what effects and 
how do they construct their masculine identities? 
These films are a result of the developments in Arab cinemas in the 
late nineties, early 2000s, developments that are called New Arab 
Cinema (Khoury 2005). Within this cinematic renewal a new discourse 
arose on sexuality and gender identities. Khoury talked mainly about 
pioneer films, however, while I will consider in the first place those 
films that are derived from the initial developments within this New 
Arab Cinema discourse. My focus lies on what happens next. Thus, apart 
from a new and different discourse on gender with perhaps slightly 
more diversity, do the films discussed here also question the 
assumption of a masculine norm and do they challenge men’s 
hegemony? We have seen in previous chapters that cinematic (anti-
)heroes can question patriarchal norms and traditions, but finally they 
continue to resort to one form or another of male hegemony. As such, 
masculine identities have so far remained untouched and have been 
taken for granted. 
The decade in which the films take place are one in which the 
mobile phone and internet have seen an incredible rise in popularity 
across classes. Men and women now enjoy more flexibility to stay in 
contact through these means of communication, bypassing the gender 
divide. Together with the increased presence of women in society 
since the 1960s’ active gender policies by ‘Abd al-Nasir (Hatem 1992, 
Bier 2011) and continued by al-Sadat in the 70s, women have not only 
flooded universities, but also the workspace. With increasing money to 
spend, women are now also in the position to demand more and go out 
more. The question is how the film industry deals with this increased 
female presence in the public sphere and what roles it constitutes for 
both men and women. 
The films considered here show diverse masculinities, though not 
comparable to the ones in the movies discussed in the first part. An 
important film exploring this new discourse on gender and identity is 
the 2003 film Long Nights (Hani Khalifa).17 This film’s scenarist, Tamir 
                                                   
17 The film’s plot revolves around four upper-middle class couples who have 
no financial, social or political problems to worry about, and asks what this 
carefree existence will do to their relationships. 
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Habib, has also written the scenario for the first film that will be 
discussed in this part of the chapter, Taymur and Shafika, with the 
popular (action film) actor Ahmad al-Saqqa. This time al-Saqqa plays 
the role of a police officer working as a private bodyguard for high-
ranking officials. His character has rather conservative ideas about 
male-female relations in this film. He considers himself and acts like 
“Sī Sayyid” or “alpha-male” (literally Mister Man and an epithet for a 
controlling patriarch). His star persona’s paternalism is here made 
more explicit. 
The second film, Nur ‘Eni/Light of my Eyes (Waʼil Ihsan 2010), is with 
the popular singer and actor Tamer Hosny. He embodies perhaps the 
most recognizable form of paternalist masculinity and his fans have 
made an unofficial website called ‘Tamer Academy’, as if wanting to 
‘learn’ to be just like their star. In Light of My Eyes he plays the role of a 
rich kid whose parents have passed away and now has to take care of 
his brother and for some reason also of his best friend. His star 
persona is also a romantic type; one of his first films is called Sayyid al-
‘Atifi/Emotional Sayyid (‘Ali Ragab 2005), but simultaneously shows off 
his masculine features such as his hairy chest, muscles and over-
protective nature, embodying simultaneously an old and new 
masculinity (Milestone and Meyer 2012: 114). In his own way, the actor 
portrays the new man, in the way that the new man discourse 
ironically reinstates male domination. We have seen that the 
masculinities of the 70s, for example, were able to adapt themselves to 
a new, ‘soft’, materialist society, in order to impose themselves as the 
dominant male, commodifying also women. The growing Western 
materialism in the first decade of the 2000s was also appropriated by 
men, taking care of their looks, entertaining friendships with women, 
yet continuing to position themselves in dominant subject-positions 
through their controlling paternalism. 
 
8.2.1 Taymur, the alpha-male 
A film that explicitly portrays gender relations is Khalid Mar‘i’s 2007 
film Taymur and Shafika. Khalid Mar‘i (1970-), started his filmmaking 
career as an editor, having studied montage at the Higher Cinema 
Institute in Giza. He has edited critically acclaimed films like Gannit al-
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Shayatin/Fallen Angels’ Paradise (Usama Fawzi 1999), Long Nights (see 
above), Bahibb al-Sima/I Love Cinema (Usama Fawzi 2004) and the film 
discussed earlier in this chapter, White Ibrahim. Taymur and Shafika is 
his debut as a director, after which he directed other popular comedies 
with star actor Ahmad Hilmi, for example the films Asif ‘Ala al-
Iz‘ag/Sorry For Disturbing (2008), Bulbul Hayran/Perplexed Bulbul (2010), 
and ‘Asal Iswid/Molasses (2010). 
The second half of the first decade of the new millennium seems 
like a decay of gender relations into a patriarchal and heteronormative 
abyss compared to the new and promising discourses on sexuality and 
gender that emerged in the handful of exceptional films defined as 
part of New Arab Cinema in the 90s and early 2000s. The main character 
in Taymur and Shafika, Taymur (Ahmad al-Saqqa), is extremely 
masculine and muscular for an essentially romantic comedy, somehow 
mocking the actor’s ambiguous presence. However, that same genre is 
abused to continuously ridicule his female protagonist’s achievements. 
His neighbor Shafika (Muna Zaki) is a very bright student who soon 
finishes her doctoral dissertation. She is even appointed as the new 
minister of the environment (without elections, it is worth noting). 
Early in the film, the two children are already conspicuously 
gendered. Taymur is very protective and plays with miniature guns, 
while Shafika is fragile and plays with dolls. Both Taymur and Shafika 
lose their fathers early on when they are still children, leaving Taymur 
as the only male in the extended family that the two neighboring flats 
form. Through a voice-over we hear the grown-up Taymur talking 
about the responsibility he had to take on as a boy who unwillingly and 
prematurely was turned into a man. Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1994) critique 
of her own assumptions vis-à-vis Middle Eastern men are here actually 
played out and posited as the ideal. The only available role for the 
young boy is to become a patriarch. Shafika on the other hand has 
never really turned into a woman and is continuously ridiculed and 
infantilized – even when she becomes a minister. To become a woman, 
it is clearly not enough to achieve professionally; her womanhood is 




Taymur and Shafika is not only a comedy; it is also a romance and an 
action movie. This mixture of genres brings the two oppositional 
characters together and again emphasizes the film’s gendered 
narrative. The action scenes at the end of the movie portray Taymur as 
the active male rescuing his beloved, while she is passively waiting to 
be rescued. To be able to aptly perform his muscularity, Taymur needs 
to distance himself from his female surroundings, studying in a 
masculine academy (the police academy). Shafika, on the other hand, 
studies in a ‘khawāgāt’18 university, downplaying the space she inhabits 
from the start. He also performs a masculine job, as a bodyguard and 
police officer. Yvonne Tasker argues that action films privilege “sites 
for the performance of masculinity” (Tasker 2002: 236). In Taymur and 
Shafika, the hero has little freedom of movement to perform his 
masculinity in such feminized spaces, being confined to his family’s 
flat, or the elaborate offices and luxurious cars of officials he is 
required to safeguard. Just like the ḥāra was a feminized space 
requiring protection in earlier futuwwa- and other films, the flats and 
the building in which both protagonists live are feminized spaces, 
specifically after the death of their fathers. 
In a way this compromises the main character’s hard-bodied 
masculinity which in turn becomes more visible in those surroundings, 
pointing at the efforts that went into achieving it, rather than 
presenting it as a natural part of men’s bodies. This is similar to the 
earlier futuwwa character, which has shown that this specific (and 
idealized) masculine type – in terms of muscles, power and control – is 
only available for the ‘best of men’. There are numerous scenes of 
Taymur’s bedroom, with pictures of him in his own ‘sites for the 
performance of masculinity’, for example his graduation from the 
police academy, or him riding a horse, as well as his dumbbells on the 
                                                   
18 Taymur calls her university a ‘khawāgāt’ university, referring to its 
international status (such as the British University, the German University, or 
the most famous, the American University in Cairo). The use of the term is 
pejoratively, and dates back to the presence of Greeks in Egypt in the early 
20th century, who were also referred to as khawāgāt, (Christian) foreigners. To 
this date, in lower and working class areas the word is occasionally (and 




floor and weapons displayed on the wall. The film also provides ample 
opportunities for Taymur to exhibit his strength in one action scene 
after another. A notable distinction between the action-hero Taymur 
and his female surroundings is that both Taymur’s and Shafika’s 
mothers are constantly seen eating and drinking coffee together, often 
accompanied by Shafika. Taymur – as the active male – has no time for 
such trivialities as food; it is only a bodily necessity for him, not a 
social event. The film’s portrayal of gender differences is, perhaps, 
sarcastic in the way that they are exaggerated to the point of ridicule. 
It is difficult not to laugh at the two preoccupied, almost caricatural 
mothers and the two young people who try to break free from their 
respective mothers’ care. 
The film’s plot reminds of a classic Egyptian comedy, Mirati Mudir 
‘Amm/My Wife, the General Manager (Fatin ‘Abd al-Wahhab 1966). In both 
films the woman has achieved a higher social and professional status 
than her love/husband. As we have seen, the 1960s were a totally 
different era that proposed ideas of working women, building the 
nation and a social organization of society – albeit through state 
paternalism. Further, the films of that period were characterized by 
images of social progress. Taymur and Shafika is made in a different 
time, when the codes of modernity are applied in a different manner, 
circumventing official rhetoric and questioning a bourgeois ideology’s 
claims for modernity – without, however, questioning the ultimate 
goal of social progress, or questioning heteronormativity. It is also 
made in different social settings, in a time when women going out for 
work are now considered a threat to a reactionary, traditionalist and 
even violent form of masculinity, as embodied by Taymur. There is no 
sense of equality between the two and Sī Sayyid Taymur wants Shafika 
to resign and stay at home after the wedding as per the example of his 
and her mothers who are both never seen leaving the building. He is 
not simply controlling, he does so ‘sympathetically’ and ‘naturally’ as 
the protective male. The film measures Taymur’s love for Shafika 
through his protectiveness and jealousy, and measures Shafika’s love 
by her obedience to Taymur’s demands. A good example is at the start 
of the film, when Taymur picks up Shafika from university. Jealous 
because she was seen leaving the building with her friends – among 
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them a boy, equally muscular as Taymur – Taymur scolds her. Shafika 
is thus immediately forced to defend her behavior which she continues 
to do throughout the film. 
Even if we consider for a second the film’s ‘novel’ ideas of working 
and ‘freely’ moving women – Shafika actually never moves freely, not 
even as a minister since Taymur is appointed as her bodyguard – and 
the sometimes over-zealous protectionism of Taymur to the point of 
laughter, the plot and mise-en-scène of the film betray its underlying 
rigid gender order. As already mentioned above, Taymur from an early 
age plays with guns and other masculine objects, while Shafika plays 
with dolls. He is the action-hero using his muscles first and foremost; 
she is the smart nerd who uses her brain. He is respected in his job and 
regularly promoted and recognized for his services, while she – even 
when promoted to become a minister – is reminded by everyone 
around her that she is still “so young and such a pretty woman”. 
Although at her job nobody reminds her that she is ‘just’ a woman, the 
constant references to her beauty in the first place and her 
professional skills second, can only be understood in terms of 
Taymur’s and her (male) superiors’ sexism towards Shafika as a 
woman. Only in the end when Taymur barely survives an exploding 
bomb (he jumpes aside a mere second before the explosion) does 
Shafika ‘finally’ realize how far he is prepared to go, and how much he 
loves her. Thus she resigns from her ministerial post – as Taymur 
demanded – and agrees to marry him. 
Taymur’s muscularity fits within what Richard Dyer called “the 
white man’s muscles” (Dyer 2002a: 262-73), except that the white man 
has now been replaced with a (whitish) Cairene upper-middle class 
male. The muscularity of white men proved their superiority in 
popular art, and, although in Egyptian cinema and particularly this 
film, the concept of race is perhaps not the main feature, Taymur 
portrays the upper-middle class (and police officials’) superiority 
through his trained and toned body. The images of fit men stem from a 
colonial past (Jacob 2011) and we have seen throughout this research 
that muscular masculine bodies have continued to play a prominent 
role in Egyptian films. Occasionally ridiculed or questioned for their 
abusive traditionalism (such as the ma‘allim in the 50s and 60s), the 
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ultimate ideal was still a fit, muscular man, but also an educated man. 
From this long history of muscular, protective men represented in 
Egyptian cinema, Taymur derives only just that: the paternalism he 
associates with men’s presumed superior position in the family and in 
society because of men’s ‘natural’ inclination towards being protective 
and their life experiences as a reason for protecting the naïve, 
unwitting women. 
 
8.2.2 Light of My Eyes: an Egyptian buddy film 
The director of the film Light of My Eyes (2010) is Waʼil Ihsan, the same 
director who made the film al-Limbi which was discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Muhammad Sa‘d’s performance appeared ambiguous, 
performing a lower class character that is non-masculine in his 
inability to convince the viewer of his external, corporal image as a 
man. Yet, at the same time his character is sympathetic and does his 
best to uphold a set of values and principles, such as the respect for his 
domineering mother, and his willingness to do whatever his fiancée 
requires of him. The main actor in Waʼil Ihsan’s film Light Of My Eyes is 
played by a very different actor, Tamer Hosny (1977-), nicknamed Nigm 
al-Gīl (‘Star of the Generation’). His nickname seems to suggest the 
actor’s great influence and popularity among youngsters across the 
Arab world. Tamer Hosny is not only the main actor in the film, he is 
also the film’s scriptwriter. But Hosny is in the first place a singer, 
famous and loved from the Arab Maghreb to the Gulf and his movies 
are primarily vehicles for the popular singer’s star persona. 
Tamer Hosny lost, however, a great deal of his followers after the 
protests of 2011. He was one of the artists who initially did not support 
the uprising against Husni Mubarak, but somehow thought that a 
public appearance in Tahrir square – the epicenter of the popular 
uprising – would be a good idea. Instead, he was booed and yelled at; 
the army even had to interfere to safely remove the singer from the 
crowds in the square. Later that day, he appeared in a YouTube video, 
crying about what had happened – to the entertainment of some of the 
protestors. His statements in which he urged the protestors to go 
home, fit his paternalist masculinity that is similar to the regime’s 
paternalism. As such, the protestors were not amused with his remarks 
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and refused to give him a platform for his public persona in Tahrir 
square. One of the main reasons for the protests was a refusal of the 
regime’s ideology and its paternalist denigration of the marginalized 
and subjugated men and women in Egypt. It was a refusal of Mubarak’s 
fatherly figure, or the ‘daddy state’ as Swedenburg (2007: 5) called it, 
and a demand for self-development and self-rule. 
The singer’s nickname may also refer to his online star persona. He 
lives his life online for his fans, announcing his marriage through his 
own YouTube channel, the birth of his daughter and congratulating his 
wife on becoming a mother through social networking sites. But the 
couple’s online life also resulted in a backlash, with rumors spreading 
about their divorce, or the rumor that his wife was married before him 
to another young singer, the Jordanian Yahya Suays. The latter, 
however, denied any relationship with Basma Bousil, claiming the 
reports were falsified. Hosny, from his part, did not involve himself in 
the treadmill of rumors, and instead continued his tour around the 
Arab world. Aside from the rumors, his online life and the pictures 
that appear, make the actor and singer simultaneously an ordinary 
young Egyptian, although his high number of followers and fans turn 
him also into a star, that special, yet ordinary someone who appeals to 
a large number of a generation of Egyptian and Arab youngsters. 
In Light of My Eyes Tamer Hosny plays the character Nur/Ahmad.19 
He takes on the role of a modern, hip and cool youngster. Initially he 
does not act like an all-controlling Sī Sayyid,20 yet the film is a 
                                                   
19 Nur (in the original title) is also a (unisex) name, which Ahmad had taken 
on after meeting a blind girl. He chose the name Nur because it also has the 
connotation in Arabic of someone very dear to you. At the same time it refers 
to the actual light in the eyes of the blind girl after an operation that restored 
her vision and she unknowingly meets Ahmad for the ‘first’ time. 
20 Tamer Hosny has recently made the song Si Al Sayed, a duet with the 
American rapper Snoop Dogg, in which he explains his vision on man’s 
control of the household. According to the song, and affirmed by Snoop Dogg, 
he decides what happens and his word is final. If it were not for the video 
clip’s stereotypical depiction of a loud, domineering wife, the song’s lyrics 
might as well be understood as a joke of extremely controlling male 
behaviour. Instead, it is more likely a ‘lesson’ he teaches his unexperienced 
wife in the clip about the facts of married life and the differences between 
men and women. 
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conservative display of patriarchal norms. In a similar line as Taymur, 
Nur/Ahmad also often resorts to violence veiled by his protective 
nature in order to assert his masculine identity. He takes on the role of 
father figure within his own family (after his parents had died); at a 
certain point violently scolding his younger brother for the latter’s 
drug abuse. Also similar to Taymur is that both men are capable of 
having a ‘modern’, ‘Western’ relationship with their girlfriends 
without portraying them as ‘loose women’: it remains within the 
confines of proper conduct. Particularly this last element creates the 
impression that the film depicts relationships in a novel way and that 
both men and women – in the setting of a romantic comedy – are 
capable of loving and respecting each other as (unequal) equals. But 
this impression rather quickly crumbles and gives way to a male-
dominated narrative and a conservative display of patriarchal values. 
Although the film’s poster with actors Tamer Hosny and Minna 
Shalabi would have one think otherwise, the film’s narrative is entirely 
centered on the main (male) character, Nur/Ahmad, and his best 
friend, Tariq (‘Amr Yusif). The opening sequence establishes the 
relationship between the two boys, playing football when they were 
still in elementary school. Ahmad protects his friend, and beats up the 
bullies that annoy him, shouting “nobody touches Tariq!” The 
romance with the blind girl (Minna Shalaby) is only a diversion from 
Husni’s character’s main interest, his best friend; her main part in the 
film is to antagonize the two friends. Ahmad’s protective instincts 
towards Tariq extend to adulthood, for example when he saves Tariq’s 
life at the end of the film, resulting in a very emotional plot twist. 
In her account on interracial buddy films in Hollywood cinema, 
Jennifer Gillan (2001: 47) argues that one of the goals of these films is 
to put forward one stable and heterosexual masculine identity, divided 
over two star actors. These films then emphasize the companionship 
between a black and white male, downplaying racial differences both 
in the film and in society. While Light of My Eyes is not a bi-racial film, 
some of Gillan’s points about the buddy film apply to this film too. 
Both men are young, middle class, educated and – it is assumed – 
heterosexual males, with little or no difference except for their 
personality which is constructed as complementary. As such, the 
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concept of a ‘buddy film’ is here understood as a film about two best 
friends – one supporting the other – and a woman who is exchanged 
between the two men, whose role is limited to problematizing a status 
quo. This ‘buddy-aspect’ of the film allows for the male protagonists to 
enter the ‘female-oriented’ genre of a romantic comedy without fear 
for homoeroticism. Homosocial bonding is clear, but not 
problematized because of the fact that the two main characters – in 
this case Nur/Ahmad and Tariq – together form a unified masculine 
identity. 
The ‘buddy-aspect’ is applicable, in fact, to most of the films I 
discussed in this chapter. They all have a similar hierarchy of 
characters, where the main male (anti-)hero is supported by another 
male character with strong homosocial bonding.21 For Ahmad in Light 
of My Eyes, his friendship with Tariq is more important than anything 
in the world. Thus, he saves Tariq at the end and exposes himself to a 
life threatening situation in a fight, taking the knife that was intended 
for his friend. This dramatic turn of events eventually leads to the two 
friends reuniting and reaffirming the male bond needed to construct 
their unified identity, though this time together with the girl as well. 
The inclusion of the girl is here to be understood as an affirmation of 
their heterosexual identities, leaving in the middle which one she will 
choose. Her presence is similar to what Robin Wood called a 
homophobic disclaimer (1986: 229), to safely presume the men’s 
heterosexuality and to be sure about who is exactly whose “light of my 
eyes”. 
Ahmad’s masculinity is furthermore constructed through sites of 
masculine performance (Tasker 2002), for example when the camera 
                                                   
21 Buddy films are common and one of those films is al-Sa‘alik/The Vagabonds. 
There are two Vagabond films, one from 1968, and the other from 1985. In the 
1968 film (Yusif Ma‘luf) two men hunt down rich women to enjoy themselves 
and have them pay their bills. The 1985 film (Dawud ‘Abd al-Sayyid) relates to 
economic changes in Egypt, focusing on two best friends – one betrays the 
other– who are poor and downtrodden, but will become part of the country’s 
richest, once they start dealing drugs and become ‘proper’ businessmen. Also 
earlier in this chapter, White Ibrahim showcases certain aspects of a buddy film 
highlighting the lifelong friendship between the two protagonists – with a 




zooms in on his skills and agility in football, or the character’s interest 
in cars. This aspect corresponds to the star’s real-life images of him 
with expensive cars, or flexing his muscles in the gym, as an extension 
of his masculine identity and star persona. Through these sites, he is 
able to perform his masculinity uncontested. One of the major aspects 
of his masculine identity is his recourse to violence, even versus his 
domestic servant. At one point in the film Ahmad and Tuna (the 
nickname of his servant, meaning tuna fish) ‘jokingly’ slap each other, 
culminating in Ahmad hitting her in her face with his fist. When 
moments later his brother wants to slap Tuna, he scolds him, saying 
“we’ve always treated her as our sister, not our servant”. As the elder 
brother, he has the privilege of violence. But worse is the way the film 
ridicules the daily domestic violence in Egyptian homes against 
servants, who are subjected to harassment and abuse with no recourse 
to the law. Ahmad’s statement shows that it would be ‘okay’ to hit a 
servant, but only when a certain ‘righteous’ authority (just like him) 
were to commit the violence. Ahmad’s masculine performance is 
portrayed as an ideal masculinity, wise in his judgment, correct in his 
treatment of those ‘subjugated’ to the fatherly role he has taken upon 
himself. His decision making is furthermore not questioned; rather, 




In Masculinities and Culture, John Beynon (2002) discerns four themes in 
the representations of new millennium men: ‘new man’ versus ‘old 
man’, men running wild, emasculated men, and men as victims and 
aggressors. His conclusion is that the outlook for masculinities is 
bleak. This is also true in an Egyptian context, if we were to believe the 
popular box office hits produced by al-Subki, with the baltagi character 
featuring in the main role. They claim to have knowledge of lower 
class neighborhoods, their ‘Baltaxploitation’22 films situated within 
                                                   
22 I have chosen an explicit reference to the other ‘exploitation’-films, such as 
Blaxploitation, because of these films’ commercial exploitation of a presumed 
‘phenomenon’ in Egypt (balṭaga), while exploiting also the representation of 
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them. But their discourse is a reactionary one: the masculinity of these 
lower class men, although hindered by financial and professional 
disturbances, is dangerous and self-destructive. The portrayal of lower 
class men in the last decade is of young, unmarried and unemployed 
males who occasionally resort to drug abuse, violence and often 
criminal activities. The occasional exception to the new norm for 
lower class men is performed by Karim ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, for example in 
Abu ‘Ali (Ahmad Galal 2005) and Wahid Min al-Nas/One of the People 
(Ahmad Galal 2006). 
Yet, the criminal men can do this with the sympathy of the 
audience, and the only reason why is because they are men placed in a 
discourse of crisis. This crisis is portrayed as a social crisis, of living in 
cramped, unfit housing. The social crisis is exacerbated by the 
impression of having lost their initial male benefits in favor of women 
working outside the home, which results in an economic crisis as well. 
If they have no job, they will not be able to afford housing, nor the 
money to marry – like al-Limbi who was for thirteen years unable to 
get married to his fiancée. The crisis is also politicized. The young men 
are criminalized, demonized as either fundamentalists or misogynists 
in public discourse. Recently – and particularly since the summer of 
2013 – the designation ‘terrorist’ is also back in currency. 
Furthermore, the different films about or with baltagiyya have a 
conspicuous absence of a father figure, which – it is assumed – leads to 
criminal behavior. This creates the impression that these young men’s 
criminality needs to be controlled and repressed by the state that has 
taken over the ‘legitimate’ role of father. The stereotypical 
representations of these young unemployed lower class men result in 
their hypervisibility as men, and thus as problems, while their 
subversive power is portrayed as a threat that needs to be contained. 
Opposite this lower class male type we find an upper-middle class 
type that is portrayed as a hegemonic ideal. The ‘new men’ who belong 
to higher social classes are at first sight able to renegotiate gender 
relations and live trouble-free lives together with their partners. Yet, 
the films’ narratives do not question heteronormativity, the narratives 
                                                                                                                   
and the actual, lived experiences of lower class Egyptians specifically and 
people living in ‘ashwāʼiyyāt more generally. 
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centering on the male characters. Common elements in all these films 
are the buddies, the supportive male actors that accompany the stars, 
thus focusing more on inter-male relationships rather than male-
female relations. 
The continuing uncritical portrayal of men as the bastions of 
stability and righteousness, without considering the possibility that it 
is masculinity itself that needs a serious reconsideration of its basic 
tenets, namely its normativity, reinforces the impression that Egyptian 
society (and its filmic representation) is in dire need of a new strong 
figure. This ‘backlash’ to more conservative forms of masculinity does 
not come as a surprise, if we consider the developments that Egypt’s 
economy and society has undergone the last decades. One’s gender 
identity is described in terms of difference and in terms of what one is 
not. The revolutionary fervor of 2011 for a moment conveyed some 
hope for the renegotiation of gender relations and a possibility for the 
“end of masculinity” as we know it, but unfortunately it backlashed 
rather quickly and again society is divided not only along class lines, 








9. Female masculinities 
 
Throughout this study about representations of masculinities it has 
become clear that masculinity is not related to men alone, or indeed 
sometimes “has nothing to do with men whatsoever” (Sedgwick 1995, 
quoted in Noble 2004: ix). Gender is a historical social construct, 
although I do not wish to completely ignore biological markers. In 
order to put weight to the claim that masculinity is not men’s 
monopoly, this chapter explores constructions and performances of 
female masculinities as they are represented in Egyptian cinema. Apart 
from female masculinities, this chapter will also include a discussion 
on the contribution of women directors to the cinema industry. In the 
first part, I will consider several films that represent a ubiquitous type 
of female masculinity, namely the ma‘allima.1 A ma‘allima does not 
differ much from her male counterpart, the ma‘allim, in terms of 
behavior and character. The type is not only present in films; in real 
life, too, a ma‘allima exists. Just like the films, the denotation is often 
used for an uneducated and working-class woman, owner of a shop or 
coffeehouse, and in general within the neighborhood a woman with a 
relatively high economic standing and social regard as a self-employed 
woman.2 
She also exhibits several aspects of the bint al-balad (el-Messiri 
1978). These characteristics are not related to the ma‘allima’s outer 
looks and dress, however, since she might dress similar to her male 
counterpart, minus the mustache. She would be wearing a galabiyya 
(long dress worn by men and women), occasionally a talḥīfa (a scarf, 
worn over the shoulder, usually by men and particularly in the Ṣa‘īd), 
                                                   
1 The word ma‘allima is the feminine form of ma‘allim, the type that was 
discussed in chapter 5. 
2 It should be noted that the Prophet Muhammad’s first wife, Khadija, was 
also an independent and self-employed woman, at the head of a trading 
business, respected and revered as Umm al-Mu’minīn, Mother of the 
Believers. Islamic historiography remembers her as a wealthy and working 




and occasionally a traditional veil (the ṭarḥa rather than hijab) often 
worn by peasant women and easier to move around in since it is only 
wrapped around the top of the head and the hair. She can also carry a 
stick, the nabūt, which, we have seen earlier, is a male symbol of power 
and standing (see chapter 6). She differs from the bint al-balad in that 
she does not necessarily wear clothing that emphasize her female 
figure (el-Messiri 1978: 89), although the ma‘allima character of belly 
dancer Tahiyya Carioca does not hesitate to reveal her body’s 
contours. Nevertheless, the ma‘allima in general resembles the bint al-
balad more in terms of character because of their similar background 
and social setting. The adjectives to describe a ma‘allima or a bint al-
balad are similar to the ones used for the futuwwa, like for example 
shahma and gada‘a.3 
But the main goal of this chapter is not simply to describe one or 
more types of female masculinities, rather the goal is to question how 
the masculinity exhibited by women challenges or affirms gender 
norms. Halberstam (1998) coined the term female masculinity, 
questioning the continuous domination of the topic of (biological) men 
in men and masculinity studies. Female masculinity for Halberstam is 
more than only a woman showing masculine traits; rather, it breaks 
through the gender binary of men and women, masculine and 
feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, and separates men from 
masculinity. In An Introduction to Female Masculinity, she writes that 
“[t]his widespread indifference to female masculinity […] has clearly 
ideological motivations and has sustained the complex social 
structures that wed masculinity to maleness and to power and 
domination” (Halberstam 2002: 356). Women donning the ‘mask’ of 
masculinity point precisely at the pose, the attitude and construction 
that masculinity is. Although she is more interested in the non-
heterosexual female masculinity deconstructing the binary of 
heteronormativity, this analysis will consider heterosexual female 
masculinities because explicit representations of homosexuality – 
specifically female homosexuality – is almost impossible in Egypt, 
                                                   
3 In general, these words seem to indicate that women can be described in 
manly terms as well, particularly considering that gada‘ means, among other 
things, ‘manly toughness and courage’ (Badawi-Hinds). 
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except for occasional allusions to it.4 Further, lesbians in Egyptian 
films – if they do appear – quite explicitly exhibit their feminine 
features, rather than masculine looks.5 Also, this does not mean that 
there is no mentioning of the possibility of homosexuality and some 
scenes and characters (also female) can be viewed through a queer 
lens. Yet, a queer reading is not my main concern here. 
The main question I will address in this chapter is how female 
masculinities contribute to or challenge a masculine norm. To this end, 
I will explore several other questions as well, such as: to what extent 
do certain female types exhibit masculine characteristics and how does 
this put them in relation to other men and women? How do they 
construct their female identities while at the same time using markers 
of masculinity? And are these women considered equals to men or 
rather a threat to male domination and heteronormativity? Perhaps 
‘masculine women’ are one of the cornerstones of a patriarchal order 
to safeguard a male norm? Women in power are obviously not 
necessarily also women who mete out new possibilities of being a 
woman; instead they might as well assert their power through 
patriarchal power schemes – as mothers or wives. As such, female 
masculinity as I understand it here is not the queer female identity 
which Halberstam talks about. It includes quite literally those women 
who are represented in certain films as women asserting masculine 
                                                   
4 An exceptional scene is in the film al-Su‘ud Ila al-Hawiyya/The Climb Into the 
Abyss (Kamal al-Shaykh 1978), with the actress Madiha Kamil in bed with her 
French female lover. In the 2007 film Till Things Get Better (Khalid Yusif), the 
director included a lesbian scene in the film. Although even this film only 
alluded to it (the lights were off and we only heard some frolicking) and the 
whole scene only lasted a few seconds, it nevertheless garnered lots of 
criticism and a court case. The Islamic thinker and professor at Cairo 
University, Abd al-Sabbur Shahin, demanded to refer the two actresses and 
the director of the film to the Public Prosecutor for “spreading sexual 
abnormality, lesbianism and moral deprivation” (from alarabiya.net). 
However, there are no later articles available explaining happened after. The 
director did file a case against one private channel for deleting several scenes 
from the film (al-Turki 2009). 
5 This does not mean there are no other available modes in Egyptian cinema 
deconstructing binaries, such as crossdressing comedies. I refer to Menicucci 
(1998) for examples on this specific topic in Egyptian films. 
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traits and possibly threatening the gender status quo, not necessarily 
gender binaries. 
The films discussed in this chapter cover several decades, while 
retaining a focus on one particular type as portrayed by different 
actresses, screenwriters and directors. The ma‘allima will thus be the 
main focus of the first part of this chapter, although it is not my 
intention to elaborately describe the type’s different representations. 
The main focus remains on how this type is able to carve out new ways 
of being a woman, also as equal to men (at least those men in her 
immediate surroundings). We will see, however, that the way the type 
is constructed depends on general discourses about women’s roles in 
society, prevalent at the time of making the film. The film al-Ma‘allim 
Bulbul/Master Bulbul (Hasan Ramzi 1951) portrays a cross dressing 
woman as ma‘allim (played by actress Hagar Hamdi).6 Her character is 
specifically coded as working-class. But the film also portrays her as a 
person with some standing within the confines of the ḥāra.7 Yet, as in 
most pre-‘52 films, the ḥāra was a place of laughter and joy, and only 
rarely depicted with more realistic interpersonal relations in a few 
first attempts towards realism. 
Judith Franco states (referring to Roberts) in her essay on female 
protagonists in masculine road/buddy movies: “inserting female 
protagonists into a male-oriented genre neither subverts nor 
                                                   
6 In terms of gender representations, the film reveals some enticing forms of 
femininity and masculinity. The female ma‘allim (not even called ma‘allima) is 
able to pull off her male stunt, although the other men in the ḥāra remain 
skeptical of her ‘impersonation’ of a masculine man. The film then proceeds 
to the woman returning back to her feminine ‘self’, dressing like an upper-
class girl and acting in a film within the film. Her tough guy performance is 
eventually questioned and finally she returns to being a woman in her 
neighborhood, while gender binaries and heteronormativity – as well as class-
based differences – are restored under loud cheers of both men and women 
when she accepts her lower class female identity. Nevertheless, the film 
reveals the tough guy personality of the ma‘allim as a mask, a performance 
that anyone could convincingly give. 
7 Hagar Hamdi also played the role of a ma‘allima in the film Bint 
al-Ma‘allim/Daughter of the Ma‘allim (Ramzi 1951), in which she takes over her 
father’s duties as boss of the coffeeshop when he is falsely accused and 
imprisoned. Her female character as the daughter of the ma‘allim is again 
living in a lower class neighborhood, in one of the historical quarters of Cairo. 
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subsumes its masculinist tendencies” (2004: 2). The analysis of the 
films will thus keep in mind that women in masculine roles and male-
oriented genres – not exactly a typology we can give to the Egyptian 
films in this chapter – are not necessarily also tackling patriarchal 
structures, or the social structure these women move around in. The 
analysis also takes into account Messner’s critique of the practical use 
of exceedingly individualizing every type of masculinity and 
describing each in detail. But rather it will describe “group-based 
relations of power, and different – sometimes contradictory – relations 
to material interests” (Messner 2004: 76). It is not so much about the 
ma‘allima’s specific individual type, but rather about investigating how 
she is able to carve out her identity in relation to others within the 
local structure of the ḥāra.  
The rest of the chapter is limited to the post-‘52 films, films from 
the 50s and 60s, as well as the new-realist films and their commercial 
derivatives of the 80s and early 90s in which many of these ma‘allimāt 
(plural of ma‘allima) are portrayed. Not many actresses have taken on 
the role of ma‘allima. Two of the most famous are Tahiyya Carioca and 
Nadia al-Gindi. The roles they have taken on are different, in which we 
can see the earlier ma‘allimāt not necessarily as criminal women. This 
has changed in the films of the later period, in which there is a 
development towards a more criminal portrayal of ma‘allimāt, similar 
to their male counterparts. Although the ma‘allima has been present 
over the history of Egyptian cinema, there are more obvious depictions 
in certain periods. This is mainly because of the star personas of the 
two most famous actresses in these ma‘allima roles, Tahiyya Carioca 
and Nadia al-Gindi. Further, certain periods in Egyptian film history 
have sought to portray lower class areas more than other periods, 
namely the 50s and 60s, and again in the 80s, raising the chances that 
such a specifically lower class type is portrayed or takes on an 
essential role in the films. 
The first half of the chapter is divided into two main time frames: 
the first part focuses on the ma‘allima of the 50s and 60s discussing 
Tahiyya Carioca’s ma‘allima in the films Shabab Imra’a/Youth of a Woman 
(Salah Abu Sayf 1956) with occasional references to her performance in 
al-Ma‘allima/The Ma‘allima (Hasan Rida 1958). The second part focuses 
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on the ma‘allima of the 70s (and followed up in later films), discussing 
the film Hikmitak Ya Rabb/God Knows Best (Husam al-Din Mustafa 1976). 
In the second half of the chapter I also include a discussion on the 
importance of the films made by female directors. The gender 
dynamics they portray might be different from those of their male 
counterparts. I will include a discussion on ‘Afwan Ayyuha al-
Qanun/Pardon Me, Law! (Inas al-Daghaydi 1985), which is based on a 
story by Hala Sarhan, now a famous talk show host on one of the many 
independent satellite channels. The second film under discussion is 
Imra’a wa-Imra’a/A Woman and a Woman (Nadia Hamza 1995), written by 
Nadia Hamza together with Inas Bakr. The film’s team boasts mainly 
women, but the question remains whether it also subverts gender roles 
and dynamics. 
 
9.1 The ambiguous case of the ma‘allima 
 
Traditionally, the mu’allima has in her shop a large special 
chair or a baladi sofa on which she sits and smokes a 
shisha. She is coquettish and gives much care to her 
appearance, adorning herself with expensive jewelry. Her 
dress, however, is a man’s gallabiyya, which is 
complemented by a rather masculine air. She takes part 
in quarrels like any man, and disciplines anyone she 
dislikes with a beating. 
Sawsan el-Messiri, Ibn al-Balad (1978: 64) 
 
El-Messiri describes the ma‘allima explicitly as a masculine woman, 
although she does not hide her femininity either, very similar to the 
ma‘allimāt and lower class women in the novels by Nagib Mahfuz. She 
continues to describe a ma‘allima as a local leader within the confines 
of the ḥāra. Several things were prominent in the films, too. The first is 
that women dressing up and acting like men is not a reason for 
ridicule, rather for respect. In these films the ma‘allimāt inspire awe, 
albeit possibly threatening their femininity because of their overtly 
masculine behavior. Another element is the fact that these local 
women are somehow able to convincingly cross a spatial binary, 
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between the public and the private. Whereas the private is sometimes 
associated with the feminine, the public can consequently sometimes 
be associated with the masculine (Elsadda 2006: 1, 4). Yet, this 
supposed binary is a construct of a modernist discourse, as Elsadda 
proves, and in the words of Soheir Morsy:  
“[r]ecent historical and micro-sociological accounts of 
women’s position in the Arab world pose a challenge to 
universalistic models of male-female power relations, 
notably those derived from the modernist paradigm, and 
the allegedly universal opposition of the public and 
private domains.” 
(Morsy 1990: 92) 
The ma‘allima in Egypt – as shop owner a part of the economic elite 
of the local neighborhood – is represented as a woman who can ‘be a 
man’ outside the home, while retaining her femininity and female 
duties inside the home (Early 1993: 5). In this regard, I would like to 
stress the difference in Egyptian Arabic that the language applies on 
describing a woman positively ‘as a man’ (rāgil) rather than the 
pejorative term ‘acting manly’ (mistargila). A famous expression in 
Egypt is that “a woman equals a hundred men” (is-sitt ʼadd mīt rāgil), 
something a ma‘allima takes very seriously in the films discussed here. 
The difference between the words is more of a linguistic nature, rather 
than referring to the woman’s gender identity. Mistargil refers to the 
act, which can be truthful or faked, but certainly not expected of a 
woman, while defining a person as rāgil suggests a number of 
positively coded characteristics this person is considered to embody. 
Nevertheless, it always depends on the context in which the words are 
used to be able to define whether its meaning is positive or negative. 
 
9.1.1 The ma‘allima in the 1950s: Tahiyya Carioca 
In 1952 Salah Abu Sayf made the dark realist thriller Rayya and Sikina 
about a couple of sisters on a killing spree in Alexandria in the early 
20th century.  Their originally true story had gained urban legend 
status by the time he made this film, with actress Nigma Ibrahim in the 
fearful role of the ma‘allima and leader of a gang of women kidnappers 
and murderers. A couple of years later, in 1956, he made his famous 
232 
 
film The Youth of a Woman, sometimes rather loosely translated as The 
Leech. In the latter film, we find Tahiyya Carioca (1919-1999) as the 
‘woman’, the ma‘allima of the ḥāra, owner of a flower mill and of an 
apartment she will rent out to a young aspiring bachelor from a small 
village in the Delta. The film presents the then prevalent discourse of 
modernity versus tradition, which we find in the characters of the 
ma‘allima Shafa‘at (Carioca) as the older woman from a traditional and 
historical quarter, and the young man Imam (Shukri Sarhan) as the 
peasant who goes to the city aspiring education and a ‘modern’ life. 
Sabrina Joseph (2009) reads The Youth of a Woman as a film taking a 
particularly positive stance towards modernity, an attitude generally 
visible in many films of this post-independence period. Another 
element of Youth of a Woman is that the film belongs to Abu Sayf’s 
realist repertoire for which he resorted to realist literature of the time, 
often aided by Nagib Mahfuz who also contributed to this film’s 
scenario. For the analysis of the film, it is important to keep in mind 
the modernist messages that are embodied by the young bachelor 
pursuing an education in the city. He will go to university, a symbol of 
Western education, but he also combines this with his religiosity and 
his Islamic and Arab background and history. Simultaneously the film 
juxtaposes the lower class neighborhood, burdened by traditions and 
backwardness embodied by Shafa‘at, with the modern city where the 
middle class acquaintances of the peasant boy Imam live. The spaces 
that the women in the film occupy are strongly related to their class, 
with the lower class ma‘allima crossing the supposed boundaries of 
domestic and public spaces, while the middle class women are only 
depicted as women taking care of the household chores. 
Hoda Elsadda (2006: 3) argues that the public-private binary with 
which Arab societies are sometimes described is a modernist 
construct, dating back to the 19th century discourses on modernity and 
the role of women in Arab society. She notes how the dominant stories 
of women’s achievements are furthermore related to class, speaking 
mostly about and to, some middle class women. She continues, saying 
that “the lives of these women are directly influenced by mainstream 
representations about an imagined family where the husband is the 
head of the family […] and women are assumed to be naturally inclined 
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towards performing household duties” (id. 4). This image is transposed 
onto the modern middle class family, while it does not seem to apply 
to the working class neighborhood where Shafa‘at (and other women) 
are seen to be working outside the home. The public-private binary is 
non-existent in the ḥāra, as a place where women are usually 
portrayed as moving around freely: working, buying, and otherwise 
actively participating in public life.8 
Tahiyya Carioca’s character Shafa‘at is not only a working woman, 
but she also occupies a position of power over her surroundings, and 
more specifically over Imam. Her power position is directly linked to 
her wealth, as well as her bint al-balad knowledge of the city and its 
mechanisms.9 A third element that empowers her is her sexuality 
which entices the young and unexperienced male. Her money and 
property are central to her position of power over others, while her 
gender, age and sexuality play a role in asserting herself over the 
younger man. But her character is not only defined by her position of 
power. As ma‘allima she performs two different gender identities, 
depending on the space she finds herself in. Towards the outside 
world, she performs a tough-guy attitude, a masculinity associated 
with coarse men. In private and towards Imam, the object of her 
desire, in particular, she puts on her feminine mask linked to her 
lower class personality. 
Shafa‘at’s masculinity is most prominently performed when she 
handles her daily business, in her treatment of her employees and her 
renters. She handles them roughly, without any humanity or respect. 
Her masculine performance is delineated by her ability to impose her 
will and to control her business and surroundings. Her impression of a 
masculine performance is one of violence and coarse behavior, 
something she continues initially at home as well. The way she treats 
Imam indicates her stronger financial and social position vis-à-vis the 
man. At one point, she invites Imam for lunch. When the bill arrives, 
                                                   
8 In this regard, I also refer to previous chapters, particularly chapters 5 and 
7, in which the ḥāra plays a prominent role. 
9 Edward Said (2000) has written a beautiful article on Tahiyya Carioca’s star 
persona as ‘almeh, the ‘knowing’ courtesan to rich, aristocratic men – a 
character she played before turning into the more manly and coarse 
ma‘allima. See also chapter 4, footnote 16. 
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she tries to pass him money under the table, in order to uphold the 
impression for the other clients and the waiter that he, as a man, has 
paid for the food. Her ‘scheme’ fails, and the waiter takes the money 
from her hands, shouting sarcastically to the patron: “the bill is 60 
(piasters), and the lady has paid for it!” Again, she remains in control, 
in part thanks to her wealth, but also because of her imposing gender 
performance towards Imam (and the waiter). 
Her performance at home is later complemented by a softer side, 
albeit one riddled with eroticism. When she finds Imam enjoying a 
belly dancer during a mūlid,10 she grabs his ear like a mother scolding 
her son, takes him back to her room and gives him a private 
performance of her belly dance skills. With minimal yet suggestive 
movements she entices Imam, as well as anyone watching the film. The 
dancing sequence starts with a bird view shot of the whole room and 
the two persons occupying it, ending with close-ups of their faces 
followed by a metaphorical sequence of images suggesting that Imam 
has ‘scored’ – similar to the director’s Soviet montage techniques used 
in The Tough Guy (see chapter 5). Her femininity is, similar to her 
masculine performance earlier, not portrayed in positive terms, partly 
because her lower class character is associated with backwardness and 
traditionalism. Her female sexuality is represented as a threat and 
eventually lures the young man into her clutches. 
Her femininity starkly opposes the one that Salwa embodies, 
Imam’s youth friend and daughter of his family’s acquaintances. This 
is not only emphasized by her typical middle class character, but also 
by the film’s techniques. When Imam first meets Salwa, he hears her 
singing an Arabic song on the piano. Walter Armbrust (1995) has 
argued how elements of modernity are used in Egyptian film, 
synthesizing local elements (such as the colloquial language) with 
classicist elements of European or Arab history and culture. Although 
Salwa sings in colloquial Arabic, she simultaneously plays a modern 
20th century song on the piano, a Western instrument. This opposes the 
traditional songs to which Shafa‘at dances: old Arab stories that are 
                                                   
10 A mūlid is a saint’s feast, held yearly across Egypt and typically near the 
saint’s burial ground. These mūlids are usually accompanied by festivities with 
dancers, storytellers, fortune tellers, merry-go-rounds and swings. 
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told accompanied by traditional instruments like the nāy, rabbāba or 
ṭabla. In addition, the camera portrays Shafa‘at’s body in suggestive 
ways, through close-ups and angles that emphasize her physicality. 
Salwa – although played by the beautiful singer and, occasionally, 
dancer Shadia – is portrayed from a distance, her body not sexualized 
or objectified, but glorified as the body of a young, pure, virgin. 
Tahiyya Carioca’s ma‘allima performance is not only portrayed 
negatively. The actress and dancer capitalized on the success of Youth 
of a Woman in her role as ma‘allima in Hasan Rida’s al-Ma‘allima/The 
Ma‘allima (1958). In this film, both her masculine and feminine 
performances are positively depicted. Her masculinity consists of 
positively coded characteristics like protectiveness, willpower and 
trustworthiness, exemplified by her tough-guy stance towards her 
husband’s midnight assailants (whom she successfully beats up, unlike 
her husband), or her futuwwa-like gad‘ana and shahāma (integrity, wit 
and courage) when she visits her employee’s sick mother. Also her 
sensual womanliness is positively represented when she dances for her 
husband, making sure he is cared for as well. Her feminine 
performance, rather than her masculine one, is here portrayed as a 
masquerade in order to conform to her husband’s requirements. 
During the dance sequence, she momentarily masks her masculinity 
that she is otherwise inclined to perform. 
The feminine masquerade that Tuha (a nickname for Tahiyya) in 
The Ma‘allima and Shafa‘at in Youth of a Woman perform constitutes an 
ambiguous gender identity. In private they perform one, in public they 
take on a whole different guise. Joan Rivière has shown in her essay 
Womanliness as a Masquerade (1929) that women already ‘naturally’ 
possess masculinity and only perform an exaggerated femininity (in 
public) in order to get along in a male-dominated society. But for the 
lower class ma‘allima to occupy her space and hold on to it, she needs 
to perform more than merely her femininity. She is supposed to shed 
her public femininity, and let her masculinity prevail. Judith Butler 
extended the idea of gender performance, including the performance 
of masculinities, focusing on the iterative act of gender performativity: 
“gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an 
exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts” (emphasis in 
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original, Butler 1990: 140). Thanks to Butler, it is possible to explain 
the ma‘allima’s gendered acts through the space she inhabits. But, 
because masculinity is performed differently by the different 
characters in both films, it also reveals itself as a mask, as something 
that can be appropriated and performed. The ma‘allima shows that 
both masculine and feminine performances are equally constructed 
and open to interpretation depending on the context, the person 
performing them, and those the performance is intended for. 
The character also offers different ways of being female, as an 
independent, sexually confident woman. She furthermore transgresses 
spatial boundaries that patriarchy seems to have imposed on them. 
Yet, the problem arises once again when class comes into the picture. 
Shafa‘at’s masculine and feminine performances are associated with 
her lower class backwardness, opposing the dominant ideal of middle 
class propriety and modern education. This juxtaposition of lower 
versus middle classes is not present in Carioca’s second film, The 
Ma‘allima. Instead, the traditional ḥāra is positively depicted and the 
‘modern’ city is only embodied by prostitutes in Western dress. 
Therefore, Tuha’s masculine and feminine performances are imbued 
with positive characteristics like the futuwwa. 
The question remains whether these women’s public persona as a 
tough woman is at all exceptional in a patriarchal society that favors 
male toughness over female sensuality in public life. Furthermore, 
men’s sexuality is not considered threatening. When women expose 
their sexuality in public they could be described as prostitutes; 
women’s sexuality needs to be contained to the house and to the 
proper and socially accepted context of marriage. Whenever the 
ma‘allima ventures outside the home, she needs to leave behind her 
femininity and sexuality11 and adopt a more masculine posture and 
attitude in her interaction with others around her, whether men or 
women. If she is capable of doing so, her leadership and gad‘ana will be 
                                                   
11 This is not to say that a ma‘allima is per definition an asexual person, her 
sex and sexuality are simply no longer her foremost characteristic in public. 
Furthermore, sometimes a ma‘allima can also be the leader or matriarchal 
figure of a dance troupe or even a prostitute ring. Yet again, as ma‘allima, her 
sex and gender are not the characteristics that define her, her masculine 
public persona is what defines her. 
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accepted and respected. As a shop owner regularly interacting with 
customers (both women and men) and other shop owners in the 
neighborhood, her public persona’s female masculinity is an essential 
property. 
The ma‘allimāt’s femininity is not denied to them, while they have 
to earn their masculinity based on their ability to properly imitate 
masculine and manly behavior, quite similar to the futuwwa (or the 
‘new’ paternalist men of the most recent decade). What is more, their 
ability to do so is respected and expected once they venture outside. 
The ma‘allimāt’s public presence is thus not necessarily a threat to male 
domination and masculine normativity; indeed, it might as well 
reinforce a patriarchal social order. Her presence is ambiguous; she is 
at once a strong, independent and confident woman capable of and 
allowed to take her slice of the cake. Her gender does not matter in 
this regard and the double space she occupies allows her to 
renegotiate the gender status-quo. But she also ventures into the male-
dominated public space by imitating what is perceived to be a public 
gender norm: her masculine behavior is expected and judged for its 
authenticity. If we were to switch roles, for example a man who at 
home takes on roles traditionally associated with women like cooking 
and cleaning, this would be considered ridiculous – although men 
could perfectly participate in the household, also in Egypt.12 In films, 
however, a man’s masculinity might be jeopardized if he is portrayed 
participating in the household.13 
 
9.1.2 God Knows Best 
An adaptation to the ma‘allima character is visualized in the later film 
God Knows Best (Husam al-Din Mustafa 1976). The ma‘allima character 
                                                   
12 As a case in point is the view from my own balcony in downtown Cairo, 
looking down upon a crowded popular neighborhood lying behind the 
relatively structured main roads. On more than one occasion, men were 
hanging out the laundry to dry on the ropes stretched out beneath their flat’s 
windows. 
13 Inas al-Daghaydi’s film Pardon Me, Law! (see later in this chapter), for 
example, explicitly portrays the male antagonist in this way: he is an 
impotent man who has ‘lost’ his masculinity; he even cooks in order to assert 
his dominance over his wife even within ‘her’ territory. 
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from the 50s that Tahiyya Carioca embodied was an example of an 
independent woman who stood up against male domination of the 
market place and performed a new way of being a woman. The later 
films with a ma‘allima character were equally embedded in their 
political and social history, talking about similar topics as other films 
from that particular era. In the 70s the ma‘allima engaged in criminal 
behavior such as drug dealing or other forms of criminal activities, 
similar to their male counterparts and often also in other spaces than 
the traditional local market we are familiar with in films of the 50s and 
early 60s. One of the reasons for this change is that décors of films 
from the 70s onward moved from the local neighborhood, the ḥāra, to 
the new city and buildings, the ‘imāra, built in the 60s. Samia Mehrez 
(2008) describes similar developments in literary production of the 
time as well, where the ‘imāra became the new symbolic space after the 
ḥāra which was prominent in Mahfuz’ novels as a metaphor for the 
larger society. 
Contrary to the previous film, God Knows Best is also a good example 
of a late 70s film that portrays a disbelief in modernist messages 
(Armbrust 1995). Where Youth of a Woman is positive about modernism 
and social progress, this next film is subtly negative about the Nasirist 
vision of progress. As shown in previous chapters, the anti-modernism 
visible in films after 1967 still employs the same ‘codes of modernity’ 
that Walter Armbrust has defined. In God Knows Best, similar codes are 
employed that are recognizable for an Egyptian audience with 
knowledge of Egyptian cinema. The most prominent of these codes is 
the juxtaposition of traditionalism and modernity. Education is 
depicted as a modernizing necessity to shed oneself of traditionalism 
and ‘backwardness’, yet the film also shows that it is less naïve about 
the romanticized stories of love and companionship as were earlier 
films. Thus, the educated woman in the film from a lower class 
background (Na‘ima) continues to be haunted by her social status and 
background. 
The director of God Knows Best, Husam al-Din Mustafa (1926-2000), is 
known for his popular melodramas, as well as his ‘action films’ such as 
the 80s futuwwa-films of which he directed several installments. 
Contrary to the famous directors Abu Sayf and Barakat, who both 
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studied cinema in Europe, Husam al-Din Mustafa traveled to the 
United States to continue his studies. His oeuvre covers the post-
independence cinema, and his films are as such beautiful depictions of 
the specific timeframe in which they were made. The current film, God 
Knows Best, is a late 70s film (after the ‘uplifting’ 1973 war) that 
contains all the elements of this era: working women, pretentious 
middle classes, drugs, criminality, and an appropriate amount of 
action and melodrama which the director is most famous for. 
The actress starring in the film, and portraying the ma‘allima 
character, is Sana’ Gamil (1930-2002). She is known for her many 
diverse performances, in comedic roles or as a protective mother (the 
latter is the case in the present film). In the 60s she acted important 
roles in films directed by some of the industry’s most famous directors, 
particularly her performance in Abu Sayf’s film Dead Among the Living 
in 1960. In it, she played the role of Nafisa, the daughter of a poor 
widow, who supports her family and her brother’s expensive studies at 
the police academy. She won a prize at the Moscow Film Festival in 
1961 as Best Supporting Actress for her role in that film. As an all-
round actress, Nehad Selaiha (2002) describes Sana’s star persona as a 
paradox. Both in real life and on stage, her character was comprised of 
opposites. She came from a small southern Egyptian town and had 
received French education at a catholic school, but soon left the village 
to study acting in Cairo without informing her family. Her stage 
presence, too, is equally mesmerizing. With commitment and 
persuasion she could perform, in Selaiha’s words, “the poor victim, the 
dangerous wild-cat, and the clown” (Selaiha 2002). Her most 
recognizable features are her refined facial contours, capable of 
expressing sternness, motherly love, heartbreaking sadness or 
overwhelming joy with the same natural and convincing appeal. 
In God Knows Best she plays the role of the ma‘allima Umm Na‘ima. 
The film is about conflict on different levels: generational, class, 
gender and – as a crime film – between police and criminals. Umm 
Na‘ima contains all the characteristics described earlier: she is a tough 
masculine woman in the ḥāra or ḥitta14 and a caring single mother at 
                                                   
14 Literally ḥitta means a piece, but it may also refer to a local neighborhood, 
similar to the ḥāra. It can also be used in extension for any area within the 
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home. Her motherhood is remarkably not denied to her, instead 
everybody refers to her as ‘mother of Na‘ima’, Umm Na‘ima, thus 
keeping in mind her sex and her status as a mother, while not ignoring 
her standing in the neighborhood as ma‘allima. Not once is she 
addressed with her birth name, only with her given name,15 not even 
during the court hearing at the end of the film. This makes it a very 
explicit reference to her motherhood, something that cannot be 
ignored. Another reason why she is addressed as ‘mother of’ is because 
her daughter Na‘ima is one of the few educated people in the ḥāra. She 
is the only one who can read and is a successful lawyer. Na‘ima is 
consistently addressed as ustāza, a generic polite form of address.16 As 
such, her insistence on being called Umm Na‘ima indicates the pride 
she takes in her daughter’s formal education and high esteem as a 
respected lawyer. 
Yet, the film portrays the paradox that many women faced and 
continue to face both in public and private life. Although the growing 
presence of women in public and the achievements made in terms of 
new laws and government schemes promoted women in universities 
and the work force (such as the lawyer, Na‘ima), the personal status 
laws had barely changed since the 1920s. Thus, women were still 
dependent on male relatives, which further influenced their presence 
in public and freedom of movement. God Know Best, however, has a 
conspicuous absence of a father figure or a dominant male, who are 
instead replaced by two dominant matriarchs: Umm Na‘ima the 
                                                                                                                   
city in general. I am referring to it here because it is used in this particular 
film more often than ḥāra. For example, occasionally Na‘ima is referred to as 
‘bint ḥittitna’ [litt. ‘a daughter from our parts (of the city)’]. 
15 For that matter also Ahmad’s (her daughter Na‘ima’s boyfriend and later 
fiancé) mother is never mentioned by name, only referred to as ‘your mother’ 
(il-sitt il-wālda) or ‘Madame’ (yā sitt hānim) by Umm Na‘ima or as ‘aunty’ (ṭanṭ) 
by Na‘ima. 
16 Ustāza, or the masculine form ustāz, is translated by Badawi-Hinds as “a 
polite form of address or reference to, a teacher or to a man not otherwise 
qualified for a title”. The neighborhood holds Na‘ima in high esteem, treating 
her differently and less roughly than the inhabitants would each other. When 
one of Umm Na‘ima’s customers shouts at Na‘ima and pushes her aside, the 
ma‘allima kicks him out of her store; she will not let anyone come close to her 
daughter, particularly not the ruffians of the neighborhood. 
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ma‘allima and Na‘ima’s fiancé’s, Ahmad’s, mother. The film touches 
upon the generational, class and gender conflicts on the level of the 
personal relationships between the lower class ma‘allima and her gang, 
and the upper-middle class family of Ahmad, the investigating officer, 
who is initially addressed derogatorily as Abū Shanab (litt. father of a 
mustache, i.e. ‘the one with the mustache’). 
The class, gender and generational conflicts intertwine in the way 
that Ahmad and Na‘ima both encounter difficulties regarding their 
plan to get married. Na‘ima, although a highly educated and working 
woman, is stopped by her mother from seeing Ahmad. Na‘ima is thus 
met with the same paradox as outlined earlier: she can leave the house 
and the area for work, but her mother – safeguarding patriarchal order 
– withholds her from meeting with a strange man unless he officially 
proclaims his love for her and agrees to marry her. Ahmad’s mother 
outright objects to the marriage because of Na‘ima’s lower social 
status; it does not matter that she is now a successful lawyer. Both 
mothers safeguard patriarchy: Umm Na‘ima through her curbing of 
Na‘ima’s freedom of movement, Ahmad’s mother through her vetoing 
the marriage in order to maintain her family’s possessions. The young 
Na‘ima and Ahmad, on the other hand, defy patriarchal rule through 
their modern understanding of male-female relationships and social 
vision.17 
But Umm Na‘ima is more than merely a mother. In her own way, 
she shows how it is possible to perform her womanliness in a different 
way: both she and her daughter are the only women who work in the 
film and yet who are not denied their femininity. Once again, the 
ma‘allima performs a different gender identity in public than the one 
she performs at home, in private, with her daughter and, later in the 
                                                   
17 The modern concept of marriage as a bond between two mutually 
understanding individuals who love each other has been the topic of 
discussion for early 20th century Egyptian writers (Elsadda 2007). Part of the 
couple’s mutual understanding in this film is related to the fact that Na‘ima is 
a university-educated ‘New Woman’, the type of woman that liberal and 
reformist writers like Qasim Amin and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid saw as the 
solution for the social and economic woes of the country in the late 19th, 
early 20th centuries. In films, as Viola Shafik writes (2007: 137), the modern 
ideal of a love marriage “was presented as the needle’s eye through which 
those social limitations could be transgressed”. 
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film, with her prospective in-laws. In public, however, Umm Na‘ima 
(more so than the sensual Shafa‘at or Tuha earlier), dresses, walks and 
talks like a man. Her public presence at the wedding party at the 
beginning of the film is indicative of this (and reminds of the comedy 
of the early 50s with Hagar Hamdi). During the wedding of one of the 
ma‘allimīn, Zaki, she goes on stage with her stick, the nabūt (the 
traditional male status symbol), and money, publicly and with great 
fanfare declaring her support for the marriage and performing a short 
dance wielding her stick. Generally, only the men of the neighborhood 
go on stage and shower the couple with money, giving a short, yet 
enticing speech about the groom. The practice is comparable to the 
speech the best man of the groom would give in European weddings, 
but in this case with more than just one best man. As ma‘allima she can 
do this, too; it is even expected from her, otherwise her public role as 
ma‘allima might be jeopardized. 
Umm Na‘ima is perhaps a more successful example of female 
masculinity that is able to convince her surroundings and the audience 
of her gad‘ana and shahāma, those characteristics attributed to only the 
‘best of men’. Men in this sense are once again not necessarily 
biological men, which this and other ma‘allimāt prove. Umm Na‘ima’s 
leadership role of a criminal gang does not question her gender 
identity, considering the film focuses mainly on her role as a mother 
and as a leader within her neighborhood. The fact that she has worked 
hard to give her daughter the education she wanted and that she is the 
one who puts the crippled Gilgil to work in her store only serve to 
portray her even more strongly as gada‘a. Furthermore, she has put the 
criminal money she had earned to good use, to pay for the education 
and upbringing of her daughter. As ma‘allima she is also respected and 
stands at the top of the ḥāra: no man or woman has any authority over 
her. She also takes what comes to her with male stoicism – a 
characteristic she shares with the ma‘allima Rayya some twenty years 
earlier in Rayya and Sikina when that murderous gang-leader was 
caught and subsequently hanged. But, by adhering to the assumption 
that women are naturally inclined to perform household duties and 
limit themselves to the private sphere, the films representing the 
‘tough woman’ masculinity of the ma‘allima in public and her 
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femininity and ‘care’ in private, eventually perpetuate a culturally 
accepted ‘ideal’ of ‘indoors’ womanhood and ‘outdoors’ manhood. 
 
9.2 The case of female directors 
 
Including a separate chapter on women directors risks putting their 
contributions in a separate box, as a ‘different’ cinema from the films I 
discussed in the previous chapters. I do not wish to belittle women’s 
contributions to the industry or ‘other’ their work, on the contrary. 
Female directors, screenwriters and producers were very active in the 
early days of Egyptian cinema, prior to the consolidation of the 
industry. After the establishment of Egypt’s largest studio, women as 
directors practically disappeared from behind the camera. This studio, 
Studio Misr, was founded by Tala‘at Harb, who nevertheless 
acknowledged the importance of the work of these female pioneers 
(Hillauer 2005: 28). Viola Shafik (2007: 190-2) lists several reasons for 
their disappearance as directors, noting most prominently economic 
reasons such as the consolidation of the industry and producers’ 
reluctance to invest large sums of money in what they believed was an 
insecure investment. 
However, women continued to be very present in the industry on- 
and off-screen, mainly as producers and most prominently as 
actresses. Inas al-Daghaydi (1953-) was one of the first mainstream 
female directors in almost 50 years. Her films are controversial, partly 
because they are produced within the framework of mainstream 
cinema, partly because the media and audience continue to criticize 
her too blunt depictions of what are considered sex scenes in Egyptian 
cinema (Shafik 2007: 193). The late 80s also saw other female directors, 
for example Nadia Hamza and Asma’ al-Bakri, although the latter’s 
films were undeniably less commercial or popular because of the lack 
of stars (Hillauer 2005: 40). After these new ‘pioneers’, more women 
directors entered commercial and mainstream cinema, including 
Kamla Abu Dhikri and Sandra Nash’at in the late 1990s. These women’s 
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presence remains, however, very limited compared to the number of 
men directing and producing mainstream films.18 
In the following discussion of two of the most iconic women 
directors, I initially chose the films presuming that women directors 
depict gender dynamics differently from male directors. But this 
assumption would assume a straightforward and one-sided 
commercial film industry; yet, we have seen in the previous chapters 
that there has always been enough space for ambiguity and different 
readings of the films. I have chosen two of the most famous new 
pioneering women, namely Inas al-Daghaydi (1953-) and Nadia Hamza 
(1939-2012), who have made films within the same commercial 
framework, a film industry that is mainly in the hands of men. 
Producers and distributors – as well as some directors, actors and 
actresses – think commercially in terms of how much that particular 
film will earn them. This is not to deny any artistic value to commercial 
films, or to denounce the commercial film industry as entirely and 
solely interested in making money. Egypt’s commercial film industry 
has a longstanding tradition of quality films discussing taboo topics for 
each timeframe in a possibly subversive manner, as evidenced in the 
previous chapters. 
Furthermore, a discussion on the contribution of women directors 
to the male-dominated commercial industry puts both the women’s 
and men’s films into perspective: in how far does these women’s 
presence constitute a feminist act, being those few remarkable 
‘exceptions’ to an otherwise male-dominated industry? Yet, not only 
women made films critically approaching the ‘woman question’. Men’s 
contribution to issues related to women in Egypt or the Arab world is a 
remarkable feat, but from the previous chapters we notice that their 
films betray to some extent a middle class, bourgeois ideology when 
‘educating’ the masses about gender relations in what they consider to 
be a ‘modern Egypt’.19 Hoda Elsadda questions the work of modernist 
                                                   
18 Outside the commercial cinema industry, mostly young, female directors 
are growing in numbers. The ease with which young directors can now 
express themselves using digital cameras is part of the reason why also 
women find it easier to participate in this growing and vibrant young film 
culture in Egypt. 
19 Ehab el-Leithi (the former head of the Egyptian Radio and Television Unit, 
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Arab writers who have written extensively about women’s roles in a 
modern Egypt. Through what is written about women’s roles, she 
analyzes what is intended for and expected of ‘modern men’ as well 
(Elsadda 2007). In films discussing women’s positions in society and the 
difficulties they face because of traditions or the domination of men 
we can also discern an indirect discourse about male roles in society. 
Now I want to have a look at what women directors have to say and 
show about themselves and about the roles of men and women in 
society, keeping in mind the commercial and male-dominated 
framework of the industry. 
The first film under discussion is al-Daghaydi’s film Pardon Me, Law! 
from 1985. It is her first film, she also produced it herself, and it talks 
about the unequal implementation of the law vis-à-vis men and 
women. Although al-Daghaydi refuses to be called ‘feminist’, not 
wanting to be reduced to her gender as a director (Hillauer 2005: 84), 
she has nevertheless always tended to topics like gender relations and 
abuse (Shafik 2007: 193-5). The second director is Nadia Hamza, whose 
film A Woman and a Woman (1995) will also be discussed here. Women – 
with different class backgrounds – take a prominent role in the film, as 
the title suggests, although at first sight the film proposes rigid gender 
roles for women as ‘mother or whore’. Generally, class plays a central 
role in the relations that develop between the characters in these 
films, whereas lower classes are depicted as a dark and ignorant cloak 
one wants and needs to shed. Nevertheless, the complexity of both 
films goes beyond mere class differences that seem to suggest yet 
another middle class feminist agenda. The visual presence of women 
on-screen in diverse roles guiding the plot might be considered a 
feminist act in and of itself. But the analysis will once again not limit 
                                                                                                                   
ERTU) is quoted in Lila Abu-Lughod, saying that “our [the ERTU] most 
important goal in relation to citizens is to help individuals become cultured. 
We must educate them, teach them the basics of morality and religious duty” 
(Abu-Lughod 2005: 11). His remark is informed by class differences, as well as 
a rigid one-way understanding of the relationship between media production 
and consumption. Abu-Lughod further shows the different possible readings 
and audience reactions to what appears on television (or in films, for that 
matter), arguing that “the way people respond depends both on the 
experiences they have on the ground and the alternative discourses they have 
available to them” (id. 14). 
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itself to a description of gender roles, rather the gender dynamics and 
relations will be discussed in these films made by women. 
 
9.2.1 The four punishments of Huda in Pardon Me, Law! 
Inas al-Daghaydi’s first film is one that discusses the law’s 
discrimination between men and women, including complex issues of 
personal status and criminal laws and the differences between the 
local and historical laws of shari‘a versus the ‘modern’ laws from the 
early 19th century. The film offers a discussion on the post-colonial 
context in a post-infitāḥ era where ‘modernity’ – with images of a 
prosperous nation – remains no longer unchallenged. Indeed, like the 
other films from the 80s (see chapter 7) Pardon Me, Law! is no longer 
advancing the belief in modernism that we could discern in films from 
the Nasir-era. Especially the film’s disentanglement of the double law 
system in Egypt – shari‘a and ‘secular’ law – is an important element in 
its discussion on what a new Egypt built on equality should look like. 
Considering the director’s secular stance, her going back to new 
interpretations of shari‘a law as a means to advance women’s rights is 
stunning.20 
The main actress in Pardon Me, Law! is Nagla’ Fathi, whose 
melodramatic depictions of troubled and abused women remind of the 
‘First Lady of the Arab Screen’, Fatin Hamama. Nagla’ Fathi (1951-) 
herself considers Fatin Hamama her example, and Fathi’s similar 
innocent expressions make her a close contender of Fatin Hamama’s 
other nickname, ‘angel without wings’. Similarly, she acts melodramas 
and romantic films, playing the part of the abused and victimized 
woman, in such a way that her four punishments in this film come as 
no surprise and further strengthen her star persona’s image. She has 
                                                   
20 Walter Armbrust describes the representational politics of Islamism in 
Egyptian cinema, and argues how “[n]o endorsement of Islam as a political 
alternative is allowed in cinema or in public sector media” (2011: 238). This is 
also related to the producers’ worldview, rather than merely an effect of 
censorship. Al-Daghaydi’s portrayal of Islamic law seems informed by her own 
background and idea that Islam can, in fact, offer an alternative to the 
colonial era personal status laws that have only barely changed. In her own 
way, she counters the dominant traditionalist interpretations and – in her 
view – patriarchal abuse of Islamic shari‘a. 
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acted in some of the most critically lauded films of major Egyptian 
directors, like Muhammad Khan, Inas al-Daghaydi and Asma’ al-Bakri, 
but has decided in the late 1990s to stop acting after a number of 
unsuccessful productions. According to her, her husband’s political 
background and disagreement with the Mubarak regime was the 
reason behind halting her latest film and television productions.21 
The narrative of Pardon Me, Law! revolves around a newly married 
couple, Huda (played by Nagla’ Fathi) and ‘Ali (Mahmud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz), 
who tells his young wife during the wedding night that he is 
impotent.22 According to him, a relationship based on mutual respect 
and love is more valuable than the ‘extra’ sexual activities marriage 
involves. All goes well in the beginning, but soon Huda is unable to 
withhold her sexual desires and she urges her husband to go and see a 
doctor. It turns out he has a mental condition ever since he saw his 
stepmother being murdered by his own father, ‘Abd al-Qawi, while in 
bed with a lover. As such, he associates sex with death and thus is 
unable to have sexual relations himself. His wife will try to cure him by 
psychoanalyzing him. The result is, however, a sexually ‘over-active’ 
and adulterous male who has sex with a mutual friend of the couple, 
Lubna. When Huda finds both in their marital bed, thinking initially a 
robber is in the house, she too shoots them after which the film 
centers on both the law’s and society’s discrimination against Huda 
who in fact re-enacted ‘Ali’s trauma. Upon shooting her husband – who 
will eventually die after a painful week in hospital – Huda receives her 
                                                   
21 Fu’ad, Rawda, available from: 
http://www.elcinema.com/news/nw678935617/ (acc. June 20, 2014). 
22 Impotence is a returning motif in Egyptian films, like for example the ‘Adil 
Imam comedy al-Nom fi al-‘Asal/Honeymoon Nights (Sharif ‘Arafa 1996)and the 
more serious new realist film The Necklace and the Bracelet by ‘Ali Badrakhan 
(1986). Men’s failing sexual performance returns in other films, like 
Muhammad Abu Sayf’s The Ostrich and the Peacock (2002) or in al-Daghaydi’s 
Lobster (1996) with the popular actor Ahmad Zaki. In each of the films, men’s 
sexual performance is constructed as an essential part of their gendered 
identity. Sexuality (both male and female) is in general depicted as integral to 
one’s gender, and, apart from the occasional exception, portrayed in a 
heteronormative binary. Nevertheless, the available exceptions with 
depictions of transvestism or homosexuality are in my opinion proof of the 
instability and uncertainty that constitutes and revolves around this binary. 
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first fateful punishment, being hit by a car after she ran out of the 
house. 
The film discusses several political subjects, like the topic of 
discriminatory personal status laws – which were initially perhaps 
considered ‘modern’ laws but which were in the late 70s adapted.  23 
During ‘Abd al-Nasir’s rule, several laws were passed to advance 
women’s presence in public space, with equal rights to vote and 
equality in pay and work.24 In the 70s new discussions arose about the 
status of women in the private sphere. Since the personal status laws 
were not changed under ‘Abd al-Nasir, there remained a lot of work to 
be done in this regard (Hatem 1992: 231-3; Elsadda 2006: 4). Films from 
the 70s started incorporating discussions on women’s rights in the 
private sphere, at the same time that topics like female adultery in 
middle class families were hot irons in Egyptian cinema.25 Sabrina 
Joseph (2009) links this interest in topics regarding ‘female criminal 
behavior’ to new discourses in newspapers in the late 60s about 
working middle class women and university students participating in 
prostitution (id.: 84, referencing Safia Mohsen 1991: 68). 
The film challenges these personal status laws – based on secular 
European laws issued shortly after Egypt’s nominal independence of 
Britain in 1922 – instead urging for a reconsideration and 
reinterpretation of shari‘a law. During the court case at the end of the 
film, Huda’s lawyer demands the judges to implement Islamic shari‘a 
since it does not discriminate between adulterous men or women, or 
between anyone who committed murder. ‘Abd al-Qawi’s presence as 
                                                   
23 The film Uridu Hallan/I Want A Solution from the hand of director Sa‘id 
Marzuq, feminist screenwriter Husn Shah and with the star Fatin Hamama is a 
famous example in this regard. For more details regarding this film and its 
influence on government policies, I refer to chapter 6, footnote 28. 
24 The film Li-l-Rigal Faqat/For Men Only by Fatin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1964) is 
exemplary of the new laws encouraging women to work outside the home. 
The film talks about two women dressing up like men because the director 
would not allow them to travel to an oil rig expedition. The women were 
obviously certain of their case and finally found oil, which the men were 
unable to do. 
25 A film like Henry Barakat’s A Woman With a Bad Reputation discusses this 
topic critically, without resorting to sheer disapproval regarding the 
adulterous woman (see also chapter 7). 
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the family’s patriarch (played by the ever-masculine brute, Farid 
Shawqi) takes on the role of abusive father figure who imposes his 
traditionalist and patriarchal views on the role of men and women, 
abusing the law to his advantage while hypocritically ignoring Huda’s 
rights as the victim of an adulterous partner. The other male 
characters in this film are no where close to patriarchs, though 
initially claiming social and legal privileges as men. 
While women are centralized in the film’s plot, men’s roles and 
depictions are patriarchal, negative, and, it is important to note, 
unmanly. ‘Ali – when shot and trying to recover in hospital – repents 
and writes a statement to help his wife, saying to her lawyer: “she 
made me capable of cheating on her”, a little joke only ‘Ali and the 
viewer understand. Repentance is not enough, and ‘Ali eventually dies 
before being able to redeem his wife’s actions. Salah, Lubna’s husband, 
claims high and low that his “honor cannot be bought”, though in the 
end he returns to her and accepts his subjected position. The only male 
capable of asserting his dominance, is ‘Abd al-Qawi. Yet, the plot’s 
focus on the man’s hypocrisy puts him in a negative light as well. 
Indeed, Farid Shawqi’s star persona who regularly played the ‘bad guy’ 
in his younger years is used here to put him in the role of abusive 
father figure.26 Huda’s stoic acceptance of her fate and punishment 
puts her in a morally superior position and perhaps portrays her as a 
woman in control, repenting her transgression of the law and 
accepting its consequences. Together with her rational character and 
attitude towards her husband’s illness – who himself childishly and 
emotionally rejects any kind of help – Huda’s role as a woman (as a 
supporting wife and mother) is portrayed positively while the different 
men’s concept of male roles and masculinity prove once again self-
                                                   
26 In an article about al-Daghaydi’s newest film, Silence (about an abusive 
father who sexually assaults his daughter), her screenwriter claims that the 
censorship committee demanded they would portray the father as “mentally 
diseased and thus, unrepresentative of the general Egyptian male figure” 
(Abdel Rahman 2012). It is disturbing to know that criticism of a ‘father 
figure’, questioning his ‘good judgment’ and subverting his hegemony is a 
difficult task that might result in censorship. Knowing this could, however, 
put certain characters and plot twists into perspective, for example the 
noticeable absence of fathers in some films, or the exceptional presence of 
father figures in others. 
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destructive or are exposed as profiteering from unequal patriarchal 
power structures. 
The relationship between the film’s main characters, Huda and ‘Ali, 
starts as a platonic relationship, portrayed as an ideal and caring 
relationship based on equality because of the absence of sex and their 
true love for each other. Yet, it does not take long before ‘Ali resorts to 
asserting his dominant position – albeit at home and in the kitchen. He 
decides on how she cooks, which pills she takes, or where she goes and 
whom she meets. At a certain point he slaps her because she accused 
him of “not wanting to be a man”. His actions are inspired by what he 
perceives to be his ‘natural’ masculine performance. He has always 
been impotent, never able to discover and develop his sexuality during 
his puberty. His masculine performance is the epitome of a social 
construct and as such it is exposed as a masquerade, symbolically 
maintained through his mustache: his ‘natural’ manly behavior (as a 
sexual actor) is denied to him, which he tries to balance by donning a 
thick mustache. The shaving of his mustache the morning after he has 
sex for the first time in his life and in his marriage is a strong symbol 
for him finally enabled to center his masculinity on a physical 
addendum other than his mustache. 
Although ‘Ali is harshly punished by death, Huda is punished on 
several levels too. The first ‘punishment’, physical, she receives is 
when she is hit by the car; the second punishment, moral, takes place 
in hospital, when society unanimously judges her for having shot her 
husband and his lover on the spot. One of the onlookers commented on 
her actions with the words: “She kills him just like that? Who is she, 
Rayya and Sikina?”, referring to the two murderous sisters from 
Alexandria. Her third punishment, legal, happens at court, when Huda 
is sentenced to fifteen years forced labor – a stark difference with ‘Abd 
al-Qawi’s one year suspended sentence for the same crime. The fourth 
punishment is the final blow – by now she has accepted her fate 
compliantly – when ‘Abd al-Qawi takes away her son with another 
court order. As a woman, she is punished on multiple levels, 
physically, morally, and legally; as a mother she is punished with the 




Opposed to the films in the previous chapters where men were 
often depicted as victims, aided by a narrative that privileges their 
misery and redeems their actions, this film’s narrative is entirely 
occupied by Huda who is the main actor pushing the narrative forward. 
The film does not, however, employ a ‘crisis of women’-rhetoric, 
instead empowering women through its social critique. From the start, 
the film opens with images of Huda packing her bags and preparing 
herself for the marriage and honeymoon. The film places great 
emphasis on the opening scenes, the wedding and the wedding night, 
and particularly Huda’s role and reactions in the developments 
through repeated shot-reverse-shots that emphasize her facial 
expressions. The audience is required to develop sympathy for her, 
rather than ‘Ali, because of her central part in the plot. Huda drives 
the narrative: she finds a medical doctor for ‘Ali, she contacts a 
psychologist, she is able to remote-psycho-analyze him and cure him, 
and she is the one who takes revenge on his unfaithful and ungrateful 
actions. The narrative goes to great lengths to redeem Huda’s 
upcoming murderous actions because of all the sacrifices she as a 
loving and caring wife makes for her ungrateful husband. 
Although she is cast in the role of a wife and mother, the film’s 
main focus on the private rights of women (following the 1960s-films’ 
focus on women’s public rights as equals to men in society) together 
with the director’s use of “textual female masculinity”,27 make this a 
film that has the potential to subvert the normative nature of male 
domination. Yet, Heiny Srour notes that the film’s adherence to 
conventional narrative strategies common for commercial melodrama 
eventually forgoes its initial critical purpose (Srour 1994: 134). 
Therefore, the focus on the depiction of Huda as a mother and faithful 
                                                   
27 “Textual female masculinity” was described by Hekanaho as “a structural 
and textual principle that pervades [their] fiction”, referring to two women 
writers’ novels (Hekanaho 2006: 11). In practice this means that certain ways 
of writing – or in this case directing – can be considered a ‘masculine’ style. 
Hekanaho – referencing Michael Davidson (2004: 169) – warns for replicating 
a dyadic gender order. Instead, textual female masculinity places the text 
somewhere in between feminine and masculine writing. Fatima Mernissi 
(1989: 13) claims that writing and analysis are exclusively male tools “in our 
culture”, and as a woman writer she thus ventures into male territory, using 
‘their’ tools to get along. 
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wife is similar to the victimization of women in melodramas of the 50s 
and 60s (but also before and after this period). Idealized and 
victimized, these depictions of women fit into the mold of generic film 
narratives. 
Nevertheless, on the narrative level as well as in the number of 
female characters, Pardon Me, Law! offers more than idealized or 
victimized images of women, contrary to Srour’s critique of the use of 
genre conventions. One such feature of textual masculinity is the 
subversion of roles as to which character has to die for his/her 
transgression. Although admitting her adulterous relationship with 
‘Ali to the court officials, Lubna leaves the courtroom as a free woman 
while her husband is unable to ‘punish’ her because it would hurt him 
even more. ‘Ali, on the other hand, dies for the actions he committed. 
This is in stark contrast to the otherwise ‘lesser’ punishments for men 
in other commercial films. Ishaq Tijani (2005) notes that by not 
allowing the victim-husband any input in the narrative, the (female) 
author actually ‘kills’ the male, while the narrative voice is reserved 
for the heroine (id. 55-6). The same is true in this film where ‘Ali’s 
narrative is subjugated to Huda’s, killing the man’s dominant voice, 
while he dies in the plot, too. 
 
9.2.2 A Woman and a Woman 
Compared to Inas al-Daghaydi, Nadia Hamza is a more activist, albeit a 
less popularly known, director. Yet, she was the first female director 
after a long disappearance of women in this field: her film Bahr al-
Awham/Sea of Illusions of 1984 was the first film directed by a woman 
since the pioneers of the 20s through 40s. Nadia Hamza, contrary to al-
Daghaydi, calls herself a feminist filmmaker and associates herself 
with the genre of women films (sīnimā al-mar’a), arguing that directors 
should stop depicting women how society wants them to be, but rather 
as they are, opposing the popular image of the morally superior 
heroines in many Egyptian melodramas (Hillauer 2005: 86). Many of 
the films feature female leads and a few are autobiographic, usually 
with a heroine named after herself. Hamza’s films can be read as 
empowering to women – as working women and single mothers who 
have to go through great lengths to ensure their children’s upbringing 
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or assert their position in a man-dominated workplace, not 
accidentally also the director’s own reality as a woman in the male-
dominated film industry. 
The current film, A Woman and A Woman, is – as the title suggests – 
about two women; one is the upper class, educated and wealthy actress 
Nadia (played by Safiyya al-‘Imari, 1949-), the other is the lower class, 
uneducated, unmannered and pregnant Muna (Dilal ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 
1960-). Nadia takes an emotional stance toward the seemingly helpless 
Muna, who claims her husband left her as soon as he heard she was 
pregnant. Eventually Nadia will take Muna in, against the advice of her 
personal assistant, while also upsetting Nadir, the man who loves her 
and has been waiting to marry her until she herself is ready for it. 
When Muna gives birth to a girl, she calls her Nadia as well, ultimately 
creating a bond between the two women and the newborn. Muna soon 
starts to abuse Nadia’s love for the child and, as it turns out, Muna had 
been lying about her past: her husband is a not too wealthy taxi driver 
whom she had left for a career in cinema. Nadia Sr. is powerless now 
that the girl is born; she will do anything in order to keep Muna and 
Nadia Jr. in her home. 
It is not a coincidence that there are essentially three Nadia’s in this 
film: Nadia Sr., Nadia Jr., as well as the director herself, Nadia Hamza, 
which makes the film partly autobiographic. Malek Khoury mentions 
that modernist self-reflexivity is one of the characteristics of New Arab 
Cinema (Khoury 2005: 15-6), and the director is well aware of her 
presence as a director, too. She also wants to make sure that the 
audience is conscious about her presence, which is why she makes an 
appearance as the director of a film-within-the-film. Similarly the film 
makes references to the Egyptian film industry, including a poster of 
Safiyya al-‘Imari’s earlier film on the walls (al-Sharisa/The Vicious 
Woman, by Sa‘id Saqr 1993). The role of Nadia’s servant Gamalat 
(played by the famous stage comedian ‘Aysha al-Kilani) is equally 
interesting. She too aspires a career in the cinema industry (which she 
has already in reality), although Nadia’s assistant Layla continuously 
reminds her of her unfortunate looks and silly naivety. For an 
informed audience, these constant references to the industry and its 
famous actors are comic intermezzos. 
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The film’s portrayal of the class differences between Nadia Sr. and 
Muna is initially stereotypical, with seemingly positive depictions of 
the wealthy and educated class Nadia stems from, in contrast to the 
boorish nature of the lower class Muna. On several occasions, Muna is 
ridiculed, either because of her inability to pronounce certain words, 
her lack of acting talent, or because she is generally loud and 
unrefined. Her lower class boorishness is always there, even when she 
dresses up in Nadia’s stylish clothes or when she puts on an act during 
the shooting of films. She stands in contrast to the more refined nature 
of the famous actress, singer and dancer Nadia. Muna’s class is also an 
important element in the narrative of the film, as an explanation for 
the young and aspiring woman to get out of the circle of poverty which 
she has lived in most of her life. Depicting lower class women selling 
their bodies might be an indication of the extreme desperation certain 
women feel – the need to take care of their families but also being cast 
in a rigid mould of acceptable roles for women. Another reading of the 
unfolding events is that the film is critical about Muna’s loss of 
humanity and any sense of manners. According to film critic Hasan 
Haddad (1986), Nadia Hamza has a knack for discussing matters of 
humanity and principles in her films, although ultimately her main 
focus is on women (and men) constructing their own identities and 
futures different from common perceptions in society and 
representations thereof in films. 
A Woman and a Woman suggests different roles for men and women 
in society, allowing for different masculine and feminine 
performances. The gender roles that the film reserves for men and 
women are initially recognizable: mothers pitted against vicious 
career-women, fathers against bachelors. But there is something 
unsettling. The biological mother, Muna, is not the one who takes on 
the role of a mother figure in the plot. Nadia, although cast as a 
‘provider’ in this unusual relationship because of her wealth, takes 
care of the baby. However, her excessive care for someone else’s baby 
is not totally void of self-interest, knowing that she can no longer have 
children after a faulty abortion. Muna, abusing Nadia’s willingness to 
support her, could thus be considered more masculine in her behavior 
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and attitude towards others around her, interested only in her career 
and not concerned with her daughter’s upbringing. 
Although the title suggests only two women are of importance, 
there are more women present in the film’s plot and each of them 
takes on an essential part of what are usually associated with female 
roles in society. The film suggests the need of four women performing 
all the tasks and duties which are usually associated with women. The 
director hereby points out that the tasks women do on a daily basis 
could easily be divided over several fulltime working women. Nadia Sr. 
is not only the ‘provider’ in the unusual relationship; she is also the 
caring mother, day and night. Muna, the biological mother of the 
child, performs the role of a pleasing object. As a woman, it is not only 
expected of her to be a mother, but also to simultaneously perform an 
adequate amount of femininity in order to please her husband. The 
husband has been replaced by the camera and instead she pleases the 
eye in general. Nadia’s two assistants (Layla and Gamalat) are 
responsible for the management of the household and the women’s 
careers. Generally, all these tasks are expected of women in their roles 
as mothers and wives, contributing to the economy through their 
unpaid labor at home. By dividing the labor over these four women, 
the director nevertheless makes a strong point regarding these 
idealizations in popular culture and society of women and women’s 
roles. 
Although women take the lead in both the narrative and in terms of 
screen presence, the film has a lot to say about male roles and 
masculine performances as well. Masculinity in the film is not 
automatically associated with violence and misogyny – although 
teasing with common perceptions thereof – but with compassion, 
understanding and respect for women and women’s choices. The lower 
class father figure, Farid, is not the runaway coward and brute who left 
his pregnant wife as Muna had said to Nadia. On the contrary, he is an 
understanding man and a father who does not want to create a scandal 
– neither for his wife, nor for the famous actress Nadia. Muna’s 
husband Farid and Nadia’s fiancé Nadir are both depicted not as 
masculine brutes but rather as men in touch, perhaps, with their 
feminine side. These men are portrayed as an ideal, a kind of 
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masculinity to strive for, although this does not necessarily lead to 
rewards either. In this way, the film questions men’s active role – they 
have no hand in the narrative development – as well as a presumed 
heteronormativity that is destabilized and deconstructed in the film in 
favor of the unusual women-only household. 
Furthermore, the film is more than a generalizing and stereotypical 
depiction of middle class values versus lower class uneducated brutes. 
It transcends these distinctions based on class and gender. The 
director is quoted in a leading Egyptian newspaper, saying “women’s 
characters should be represented as they are and not as society thinks 
they ought to be” (Hillauer 2005: 86). The director portrays the media’s 
insistence on women’s objectification through the ‘film within a film’, 
the scenes in which the actress Nadia Sr. performs the two opposites of 
most common roles associated with women in film: the first as an 
overly caring mother, the second as a sexy dancer and object of the 
camera’s gaze. As a consequence, Nadia’s female roles are scrutinized 
and portrayed as artificial. Through the emphasis on her on-screen 
female performances – no matter how it manifests itself – A Woman and 
a Woman betrays the performance and the mask that Nadia puts on in 
front of the camera and raises questions about gendered performances 
in film in general. 
Yet, the film is ambiguous in its portrayal of gender roles and its 
‘division of labor’ allocated to the four women in the narrative. By 
distributing the work load over several characters, the film seems to 
ignore the reality that many women – not only in Egypt or the Arab 
world at large – find themselves in. Soheir Morsy relegates the 
disinterest of researchers and policy-makers with women’s unpaid 
labor to Eurocentric definitions that distinguish between public and 
private domains, and formal and informal economies. This eventually 
leads to a trivialization of women’s work and “hides not only women’s 
domestic labour, but also their more ‘public’ contribution to the so-
called informal sector; as well as their double burden of domestic and 
non-domestic work” (Morsy 1990: 90). If the director wished to critique 
the male-dominated cinema industry that has difficulty with engaging 
and employing women, as she herself has experienced, then this 
message does not come across. It furthermore ignores the experiences 
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of other women – as actresses mainly, but also as directors – who do 
combine motherhood or a married life with their careers in cinema, 
such as Inas al-Daghaydi, Fatin Hamama, Nadia al-Gindi, and many 
more. 
On the other hand, the focus in A Woman and a Woman is on the 
emotional stress that being a woman in contemporary Egypt (the 90s) 
entails. This is a time in which women had gained a few legal rights 
such as the custody over their children (until the age of 15)28 and the 
abolishment of the police-enforced ‘house of obedience’-law.29 Both 
elements are discussed in the film, albeit through Muna’s abuse of the 
law in order to prohibit her husband from seeing their daughter. 
Furthermore, the film’s position within the larger structure of 
commercial Egyptian cinema should not be ignored. The modernist 
self-reflexive aspects of the film, successful or not, suggest that the 
director tries to convene a female point of view of what it means to be 
a woman in Egypt and a female director in a male-dominated film 
industry. Many male directors – as we have seen in earlier chapters – 
have contributed to the ‘woman question’ and through it also give 
clear markers of Egyptian male identity. Here, we get an insight from a 
woman’s point of view, stressing the emotional pressure on women 
from the part of society to concentrate on their role as mothers and 
housewives. Men’s agency is limited and heteronormativity is 
challenged in a film with a clear female authoritative voice and 
women’s omnipresence on screen. Yet, the subversion is watered 
down, as the director reinforces female gender roles as a choice 
between being a mother or a selfish ‘bitch’; there really is no other way 
to describe Muna. Perhaps the director wished to criticize the social 
                                                   
28 An amendment of the law in 2005 stipulated the right to custody for 
women until the age of 15 and the husband’s right to visit was set to three 
hours per week. 
29 The ‘house of obedience’ (bayt al-ṭā‘a) is an old law, based on a patriarchal 
understanding and abuse of Islamic principles, in which a husband can force 
his wife to return to the home, enforced by the police until 1967. The law still 
exists, but the police can no longer enforce it (Mahshour 2005: 581-2). The 
‘house of obedience’ also requires the husband to provide a room with water 





limitations on women to give up their career in favor of their 
‘traditional’ role as housewives and mothers, yet through the portrayal 
of these double-protagonist’s life choices she actually does just that 
and ignores the possibility (and reality) of being all that: a mother, a 




This last chapter has tried to contextualize representations of 
masculinity by including a specific type of female masculinity as well 
as a discussion on a few iconic films made by women directors and 
screenwriters. Gender dynamics are shown to fluctuate and change, 
and relations of power are not always and necessarily linked to gender, 
rather than class or economic power. The metanarratives of state 
ideology in these films are prominent, something which became 
particularly obvious in this chapter since it included an analysis of 
films from different eras, and as such might also be read as a general 
conclusion to this study. 
The ma‘allimāt are independent women who in their own way cope 
with their specific surroundings, constructing their identities in ways 
similar to men’s. Yet, it is mostly thanks to their status as free 
entrepreneurs that they are able to demand respect and compete with 
(mainly) men in the ḥāra. The ma‘allimāt are also examples of how 
women can sustain social bonds with men, transgressing the common 
perception of Egypt as a segregated society. The way their masculine 
performance is represented shows their ability – if appropriately 
adapted – to participate in the public arena, usually regarded as male-
dominated arenas and represented as such. Particularly these women’s 
presence in public and the way they construct their own support 
networks show how the binaries of public and private spheres, formal 
versus informal sectors, paid and unpaid labor are arbitrary. Yet, they 
are also required to perform a certain public persona, imitating what is 
perceived as ‘proper’ behavior in public, in other words, to ‘walk and 
talk like a man’. Particularly their insistence on violence – if required – 
is a somewhat disturbing perception of what is deemed manly. As 
El-Messiri demonstrates, these performances are not only popular 
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representations of the ma‘allima’s female masculinity, but they are also 
real lower class female identities. 
As Youth of a Woman showed, the exaggerated masculine and 
feminine performance of Tahiyya Carioca’s star persona as lower class 
urban woman was portrayed as undesirable. The feminine ideal is 
embodied by Shadia’s character Salwa, the middle class bourgeois 
virgin girl who has had proper education and is an exemplar of love 
and care. Yet, in the film The Ma‘allima, Tahiyya Carioca was able to 
positively portray the gada‘a and baladi woman, physically, emotionally 
and psychologically standing by her husband no matter the latter’s 
mistakes. Another positive portrayal of the ma‘allima is Sana’ Gamil’s 
performance in God Knows Best. Gada‘a and tough in public and a caring 
mother in private, her performance shows in the first place that it is 
possible for women to have a career or to work outside the home and 
having multiple responsibilities and a complex construct of identity 
beyond the usual roles layed out for women. Second, her performance 
is a positive example of an independent woman who needs no men in 
her life. Rightfully she takes pride in having been able to single-
handedly raise her child and offer her the best education money could 
buy. But her gender performance also somehow reinforces cultural 
expectations of male and female behavior in public and private 
respectively, making it once again an ambiguous read and 
perpetuating male/female, public/private binaries. 
In the second part of the chapter I have dealt with two of the most 
prolific pioneering women directors of the 80s. For these women it was 
and is not always easy to construct a female narrative in a male-
dominated industry. They nevertheless make a difference, using the 
tools at hand, sometimes therefore having to give up a more 
expressive and original criticism and resorting to what Srour (1994) 
calls a ‘conventional style’. Although male-dominated, the ‘plights of 
women’ have never been neglected in Egyptian cinema, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters. Being a man is not simply accepted as a 
marker for his identity or hegemonic rule, indeed strong criticism was 
present in many films. Still, the normative element of an idealized 
masculinity was never truly questioned, which these women directors 
have tried to do by inverting their films’ narratives. But al-Daghaydi 
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for example refuses to accept the description ‘feminist’ for her films, 
contrary to Nadia Hamza (Hillauer 2005: 84), signaling that the 
former’s films are meant solely to offer her artistic point of view on 
gender relations in society, for example the discriminatory law in 
Pardon Me, Law!, or polygamy in Dantilla from 1995 (id. 59). But it also 
means that the director does not want to associate herself entirely 
with women issues, trying to avoid a discussion on her gender as an 
integral part of her way of filmmaking. However, her presence, her 
films’ topics and female narrative authority already constitute a 
feminist act. 
The contributions of women as directors to the industry are 
important elements to continue to include a female narrative and a 
woman’s point of view on not only gender relations, but society as a 
whole, with the potential for more equal representations of men and 
women. Nadia Hamza’s film sets out to do just that, with 
unconventional male performances and representations of female-
dominated households. In a way, her film tries to make gender 
relations more equal, and challenge our common perceptions of those 
relations. The director’s known history in filmmaking discussing 
matters of humanity and principles stand out in this film as well. But 
ultimately her project remains ambiguous in its representation of 
masculine and feminine identities, linking Muna’s boorish nature and 
unprincipled character to her lower class background and Nadia Sr.’s 
refinement to her upper class upbringing and lifestyle. Furthermore, 
the director ambiguously divides women’s labor in the film over 
multiple characters, ignoring the reality of many women of being 
more than either a mother or a career woman, but being all this at 
once. Nevertheless, her film is in any case a refreshing look on 
stereotypical depictions of men and women in Egyptian cinema, 









Masculinity, for a long time taken for granted, has been proven to be 
all but natural, stable or normative. Since Connell’s assertion of 
multiple masculinities and the power relations that work between 
them (and between femininities), masculinity is no longer considered 
as a set of traits that some men might possess and others not, although 
specific traits are certainly considered more masculine than others. 
Masculinities are as much the result of power relations fluctuating in a 
historical space and time, creating changing and sometimes 
contradictory hegemonic masculinities, to make meaning of our 
everyday lives in a gendered system based on heteronormative 
binaries. But masculine identities are also subject to change, for 
example through mediated images of men and masculinities 
promoting certain types of men as hegemonic, portraying others as 
marginalized or subversive. Yet, when it comes to Arab men, popular 
discourse often restricted them to narrow and stereotypical notions of 
masculinity and manliness, particularly in Western media. A racialized 
discourse grounded in an orientalist and paternalist stance toward the 
Arab world continued to depict Arab men as violent, misogynist, 
homophobic, extremist and problematic, not giving them the same 
scholarly ‘treatment’ as Western men. 
Arab men’s hypervisibility in popular (Western) media was for me a 
starting point to investigate popular representations of Arab 
(Egyptian) men in one of the largest film industries of the Middle East 
and North Africa. Egypt’s film industry has shaped popular 
conceptions of Arab men and masculinity across the Arab world, 
particularly in the 1940s through 60s when the country was a major 
cultural center in the region. Also in more recent decades the industry 
has continued to produce popular images of Arab and Egyptian men. 
Although the films were and are in the first place aimed at a local 
market, contributing to the creation of a national, Egyptian, identity. 
The images that the industry presented – as we have seen – were and 
are varied. Melodramatic realist films from the 50s and 60s conveyed a 
new discourse on gender relations in ‘Abd al-Nasir’s socialist Egypt. 
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Emphasizing on the one hand the rural peasant who was the victim of 
an unjust feudal monarchy, and on the other hand the modern, 
educated, middle class male, Egyptian films from the period after the 
independence in 1952 constructed male (and female) identities that 
would form the backbone for the nation’s ideal of progress and social 
equality. 
In a time when gender relations were part of a public debate in the 
50s and 60s, women gained more rights in the public space, to vote, to 
study and to work. This rethinking of gender relations in the public 
sphere was not accompanied by more personal freedom for women 
within the family, however. Many films did represent these 
incongruities between the private and public spheres, though 
heralding in the first place the progress women had supposedly made 
in the fields of work outside the home. Ideal men were also part of the 
representational politics: men who respect women and do not abuse 
patriarchal notions of gender difference – often abusing religion and 
tradition in the process – in order to curb women’s freedom of 
movement. These men, types like the ma‘allim, occasionally portrayed 
by Farid Shawqi or ‘Adli Kasib, were depicted as brutes and in need of a 
proper ‘education’ in order to become valued citizens and be part of a 
well-oiled and functioning society. But, in the aftermath of the 1967 
war, the myths of modernity were exposed and the messages of social 
progress espoused by the media’s intentional ‘development realism’ 
(Abu-Lughod 2005: 81) were no longer welcomed, nor desired. The 
ideal images of men and women were now under scrutiny, and the film 
industry too would bring messages of Egyptian men and women as 
flawed, defeated, without direction, at a loss. 
The 70s epitomized on the new discourses of social crisis, not only 
for society as a whole but also for men and in women in particular. The 
message was clear: men in the 70s were either victims of the missed 
opportunities of the former regime, or they were able to adapt 
themselves and appropriate the new ideals of materialism and 
consumerism under the veneer of a ‘modern lifestyle’. Men were well-
groomed and a dominant position was occupied by the businessman, a 
successful and wealthy man capable of providing for his family. 
Notions of romantic love were no longer the outcome, although they 
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continued to be idealized: defying the hegemonic businessman was the 
(marginalized) ideal of the educated professional, the true object of 
desire of the abused women in the films, such as the future doctor or 
engineer, not coincidentally professions that could assist in 
constructing the country’s prosperous future as they used to do in the 
50s and 60s. Although Bouzid (1995: 245) claimed the commercial 
nature of Egypt’s industry caused its potential for a ‘new cinema’ to 
succumb to the same commercial patterns during the 1970s, films from 
this period offered insights into the destruction rather than 
construction of the male as a national subject, as father, husband, 
soldier or worker. 
The role strain men experienced was extended to their ‘inner 
selves’ of men as providers. The expectations society had (and 
continues to have) of men had not changed, yet the possibility to live 
up to them was increasingly problematic. In the 80s, films longed for 
stability, security and social equality embodied by the masculine ideal 
of the futuwwa. But, with a return to more ‘realist’ filmmaking – 
including more realistic portrayals of men and women opposed to the 
ideal images of the 50s and 60s – the men performing this ideal 
masculinity are flawed and continue to be so at the conclusion of the 
films. The anti-heroes, lower middle class men coping with the dire 
economic situation and aiming for a ‘better’ lifestyle and financial 
security, are equally flawed. Their patriarchal control is under threat, 
unable to live up to their work ethic as providers or to take care of 
their family. Their central role at home and in public is scrutinized, 
even more so in films made by female directors. 
Throughout the history of the film industry, the concept of an 
‘ideal’ masculinity, whether as secular, educated middle class in the 
50s and 60s, as student and educated professional in the 70s or as 
providers and family men in the 80s and 90s, was never far away. The 
question was rather how the films dealt with the issue of a normative 
masculinity: was it portrayed positively as heroes and successful men, 
or negatively as an unattainable ideal? The films with female 
masculinities transgressed the spatial boundaries often associated with 
the feminine and the masculine, the domestic and the public 
respectively. The women impersonating the tough ma‘allima were 
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nothing short of both masculine and feminine, practically 
simultaneously. Their roles as women were not denied to them, and 
their masculine performances were truthful and respected by their 
surroundings. These independent women do encounter difficulties, yet 
their financial independence also creates possibilities for them. As 
such, both class and patriarchy – in the form of structural 
discrimination of certain men and women in favor of others, both men 
and women – play important roles in the resulting position of power 
these women assert for themselves. 
Women directors created other opportunities for the 
representation of men and women as of the 80s. Not necessarily in 
terms of new sex roles, women were already portrayed as mothers, 
working women, professionals and students, but more in terms of a 
truthful depiction of men and women in their respective roles while 
critically approaching women’s position in the private sphere. The 
women were not ideal images of women, as often portrayed by 
actresses like Fatin Hamama, nor were the men per se ideals – no 
matter how often men had to be ‘educated’ into proper citizens in 
previous eras. Both men and women were portrayed more genuinely 
and the gender relations between them more equally. Further, women 
directors assert a female narrative voice, limiting the male narrative in 
their films and storylines. Yet, we have also seen that women’s 
narratives were often the primary narrative in earlier films not 
necessarily only those made by female directors, limiting male agency, 
but also restricting women to mothering roles as sturdy and ideal 
bases on which the family’s and the nation’s foundations can be 
constructed. 
To conclude, the most recent period in Egyptian filmmaking is 
witnessing a return to patriarchal domination; a paternalist ideal is 
reinstituted as a way of creating order in the country’s chaos. Several 
actors, mainly Tamer Hosny and Ahmad al-Saqqa have made 
paternalism their trademark masculinity, controlling not only women 
but also younger men condescendingly. Tamer Hosny’s 2013 song, with 
American rapper Snoop Dogg, entitled Si Al Sayed is representative of 
his masculinity: a controlling patriarch and misogynist, locking his 
girlfriend up in a room surrounded by windows, while he is having a 
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pool party with scantily clad women and his new ‘pal’, Snoop Dogg. 
Unfortunately, this song did not cause a stir similar to Robin Thicke’s 
misogynist ode to rape, Blurred Lines, from the summer of 2013. Both 
Hosny’s and al-Saqqa’s masculine performances on the screen are 
riddled with violence and a continuous performance of their 
muscularity. The emphasis on their body, their muscles and (in the 
case of Hosny) machoism puts these men in a contradictory position. 
Their bodies are objects of desire, and homosocial bonding between 
the men is not uncommon, yet the desire falls safely within the 
constraints of “sites for the performance of masculinity” (Tasker 2002: 
236). Next to the si sayyid ‘modern patriarchs’ is the baltagi, the 
unemployed lower class male in films from the last decade. The politics 
of representation of these young unemployed men, as burdens, or as 
drug addicted violent criminals, is suggestive of a discourse of ‘balṭaga’ 
in Egypt’s media as general framework to talk about lower class men. 
Apart from the different types that Egyptian cinema has never 
failed to show us, and occasionally its scorn of hard-boiled 
masculinities favoring instead the soft-hearted educated professionals, 
the industry is influenced by and has contributed to popular images of 
an ideal, ahistorical interpretation of masculinity as a norm. We have 
seen how these ideals have changed over time, in their outer 
appearance, in their behavior or psychology. The differences are huge, 
pointing at the actual different possibilities for lived experiences of 
‘being a man’ in Egypt. Yet, in the background there has always been a 
tacit approval of masculine domination, together with an expectation 
of men naturally inclined to lead. Certain traits are coded as masculine 
through their association with masculine performances – whether 
performed by men or women – resulting in the denunciation of certain 
other traits which are relegated to a private sphere, veiled as it were. I 
would not explain this in terms of shame, but rather as the result of a 
binary of masculine versus feminine mannerisms with each their own 
space in which they are meaningful. The figure of the ma‘allima has 
been able to transgress the imagined public-private binary, pointing 
out the possibility for women (and men) to occupy both spaces 
simultaneously and successfully. Nevertheless, the assumption 
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remains that certain gender performances are expected in public or in 
private, depicted positively as ideal male and female behavior. 
 
The future of representations of gender identities is sometimes 
depressingly negative, in such films as the Baltaxploitation-films with 
popular actor Muhammad Ramadan who has so far made several 
similar films and TV-serials set in lower class neighborhoods, 
impersonating a lower class unemployed character, the baltagi. His 
character, imbibed with violence and criminality, is not exactly an 
ideal type to look up to for young men and women alike. Yet, his 
popularity seems to indicate otherwise, in part due to his films’ 
recognizable plot developments of a rebellious young man who was 
wronged by an unwelcoming class society looking down on him. 
Instead, the upheld ideal masculinity is impersonated by paternalist 
men, such as the Hosny’s and al-Saqqa’s, controlling the lives and 
whereabouts of others, an attitude veiled by their protective nature 
and their condescending knowledge of the dangers of society and what 
is good for their ‘ignorant’ inferiors, notably women and younger men. 
Yet, other actors impersonate more positive images of men and 
masculinity, such as Khalid Abu al-Naga and Asir Yasin. Their 
performances are not limited to violence; instead they are men 
portraying respect and love for women without being controlling or 
paternalist. Since the revolution, their films have not reached high box 
office results, however, giving way for the Baltaxploitation-films 
instead. Furthermore, their films are not entirely void of a certain 
bourgeois arrogance towards what is deemed unwanted masculine 
behavior, often resulting in popular disapproval of their on-screen 
performances. 
Simultaneously, the first years after the revolution saw productions 
such as Hatuli Ragil/Get Me a Man (Muhammad Shakir Khudayr 2013) in 
which an imaginary world of upside down gender relations was 
presented. Women took on roles of men in society, such as taxi drivers, 
police officers, and even criminal gang leaders. Men, on the other 
hand, were confined to the home and required to protect theirs and 
their family’s honor. Another male character in the film was a 
prostitute. Apart from the stereotypical representations and roles for 
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men and women – reversed – the film offered the possibility to 
question the nature of men’s and women’s work, stating that in a 
parallel universe it might as well have been the other way around. But 
there is also some sort of nostalgia to a ‘normal’ gender order in the 
film, with a return to masculine domination and a proper, 
heteronormative, division of genders and sexualities. For example, in 
the fictive world of the film dominated by women, the resolutions to 
problems that pose themselves to the characters eventually lie in the 
hands of men who are able to heroically reclaim their masculinity. 
The future for masculinities and men on the screen in Egypt lies 
unequivocally in the hands of young people. Some might be pessimistic 
about the prospect, quoting such paternalist types as portrayed by 
Tamer Hosny and, to a lesser extent, Ahmad al-Saqqa or Muhammad 
Ramadan, who also enjoys a rebellious air because of his young age. 
Personally I am less pessimistic, since the film industry has always 
shown relative leniency towards different representations while it has 
never failed to break taboos, however disguised it was at times. 
Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the paternalist take in Egyptian media, 
from films to TV-serials and other mass media which have always 
referred to Egyptians as ‘sons and daughters’ of the nation. While 
official rhetoric claims to ‘protect’ the nation through images of a 
population at a loss and in need of decisive leadership, a different 
reading might be that of the rape of the nation. This allegorical rape by 
the different regimes and the army at the forefront – which 
occasionally turns real when certain army generals condone virginity 
checks – needs to stop and Egyptians must be allowed to take 
responsibility in their own hands without being fooled by such 
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Appendix 1: Nederlandse samenvatting 
 
Onderzoek naar “mannen en mannelijkheden” in de Arabische regio is 
relatief beperkt, met slechts onregelmatig een interesse van 
onderzoekers voor dit onderwerp. Gender studies in het Midden-
Oosten en Noord-Afrika blijven hoofdzakelijk aandacht besteden aan 
vrouwen. Desalniettemin wordt er onder ‘gender’ verstaan dat het 
over meer dan alleen vrouwen gaat. In de praktijk vinden we echter 
weinig terug over Egyptische en Arabische mannelijkheden en 
mannen. 
Dit gebrek is deels te verklaren door de interessegebieden van de 
discipline van gender studies in de regio, een discipline die vooral 
interesse heeft in de sociale, economische en wettelijke kaders die 
genderrelaties bepalen in de regio. In deze zin besteedt ze dus vooral 
aandacht aan de discriminatie die vrouwen ondervinden, maar ook aan 
de positieve aspecten zoals vrouwen (en mannen) die proberen om 
gender relaties gelijker te maken, en formele en informele structuren 
opbouwen om veranderingen door te kunnen voeren. Een groot gebrek 
is de veronderstelling dat – gezien de regio zogezegd lijdt onder een 
strikt patriarchale maatschappij – mannen zich per definitie in een 
bevoordeelde positie bevinden. Deniz Kandiyoti (1994) heeft haar eigen 
veronderstellingen moeten bijstellen zodra ze aandacht begon te 
besteden aan mannelijkheden en mannen, met name in haar artikel 
The Paradoxes of Masculinity, waarin ze stelt dat patriarchale structuren 
een ongelijkheid creëren die ook invloed heeft op mannen en 
mannelijke identiteit. Bovendien kan men zich vragen stellen bij de 
definitie die aan patriarchie in de regio wordt gegeven, zoals Mervat 
Hatem (1987) heeft gedaan, en de bruikbaarheid ervan om sociale 
relaties te verklaren. Hatem argumenteert dat niet alleen patriarchie, 
verstaan als een systeem dat sommige mannen privileges geeft over 
vrouwen en andere mannen, maar ook klasse een belangrijk onderdeel 
zijn om de sociale structuur, waar genderrelaties onder vallen, te 
bestuderen en te deconstrueren. 
Dankzij de ontwikkeling van men studies in de Angelsaksische 
wereld, en met name de theorie van hegemonische mannelijkheid van 
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Connell (1987), wordt er recentelijk ook meer aandacht besteed aan de 
ervaringen van mannen en de constructie van mannelijkheden op een 
globaal niveau en in specifiek niet-Westerse contexten. Door gebruik 
te maken van Connell en te erkennen dat mannelijkheid geen stabiele 
entiteit is of was, werp ik in deze studie licht op een van de lacunes 
binnen de studie van mannen in het Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika, 
namelijk over hoe mannelijke identiteit wordt geconstrueerd in 
populaire cultuur in Egypte, en meer specifiek in Egyptische cinema. 
De hoofdvraag die mij bezighield aan het begin van het onderzoek 
was rechttoe rechtaan: hoe worden mannen afgebeeld in populaire 
Egyptische films? Deze vraag bracht echter een aantal belangrijke 
subvragen met zich mee, gerelateerd aan identiteit, nationaliteit, 
ethniciteit, gender, klasseverschillen, en generatieconflicten. In de 
loop van het onderzoek verschoof de aandacht ook steeds meer en 
meer van het ‘hoe’ naar het ‘waarom’, met aandacht voor diezelfde 
onderdelen die deel uitmaken van onze dagelijkse uitvoering, of 
‘performance’ (Goffman 1990),1 van onze identiteit. Vandaar dat dit 
onderzoek in de eerste plaats historisch is, om na te gaan hoe en 
waarom op bepaalde momenten in de recente geschiedenis van Egypte 
(sinds 1952) bepaalde types mannen en een bepaalde mannelijkheid – 
of mannelijkheden – in staat waren zich te ontwikkelen en een 
hegemonische positie in te nemen. 
Maar we kunnen hegemonische mannelijkheden niet alleen 
beschouwen als iets dat zich in een vacuüm heeft kunnen ontwikkelen 
tot een zogenaamde essentie. Integendeel, hegemonie is niet iets dat 
we volledig in de hand hebben, maar eerder een resultaat van 
machtsrelaties die zich ontwikkeld hebben en die constant 
verschuiven en aangepast worden. In die zin kan hegemonische 
mannelijkheid tegenstrijdig zijn, zoals de ouder wordende leider die 
tegelijkertijd voordelen geniet als man en als leider, maar ook de 
gevolgen ondervindt van het ouder worden waarmee allerlei 
uitdagingen gepaard gaan. Hegemonische mannelijkheid is een 
abstracte entiteit en, zoals Connell (1987) ook stelt, in alle 
                                                   
1 Ik heb er voor gekozen om in de Nederlandse samenvatting ook het Engelse 
‘performance’  te gebruiken gezien de Nederlandse vertaling (uitvoering) niet 
dezelfde betekenis met zich meedraagt. 
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waarschijnlijkheid niet eens de meest voorkomende vorm in de 
werkelijkheid. Bovendien kunnen er meer dan een hegemonische 
mannelijkheid tegelijkertijd bestaan in deze globale wereld, met lokale 
varianten of competitie tegenover de globale hegemonie van, 
bijvoorbeeld, businessmannen. De reële ervaringen van mannen 
kunnen zeer verschillend zijn van het ideaalbeeld dat hen voorgelegd 
wordt, een ideaalbeeld dat kan veranderen net zo goed als dat hoe 
mannen hun mannelijkheid beleven onderhevig is aan allerlei 
factoren. 
In dit onderzoek heb ik dus ook rekening moeten houden met de 
context waarin de films werden en worden geproduceerd en 
geconsumeerd. Stuart Hall’s Representation (1997) is een goed startpunt 
voor de studie van representaties en hoe betekenis wordt 
overgedragen, getransformeerd en gereproduceerd. Representatie, een 
Nederlandse vertaling van het Engelse representation brengt te veel 
onduidelijkheid met zich mee en legt te veel nadruk op degene die het 
uitvoert (in dit geval de filmindustrie zelf), is het proces waarbij een 
boodschap op een betekenisvolle manier wordt overgedragen en wordt 
begrepen (Hall 1997: 10). Hierdoor is het dus bijzonder belangrijk om 
de context waarin de films worden geproduceerd en geconsumeerd in 
de analyse te verwerken, aangezien films ook niet in een vacuüm 
worden geproduceerd, gecodificeerd en geconsumeerd. 
Een essentieel onderdeel voor de analyse van mannelijke 
‘performances’ in films is de studie van sterren (Dyer 1998). Sterren, 
zoals Dyer zegt, creëren verwachtingen in het publiek met hun 
specifieke en gekende ‘performance’, hun karaktertypes. Tegelijkertijd 
spreken sterren ons aan omdat ze ons op het gemak stellen door hun 
‘alledaagsheid’ maar ook onze aandacht trekken met hun glamoureuze 
leven en hun ‘performances’ van ideale mannelijk- en vrouwelijkheid. 
Hierdoor nemen sterren een belangrijke plaats in in de studie van 
mannelijke ‘performances’ en brengen ze een hele resem aan 
betekenissen en kenmerken met zich mee. Bijgevolg bepalen ze ook 
hoe de betekenis van een mannelijke ‘performance’ wordt 
gecommuniceerd naar het publiek toe, hoe individuele kijkers er 
betekenis in lezen en hoe ze de publieksreacties beïnvloeden dankzij 
hun speciale status als “Ster”. 
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De analyse van de films heeft aangetoond dat mannelijkheden in 
Egypte, zoals ze voorgesteld worden op het witte scherm door sterren, 
verre van eenzijdig zijn. De diversiteit in representaties op het scherm 
over de loop van de afgelopen decennia, maar ook binnen een bepaald 
tijdperk, en zelfs binnen een en dezelfde film, toont aan dat het 
concept ‘mannelijkheid’ helemaal niet zo stabiel is als het op het eerste 
gezicht lijkt. De verschillende paradigma’s van mannelijkheden (Spicer 
2001), culturele types die niet per se specifiek gebonden zijn aan een 
periode maar ook in aangepaste vorm kunnen terugkeren in latere 
periodes, zijn uitingen van mogelijke belevingen van een mannelijke 
identiteit. 
Deze paradigma’s vormen de basis van dit onderzoek waarrond de 
analyse is opgebouwd. Dat ik paradigma’s gebruik betekent echter niet 
dat er geen ruimte is voor verschil binnen een paradigma; ook hier 
kunnen er verschillen te zien zijn al naargelang de specifieke en 
persoonlijke ‘uitvoering’ (performance) door de ster in kwestie en door 
het narratief, de interactie met andere acteurs en met de regisseur. De 
belangrijkste paradigma’s die aan bod komen in het onderzoek, dat 
een tijdsspanne heeft van na 1952 tot ruwweg 2011, zijn de ma‘allim, de 
nationale held, de ‘overwonnen mannen’, de consumptieman, de anti-
held, de futuwwa, de rebel, en de ‘nieuwe man’.2 Daarnaast heb ik ook 
een paradigma van vrouwelijke mannelijkheid bestudeerd zoals die 
voorgesteld wordt in het type van de ma‘allima. Een apart deel van het 
laatste hoofdstuk behandelt bovendien twee films van twee 
verschillende vrouwelijke regisseurs, met als doel vast te stellen hoe 
twee nieuwe ‘pionieren’ uit de jaren 80 man-vrouw relaties 
voorstellen. 
Een rode draad die door het hele onderzoek loopt, is het feit dat, 
hoewel mannelijkheid verschillend kan uitgebeeld en geapprecieerd 
worden, er toch steeds een neiging is om mannen en een begrensd en 
ahistorisch mannelijk ideaalbeeld als essentie te beschouwen. 
                                                   
2 Voor sommige van de types hier heb ik gekozen voor een Arabische 
benaming, ook in het Nederlands (en in het verdere onderzoek). De ma‘allim – 
de Egyptische uitspraak van het woord – is een titel voor een lagere klasse 
winkeleigenaar, handelaar, of zelfstandige. De futuwwa is een klassiek 




Sommige mannen kunnen hun gender identiteit gebagatelliseerd zien 
worden, terwijl anderen hun ‘performance’ als ideaal kunnen 
voorgesteld zien. Maar de essentie blijft bestaan, namelijk dat een man 
als een standvaste steun wordt gezien,  gewoon in zijn hoedanigheid 
als deel uitmakend van de mannelijke sexe. Niet alleen dient een man 
standvast te zijn, het ideaal is ook heteronormatief. Afhankelijk van de 
periode waarin de films werden gemaakt, worden gender relaties 
tussen mannen en vrouwen verschillend afgebeeld. Maar een van de 
conclusies van het onderzoek is dat er van uitgegaan wordt dat er een 
essentieel verschil tussen mannen en vrouwen is en dat elk met een 
duidelijk afgebakend doel deel uitmaakt van de maatschappij. 
Hoe deze maatschappij er dient uit te zien, is ook onderdeel van 
discussie in de analyses. Uit mijn onderzoek blijkt dat de films uit de 
eerste twee decennia na de onafhankelijkheid waren beïnvloed door en 
bijdroegen aan een officiële, modernistische retoriek en door een door 
de middenklasse geïnspireerd discours over hoe het nieuwe, moderne, 
Egypte er uit diende te zien. De latere decennia, en vooral sinds de 
oorlog van 1967, waren minder ideologisch beladen en stelden de 
vroegere positieve houding tegenover moderniteit, zoals die werd 
gedefiniëerd, in vraag. Wat de films echter niet in vraag stelden, waren 
de ‘codes of modernity’ (Armbrust 1995). Deze codes – antitheses van 
moderniteit en traditie, of van Westers kolonialisme en nationalisme 
die naar het einde van de film een emulgane synthese opleverden – 
bleven van toepassing om de wereld rondom zich te verklaren, uit te 
beelden, en de boodschap over te dragen aan een Egyptisch publiek. 
Vanaf de jaren 70 en vooral het daaropvolgende decennium zouden 
deze antitheses geen synthese meer bieden die een betere toekomst 
aankondigt. Vanaf ’67 werden ze geproblematiseerd en bekritiseerd, 
maar maakten ze dus wel nog steeds deel uit van een cultureel 
‘systeem’ om betekenis te creëren voor een publiek dat gewend was 
aan deze codes. 
In recentere films spelen deze antitheses geen al te grote rol meer. 
Er worden af en toe nog postmoderne toespelingen op gemaakt, 
bijvoorbeeld door verwijzingen naar de grote iconen uit de ‘klassieke’ 
periode (de jaren 60) alsook door gebruik te maken van filmische genre 
conventies, maar daar blijft het bij. De verwijzingen naar deze 
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conventies en iconen staan in een postmoderne zin los van hun 
culturele en historische achtergrond. Bovendien hebben mannen ook 
weer een hegemonische positie bemachtigd, na de desastreuze jaren 
’70 die initieel gekenmerkt waren door het verlies in de oorlog van ’67. 
Bijgevolg werden de oorzaken van dit verlies voor Arabische landen en 
regeringen besproken in films uit deze periode, met voorstellingen van 
een ‘overwonnen mannelijkheid’, doelloos en in crisis. 
De jaren 80 vertoonden nog stuiptrekkingen van een mannelijkheid 
in crisis-discours, een discours dat ervan uitging dat een terugkeer 
naar morele waarden – belichaamd door een ideaal, maar menselijk 
manbeeld, de futuwwa zoals Nagib Mahfuz hem beschreef – stabiliteit 
met zich mee zou brengen. Tegelijkertijd merken we in de films van de 
jaren 80 ook de mythe, zoals Viola Shafik het beschreef, van de ‘fat 
cats’ (Shafik 2007), die de angst uitdrukte van de middenklasse voor de 
lagere klasses die de sociale ladder beklommen maar niet het cultureel 
kapitaal van de middenklasse met zich meebrachten. 
De jaren 90 en vooral het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw kenden 
een radicale terugkeer naar patriarchale normen waarbij mannen – en 
eigenlijk meestal één man geholpen door een mannelijke ‘buddy’ – het 
scherm vullen. Deze ‘nieuwe mannen’ zijn enkel nieuw in hun 
Westerse kledij en levensstijl, maar zijn de absolute tegenpool van 
gelijkheid. Daarnaast komt het beeld op van de rebelse, doch ‘verloste’ 
mannen, die, ondanks hun onderdrukte positie als lagere klasse, ook 
elementen bezitten van deze eeuwige mannelijkheid: (‘de man’ als) 
vasthoudend aan zijn woord, beschermend, voorziend. De 
tegenstrijdigheid in de beleving van hun mannelijke identiteit zit hem 
wederom in de twee concepten patriarchie en klasse. Als man kunnen 
ze met geweld hun positie innemen, maar als lagere klasse komt hun 
mannelijke identiteit in gevaar langs allerlei fronten, meer bepaald 
omdat ze als jongere en (occasioneel) als ‘crimineel’ afgebeeld worden 
als een probleem, wat ons dan weer tot de tweede conclusie brengt. 
Een tweede belangrijke bevinding van dit onderzoek, is het concept 
‘crisis’ en hoe het in elk decennium in een nieuwe vorm terugkomt. 
Mannelijkheid, afgebeeld als een norm, is een moeilijk, zo niet 
onmogelijk, te bereiken ideaal. Doorheen de jaren hebben de films dit 
ideaalbeeld verschillend afgebeeld, doch een aantal essentiële 
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kenmerken blijven terugkomen die voor de mannelijke protagonisten 
in de films steeds een soort van les is, die hun weg zoeken in de 
(fictieve) wereld en zo de perfecte balans proberen te vinden. Maar de 
crisis die ervaren wordt om hun mannelijkheid ‘correct’ te kunnen 
beleven – en dit is vooral het geval in films vanaf de jaren ’70 – 
verlangt tegelijkertijd een soort veronderstelling van een mannelijke 
essentie. 
Hoe deze ideale essentie wordt geïnterpreteerd en voorgesteld, 
hangt af van het tijdperk waarin de films zijn gemaakt. In de jaren 50 
en 60 zijn dit vooral de opgeleide, zachte doch charismatische mannen. 
In de jaren 70 zijn dit de outdoorsmannen op zoek naar hun ‘natuur’ 
en mannen die vrouwen gelijk en met respect behandelen. In de jaren 
’80 grijpen filmmakers dan weer terug naar een vereeuwigd ideaal, de 
futuwwa, waarbij mannelijkheid ook geassocieerd wordt met geweld en 
controle en gezien wordt als een factor die stabiliteit kan brengen in 
een chaotische wereld. In de jaren 90 en vooral vanaf het nieuwe 
millenium zijn er nieuwe mannen bijgekomen die tegelijkertijd hip en 
trendy zijn, maar ook hun mannelijkheid vorm geven door een 
terugkeer naar een patriarchaal idealisme, zoals strikt mannelijke 
controle, geweld en een geveinsd respect voor vrouwen en kinderen 
(die doelbewust op één lijn worden gezet). Tegelijkertijd wordt de 
crisis die mannen beleven in deze recente periode voorgesteld als een 
crisis afkomstig van de maatschappij, een crisis die ze niet in handen 
hebben en enkel op lijken te kunnen lossen door een terugkeer naar 
een mannelijke essentie van kracht en geweld, hun lichamen als enige 
site waar ze nog zelf beslissingen over kunnen nemen. 
De films in dit onderzoek hebben allemaal op hun eigen manier 
aangetoond dat een ‘gender performance’ geen eenzijdige, stabiele en 
biologisch geconditioneerde zaak is.  Dat gezegd zijnde, een derde 
belangrijke bevinding in dit onderzoek is het feit dat het concept 
mannelijkheid gedefinieerd wordt in essentialistische termen. Het 
wordt beschouwd als een stabiele identiteit waar mannen (en in 
sommige gevallen vrouwen) naar zouden moeten streven. 
Mannelijkheid is positief, het creëert de illusie van stabiliteit en 
zekerheid, van veiligheid, individualiteit en onafhankelijkheid. Deze 
ideale mannelijkheid ligt echter niet zomaar voor het grijpen. 
302 
 
Integendeel, het is enkel beschikbaar voor de beste mannen, diegene 
die in staat zijn het strikte arbeidsregime rigoureus na te leven. Het is 
als een opgave, een zware taak die leidinggevende mannen op zich 
nemen. Dit kwam expliciet aan bod in de futuwwa-films, maar impliciet 
ook in eerdere en latere films, door de tegenstrijdigheden in 
mannelijke karakters en (fictieve) identiteiten bloot te stellen, weg te 
werken, en een nieuw ideaal voor te stellen. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit onderzoek is dan weer toegewijd aan 
vrouwelijke mannelijkheden, vrouwen die mannelijke kenmerken (in 
gedrag en eventueel kledij, niet per sé lichamelijk) vertonen. 
Halberstam (1998) heeft mannelijke ‘performances’ geanaliseerd zoals 
die door vrouwen worden uitgevoerd. Hij stelde de link in vraag tussen 
het mannelijke lichaam en zijn sociaal-politieke effect, waardoor 
impliciet verondersteld wordt dat mannelijkheid een gevolg is van 
‘man zijn’. Door vrouwelijke mannelijkheid te bestuderen, stelt 
Halberstam dat we inzicht kunnen krijgen in hoe mannelijkheid vorm 
wordt gegeven (ibid. 1). Het bekendste type in Egyptische films is de 
ma‘allima die net zoals de ma‘allim uit de lagere en werkende klasse 
komt, vaak ook een zelfstandige is, als eigenares van een winkel of een 
café. Uit de analyse blijkt dat ze een dubbele ‘gender performance’ 
kent, waarbij ze een mannelijke houding aanneemt wanneer ze zich 
bezig houdt met klanten of haar zaak, terwijl ze even goed een 
‘emphasized femininity’ (Connell 1987) uitvoert wanneer ze zich alleen 
met haar man (of tijdelijke flirt) bevindt, de illusie creërend dat deze 
man toch nog enige positie bekleedt. Deze succesvolle dubbele 
‘performance’ toont aan de ene kant aan dat mannelijkheid zeker geen 
privilege is van mannen alleen, maar aan de andere kant wordt er ook 
van uitgegaan dat een gerespecteerde publieke ‘gender performance’ 
in bepaalde situaties een imitatie moet zijn van wat algemeen 
aanschouwd wordt als ‘mannelijk’ en waaraan dus voorkeur wordt 
gegeven. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk kijk ik ook naar films die door vrouwelijke 
regisseurs zijn gemaakt in de context van de commerciële 
filmindustrie in Egypte. In hun stijl en het gebruik van genre 
conventies verschillen de films niet van die van hun mannelijke 
collega’s. In de manier waarop de narratieven zich ontwikkelen – en 
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dan rijst de vraag wiens standpunt de voorkeur krijgt – kunnen de 
films wel verschillen. Beide regisseurs die besproken worden, Inas 
al-Daghaydi en Nadia Hamza, geven hun vrouwelijke protagonistes een 
dominante narratief, en hierdoor beperken ze in essentie de 
mannelijke inbreng in de plot. De dominantie van mannen en 
mannelijkheid wordt zo in twijfel getrokken terwijl nieuwe 
mogelijkheden voor een vrouwelijke identiteit worden ontwikkeld. Een 
laatste conclusie van dit onderzoek, dankzij de films van deze 
vrouwelijke regisseurs, is dat mannelijkheid niet normatief moet zijn. 
Mannen en mannelijkheid worden hier voorgesteld als één van de vele 
mogelijkheden om een gender identiteit te beleven, als individu en 
niet als deel uitmakend van abstracte, ongedefinieerde groepen zoals 
‘mannen’ en ‘vrouwen’. 
 
Tot slot wil ik er nog aan toe voegen dat dit onderzoek bijdraagt aan 
de groeiende discipline van Midden-Oosterse Media studies, een 
discipline die vooral ook in de Angelsaksische academia aan een 
opgang bezig is. Tegelijkertijd draagt het bij aan Gender studies in het 
algemeen en hoop ik dat het een waardevolle bijdrage kan zijn voor 
Men studies die vooralsnog beperkt zijn gebleven in deze regio. Dit 
onderzoek is de start, een eerste uitgebreidere kennismaking met hoe 
mannelijke identiteiten worden uitgebeeld in een populair 
massamedium uit de Arabische regio en kan dienen voor een verdere 
uitdieping van het complexe begrip identiteit en hoe die wordt 
vormgegeven. Meer bepaald dringen zich vragen op voor een verdere 
uitdieping van het discours rond crisis en hoe dit mannelijke 
identiteiten en de ‘performance’ van mannelijkheid (in de realiteit en 
op het scherm) beïnvloedt en vorm geeft. 
